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Introduction
Dragos Calma and Evan King
University College Dublin / Newman Centre for the Study of Religions, 
Dublin
1 The Elements of Theology in the Latin West (Revisited)*
18 May 1268. An important medieval manuscript (Vat. Lat. 2419, f. 105va)1 reg-
isters this date as the last day of William of Moerbeke’s work on the first-ever 
Latin translation of Proclus’ Στοιχείωσις θεολογική (Elementatio theologica).2 
Another important manuscript confirms both the date and the translator, and 
* Dragos Calma was responsible for drafting section 1 and 3; Evan King for section 2. The sec-
tion 4 was jointly written. This research was undertaken within the framework of the erc 
research project CoG_NeoplAT 771640.
1 ms Vat. lat. 2419, f. 105va: Procly dyadochy lycii platonici phylosophi Elementatario (!) theo-
logica explicit capitulum 211. Completa fuit translatio huius operis Viterbii a fratre G⟨uillelmo⟩ 
de Morbecca ordinis fratrum predicatorum XV Kalendis Iunii anno domini millesimo 
CC°LX°octavo. The same colophon can be read in ms Cambridge, Peterhouse, 121, f. 202rb. 
Cf. L. Miolo, “Le Liber de causis et l’Elementatio theologica dans deux bibliothèques anglaises: 
Merton College (Oxford) et Peterhouse (Cambridge)”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus 
and the Book of Causes. Vol. 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates (Leiden: Brill, 2019), 
p. 120–150.
2 It is worth recalling that there are (at least) four other translations into Latin of the Elements 
of Theology: one by Franciscus Patricius (Procli Lycii diadochi platonici philosophi eminentis-
simi Elementa theologica, et physica opus omnis admiratione prosequendum, Ferrara, Apud 
Dominicum Mamarellum, 1583); one by Aemilius Portus, who published it together with 
the Greek text, preceded by the bilingual (Latin-Greek) texts of the Theologia platonica and 
Marinus’ Vita, and followed by the 55 Conclusiones on the Elements by Pico della Mirandola 
(Procli successoris platonici philosophi Institutio Theologica quae continet capita 211 [Hamburg: 
Apud Rulandios, 1618], p. 415–502). The bilingual edition and translation of Aemilius Portus 
is reprinted (with adjustments) and dedicated to Hegel by F. Creuzer in 1823 (Frankfurt a.M.: 
In officina Broenneriana). One should also consider that the Elements is extensively cited by 
Nicholas of Methone in his Refutation, which was translated into Latin twice: by an anony-
mous translator from the sixteenth century (ms Milan, Ambr. Lat., P 63) and by Bonaventura 
Vulcanius (d. ca. 1614), the autograph being preserved in ms Leiden, b.p.l., 47. Marsilio Ficino 
famously claimed that he translated the Elements, but there is no clear evidence for it. On 
this topic see D. Robichaud, “Fragments of Marsilio Ficino’s Translations and Use of Proclus’ 
Elements of Theology and Elements of Physics: Evidence and Study”, in Vivarium 54/1(2016), 
p. 46–107; S.-A. Kiosoglou, “Notes on the Presence of the Elements of Theology in Ficino’s 
Commentary on the Philebus”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. 
Vol. 2. Translations and Acculturations (Leiden: Brill, 2020), p. 391–403.
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adds: the fourth year of the Pontificate of Clement iv.3 The manuscript, offered 
to the above-mentioned Pope, was copied in Moerbeke’s inner circle most 
probably in the late 1270s.4 It contains the Book of Causes and the Elements 
of Theology, copied one after the other, which shows that Aquinas’ exquisite 
proof of the relationship between the two texts was already accepted, although 
it is not unusual to find that his arguments were often reduced to clichés: the 
medieval scribes either attributed the Book of Causes to Proclus or simply 
mistook it with the Elements of Theology.5 And yet Aquinas shows, although 
rarely in explicit ways, that there are differences between the two texts.6 For 
3 ms Toledo, Biblioteca Catedral, Ms. 97–1, f. 93v: Procli diadochi licii platonici philosophi 
Elementatio theologica. Explicit. Capitula CII (!) completa fuit translatio huius operis Viterbii a 
fratre G⟨uillelmo⟩ de Morbecca ordinis fratrum predicatorum XV Kalendis Iunii anno Christi 
M°CC° sexagesimo octavo pontificatus domini Clementitis (!) Pape IIII Anno IIII.
4 Dates confirmed by Patricia Stirnemann, to whom I am grateful.
5 The manuscript Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. ca 2° 331, transmits the commen-
tary on the Book of Causes by Giles of Rome; on the guard-leaf, one reads: commentum ven-
erabilis Egidii Romani cum questionibus optimis super libro Aristotelis, but on f. 3v: Super De 
causis Procli Egidiis Romanus (by the hand who copied the text), and on f. 8v: Egidius super 
De causis Procli (by the rubricator). The unusual attributions of the Elements of Theology in 
Berlin, Staatsbibl., Ms. Lat. Fol. 568, f. 1r: Iste liber potest vocari liber de Proculi (!) Causis in 
loyca, in philosophia sive in sacra theologia vel in moralibus; f. 38r: Procli dyadochi Platonici 
philosophi Elementatio theologica explicit; and Erfurt, Universitätsbibliothek, Dep. Erf. ca 2° 
40°, f. 32a: Incipit Proclus platonicus de causis. Aquinas establishes the relationship between 
the two texts already in the prologue of his commentary. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum 
de causis Expositio, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), Prooemium, p. 3, l. 7–10: unde videtur 
ab aliquo philosophorum arabum ex praedicto libro Procli excerptus, praesertim quia omnia 
quae in hoc libro continentur, multo plenius et diffusius continentur in illo. Giles of Rome, who 
often compares these two texts independently from Aquinas, is seduced by the idea, but 
uses the Neoplatonic concept of emanation in order to describe the relationship between 
them, and thus acknowledges Aquinas’ proof: In Greco autem habentur propositiones Procli 
a quibus hee propositiones emanaverunt et sunt accepte; ut enim apparet scientibus, hic liber 
emanavit ab illo. (ms Paris, Bibliothèque nationale de France, lat. 16122, f. 2ra). The idea that 
the Book of Causes is nothing more than a shorter version of the Elements of Theology is still 
widespread in contemporary scholarship: R. Taylor deplores it in a recent paper. Cf. R. Taylor, 
“Contextualizing the Kalām  fī maḥḍ al-khair / Liber de causis”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading 
Proclus and the Book of Causes. Vol. 2, p. 211–232, at p. 211. The Western reception of Aquinas’ 
commentary on the Book of Causes needs to be studied in depth.
6 Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, Prop. 7, p. 51, l. 9–13: Et haec quidem est 
expositio huius propositionis [i.e. Prop. 7 Libri de causis] secundum quod ex verbis hic posi-
tis apparet. Sed sciendum est verba hic posita ex vitio translationis esse corrupta, ut patet per 
litteram Procli, quae talis est: ‘Si enim est sine magnitudine […]’. And also, Thomas Aquinas, 
Super Librum de causis Expositio, Prop. 12, p. 78, l. 27–79, l. 10: Addit autem Proclus in sua 
propositione expositionem modi quo unum horum sit in alio, dicens: ‘Sed alicubi quidem intel-
lectualiter, alicubi autem vitaliter, alicubi vero enter’ (id est per modum entis) ‘entia omnia’; 
quasi dicat quod omnia tria praedicta sunt in intellectu intellectualiter, in vita vitaliter, in esse 
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Aquinas, the Platonici, to whom Proclus belongs, departed from the teaching of 
the Christian Fathers, whereas Aristotle often professes a consonant doctrine.7 
Dionysius the ps.-Areopagite, the faithful disciple of St. Paul, is called to correct 
Proclus, and at times is “followed” by the author of Book of Causes.8
Unlike the Book of Causes and the (authentic) Aristotelian works, there is no 
evidence that the Elements of Theology was part of the curricula of European 
universities. There might be evidence of its teaching in the second half of the 
14th century in the German mendicant studia, with the purpose to introduce 
novices to philosophy, as one can deduce by studying the diffusion of John 
Krosbein’s commentaries, or rather paraphrases, on all the Aristotelian works, 
as well as on the Book of Causes and the Elements of Theology.9 The anonymous 
essentialiter. Sed hoc quod ponitur loco huius in hoc libro, videtur esse corruptum et malum 
intellectum habere. Sequitur enim: ‘Verumtamen esse et vita in intelligentia sunt duae intelli-
gentiae’, debet enim intelligi quod ista duo, scilicet esse et vita, sunt in intelligentia intellectu-
aliter (…). Si autem intelligatur secundum quod verba sonant, falsum continent intellectum. 
Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, Prop. 16, p. 93, l. 20–94, l. 3: Haec autem 
secunda propositionis pars in omnibus libris videtur esse corrupta; deberet enim singulariter 
dici: non quia ipsa sit acquisita,  fixa, stans in rebus entibus,  immo est virtus etc., ut referatur 
hoc ad ‘virtutem virtutum’. Et hoc patet ex libro Procli cuius propositio XCII talis est: ‘Omnis 
multitudo infinitarum potentiarum’ (…).
7 Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, Prop. 2, p. 12, l. 12–17: Quaecumque igi-
tur  res  cum  indeficientia  essendi  habet  immobilitatem  et  est  absque  temporali  successione, 
potest dici aeterna, et secundum hunc modum substantias immateriales separatas Platonici 
et Peripatetici aeternas dicebant, superaddentes ad rationem aeternitatis quod semper esse 
habuit, quod  fidei Christianae non est  consonum. Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis 
Expositio, Prop. 10, p. 67, l. 19–68, l. 1: Circa primum igitur considerandum est quod, sicut supra 
iam diximus, Platonici, ponentes formas rerum separatas, sub harum formarum ordine pone-
bant ordinem intellectuum. (…) Sed quia, secundum sententiam Aristotelis quae circa hoc est 
magis consona fidei Christianae, non ponimus alias formas separatas supra intellectuum ordi-
nem, sed ipsum bonum separatum ad quod totum universum ordinatur sicut ad bonum extrin-
secum, ut dicitur in xii Metaphysicae (…).
8 Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, Prop. 3, p. 20, l. 5–6: Hanc autem positio-
nem corrigit Dionysius quantum ad hoc quod ponebant ordinatim diversas formas separatas 
quas ‘deos’ dicebant (…). Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, Prop. 4, p. 33, 
l. 5–12: Circa primum considerandum est quod, sicut supra dictum est, Platonici ponebant for-
mas rerum separatas per quarum participationem intellectus fierent intelligentes actu, sicut per 
earum participationem materia corporalis constituitur in hac vel illa specie. Et idem sequitur 
si non ponamus plures formas separatas, sed, loco omnium illarum, ponamus unam primam 
formam ex qua omnia deriventur, sicut supra dictum est secundum sententiam Dionysii, quam 
videtur sequi auctor huius libri nullam distinctionem ponens in esse divino.
9 F. Retucci, “Sententia Procli alti philosophi. Notes on an Anonymous Commentary on 
Proclus’ Elementatio theologica”, in D. Calma (ed.), Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II. New 
Commentaries on Liber de causis and Elementatio theologica (ca. 1350–1500) (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2016), p. 99–180; D. Calma, “A Medieval Companion to Aristotle: John Krosbein’s 
Paraphrase on Liber de causis”, in Calma (ed.), Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages, II, p. 11–98.
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commentary preserved in the ms Vat. lat. 456710 is also a paraphrase of Proclus’ 
Elements of Theology, chapter by chapter, which does not seem to have had a 
significant diffusion.
In 1936, Martin Grabmann, with his incomparable effort to unearth previ-
ously ignored texts, discussed a relatively short text,11 certainly incomplete, 
preserved in the manuscript Paris, BnF, lat. 16096, f. 172va–174va. Although the 
manuscript is important and well known to scholars – it contains numerous 
important works and belonged to Godfrey of Fontaines, who bequeathed it 
to the library of the Collège de Sorbonne –,12 this short text remained unpub-
lished until 1991. Lambertus Maria De Rijk’s editorial efforts13 still did not attract 
enough consideration from scholars. Yet it might be one of the very first Latin 
commentaries on Proclus’ Elements of Theology, composed (or at least copied) 
in Paris in the last quarter of the 13th century. Godfrey left numerous marginal 
notes in this manuscript, but not on the folios that interest us. It is certain 
that some parts of the manuscript have been copied by one of Godfrey’s sec-
retaries: one can recognize the same hand in BnF, lat. 16080 and in the famous 
BnF, lat. 16297. The short text edited by De Rijk bears in the margins the title 
Questiones super librum Posteriorum, and most catalogues and descriptions of 
the manuscript (with the notable exception of Concetta Luna)14 refer to it with 
this title.
10  Evan King is currently preparing the critical edition of this text.
11  M. Grabmann, “Die Proklosübersetzungen des Wilhelm von Moerbeke und ihre 
Verwertung in der lateinischen Literatur”, in Byzantinische Zeitschrift 30/1(1929/1930), 
p. 78–87 (repr. in M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur 
Geschichte der Scholastik und Mystik. Bd. II [München: Hueber, 1936], p. 413–423).
12  ms Paris, BnF, lat. 16096 transmits notably Avicenna’s Liber de philosophia prima 
(f. 1r–71rb), Algazel’s Logica (f. 74rb–83va), Metaphysica (f. 83vb–107rb) and Physica 
(f. 108ra–120vb), an incomplete Dux neutrorum by Maimonides (f. 124ra–137v), the Liber 
de fato by Alexander of Aphrodisias (f. 138ra–149ra), Giles of Rome’s commentaries on the 
Liber de bona fortuna (f. 122ra–123vb) and on De generatione et corruptione (incomplete, 
f. 162ra–172va), and fragments of Albert the Great’s Summa theologiae (f. 237ra–252rb). It 
is known also for its supposed linked with the condemnation of 1277; cf. R. Wielockx, “Le 
ms. Paris Nat. lat. 16096 et la condamnation du 7 mars 1277”, in Recherches de théologie 
ancienne et médiévale 48(1981), p. 227–237. It also contains an anonymous commentary 
on the De anima; cf. D. Calma, “La connaissance réflexive de l’intellect agent. Dietrich de 
Freiberg et le ‘premier averroïsme’”, in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), Recherches sur 
Dietrich de Freiberg (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), p. 63–105.
13  L.M. de Rijk, “Two Short Questions on Proclean Metaphysics in Paris, B.N. lat. 16096”, in 
Vivarium 29/1(1991), p. 1–12.
14  Giles of Rome, Opera Omnia, I.1/3**, Catalogo dei manoscritti: Francia (Parigi), ed. C. Luna 
(Firenze: Olschki, 1988), p. 206–211.
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The two short questiones edited by De Rijk following one another in the 
ms BnF, lat. 16096 are written by the same author and belong to one single, 
larger text (the copy preserved ends abruptly). The author himself refers to 
the questiones according to their specific topics: the first is De ente ipso and 
the second De uno. The first discusses the status of the first being according to 
Plato, the Pitagoreici, and Aristotle, and begins with: queritur utrum sit aliquid 
sic ens quod sit ipsum esse solum et cuius ratio sit ratio essendi solum sine appo-
sitione. The second questio has four explicit references to Proclus (to Prop. 1, 
2, 18), and several references to Plato, the Platonici, and Aristotle. The Book of 
Causes and Dionysius are never mentioned, nor any other theological source. 
It is difficult to understand the institutional context and the purpose of this 
acephalous text, but it is clear that the anonymous author does not refer to the 
Elements of Theology as to an external authority; rather, he refers to it as the 
present treatise (presens tractatus) without naming it explicitly and with the 
intention to describe its metaphysical outline:
scimus igitur ex presenti tractatu duo. Primum est quod est prime Unum 
ab omni multitudine exemptum. Quod non est unum et non-unum nec 
Multitudine participat. Secundum est quod omne quod participat Uno, 
est unum et non-unum seu unum aliqualiter plurificatum.15
He also refers generally to the probatio Procli (p. 11) and alludes to the propositio 
que dicit quod omne quod non est Unum ipsum est unum et non-unum non est 
usquam vera (p. 10). These are manifest proofs that the reader (or the public?) 
already knows that the author comments on the Elements of Theology. The 
questions have arguments pro and contra, and solutions. It gives the impres-
sion of a commentary per modum questionis, typical of the late 13th-century 
Parisian fashion. Yet, the details of the composition of these two questions 
remain unclear: in what context were they written (hec scripta)? If it was for 
the students, under what circumstances? Or were they written in order to sat-
isfy a circumstantial request? The author notes that he does not give too much 
weight to his considerations on Proclus, and pretends that his own text was 
written without much reflection.16 If this is not a rhetorical expression either 
faking modesty or hiding incomprehension, we should trust him. However, we 
must note that these anonymous questions are soaked in typical Proclean con-
cepts or syntagms (rarely identified in the apparatus fontium) such as prime 
15  De Rijk, “Two Short Questions”, p. 12.
16  De Rijk, “Two Short Questions”, p. 12: Hec scripta fuerunt leviter et sine multa consider-
atione. Credo tamen quod vera.
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ens, maxime ens, prime Unum (p. 4, 10, 11 – cf. Elements of Theology, Prop. 13, 
22, 65, 73, 102, 127, etc.); ens imparticipatum quod omnibus irradiat (p. 4 and 
7 – cf. Elements of Theology, Prop. 23, 24, 69, 162), which equally appears in the 
Moerbeke’s translation of Proclus’ Commentary on the Parmenides;17 primum 
deificatorum est ens (p. 7 – cf. Elements of Theology, Prop. 138, 153); Unum prime 
(p. 8 – cf. Elements of Theology, Prop. 13); neque Unum multum neque multitudo 
Unum (p. 9 – cf. Elements of Theology, Prop. 5, 163, 164, 165); divinus intellectus 
(p. 9 – cf. Elements of Theology, Prop. 129, 182).
Despite his evident interest in Proclean metaphysics, the anonymous author 
is not persuaded by the arguments on Being and One. About the former he 
argues that it is impossible to conceive an absolutely simple being, without 
quia, quantum or quale.18 About the latter he expresses his doubts about the 
distinction between Ipsum Unum and prime Unum.19
This anonymous text must be included in any updated narration about the 
Western reception of the Elements of Theology. It represents yet another proof 
that Proclus was read in Paris in the last quarter of the 13th century, in a time 
when not only Godfrey of Fontaines, who owned (and even requested the copy 
of?) these questiones, but also Henry of Ghent, Giles of Rome, and Dietrich of 
Freiberg were either students or masters of the same university.
A half century later, the Latin West would know the first complete and over-
whelmingly positive reception of Proclus, which coincides with an original 
and still largely underestimated intellectual project arguing that Aristotle’s 
metaphysics is limited in its objectives and methods. This was Berthold of 
Moosburg’s daring project.
17  Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria iii, ed. C. Steel (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2009), lib. vii, p. 284, l. 8–9.
18  De Rijk, “Two Short Questions”, p. 5: Dicendum est quod aliquid non est ens quod sit Esse 
ipsum solum et cuius ratio sit essendi ratio solum sine appositione et determinatione. Et hoc 
apparet dupliciter. Prima quia ratio essendi non est ratio preter esse ‘quid’, ‘quantum’, aut 
‘quale’. etc.
19  De Rijk, “Two Short Questions”, p. 12: Et quod videtur dubium in predictis, esset qualiter ab 
ipso Uno seu Unius abstracta vel absoluta ratione sit differre non per non-unum admixtum. 
Hoc autem non est necesse, quia si Unum Ipsum solum est tale ratione, non quia sic existat, 
tunc differret prime Unum ab ipso per aliter intelligi ‘unum existere’, non quia prime Unum 
ad ‘unius’ rationem addat aliquam multitudinem. Bene tamen est verum quod illud quod 
non est Ipsum Unum, est aliquid aliud existens quam Unum Ipsum secundum ratione⟨m⟩, 
precipue supponendo ⟨utrumque⟩ unius esse generis seu substantie ⟨et⟩ secundum aliquem 
eius modum habere rationem ‘unius’. Sed hec hactenus.
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2 Berthold of Moosburg
Berthold of Moosburg was born in Bavaria, probably before 1290.20 This can be 
inferred from the earliest report of his activities in 1315, when the Dominican 
chapter meeting held in Friesach dispatched him to Oxford, presumably for 
his advanced theological studies in the studium generale.21 If his education fol-
lowed the protocols of the order, by that time he would have been trained in 
the Dominican schools of logic and natural philosophy for about five years, 
and perhaps had already lectured in the schools of logic for two to three years.
In Oxford, Berthold would have studied with scholars like the Dominican 
master of theology Nicholas Trevet (1257/65–c. 1334), whose commentaries on 
ancient literature, philosophy, and theology locate him in a group of writers 
now known as the “classicising” friars.22 Oxford was a tumultuous place for the 
Dominicans at this time, due to a conflict between the mendicant and secu-
lar clergy that began in 1303 as to whether, among other things, a dispensa-
tion from the University was required in every case for a student to proceed 
directly to the theology doctorate after studying arts outside the University. 
Between 1312 and 1320 the fallout between the friars and the University had 
escalated so far that the regular stream of Dominican friars to the studium was 
often substantially interrupted.23 In 1314, the English Dominicans appealed to 
King Edward ii, and again in 1317 to Pope John xxii, requesting the repeal of 
the Statute of 1253 which resolved “the affair of Thomas of York”, a Franciscan 
whose exceptional case had set the precedent for the contested arrangement.24 
20  For more literature on Berthold’s life and the traces of his library, see L. Sturlese, 
“Introduzione”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 
Procli. 184–211. De animabus, ed. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), 
p. xv–lxxxiii; E. King, Supersapientia. Berthold of Moosburg and the Divine Science of the 
Platonists (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2021).
21  Th. Kaeppeli, “Ein Fragment der Akten des in Friesach 1315 gefeierten Kapitels der Provinz 
Teutonia”, in Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 48(1978), p. 71–75, at p. 72: […] guerrarum 
strepitum, quibus quasi tota ian⟨vensis⟩ provincia affligitur et gravatur. Hoc anno intermisi-
mus studia artium et philosophiae, volumus ⟨tamen⟩ et inponimus prioribus universis qui in 
suis conventibus habent aliquos juvenes ap⟨tos et⟩ habiles ad profectum, quod ipsis aliquem 
fratrem preficiant qui eis aliquid de naturis ⟨…⟩bus legere teneatur, quos etiam volumus a 
discursibus suportari. […] Mictimus ⟨in Ang⟩liam fr. Berchtoldum de Mospurg.
22  B. Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1960).
23  A.B. Emden, A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford to A.D. 1500, 3 vols (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1957–59), p. 95 and p. 987.
24  See the literature cited in F. Retucci, J. Goering, “The Sapientiale of Thomas of York, OFM. 
The Fortunes and Misfortunes of a Critical Edition”, in Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 
52(2010), p. 133–155.
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Over these years Berthold mostly likely discovered the Sapientiale of the same 
Thomas of York (c. 1220–d. before 1269), a metaphysical summa which became 
for Berthold a sort of vade mecum of classical and Arabic philosophy.25
Brief glosses on Dietrich of Freiberg’s De iride et radialibus impressionibus 
indicate that Berthold gave a commentary on Aristotle’s Meteorology iii.5 (on 
the pole of the rainbow) in 1318, while also relying on Dietrich’s calculations.26 
Along with Berthold’s own, more extensive glosses on Macrobius’ Commentarii 
in Somnium Scipionis, most of which can be dated to before 1323, these sug-
gest that Berthold was tasked with teaching natural philosophy after leaving 
Oxford.27 These glosses on Macrobius demonstrate Berthold’s familiarity with 
texts on philosophical theology, astronomy, arithmetic, and harmonics, and 
above all with the Elements of Theology, which he cited ten times. Shortly after 
writing these glosses, Berthold made his first in-depth study of the Tria opuscula 
of Proclus.28 These showed him a Platonic criticism of Aristotle’s metaphysics 
that argued for a superior and more ancient anthropological theory (“the one 
of the soul” above intellect) that would be decisive for his understanding of the 
rationale and higher purpose of the Elements of Theology.
In 1327, Berthold appears as a lector in the Dominican convent in Regensburg, 
where he may have been teaching theology. Then, from 1335 to 1361, we find 
him named four times in the city records of Cologne, which identify him as 
an executor to the will of a beguine named Bela Hardevust. At some point in 
this period, perhaps nearer to 1335, he taught theology at the studium generale 
in Cologne. Berthold perhaps worked on his Expositio super Elementationem 
25  For the most recent synthesis on Thomas’ pervasive influence on the Expositio, see 
Fiorella Retucci’s contribution to this volume.
26  ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.30, f. 56v–57r. See L. Sturlese, “Note su Bertoldo di 
Moosburg O.P., scienziato e filosofo”, in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 
32(1985), p. 249–259, at p. 250: Descriptio figurae, in qua explicatur intentio Philosophi in III 
Meteororum, cum textus expositione inventa a fratre Bertoldo de Mosburch ordinis praedi-
catorum anno Christi 1318.
27  ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, f. 1r–44r. On this manuscript, see L. Sturlese, 
“Introduzione”, p. xxiv–xlii; L. Sturlese,, Dokumente und Forschungen zu Leben und Werke 
Dietrichs von Freiberg (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 73–76; H. Boese, Wilhelm von Moerbeke 
als Übersetzer der Stoicheiosis theologike des Proclus. Untersuchungen und Texte zur 
Überlieferung der Elementatio theologica (Birkenau: Bitsch, 1985), p. 76–77.
28  Berthold’s text of the Tria opuscula was later bound with his copy of Macrobius. See ms 
Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31: f. 46r–59r (De decem dubitationibus circa providen-
tiam); f. 59v–68v (De providentia et fato); f. 70r–82va (De malorum subsistentia). For a criti-
cal edition of these treatises, see Proclus, Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo). 
Latine Guilelmo de Moerbeke vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scrip-
tis collecta, ed. H. Boese (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960).
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theologicam Procli over this period, but it is equally possible that he began his 
project after reading the Tria opuscula in the early 1320s.
In 1348, we find Berthold in Nuremberg, where he is identified as a vicar to 
the province of Bavaria. This coincided with the expulsion of the Dominicans 
from Cologne (1346–1351). During this period, Berthold would have been in 
contact with the community of Dominican nuns in Engelthal, which was a 
major centre of vernacular spiritual literature in the 14th century. The writ-
ings from Engelthal contain at least one, possibly three, trace(s) of his pastoral 
activities there, and suggest that his relationship with this community in his 
home province antedated his vicariate.
Berthold resigned his executorship of Bela Hardevust’s will in Cologne in 
1361. Since the texts it seems he bequeathed to the Dominican library in Cologne 
began to disperse around the feast of Pentecost in 1363, we may assume that he 
died sometime between 1361–1363. Berthold of Moosburg’s only extant work 
is his Expositio, which is now preserved in two 15th-century manuscripts (mss 
Oxford, Balliol College Library, 224B; Vatican, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 
Vat. lat. 2192).
3 Worldly Philosophy
Berthold’s rigorous and constant method of interpreting the Elements, with a 
suppositum, propositum et commentum applied to virtually all of its 211 prop-
ositions is unique and impressive. So too is the use of sources throughout 
the entire text: he never wearied of citing author after author, always choos-
ing what seemed most appropriate for his own purposes. Each of Berthold’s 
choices, to cite some authors and ignore others, was significant. One could 
argue that these can be explained by his context: the libraries in Cologne or 
Regensburg or wherever he worked on his text did not always have the same 
texts – that is a fact that nobody will contest. However, the Expositio gives 
the impression that Berthold went from Proclus to the sources and not from 
the sources to Proclus. His regularity in citing the same sources throughout the 
Expositio gives the impression that he carefully planned his commentary. One 
could assume that he had a good knowledge of the Elements of Theology, and 
that he prepared thematic files with citations for each of the 211 propositions. 
Indeed, it is hard to imagine that he discovered each of the propositions of the 
Elements while he was commenting on them or that he wrote such an exten-
sive text without preliminary preparation. Being the first in the Latin world 
to undertake such a project, he did not have a model to copy: he came with a 
method, a structure, and a plan. There is also the Index of terms that he seems 
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to have produced himself in order facilitate a clearer and rapid access to the 
content of the Expositio.
One of the most fascinating and also complex ways to approach Berthold’s 
Expositio is to unfold his understanding of theologia. Each of the three introduc-
tions to the Expositio (the Prologus, the Expositio tituli, and the Praeambulum) 
opens with a reflection on theologia or the theologus. Like a Platonic dialogue, 
the opening lines of the Prologus set the entire framework – and in this case, it is 
a line pronounced by St. Paul, the highest theologian of the divinizing wisdom, 
regarding the sages of worldly philosophy: “summus divinalis sapientiae theo-
logus Paulus loquens de mundanae philosophiae sapientibus”. St. Paul, after 
acquiring in raptu the knowledge of God’s mysteries, concedes (Rom. 1:19–20):
[Q]uia quod notum est Dei, manifestum est in illis: Deus enim illis mani-
festavit [Berthold: revelavit]. Invisibilia enim ipsius, a creatura mundi, 
per ea quae facta sunt, intellecta, conspiciuntur: sempiterna quoque eius 
virtus et divinitas […].
Immediately thereafter, Berthold introduces a choir of authorities – Christian 
(Western and Eastern), Jewish, and Muslim alike – that unfolds and supports 
Paul’s verdict in a polyphonic orchestration: Ambrose, Gundissalinus, Dionysius 
the p.s.-Areopagite, Algazel, Maimonides, John of Damascus, Peter Lombard, 
the Glossa ordinaria, Hugh of St. Victor, Augustine, Alfarabi, Thomas Gallus, 
and Maximus the Confessor (rather: what Berthold believed to be Maximus 
the Confessor). Berthold’s intention is to produce a symphonia, that is a con-
cord of Hellenic philosophy with Christian revelation. And that is manifest not 
only in these opening lines, but throughout the entire text. This constant quest 
for concord is the key for interpreting the Expositio. Building bridges is the 
quintessence of Berthold’s intellectual project, and justly could it be linked to 
a tradition originated in the 2nd century with Clement of Alexandria and even 
earlier with Justin Martyr of Neapolis, born in the city of Marinus, Proclus’ dis-
ciple and biographer.
In the three introductory texts of the Expositio, Berthold sets a tension 
between theology and metaphysics, not (as a hasty reading might conclude) 
between theology and philosophy. Theologia for Berthold is a true science – 
that is nevertheless based on believed or trusted principles – about the invisi-
bilia Dei, about beings beyond the senses and the intellect.
Cum enim Aristoteles […] non ducat nos sursum in cognitivis et cog-
nitionibus animae nostrae nisi usque ad intellectum et intellectualem 
operationem et nihil ultra hanc insinuet, Plato autem et ante Platonem 
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theologi laudant cognitionem supra intellectum, quam divulgant esse 
divinam maniam, et dicunt ipsam talem cognitionem esse unum animae.
Praeambulum C, p. 66
or
[E]x praedictis evidenter apparet scientiam istam in suorum principio-
rum certitudine ratione principii cognitivi, per quod circa divina versatur, 
non solum de omnibus particularibus scientiis, sed etiam metaphysicae 
Peripatetici, que est de ente in eo, quod ens, incomparabiliter eminere.
Praeambulum, p. 64–65
or
Ex dictis evidens est eminentia habitus supersapientialis scientiae 
Platonicae ad habitum sapientialem metaphysicae.
Praeambulum, p. 68
Aristotelian metaphysics offers, according to Berthold, a narrow understand-
ing of reality. It limits objects to being as such (ens inquantum ens) and all 
knowledge to intellect. But principles beyond being as such are beyond sense, 
and therefore beyond the cogitative power, beyond the possible intellect, and 
beyond discourse.29 The only language applicable to these invisible reali-
ties (invisibilia) is the language of super-iorities used by St. Paul’s “disciple” 
Dionysius the Areopagite (scientia supersapientialis, exellentissima, divinis-
sima, difficilima etc.). And the only way to access these superior levels of reality 
is by ascending through reasoning, following Platonic principles, to intellect, 
and finally beyond intellect to the unum animae. To refrain from accessing this 
higher rung of realities, to refrain even from positing them, is to fail to fulfil 
the aim for which we have been created. That is not an intellectual option, one 
among others; it is a choice that goes beyond intellect and transforms the very 
nature of the human being.
Does Berthold oppose a Plato Christianus to an Aristoteles Arabus? One 
should resist the temptation to reduce Berthold’s project to this simple equa-
tion. And one could immediately add: it is even irrelevant inasmuch as many of 
Berthold’s borrowings from Peripatetic philosophy (Arabic or not) are already 
“altered” by the nuanced readings of Dietrich of Freiberg, Ulrich of Strassburg, 
29  Berthold’s criticisms echo Proclus’ own critical remarks against Aristotle (De providentia 
et fato, c. 8).
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and Albert the Great. However, one must note that for Berthold, the Book of 
Causes is not a reasonable alternative. For him, unlike numerous other medi-
eval authors (as previously mentioned), the Book of Causes is not a shorter 
or abridged version of the Elements of Theology. They are different in their 
method and in their object:
Ex praemissis summatim colligitur et forma seu modus procedendi in 
hoc libro et ratio nominis ipsius, quod a forma imponitur, scilicet ele-
mentationis theologicae, et quare non vocatur “prima philosophia” seu 
“metaphysica” aut “de pura bonitate” aut “de lumine luminum” vel “de 
causis causarum” aut “de floribus divinorum”, sicut quidam alii consimi-
lem tractantes materiam, sed in excelsum dissimiliter a praesenti auctore 
suas editiones vocare curarunt.
Expos. tit. K, p. 48–49
The Book of Causes offers a science about superior causes analysed accord-
ing to their functionality (that is, in relation to their effects); as such it is too 
remote from Proclus’ own interest which is to elevate the intellect toward the 
divine. Yet it is what is beyond the senses that one needs to understand, not 
the actuality or the act of being analysed in the Book of Causes, as Berthold 
expresses it clearly when discussing its famous fourth proposition (“the first of 
created things is being”):
[Q]uem quidam firmati in existentibus et non opinantibus aliquid esse 
super entia dicunt fore esse, sicut dicit auctor De causis: “prima rerum 
creatarum est esse”. Esse autem est actus entis. Sed tales vocat Dionysius 
indoctos, in 1 cap. De mystica theologia, ubi dicit sic: “Istos autem dico 
(subaudi: indoctos), qui in existentibus sunt firmati nihil super existentia 
supersubstantialiter esse opinantes”.
Expositio, 71D, p. 35
It is an interesting interpretation of the fourth proposition, not only because 
he cites Dionysius (a reminiscence of Albert?) but because Berthold under-
stands this first created thing as existence or the act of being. Interestingly, 
he does not comment on the links between Proclus’ Prop. 138 and the fourth 
proposition of the Book of Causes.
It is true that Berthold opposes Plato or Platonism (Plato et ante Platonem 
theologi – an expression taken for Proclus – or the theologia divinalis 
Platonicorum) to Aristotle or Aristotelianism. Nevertheless, he copies mas-
sively from and refers explicitly to Aristotelian texts: for example, he copies, 
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wittingly or not, Albert’s commentary on the De causis through Ulrich of 
Strassburg; he also possessed and read Albert’s autograph commentaries on 
Aristotelian texts, such as his commentary on De animalibus. He also reads 
and copies astrological texts from Peripatetic philosophers. Berthold’s project 
is theological in the broad sense, it is about invisibilia Dei transitive accepta 
on which both Pagan and Christian authors have written, and which has all 
the characteristics of a science. It is a scientia Platonica, under every aspect 
superior to Aristotle’s metaphysics, which nevertheless remains a philosophia 
prima or, as Ruedi Imbach puts it in a recent article,30 an “Agatho-theology”, 
given Berthold’s tendency to accentuate the priority of Good over the One in 
his interpretation of Proclus.
4 Retrieving Berthold of Moosburg
This volume and the three days of conference proceedings that preceded 
it31 are equally a tribute to Loris Sturlese and to the team of researchers 
formed by him over the years who edited Berthold’s lengthy commentary. 
Loris Sturlese’s work began with his PhD thesis, published in 1974, consisting 
in an analysis of the manuscripts, the historical context, and a partial edi-
tion of Berthold of Moosburg’s Expositio. Gradually connecting Bochum and 
Lecce, he joined the editorial project around the work of Dietrich of Freiberg, 
formed collaborators, and coordinated the publication of the entire com-
mentary within the series Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevii, 
now comprising thirty-eight volumes. The entire text of Berthold’s Expositio 
is now published, but the last volume, comprising the index of sources, is 
still in preparation. We considered that it was important, indeed necessary, 
to celebrate this work of over forty years and to encourage further studies 
on Berthold.
Paul Hellmeier provides a comprehensive and detailed analysis of Berthold’s 
use of biblical authorities in the Expositio, and argues that these citations have 
a profound significance for understanding Berthold on the relation between 
pagan philosophy and Christian revelation. Hellmeier first establishes the pre-
cise number of references to Scripture in the Expositio (194 citations). He finds 
30  R. Imbach, “Au-delà de la métaphysique. Notule sur l’importance du Commentaire de 
Berthold de Moosburg OP sur les Éléments de théologie”, in Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus 
and the Book of Causes. Vol. 1, p. 376–393.
31  Conference organized by D. Calma and E. King at University College Dublin, on 
October 23–25, 2019, with the support of the erc NeoplAT CoG Grant (771640), the 
School of Philosophy (ucd) and the Museum of Literature Ireland, Dublin.
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that the biblical texts most frequently cited by Berthold were, from the Old 
Testament, the book of Wisdom and the Psalms, and, from the New Testament, 
the Pauline Epistles. The distribution of biblical citations in the Expositio is 
uneven. Almost half in the entire commentary occur in the Prologue (73 cita-
tions). Almost all of these, as Hellmeier’s appendix to his study shows, were 
Berthold’s additions to the text and were not incorporated from other direct 
sources. It was otherwise for the Scriptural citations in the main body of 
the commentary itself, where most of the biblical citations in the Expositio 
were taken over indirectly and through another source (mostly Honorius 
Augustodunensis, Dionysius, Thomas of York, or Augustine). These citations 
cluster around the propositions of the Elements of Theology devoted to the 
gods (Propositions 115–159) and those concerning the soul, contemplation, and 
the spiritual body (Propositions 184–211).
All these citations are considered by Hellmeier in his thematic case studies 
of Berthold’s use of the Bible on the transcendence of the One, the primordial 
causes, the Trinity, contemplation, and the Resurrection. The way Berthold 
used Scripture for these central doctrines in the Expositio, Hellmeier argues, 
indicates that we should not speak of “an equal coexistence of pagan wisdom 
and the Christian concept of revelation” in the Expositio, but rather a synthesis 
of pagan and Christian wisdom “formed under the clear auspices of Christian 
doctrine” (p. 47).
Alessandra Beccarisi unveils the importance of Avicebron’s Fons vitae for 
Berthold’s theory of essential causality. Beccarisi emphasizes that Berthold’s 
Expositio represents not only the most extensive medieval reception of 
Eriugena (as King and Ludueña have shown elsewhere), but also of Avicebron 
(p. 62).
Berthold’s lengthy discussions of essential causality while comment-
ing on Propositions 18 and 172 show that he borrows three key features from 
Avicebron’s metaphysics. (1) “God does not give himself, but what He has 
apud se, that is forma universalis”, which acts by necessity (p. 63), an action 
that proceeds from the God through the mediation of God’s Will. (2) “Only 
radii et vires [i.e. perfections] of the substances are communicated” (p. 64) 
to the inferior realities, not the substances themselves, otherwise one would 
have to admit that created substances can create from nothing. (3) God’s 
Will, different from His Intellect, “is the link between God and creation, a first 
hypostasis of the divinity that is – at the same time – a hypostasis external to 
God (…) and an aspect of the divine essence” (p. 65). From Dietrich, Berthold 
borrows notably the idea that the agent intellect (intellectus in actu) is an 
essential cause and that it contains its own effects. He then distinguishes, like 
Dietrich, between essential and accidental causes, and between essential and 
substantial causes. However, unlike Dietrich, Berthold applies the definition of 
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essential cause exclusively to the agent intellect, excluding God and the celes-
tial souls. It is, according to Beccarisi, a significant difference between the two 
authors, enabling us to understand the role of Avicebron. Berthold argues that 
God (prime Deus) is beyond the intellect, and we can know only His will (vol-
untas Dei) identified with Proclus’ prime bonum. The creative flow pouring out 
of God’s essence is neither an impersonal nor a necessary act, but the result of 
God’s creative will. Through the essential chain of emanating forms, we can 
turn to the noblest intellectual object: voluntas Dei.
Fiorella Retucci’s main goal is to show that both Berthold of Moosburg and 
Thomas of York “converge on two points: first, the attempt to recover the clas-
sical and ancient heritage, aimed at founding self-sufficient philosophical wis-
dom and, second, the emphasis on the continuity of the Platonic tradition” 
(p. 89). According to Thomas, the truth can manifest itself either through 
Scripture or through rational inquiry. The former allows a broader participa-
tion of human being in wisdom, whereas the latter is accessible to very few due 
to its inherent difficulty. However, Thomas establishes a hierarchy between 
these fields by attributing a greater value to rational investigation than to 
belief. Human beings can “emancipate themselves from bestiality and, by their 
own effort, obtain the dignity of humanity”; they “alone are responsible for 
the perfection of their own nature” (p. 92), and can ultimately be assimilated 
to God.
Berthold endorses Thomas’ views and equally argues that “divine revelation 
is not necessarily needed for the well-exercised human intellect” (p. 94). The 
philosophers’ specific way of attaining the knowledge of God is through an 
oblique vision (per motum obliquum), and this knowledge is partial. They can 
also enjoy a direct vision (rectus motus) which is not an alternative to philoso-
phy, but it is given to those who have previously searched to obtain an oblique 
vision. “The idea of God is, in fact, naturally present in the human intellect”, 
hence “no human being is (…) deprived of the knowledge of God” with all His 
particular qualities (i.e. unity, trinity etc.) (p. 95). Thomas and Berthold agree 
on this view, and they found in Platonism a confirmation of their intuition. 
Considered as such, as a “perfect and self-sufficient wisdom”, philosophy, and 
more broadly pagan wisdom, is neither subordinated to theology nor inte-
grated in a system of revelation. They legitimately coexist autonomously and 
independently of each other. More specifically, the Platonic tradition is for 
both Thomas and Berthold the only philosophical “valid science of the divine” 
(p. 101), in all aspects superior and closer to truth than the Aristotelian tra-
dition. Retucci provides in the Appendix a list of all citations from Thomas’ 
Sapientiale in the Expositio.
Henryk Anzulewicz argues that Albert the Great’s thought is a key ele-
ment in the understanding of Berthold’s intellectual project. First Anzulewicz 
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reassesses the previous historiographical research on Berthold, observing a 
certain tendency in scholarship to underestimate the role of revealed theol-
ogy in respect to natural or immanent philosophy. It is undisputable that the 
core of Berthold’s work is the idea that Proclean metaphysics in particular, and 
Platonism in general, is the summum of philosophical theology. Yet one major 
question remained unanswered: is this philosophical theology a philosophi-
cal revelation? Anzulewicz argues that the solution lies in Berthold’s theory 
of intellect, which depends extensively on Albert the Great (without denying 
the role of Dietrich). Anzulewicz argues that the influence of Albert is stronger 
than has been previously acknowledged, notably in respect to the Peripatetic 
doctrine of intellectus adeptus that represents the foundational layer for 
Berthold’s views on the divinization of man, upon which the Proclean concept 
of unum animae is grafted.
The first aspect discussed is Berthold’s tripartite typology of the divine intel-
lect (secundum causam, secundum existentatiam, secundum participationem 
unitatis). Albert used the same concept already in his early works, such as the 
Commentary on the Metaphysics, primarily on the basis of Dionysius the ps.-
Areopagite and the Book of Causes, but it soon became part of his intellectual 
speculation used throughout his entire career. Berthold’s twofold distinction 
between the intellectus separatus simpliciter and the intellectus non-proprie 
separatus depends on both Proclus and Dietrich, yet one must also note ideas 
and even passages tacitly copied from Albert’s Commentary on the Metaphysics. 
A third aspect where one can recognise the influence of Albert’s noetics is 
the description of the six intellects involved in any cognitive process (intel-
lectus speculativus / contemplativus, practicus / operativus, adeptus, possibilis, 
formalis, universaliter agens). However, Berthold, unlike Albert, distinguishes 
between these intellects according to their theoretical or practical goal. These 
differences do not rule out that Berthold was inspired by Albert. On the con-
trary: as Anzulewicz points out, Albert the Great is for Berthold the model to 
interpret the littera Procli.
Ezequiel Ludueña brings to light new citations of Thomas Aquinas in the 
Expositio and argues for their importance in Berthold’s metaphysics. At the 
present state of research, the quantitative presence of Aquinas seems limited. 
Ludueña identifies three new citations of Thomas in the Expositio, bringing 
the total to 15 citations. Nevertheless, Ludueña argues that Berthold drew upon 
Aquinas for two aspects of his distinctive interpretation of Proclus’ gods (their 
ontological status and their causal function).
According to Berthold, there are six gods or unities, which are principles 
immediately subordinate to the One. These six gods, presupposing the abso-
lute and creative influence of the One, are the origins of the universal formal 
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determinations of power, being, life, intellect, soul, and nature. Unlike every 
other entity created by the One, each god originates its own formal series and 
exists as determinate unity without being composite. In other words, each god, 
considered as a formal cause, is a “simple one” and is per se subsistent. Ludueña 
shows that Berthold used Aquinas’ commentary on the Book of Causes for 
“another, more developed, way of explaining how the unitates are an unum per 
essentiam even if they participate in the absolute One” (p. 187), even though 
Aquinas had rejected the Platonic doctrine of separate forms or gods. He also 
proposes that Berthold was inspired by Aquinas’ account of instrumental 
causality in his frequent descriptions of the gods as “instruments” of the One, 
and in his explanation of how the gods “cooperate” with the One through its 
causal power.
Ludueña suggests that there may be a lingering tension between these two 
aspects of Berthold’s interpretation of the gods, that is, between their status as 
self-constituted formal principles and as instruments of God’s efficient cau-
sality. Berthold’s recourse to Aquinas on the Book of Causes for these central 
metaphysical questions, he concludes, is proof that Berthold read the Elements 
of Theology through an interpretative tradition thoroughly formed by the Book 
of Causes.
Tommaso Ferro revisits the question concerning the extent of Berthold’s 
debt to his German Dominican predecessors. Scholars now take for granted 
that Albert the Great and Dietrich of Freiberg had an enormous influence on 
Berthold’s metaphysics, his theory of intellect, and his methods for establish-
ing the relationship between pagan philosophy and Christian theology. Ferro 
argues that Berthold’s interpretation of the Augustinian distinction of natural 
providence (providentia naturalis) and voluntary providence (providentia vol-
untaria), which was fundamental to the Expositio, was inspired by Ulrich of 
Strassburg’s De summo bono.
Berthold’s primary concern with distinguishing the methods of “the phi-
losophizing theologians or theologizing philosophers” and the theologians, 
rather than their aims or objects, Ferro maintains, has more in common 
with Ulrich, who frequently superimposes the objects of revealed theology 
and natural philosophy, than with Albert or Dietrich, for whom the separa-
tion is stricter. Proclus’ status in Berthold as a pagan touched by divine grace 
(apud I. Zavettero, p. 219) is more intelligible within the framework of the De 
summo bono, where philosophical and theological questions are considered 
(Trinitarian theology, grace, the sacraments, etc.). Ferro then examines cer-
tain overlooked passages in the Expositio devoted to the nature of the divine 
intellect, its causality, and providence (Propositions 114, 121, 141, 144). In all 
these cases, Berthold relied on Ulrich’s principles to explain why “Intellect” is 
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the most proper name for God and how the essential causality of the divine 
intellect – its providence – grounds the stability, order, and intelligibility of 
the cosmos. The doctrine of natural providence thus accounts for the possi-
bility of knowing “the invisible things of God from the creation of the world” 
(Rom. 1:20). Berthold’s reliance on Ulrich for these pivotal doctrines is evi-
dence, Ferro contends, that Martin Grabmann was correct to call Ulrich the 
“co-founder” of the Dominican school in Cologne.
Evan King’s aim is twofold: on the one hand, to provide an overview of the 
presence of Dietrich of Freiberg in Berthold’s Expositio; and on the other hand, 
to examine the similarities and differences between the two Dominicans. King 
emphasizes that, on average, Berthold cites Dietrich twice in each commented 
proposition. In the Expositio, there are only two explicit references to Dietrich, 
yet Berthold’s familiarity with the latter’s thought is astonishing, as it becomes 
clear from the very useful table presented by King: the Expositio contains, in 
228 sections of the text, 464 citations from almost all of Dietrich’s known works.
King equally examines the doctrinal impact of Dietrich on Berthold’s theo-
ries of transcendentals, of time and eternity, of the doctrine of causality, and of 
theology as a science. The last is unexpected inasmuch as, according to King, 
it bares the traces of one of Dietrich’s lost works: the De theologia, quod sit 
scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae. A careful examination of the 
terminology and a patient reconstruction of the polemical context of the late 
13th-century University of Paris, notably the debate between Henry of Ghent 
and Godfrey of Fontaines, enable King to conclude that one can see in the 
Praeambulum the reflection of Dietrich’s endorsement of Godfrey’s distinction 
between the certitude of evidence and the certitude of adhesion. The aim of 
Berthold’s own position is to show that “Platonic philosophy (…) both meets 
and exceeds the Aristotelian criteria for demonstrative scientific procedure” 
(p. 266), by substituting Platonic philosophy for Dietrich’s revealed theology. 
Platonic wisdom “has the same scientific structure, proportionately speaking, 
as the other genuine sciences, except the purely mathematical”. Berthold and 
Dietrich have different agendas, echoing their diverse understanding of the 
relation between pagan and Christian rational traditions. For Dietrich, the dif-
ference between these two traditions would only be overcome in the end of 
time, whereas for Berthold, they have already been overcome in the Golden 
Age of ancient Platonism.
Loris Sturlese analyzes Berthold’s theory of deification in its historical con-
text. For Sturlese, Berthold’s discovery of the hierarchy of immutable causes 
in Proclus had a precise anthropological significance that addressed a debate 
concerning the dignity of the individual human soul, which occupied writers 
of Latin and German literature in the 14th century.
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According to Berthold, following Thomas of York, the intellectual ascent to 
God occurs in three ways, corresponding to “the three movements” of angels 
and souls described by Dionysius. Sturlese finds that Berthold modified 
Dionysius to emphasize that the vision of God is a prerogative of the “oblique” 
movement, which corresponds to the soul’s ascent through discursive, philo-
sophical reason. Berthold then focalized this theory on Proclus’ own perfect 
realization of all three intellectual movements. This not only makes Proclus 
a prototype of the divine man (homo divinus), it also makes his anthropology 
of the one of the soul (unum animae), with its concomitant metaphysics of 
the One and Good beyond Being, the benchmark for philosophical wisdom. 
Here Dionysius was being assimilated to Proclus: Berthold judged Proclus’ 
formulation of the unum animae “clearer” than Dionysius’, Sturlese proposes, 
because Proclus had rationally demonstrated that the soul’s sensible and intel-
lectual activities depend on a principle that grounds the division of knower 
and known. If the human condition for Berthold is precisely “that of living 
in the unawareness of bearing within oneself a secret vestige of the One” 
(p. 295), then, in one sense, the rational awareness of this dignity is the fruit of 
the discursive reflection Berthold so valued in Proclus. Compared to Dietrich 
of Freiberg and Meister Eckhart, Berthold’s notion of a principle beyond intel-
lect, and his citations of the Mystical Theology of Dionysius, placed a greater 
emphasis on the possibility (and difficulty) of experiencing a transitory union 
with God in this life. Berthold thus united the two orders of natural and vol-
untary providence, metaphysics and eschatological merit, in his theory of the 
unum animae. Sturlese concludes by asking whether there is still a lingering 
tension between these two sides of deification in Berthold, that is, between 
the soul’s natural, metaphysical condition as divine and its realization of union 
with God in becoming.
Wouter Goris compares the views of Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg 
and Berthold of Moosburg on the first principle’s freedom (to act) in relation 
to its will (voluntas) and omnipotence (omnipotentia). Goris underlines that 
Aristotle’s definition of “the free” as causa sui inspired Plotinus’ Enneads vi.8, 
whereas Proclus, who does not mention it in the Elements of Theology, dis-
cusses the concepts of the self-sufficient (autarkes) and the self-constituted 
(authupostaton). The author of the Book of Causes does not want to cut the 
ties with the Aristotelian tradition and preserves the notion of causa sui ipsius.
Goris emphasizes the structural differences between Albert’s and Berthold’s 
views on freedom (which echo the more general aims of their intellectual 
projects): the former tries to harmonize the Platonic and the Aristotelian tradi-
tions, while the latter accentuates the contrast between them, clearly prefer-
ring one over the other. Albert, faithful to the Aristotelian concept of causa 
sui, “introduces necessity into the concept of freedom he attributes to the first 
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principle” (p. 311) yet argues in favor of a Platonic concept of absolute free-
dom, compatible with the freedom of choice. Ulrich of Strassburg transforms 
Albert’s discussion by stressing the compatibility of freedom and necessity; 
hence, the Aristotelian concept of freedom, still very important in Albert, 
“is reduced to a mere afterthought” in Ulrich. This tendency becomes even 
more salient in Berthold who relies on the Proclean triad imparticipatum – 
participatum – participans, and who insists on the notion of freedom in rela-
tion to what acts per esse (which Goris calls “the essence of a Platonic concept 
of freedom”), whereas both Albert and Ulrich discussed it in relation to agere 
et non agere. In the Expositio there is no room for the Aristotelian concept and 
vocabulary of freedom: causa sui, a self-refuting and self-contradictory con-
cept according to Berhold, is replaced by gratia sui or sui ipsius existens. The 
only acceptable meaning of this concept of causa sui is in terms of formal and 
essential causality: “freedom is essential self-constitution” (p. 317).
Theo Kobusch situates Berthold’s view on double providence in relation 
to the major figures of the long tradition of Neoplatonism (both Latin and 
Hellenic). According to Berthold, natural or essential providence enables 
us to know, through philosophically grounded propositions, more than the 
Aristotelian ens inquantum ens: they enable us to know God. Voluntary provi-
dence speaks about God according to the principles of the Christian faith 
through the hierarchies (angelic and human) endowed with free will, in which 
the divine retribution of rewards and punishments is manifested. These two 
modes of theologizing are neither contradictory nor mutually complemen-
tary; rather, voluntary providence is a complement, an aid to natural reason-
ing, a part that renders the whole perfect. Kobusch claims that the real original 
contribution of both Berthold and Dietrich to the history of Western philoso-
phy consists in their effort to reverse the relationship of servitude: revealed 
theology loses its primacy in respect to all domains pertaining to philosophi-
cal theology (a view that could find echoes among contemporary Catholic 
theologians).
The Hellenic origin of this problematic cannot be overlooked. The topic is 
present in Porphyry, Proclus, Hermias, Hierocles of Alexandria, Simplicius, and 
is transmitted to Philoponus and John of Damascus. Kobusch emphasizes that, 
for the Neoplatonists, divine providence in its broadest understanding, as gov-
ernance of the entire universe, is the subject of first philosophy, and it pertains 
to the metaphysician (understood as a theologian) to discuss necessity and 
contingency, freedom, ethics, and education. However, the major difference 
between the Neoplatonic and Christian understanding of double providence 
is the concept of care: for the former, divine providence does not contain any 
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form of direct or personal relation to individuals, whereas for the latter, divine 
providence is essentially turned toward humans. For example, unlike the for-
mer, the latter consider that through free choice (i.e., repentance) anyone can 
obtain divine forgiveness, and thus modify the retributions for their moral 
misconducts.
Alessandro Palazzo focuses on the central theme of natural providence 
in the Expositio, and considers how it arose from Berthold’s reflection on the 
theory of providence and fate he found in Boethius’ Consolation of Philosophy 
and, most importantly, Proclus’ three works on providence (Tria opuscula). 
Palazzo argues that there are two complementary approaches to the notion of 
providence in Berthold, one that is naturalistic and a posteriori, and another 
that is metaphysical-theological and a priori. Regarding the first, he observes 
that the only time the crucial passage from Augustine on twofold providence is 
cited in the Expositio is in Proposition 141A, which the Index (Tabula contento-
rum) identifies as a discussion of the distinction between providence and fate. 
This reflects Augustine’s description of natural providence as what presides 
over physical phenomena (celestial motions and terrestrial causes). Palazzo 
then shows how Berthold builds on Ulrich of Strassburg, first with Boethius, 
and then with Proclus, who provides the clearest account of the hierarchical 
relation of the realms (regna) of providence (the presence of all things in the 
divine mind) and fate (the unfolding of that content in time, space, and the 
chain of causes). For Berthold, Proclus’ approach autonomized the realm of 
nature, which can be studied according to its own laws and without reference 
to a higher level of reality. The top-down view of natural providence emerges 
in Proposition 121, where Berthold uses Proclus’ notion of an essential order to 
establish that providence exists in God “causally” and in the gods or primordial 
causes “essentially” and “participatively”. Palazzo insists that the dynamic rela-
tion between fate and providence should not be overlooked when considering 
the meaning of natural providence in the Expositio: it explains the presence of 
the extensive discussions of nature (Proposition 34) and celestial phenomena 
(Proposition 198) in the commentary and, therefore, it provides a more com-
plete picture of Berthold’s understanding of how the soul ascends to share in 
God’s “providential cognition” through philosophical reason.
Sylvain Roudaut considers Berthold’s complex views on forms, arguing that 
he developed an original theory of formal causality by adjusting doctrines 
inherited from various sources to the Elements of Theology. Roudaut shows 
that in the Expositio, light is not a metaphor (for creation) but has a meta-
physical meaning and it is defined as the first (emanated) form. Light is a theo-
retical model allowing one to understand the diffusion of essence from the 
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divine unity to created beings. Indeed, Berthold claims that all divine unities 
(in Proclean terms: the gods following the One) are essentially identical and 
can be called uniform. “The Gods are constituted by a single formal intention, 
just like light in the physical real is the purest form” (p. 409)
Berthold’s view on “universal essence” (as Roudaut calls the theory of an 
essence, emanating in the intellectual light, and capable of different modes 
of being) is fundamental for his “theory of generation of natural forms at 
the lowest level of matter”. Roudaut equally indicates that Berthold’s distinc-
tion between essentia (characterizing entia secundum speciem) and substan-
tia (characterizing celestial bodies and beings from the sublunar world) is 
echoed in the distinction between forma essentialis and forma substantialis. 
The former “refers to a form that does not inhere in a subject (…), an inten-
tion that more truly informs a subject without becoming one with it”, and the 
latter “refers to a part of the compound substance (…) restricted to designate 
the part of the hylomorphic compound” (p. 406). A second major concep-
tual distinction, equally deriving from the dichotomy previously explained, 
underlines the difference between species and forma (or idea). Species refers 
to specific reasons “that express intelligible features possessing a universal 
mode of being devoid of individual character”, whereas forma / idea refer “to 
the model from which an individual entity comes to being” (p. 407). Berthold 
inherits key-concepts from his German Dominican predecessors, but equally 
finds inspiration in Avicebron. His extraordinary capacity to combine sources 
enables him to innovate and to extend this heritage to themes absent both in 
Proclus and in the Latin tradition.
Michael Dunne compares Peter of Ireland (and marginally Thomas Aquinas) 
with Berthold of Moosburg on the so-called noetic triad: Being-Life-Intellect. 
The content of Proclus’ Proposition 102 of the Elements was known to Aquinas’ 
first master of philosophy, Peter of Ireland, through chapter xvii(xviii) of the 
Book of Causes, that Peter cites at length in the prologue of his commentary 
on the De longitudine et brevitate vitae. However, as Dunne observes, Peter of 
Ireland is selective in his use of the quotation: he excludes those passages in 
the secondary propositions of the chapter xvii(xviii) that refer to scientia and 
intelligentia, and preserves only those presenting the dependence of beings 
upon the First Being and of life upon the First Life. Peter explains that being 
is given per modum creationis and life per modum formae, inasmuch as, firstly, 
“life is to be found in living things in the way of a form and not in the way of 
a created thing” and, secondly, “life does not become actual, does not go out 
into being, by means of creation but only […] by infusion” as any form does 
(p. 443). Berthold, while commenting on Proposition 102 of the Elements, dis-
tinguishes between life and living, and introduces the example of intellects 
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which, although they live, are not properly life. Berthold distinguishes eight 
levels of life, from vita essentialis and vita intellectualis to ultima vita which 
presupposes only vital movement (of nutrition).
Stephen Gersh’s comparison of Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, 
and Marsilio Ficino documents the subtle transformations that constitute 
medieval and Renaissance Platonism. These three great representatives of the 
Platonic tradition share a common philosophical method and goal: in vari-
ous ways, each thinker held that doxography (a reflection on the history of 
philosophy) was integral to the pursuit of philosophy itself. They also strove 
to demonstrate the profound compatibility of Platonism and Christian doc-
trine by appealing to the authority of Augustine and invoking the example of 
Dionysius the Areopagite. To illustrate the numerous important differences 
in these Christian Platonisms, Gersh provides a wealth of information in a 
series of case-studies of the authors’ attitudes toward Hermes Trismegistus, 
Pythagoras, Plato, the Latin Platonists, Proclus, and, finally with Ficino, 
Plotinus and the Greek Platonists. In most instances, Gersh finds a shift from 
“the medieval phase” of Platonism, which includes Berthold and Cusanus, to 
“the Renaissance phase”, represented in Ficino. In the broadest sense, these 
terms denote an author’s access to new sources, with Cusanus regarded as a 
“transitional” figure by his use of humanist translations of Plato and Proclus, 
and Ficino’s translations of Plato (published in 1484) and Plotinus (completed 
in 1490) inaugurating a turning point in the Platonic tradition in the West. 
What emerges from Gersh’s analysis is that Proclus, as the author of the axiom-
atic Elements of Theology (Berthold), is eclipsed by Proclus, the commentator 
on the dialectical Parmenides (Cusanus), and finally by Plotinus, as the pre-
eminent interpreter of Plato (Ficino), inasmuch as Proclus’ polytheism was 
subjected to increased criticism.
…
The studies reunited here are not meant to provide an exhaustive panorama of 
Berthold’s thought. Nevertheless, singly and in concert with one another, these 
contributions open paths for further investigation. We now can better appreci-
ate the importance of vital sources for the Expositio, such as the Scriptures for 
Berthold’s conception of the relationship between paganism and Christianity, 
Avicebron on the doctrine of fluxus and essential causality, and Thomas 
Aquinas’ analyses of Proclus in his Super Librum de causis Expositio. How does 
Berthold’s interpretations of Avicebron on essential causality and the doctrine 
of forms compare to those of Thomas of York, whose massive influence on 
the Expositio we are now in a position to gauge? Does his positive reception of 
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the Fons vitae, which departs so strikingly from Albert the Great’s rebuttal of 
Avicebron’s metaphysics, mark an original synthesis between the Franciscan 
philosophies from Oxford and the Albertist traditions of Cologne? In his 
reading of Proclus and Dionysius on contemplative felicity and even deifica-
tion, was Berthold inspired more by the Sapientiale or by Albert, by Ulrich of 
Strassburg or by Dietrich of Freiberg? Much more remains to be done to mea-
sure the extent of Berthold’s debt to his Dominican predecessors. Berthold was 
certainly reliant upon Albert, Ulrich, and Dietrich in numerous fundamental 
ways – in his conception of freedom, in his noetics, in his understanding of the-
ology itself. Nevertheless, his modifications of and departures from his sources 
is even more striking and decisive. Have the boundaries of the historiogra-
phy of the “German Dominican school” been confirmed or undermined? The 
impact of other Dominicans was previously overlooked, but there are now 
good proofs that further studies should be undertaken on the influence of 
Aquinas on Berthold.
The doctrine of natural and voluntary providence has received considerable 
attention in this volume. This is not, however, disproportionate to its weight 
in the Expositio. While not pretending to achieve unanimity on a subject that 
permeates every facet of the commentary, each study has nevertheless brought 
to light new aspects of the theory. We see how Berthold’s project responded 
to a perennial question of the Neoplatonic tradition relating to divine care 
and the place of the human within the universal order. Moreover, Berthold’s 
conception of natural providence served not only to demarcate the domain 
of philosophical inquiry relative to Christian theology, but also to lay the 
foundation for Berthold’s philosophy of nature. Key influences on Berthold’s 
interpretation of Augustine’s notion of “twin providence” have also been reas-
sessed (Proclus’ De providentia et fato, Albert the Great, Dietrich of Freiberg) or 
highlighted for the first time (Ulrich of Strassburg). Berthold’s endorsement of 
Proclean Platonism was unprecedented in the Middle Ages and, undoubtedly, 
scholars will continue to weigh the precise balance between pagan philosophy 
and Christianity in the Expositio, as we come to a clearer sense of how this 
remarkable synthesis of these traditions arose within its context.
Understanding Berthold’s Christian Platonism also requires us to move 
from the Expositio’s immediate context, and the problematics it answered, 
to comparing it with other great syntheses of Platonism and Christian doc-
trine. The “medieval” features of Berthold’s reception of Proclus come into 
much sharper relief when they are compared to the Platonisms of Nicholas of 
Cusa and Masilio Ficino. Further comparisons of Berthold’s Expositio with the 
major receptions of Proclus in the Georgian commentary on the Elements by 
Ioane Petritsi (12th c.) and the Greek Anaptyxis (Refutation) of the Elements by 
25Introduction
Nicholas of Methone (d. c. 1166) may yet help us to appreciate the distinctive 
features of these branches of the Platonic tradition.
Can one consider Berthold’s project in terms of a renewal of medieval meta-
physics? We would firmly respond with the affirmative, not because we need 
to justify the choice of the title of this volume but because the Expositio sets 
the plan of a different metaphysics, outside universities, outside the stream 
of the Aristotelian tradition, in a context and with a purpose that still remain 
to be explored. These papers bring forth numerous and solid arguments that 
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chapter 1
The Meaning of the Biblical Citations in the 
Expositio of Berthold of Moosburg
Paul D. Hellmeier OP
Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München
1 Introduction1
Although for Berthold of Moosburg, as for any medieval Christian thinker, 
Scripture functions as a crucial source of doctrine, no one has yet looked in 
detail at the biblical citations in Berthold’s Expositio. Perhaps this is because 
Berthold quotes other works and authors much more frequently and in more 
detail than the Bible. Nevertheless, the passages where Berthold quotes the 
Bible or alludes to it should not be overlooked.2
About a third of these quotations can already be found in the texts that 
Berthold takes over from other authors. These are a total of 14 authors, of whom 
Honorius Augustodunensis (with 23 citations), Dionysius the Areopagite (13 
citations), and Thomas of York (9 citations) are the most important. In about 
two-thirds of the cases, however, Berthold himself inserts these biblical quota-
tions into his commentary. Berthold’s scriptural quotations are always short 
passages, usually only single verses or parts of verses. These quotations vary 
in their character, ranging from exact citations to somewhat modified cita-
tions, references, and allusions. The vast majority, however, are exact or slightly 
changed citations. In more than a third of these cases, Berthold shows through 
different formulations that he is consciously quoting the Bible. These quota-
tions appear as single quotations or in small groups. In the latter case, they 
form a kind of network of mutual relationships – a technique found in many 
medieval biblical commentaries, e.g. in those of Albert the Great.3 Often, these 
clusters of quotations appear in texts that Berthold has taken over from other 
1 I am grateful to Innocent Smith op for his critical remarks.
2 For detailed documentation of the following statistics, see the Appendix.
3 For overviews of medieval exegesis and biblical hermeneutics see the classic studies of 
B. Smalley, The Study of the Bible in the Middle Ages (Oxford: Blackwell, 19843) and H. de Lubac, 
Exégèse médiévale. Les quatre sens de l’Écriture, 4 vols (Paris: Aubier, 1959–1964). For more 
recent studies, see La Bibbia nel Medio Evo, eds G. Cremascoli, C. Leonardi (Bologna: edb, 
1996); G. Dahan, L’exégèse chrétienne de la Bible en Occident médiéval. XIIe–XIV e siècle 
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authors. These clusters tend to indicate that particularly important issues 
are being addressed, such as the Trinity, the resurrected body, beatitude, the 
primordial causes, etc. Berthold rarely offers interpretations of these biblical 
citations, but rather uses them to interpret the philosophical context in which 
they appear, or to contextualize the philosophical content of his commentary 
in a Christian frame.
These quotations are frequently found in volumes one, four, five, and eight 
of the critical edition. If we add up all the quotations indicated by the Index 
auctoritatum of this edition, we get the number 159. In addition, there are at 
least 38 other quotations and allusions overlooked by the editors,4 which add 
up to 197 biblical references. However, since the Index auctoritatum contains 
several mistakes, the real number of biblical references is 194.5 In other words, 
nineteen percent of Berthold’s biblical citations have been overlooked. Here is 
the list of the omitted biblical citations, arranged according to the volume of 
the critical edition. This list shows that Berthold quotes some passages of the 
Bible particularly often, for example Romans 11:36 or passages from the Book 
of Wisdom.
Volume 1:6
Sapientia 9:15 p. 7, l. 56
Liber Proverbiorum 25:27 p. 7, l. 68–69
Psalmus 49(50):1 p. 12, l. 243–244
Ad Timotheum i 6:15 p. 16, l. 349–350
Proverbia 9:1 p. 18, l. 420
Daniel 3:54 p. 18, l. 434
(Paris: Cerf, 1999); id., Lire la Bible au Moyen Âge. Essais d’herméneutique médiévale (Genève: 
Librairie Droz, 2009).
4 By “overlooked citations” I mean citations, allusions, or references which are not mentioned 
in the footnotes of the text or in the Index auctoritatum.
5 For further details on these passages, see the Appendix. In a few cases, the index of the criti-
cal edition gives incorrect information about biblical citations present in Berthold’s text. In 
one case the index refers to a biblical passage which does not exist in Berthold’s text. Three 
times the editors list several biblical parallels in the apparatus corresponding to only one 
citation in Berthold’s text. These parallels also appear in the indices, but without any indi-
cation that they are merely parallels. On rare occasions, Berthold quotes the same biblical 
passage twice on the same page of the critical text, which is mentioned by the editors in the 
footnotes, but is not indicated in the index. Also on rare occasions, the editors omitted bibli-
cal passages from the index which were indicated in the footnotes of the text.
6 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. 
Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984).
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Psalmus 144:3 p. 18, l. 435
Psalmus 144(145):13 p. 16, l. 360–361
Ad Timotheum i 6:16 p. 18, l. 432
Daniel 3:54 p. 18, l. 434
Canticum Cant. 2:9 p. 34, l. 944–945
Volume 2:7
Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:3 p. 196, l. 201–202
Volume 3:8
Psalmus 94(95):3 p. 173, l. 98–99
Volume 4:9
Psalmus 95(96):4 p. 208, l. 171
Volume 5:10
Ad Romanos 11:36 p. 84, l. 36
Ad Romanos 9:5 p. 134, l. 321
Sapientia 11:21 p. 168, l. 79–80
Psalmus 35(36):9 p. 179, l. 191
Ad Corinthios i 15:28 p. 179, l. 194
Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:16 p. 191, l. 55–p. 192, l. 56
Ad Romanos 11:36 p. 211, l. 164
Volume 6:11
Ad Romanos 11:36 p. 9, l. 178; p. 40, l. 88; p. 136, l. 132
Evang. sec. Lucam 1:79 p. 70, l. 357
Ad Ephesios 3:15 p. 136, l. 137
Epist. Ioannis i 1:5 p. 171, l. 69
7  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
14–34, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986).
8  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
35–65, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001).
9  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
66–107, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003).
10  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
108–135, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011).
11  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
136–159, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007).
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Sapientia 11:21 p. 199, l. 311
Volume 7:12
Ad Timotheum i 6:16 p. 20, l. 151–152
Ad Romanos 11:36 p. 196, l. 259–260
Volume 8:13
Cf. Evang. sec. Matth. 17:1 p. 25, l. 360–361; p. 185, l. 131–132
Cf. Sapientia 11:21 p. 77, l. 37
Cf. Ad Corinthios i 15:54 p. 130, l. 244
Psalmus 17(18):12 p. 188, l. 225–226
Psalmus 94(95):3 p. 188, l. 226–227
Isaias 12:4 p. 190, l. 22
Ad Romanos 8:21 p. 249, l. 87–88
Ad Corinthios ii 4:18 p. 249, l. 93–94
One could object that the number 194 is not large (e.g. compared to the hun-
dreds of citations of Aristotle or Augustine), and that these places are almost 
always single verses or even only partial verses that seem to get lost in the sea 
of the Expositio. However, the mere number is not decisive in this case, since, 
among all his other sources, the Bible has an authoritative status as revealed 
truth. This truth is unquestionable for him, as Berthold confirms on the last 
pages of his Expositio with a quotation from Honorius Augustodunensis:
Discipulus: De causarum omnium incommutabili perseverantia in 
ipsa divina substantia, quod est verbum Dei patris, in quo et per quod 
facta sunt et subsistunt, nullo modo dubitarim: Illud siquidem et divina 
Scriptura et sanctorum Patrum traditio incunctanter asserit.14
The prominent position that Berthold assigns to the Bible is also made clear by 
the fact that the Expositio begins with a citation from Rom 1:19–20:
12  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
160–183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003).
13  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
184–211, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014).
14  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 211D, p. 262, l. 152–155 (“Disciple: In no way do I doubt 
the unchanging constancy of all causes in the divine substance itself, which is the word 
of the Father in and through which they are and exist. This both divine Scripture and the 
tradition of the fathers declare without hesitation.”).
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INVISIBILIA ENIM DEI [Vulg. “ipsius”] A CREATURA MUNDI PER EA, 
QUAE FACTA SUNT, INTELLECTA CONSPICIUNTUR, Ad Rom., 1 cap.
Summus divinalis sapientiae theologus Paulus secretorum Dei cons-
cius utpote in tertium caelum raptus loquens de mundanae philosophiae 
sapientibus, postquam dixerat: ‘Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis: 
Deus enim illis revelavit’, subiungit: ‘Invisibilia Dei’ etc.15
Since the final volume of the critical edition shows a substantial accumulation 
of quotations from St. Paul (there are fourteen quotations, six of which can be 
found in the last two propositions), one can perhaps even speak of a Pauline 
frame that encloses the entire Expositio. This can be seen in the following table 



















































Prophets 5 – – – – 1 1 1 8
o.t. 101
Gospel 1 1 – – 6 2 – 6 16
St. Paul 18 2 – 2 14 13 3 14 66
Cath. Epistles 2 2 – – 1 6 – – 11
– n.t. 93 
Total 78 8 1 3 36 33 5 30 194
15  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 1, p. 5, l. 2–8 (“The invisible realities of God are 
perceived as recognized from the creation of the world through that which is created. 
Rom, ch. 1.
   The greatest theologian of divinely inspired wisdom, Paul, knowing the secrets of God, 
having been raptured into the third heaven, thus spoke of the wise men of worldly philos-
ophy. Before he had said: ‘What is known of God is manifest to them, for God has revealed 
it to them.’ Then he adds ‘The invisible realities’, etc.”).
34 Hellmeier
2 A First Analysis
Let us now take a closer look at the table indicating how the biblical quotations 
are distributed among the individual volumes of the critical edition and from 
which books and groups of books of Holy Scripture they come. What does this 
show? And what questions arise in view of this distribution?
First of all, there is a very uneven distribution of quotations: as already men-
tioned, most are found in volumes one, five, six, and eight. In addition, 73 of 
the 78 quotations of the first volume can be found in the Prologus, with only 
two in the Expositio tituli and three in Propositions 1–13.
A partial explanation for this distribution can be given for volumes five, six, 
and eight. In Berthold’s view, the movement of ascent to the One begins in 
Proposition 108 (the opening proposition of volume five of the critical edition). 
Berthold explicitly mentions this turning point.16 The remainder of the com-
mentary concerns the gods or henads, the separate intelligences, and souls, 
and their relationship to the One and Good. However, Berthold interprets the 
henads as primordial causes and the One as the Trinitarian God. These two 
interpretations are very often supported and further explained by quotations 
from the Bible (see below). Berthold then discusses the major topics of con-
templation and eschatology in volume eight (Propositions 184–211). These top-
ics are also extensively treated in Holy Scripture and Christian theology, which 
can explain why Berthold repeatedly refers to the Bible here.
The table also illustrates the distribution of quotations from the Old and 
New Testament. We see here that quotations from the Old Testament slightly 
predominate, which is mainly due to the frequent quotations from the Wisdom 
Books. This frequency may be due to the fact that statements from the Wisdom 
Books are particularly suitable for philosophical representations. Incidentally, 
Meister Eckhart showed a strong interest in this group of writings for the same 
reason. Within the Wisdom Books, the Psalms are most prominent in the 
Expositio. After all, Berthold prayed the Psalms daily and probably knew them 
by heart from the time of his novitiate.
16  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 108, p. 3, l. 7–11: Postquam superius descensum est a cau-
sis seu unitatibus primordialibus et amethectis ad causata participantia per derivationem 
proprietatum, investigationem et ipsorum ordinum et distinctionem et ad se invicem conex-
ionem, nunc auctor in isto elemento incipit ostendere reductionem quorundam causatorum 
in suas prime causas per duplicem participationem dicens: OMNE etc.
35the Meaning of the Biblical Citations in the Expositio
Among the quotations from the New Testament, those from the Pauline 
epistles form the largest group.17 I have already suggested above that St. Paul 
plays an important role for Berthold.18 This central role is related to the fact that 
the tradition regarded St. Paul as the master of Dionysius – an identification 
emphasized by several statements of Pseudo-Dionysius himself.19 However, in 
Berthold’s view, Proclus had received fundamental impulses from Dionysius! 
This connection explains why for Berthold St. Paul is the summus divinalis 
sapientiae theologus and a secretorum Dei conscius.
3 More General Questions
In view of the 194 biblical citations in the Expositio more general questions also 
arise: What kind of citations are these and how does Berthold use them? Does 
he use them as authorities, or as evidence, or are they just decorative acces-
sories? What is their purpose? Why do they even appear in a commentary on a 
philosophical work? For comparison: the Bible is never quoted in Albert’s com-
mentary on the Liber de causis (at least not explicitly). Do Berthold’s biblical 
citations serve only to protect him against possible accusations of heterodoxy? 
Or do they have a deeper meaning for the whole Expositio?
This last question leads to another one, that is, the significance of Christian 
theology for the Expositio. In previous research, opinions differ on this issue. 
Willehad Paul Eckert said that Berthold wrote the Expositio as a theologian.20 
According to Kurt Flasch, Berthold did not want to become a “theologian of 
revelation”; instead he stuck to the “immanent philosophical character of his 
interpretations”.21 According to Loris Sturlese, the theme of grace plays a very 
subordinate role in the Expositio, and “there is no mention of sacraments, 
church, revelation, good works and faith”.22 In the eyes of Fiorella Retucci, 
17  According to the medieval view I count Hebrews among the Pauline epistles.
18  See p. 33 of this contribution.
19  B.R. Suchla, Dionysius Areopagita. Leben –Werk – Wirkung (Freiburg: Herder, 2008), 
p. 15–17. Dionysius ps.-Areopagita, De divinis nominibus, ed. Ph. Chevallier, Dionysiaca, 
vol. 1 (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1937), c. 2, 649D–652A, p. 117–118; c. 3, 681A–B, p. 130; 
c. 7, 865B–C, p. 381–382.
20  W.P. Eckert, Berthold von Moosburg O.P. und sein Kommentar zur Elementatio Theologica 
des Proklos, PhD diss. (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 1956), p. 51; id., 
“Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im Spätmittelalter”, in 
Philosophisches Jahrbuch 65(1957), p. 131.
21  K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, vol. 1, p. xiv; p. xxxii.
22  L. Sturlese, Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister 
Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer 2007), p. 146.
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Berthold interpreted “the relationship between revealed religion and ratio-
nal knowledge not in the sense of an integration of pagan wisdom into the 
Judeo-Christian concept of revelation, but rather as an equal coexistence.”23 
For Ezequiel Ludueña, on the other hand, Berthold wanted to “offer a Christian 
interpretation of Proclean thought”.24 However, this strong assessment is 
immediately weakened by the statement that Berthold wanted to estab-
lish a dialogue between Dionysius and Proclus.25 Furthermore, for Ludueña, 
Berthold had tried to show a philosophical agreement of Christian, pagan, 
and Arabic thinking. Philosophy serves as a means of dialogue between Islam, 
Christianity, and pagan philosophy.26
4 Five Thematic Groups
But let us now return to the question of the meaning of the biblical citations 
within the Expositio. A more detailed analysis of the citations is necessary to 
answer this. First of all, such an examination shows that almost all citations 
can be assigned to one of five thematic groups that often overlap, especially 
in the Prologus. The first group deals with the absolute position of the One 
and Good and its relationship to creation. The second group deals with the 
primordial causes, the third with the Trinity, the fourth with contemplation, 
and the fifth with eschatology and the Resurrection. Berthold presents all five 
themes in the Prologus, and thus uses many biblical quotations in the Prologus 
(73 in 35 pages) except in the case of eschatology and the Resurrection.27 The 
following are some examples for each thematic group, first from the Prologus 
and then from the commentary itself.
23  F. Retucci, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, vol. 5, p. xvii.
24  E. Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela 
de Colonia, (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013), p. 15; see also p. 94.
25  Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena, p. 15.
26  E. Ludueña, “Eriúgena en el siglo XIV. Su presencia en la Expositio de Bertoldo de 
Moosburg”, in Scintilla 10(2013), p. 131.
27  For comparison, some examples of how often Berthold quotes other important authors 
(or works) in the Prologus: Dionysius ps.-Areopagita: 51; Augustine: 16; Proclus: 15; 
Albertus Magnus: 14; Asclepius: 12; Cicero: 4; Aristotle: 3; Dietrich of Freiberg: 2; Thomas 
Aquinas: 1; Averroes : 0.
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4.1 The Absolute Position of the First One and Good and Its Relationship 
to Creation
In Prologus 4 there is a passage that is typical for Berthold in its combination of 
quotations from the Psalms and from St. Paul. It reads:
De istis dis, super quod Deus ‘magnus, dominus et rex magnus’ <Ps 94:3>, 
‘princeps Deus et superdeus supersubstantialiter unus Deus’, ‘nimis exal-
tatus’ <Ps 96:9> est, utpote ‘Deus deorum dominus’ <Ps 49:1>, sic dicit 
Dionysius ex verbis Apostoli <i Cor. 8:5–6>: ‘Etenim si sunt di sive in 
caelo sive in terra, sicut quidem sunt di et domini multi, sed nobis qui-
dem unus Deus Pater, ex quo omnia et nos in ipso, et unus dominus Iesus 
Christus, per quem omnia et nos per ipsum’.28
Here, through quotations from the Psalms and from Dionysius, the absolute 
superiority of the one God over the many gods is emphasized. Since Berthold 
understands these gods to be the primordial causes, the subsequent reference 
to St. Paul takes on a new meaning, since in the original Pauline context it is 
about the gods of the pagan religion and not about primordial causes. On the 
other hand, the quotation of St. Paul, who here is explicitly considered to be 
the source of Dionysius, also contributes further information: the one God who 
brings forth and sustains everything is the Father and the Lord Jesus Christ.
In Prologus 9, Berthold first emphasizes the absolute superiority of God 
over the primordial causes with the same quotations from Psalms 94(95) and 
96(97). Because of this superiority, God’s work and domain are also supe-
rior to those of the primordial causes. According to Berthold’s interpretation 
of Proclus, the primordial causes rule over only a portion of the universe. 
Thus their domains fall short of the perfection of God’s works. Berthold then 
describes the work of God as an eternal kingdom, using several verses from 
the Psalms (144[145]:13 and 148:6).29 These biblical verses appear to function 
28  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 12, l. 218–223 (“About those gods, over which ‘the 
great God, the Lord and great king’ <Ps. 94(95):3>, the ‘first God and super-god, the super-
substantial one God’ ‘is far exalted’ <Ps. 96(97):9> because he is ‘God, the Lord of gods’ 
<Ps. 49(50):1>, Dionysius says the following using the words of the Apostle <i Cor. 8:5–6>: 
‘Indeed, even though there are gods in heaven and on earth, to be sure, many “gods” and 
many “lords”, yet for us there is one God, the Father, from whom all things are and toward 
whom we return, and one Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things are and through 
whom we exist.’”).
29  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 9, p. 16, l. 353–362: Cum igitur primordiales causae 
sint super totum universum principalissimae, ipsae sunt reges et domini et di, super quas 
et earum regna et dominia est Deus magnus, dominus et rex magnus super omnes deos 
<Ps. 94(95):3>, super quos etiam nimis exaltatus est <Ps. 96(97):9>. Unde et operi suo non 
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as authoritative affirmations of the preceding argument, which is based on 
a statement of Proclus. The fluent and natural transition from philosophical 
principles to biblical quotations suggests a deep synthesis of philosophical and 
biblical reasoning.
A good example of Berthold using the Bible as an authority can be found 
in the commentary on Proposition 133. Here Berthold proves the opinion that 
in nature all things take the position that is best for them with the statement 
Dei perfecta sunt opera. This could be read simply as a philosophical argu-
ment. However, the formulation comes from Deuteronomy 32:4.30 Berthold’s 
argument is thus ultimately based on a statement that is taken directly from 
the Bible.
4.2 The Primordial Causes
Since the primordial causes are also part of creation, they have already been 
dealt with in the first thematic group, insofar as they are inferior to God. In 
the second group, the primordial causes are considered in themselves. In 
this regard, too, Berthold applies statements from Scripture to the primordial 
causes. He does this almost exclusively by interpreting biblical images, espe-
cially from the Psalms, as metaphors and symbols for the primordial causes. 
One of the many examples of this can be found in Prologus 9, where Berthold 
writes:
Dicuntur autem primordiales causae ‘caeli’ <Ps. 148:4> […], id est 
summi Dei domus, qui inhabitat caliginem et ‘lucem inaccessibilem’ 
<i Tim. 6:16>, et ‘posuit tenebras latibulum suum’ <Ps. 17(18):12>; quae 
omnia significant ipsas primordiales causas.31
With such identifications Berthold apparently wants to show the concor-
dance of biblical and Platonic wisdom. In this way new meanings are opened 
up for the biblical statements. However, Berthold also interprets the Platonic 
est simile in omnibus regnis deorum, qui licet regnent et principentur in regnis suis secun-
dum Proclum De malorum existentia, tamen quia regna sua sunt partiales universitates, 
partes scilicet totius universitatis, ideo deficiunt a perfectione eius, quae simpliciter omnia 
summi Dei opera est complexa, quae est regnum omnium saeculorum <Ps. 144:13>; cuius 
gloriam etiam ipsi di dicent, dicentes ipsum esse opus altissimi Dei, qui ‘statuit ipsum in 
aeternum et in saeculum saeculi’ <Ps. 148:6>.
30  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 133H, p. 211, l. 175–p. 212, l. 183.
31  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 9, p. 14, l. 309–313 (“The primordial causes are called 
‘heavens’ <Ps. 148:4> […], i.e. house of the highest God, who dwells in darkness and in 
‘inaccessible light’ <i Tim. 6:16>, and who ‘made darkness his hiding place’ <Ps. 17(18):12>; 
which all means the primordial causes.”).
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understanding of the world in the light of revelation. This second consequence 
can also be seen in the continuation of the passage just discussed. Referring to 
Honorius, Berthold interprets the primordial causes as the water above which 
the Spirit hovered in the beginning (Genesis 1:2), which leads Berthold to expli-
cate the creation of the primordial causes as the common work of the three 
divine Persons.32
On several occasions Berthold also makes use of Scripture by analogously 
applying to the higher causes statements that originally referred to the believer 
or to divine wisdom. He states in the Prologus that the primordial causes are 
built up in the Holy Spirit into a dwelling place of God (Ephesians 2:21–22).33 
In the commentary on Proposition 143, Berthold applies the words “the mir-
ror of eternal light” and “image of his goodness” (Wisdom 7:26) to all higher 
causes.34 In doing so, he does not reinterpret the meaning of Scripture, but he 
does extend its scope – as was usual for medieval authors.35
4.3 Trinity
The Trinity is mentioned very early in the Prologus, since for Berthold it consti-
tutes the first and most important component of the Invisibilia Dei (intransi-
tively understood), which are explored in the Expositio. In Prologus 3, Berthold 
uses the three-part verse i Timothy 1:17 containing the keyword “invisible” and 
its Trinitarian interpretation by the Glossa to open his discussion of the Trinity. 
Then he makes several very clear dogmatic statements by contradicting the 
error of the Arians with quotations from Augustine and rejecting a false under-
standing of Colossians 1:15 (qui est imago Dei invisibilis). The Son is homousion, 
id est coessentialis Patri.36 Later, Berthold talks again about the Son when, 
32  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 9, p. 14, l. 313–p. 15, l. 320: Sunt et ‘aquae’, quae super 
caelos sunt, secundum expositionem Theodori in Clave, ubi exponit illud Gen. 1: ‘Spiritus 
domini ferebatur super aquas’ id est ‘super conditas causas cognitionis excellentia super-
eminet’. Ipse enim Deus deorum, scilicet Deus Pater, ‘dixit’, id est Filium genuit, in quo ista 
divinissima ‘facta sunt’; ipse ‘mandavit’ istis divinissimis, scilicet primordialibus causis, ‘et 
creata sunt’ omnia in ipsis, id est per ipsas, per Spiritum sanctum, qui eas in effectus suos 
dividit et multiplicat.
33  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 11, p. 19, l. 473–p. 20, l. 476.
34  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 143L, p. 70, l. 351–352. Berthold can apply those words 
to the higher causes since these causes can be understood as existing within the eternal 
Wisdom or Word of God. I am grateful to Evan King for making this suggestion.
35  See note 3, above.
36  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 3, p. 7, l. 77–p. 8, l. 91: Circa primum sciendum, quod 
li INVISIBILIA DEI potest accipi dupliciter, vel intransitive, vel transitive. Primo modo, ut 
sit sensus: invisibilia Dei, id est quae sunt Deus, iuxta illud I Ad Tim. 1 cap.: ‘Regi saeculorum 
immortali’ (Glossa: ‘immutabili’), ‘invisibili’ (Glossa: ‘incomprehensibili’), ‘regi saeculorum’ 
(Glossa: ‘Trinitati’). Augustinus libro De videndo Deo cap. 2 tractans verba Ambrosii sic 
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following Hebrews 11:3, he states that we know by faith that the world was cre-
ated by the Word of God.37
In Prologus 19, Berthold identifies the One and Good itself, which he pres-
ents here as the Beautiful itself, with the Trinity. In his introduction to the first 
volume of the critical edition Kurt Flasch observes the following: “Berthold 
pretended that the ‘One’ of Proclus was the Christian Trinity; without transi-
tion he also called the prime pulchrum the superbenedicta Trinitas.”38 Now it 
is undoubtedly true that such identification was unthinkable for Proclus. But 
Berthold by no means makes this identification without transition; rather, he 
prepares it by the keyword fontana pulchritudo and then interprets that iden-
tification further using three quotations of the Bible. All three quotations deal 
with splendour and brightness and illustrate the admirable, even frightening 
beauty of the Son and the Holy Spirit that emerge from the paternal origin.39
It is well known that in the Expositio, Berthold twice explores the question 
of whether the existence of the Trinity can be recognized by the philosophers’ 
arguments (Propositions 40 and 131). Previous research has focused exclusively 
on Berthold’s affirmation of this question, but not on the role of the Trinity 
in his work.40 I will not analyse this role here either, as it is not the subject 
of this contribution. But I would like to make two notes for now. First, the 
Expositio is interspersed with shorter remarks or longer elaborations on the 
Trinity. Secondly, these statements on the Trinity are very often introduced, 
dicit: ‘Deus natura est invisibilis’. Et infra: ‘Arianorum procul dubio error astruitur, si Patris 
natura invisibilis, Fili vero visibilis creditur, utriusque unam pariterque invisibilem asseruit 
esse naturam adiungens et Spiritum sanctum’. Et infra: ‘Invisibilis igitur Deus natura, non 
tantum Pater, sed et ipsa Trinitas unus Deus.’ Haec Augustinus. Non solus Pater, sicut qui-
dam exponunt illud Apostoli Ad Col. 1 cap., ubi loquitur de Filio, ‘qui est imago Dei invisibilis’ 
homousion, id est coessentialis Patri, et sic est invisibilis sicut et Pater.
37  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 3, p. 8, l. 115–116: Ad Hebr. 11: ‘Fide intelligimus aptata 
esse saecula Verbo Dei, ut ex invisibilibus visibilia fierent’.
38  Flasch, “Einleitung”, p. xxi: “er tat so, als sei das ‘Eine’ des Proklos die christliche Trinität; 
übergangslos nannte er das ‘prime pulchrum’ auch ‘superbenedicta Trinitas’ […].”
39  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 19, p. 29, l. 776–788: Aut secundum causam, puta 
primum: et enim pulchrum illud propter traditam ab ipso iuxta cuiuslibet proprietatem 
pulchritudinem, cum sit causa consonantiae et claritatis universorum et ad seipsum omnia 
vocans et tota in totis congregans ad idem. Et haec est fontana pulchritudo omne pulchrum 
in semetipso excedenter praehabens, ut dictum est, et hoc est prime pulchrum, superbene-
dicta Trinitas, ut de ea intelligatur illud: ‘Pulchritudinem candoris eius admirabitur oculus, 
et super imbrem expavescit cor’ <Eccl. 43:20>. Ecce candor lucis aeternae <cf. Sap. 7:26> et 
splendor gloriae paternae et figura substantiae eius <cf. Hebr. 1:3>, id est character subs-
tantialis et imago bonitatis illius; pulchritudinem, inquam, superpulcherrimam et candoris, 
scilicet Filii, et lucis paternae admirabitur oculus contemplantis, et super imbrem Spiritus 
sancti expavescit cor virorom gloriosorum deditum in virtute pulchritudinis studium haben-
tium […].
40  The exception to this is Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena, p. 146-154.
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illustrated, or supported by biblical quotations. A typical example of this is the 
quotation from Romans 11:36 (ex ipso et per ipsum et in ipso sunt omnia) in the 
commentary on Proposition 126, which initiates a highly speculative explana-
tion of the relationship between Trinitas and Unum.41 In the same proposition, 
a quotation from Genesis 1:2 introduces an analysis of the creative work of the 
Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit.42 Elsewhere, in Proposition 151, referring 
the paternal quality to God, which for Proclus belongs to the highest henad, 
Berthold cites three passages from the letters of St. Paul, and he even quotes 
extensively from the Nicene Creed.43
4.4 Contemplation
I now turn to the last two topics, namely the theory of contemplation and the 
doctrines of eschatology and the Resurrection. Berthold repeatedly quotes the 
Bible in the Prologus when he addresses the ground and principle of the high-
est human contemplation. In this context he quotes Genesis 1:27 three times: 
Fecit Deus hominem ad imaginem et similitudinem suam.44 Being made in the 
image of God makes man capax Dei and enables him to turn to God and to 
receive from God the beautiful ideas (pulchritudines) that are free from space 
and time.45 Berthold defines the image of God in man more precisely as the 
unum of man, which is brighter than the simple intellect, and describes the 
way in which the unum is imprinted on man with the image of the seal men-
tioned in Psalm 4:7. Then, with an allusion to i Corinthians 13:12, he says that 
in the present, God is imperfectly seen by this image, but in the future he will 
be seen face to face.46 This is the first reference in the commentary to the 
eschatological expectation that is understood in personal categories, since the 
beatific vision is not conceived as a vision of cosmological structures, but as 
a vision of God’s face. Thus the eschatological perfection of man is presented 
here as a personal encounter with God face to face. This personal concept 
coincides with two other passages in the Prologus where Berthold, referring 
to other verses of the Bible, articulates the goal of contemplation as the vision 
41  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 126A–B, p. 154, l. 10–p. 157, l. 97.
42  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 126B, p. 156, l. 77–p. 157, l. 91.
43  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 151A, p. 133, l. 33–40.
44  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 12, p. 21, l. 516–517; Prol. 18, p. 27, l. 730–731; Prol. 19, 
p. 32, l. 877–878.
45  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 18, p. 27, l. 729–734: Sic ergo homo subnexus Deo vero 
et indicibili uni per suum unum, hoc est per divinam similitudinem – uno enim suo, quod est 
imago ipsius Dei, qua homo est capax Dei et connexus Deo, habet similitudinem Dei, immo 
est similitudo Dei et deus participatione –, est accipiens secundum Trismegistum pulchritu-
dines non immersas mundo, hoc est continuo et tempori.
46  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 19, p. 31, l. 858–p. 32, l. 878.
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of the Son or Word,47 who, of course, also includes the noetic structures of the 
cosmos. Like his master Dionysius, Berthold also refers to Philippians 4:7 when 
describing the ecstatic union of man with God: Pax Dei, quae exsuperat omnem 
intellectum.48 The penultimate page of the Prologus, where Berthold discusses 
the soul’s contemplative ascent to God, reads like a Psalm commentary. In 
fact, Berthold draws on the commentary of Peter Lombard on Psalm 41(42) 
(Sicut cervus).49
4.5 Eschatology and the Resurrection
The subject of the Resurrection appears only once in the Prologus, when 
Berthold includes the blessed with their glorified bodies among the invisibilia 
Dei (transitively understood).50 Even though this reference to the Resurrection 
is singular in the Prologus, nevertheless it should make us sit up and take 
notice. Resurrection is not a theme found in Proclus, and does not belong to 
providentia naturalis but to providentia voluntaria. Kurt Flasch’s assessment 
thus appears highly problematic: “In the course of his investigation Berthold 
recorded the immanent philosophical character of the theories of Proclus’ and 
his own interpretation with the formula in ordine providentiae naturalis.”51 The 
accuracy of this assessment seems even more doubtful when we consider how 
often Berthold deals with the glorified bodies of the resurrected in the actual 
commentary on the Elementatio theologica.
Berthold does this prominently and with explicit reference to providentia 
voluntaria in the commentary on Proposition 129. He first gives extensive quo-
tations from Dietrich of Freiberg’s arguments about the status of glorified bod-
ies, “the bosom of Abraham” (Luke 16:22), purgatory, and hell. These are the 
places where the souls who have left their bodies will accept their bodies again 
in the future Resurrection.52 But this is not all that Berthold has to say about 
the Resurrection. He wants to explain, using the example of man, what Proclus 
means in Proposition 129 about the top-down process of deification. According 
to Proclus, this process starts with the henads and, through mediation of the 
intellects and souls, extends to bodies. Analogous to this, for Berthold, drawing 
on Dionysius and Proclus, the deification of man begins with the union of the 
“one in us” with the divine One. Because of the connection of the “one in us” 
47  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 19, p. 29, l. 785–786; Prol. 21, p. 34, l. 968–973.
48  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 17, p. 26, l. 683–684.
49  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 20, p. 33, l. 939–p. 34, l. 967.
50  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 6, p. 13, l. 279–280.
51  Flasch, “Einleitung”, p. xxxii: “Mit der Formel ‘in ordine providentiae naturalis’ hielt 
Berthold im Laufe seiner Untersuchung den immanent-philosophischen Charakter der 
Theorien des Proklos und seiner, Bertholds, Auslegung fest.”
52  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129A, p. 176, l. 94–p. 177, l. 130.
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with the human intellect, which in turn is connected with the soul, deification 
finally reaches the body.53 Berthold thus expresses the result:
Et sic participatio divinitatis transit per omnia media usque ad deifica-
tionem corporis. Et sic, ut dicit Bernardus, totus homo perget in Deum et 
deinceps adhaerens ei unus cum eo spiritus erit <i Cor. 6:16>. ‘Quomodo 
stilla aquae modica multo infusa vino deficere a se tota videtur, dum 
et saporem vini induit et colorem’, ‘sic omnem tunc in sanctis (scilicet 
quando quasi ebrii ab ubertate domus Domini <Ps. 35(36):9> quodam-
modo obliti sui ipsorum fuerint) humanam affectionem quodam inef-
fabili modo necesse erit a semet ipsa liquescere atque in Dei penitus 
transfundi voluntatem. Alioquin, quomodo erit Deus omnia in omnibus 
<i Cor. 15: 28>, si in homine de homine quidquam supererit? Manebit 
quidem substantia, sed in alia forma, alia gloria aliaque potentia’. Haec 
Bernardus. Sic enim implebitur homo ‘in omnem plenitudinem Dei’ 
<Eph. 3:19>.54
Eugenio Massa comments on this important passage:
A faint sense of the Bible is enough to recognize an echo of the eschatol-
ogy of St. Paul: ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus. […] In other words, up to the 
first part of section B, the Expositio filters Neoplatonism into a Christian 
ethical and soteriological context. Patristic tradition illuminates the 
watermark that appears for Berthold on the page of Proclus: the breath of 
a living and experiential theory breathes in an archaeological park. Even 
for the Dominican philosopher, in the garden of the archetypes burns the 
pure love of St. Bernard: et sic, ut dicit Bernhardus, ‘totus homo perget in 
Deum …’ […].55
53  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 178, l. 155–p. 179, l. 186.
54  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 179, l. 187–197 (“And thus the participation in 
deity reaches through all levels down to the deification of the body. And thus, as Bernard 
says, the whole human being advances to God and finally, attached to him, becomes one 
spirit with him <i Cor 6:16>. ‘As a small drop of water, when poured into much wine, 
seems to pass away completely when it takes on the taste and colour of the wine’, ‘so in the 
case of the saints every human aspiration is necessarily inexpressibly liquefied by itself 
and poured entirely into the will of God (that is, when drunk of the riches of the Lord’s 
house <Ps. 35(36):9> they have in some way forgotten themselves). For how else could 
God be all in all <i Cor. 15:28>, if there were anything left in man of man? Of course the 
substance remains, but in a different form, in another glory and in another power.’ This is 
what Bernard says. For in this way man is filled with all the fullness of God <Eph. 3:19>.”).
55  E. Massa, “La deificazione nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg a Proclo, Elementatio 
theologica, 129. Edizione del testo e prime analisi”, in R. Lievens, E. Van Mingroot, 
44 Hellmeier
Another place where the Expositio expresses a connection between the uni-
tive knowledge of God and the Resurrection can be found in the commen-
tary on Proposition 185. Berthold presents here a quotation from On the Divine 
Names. According to Dionysius, having become immortal we will receive a 
Christ-like form and will always be with the Lord (i Thessalonians 4:17). We 
will see him like the apostles at the Transfiguration on the mountain and par-
ticipate in his radiance in an incomprehensible union. According to Luke 20:56 
we will then be sons of God and sons of the Resurrection.56
A very important section for the Expositio is the commentary on 
Proposition 202, in which Berthold gives a detailed commentary on the subject 
of contemplation. Quite naturally, he bases his statements on the Christian 
distinction contemplatio in via – contemplatio in patria. At the end of his dis-
cussion, Berthold says that the human soul does not always recognize real-
ity because its essentia intellectualis, that is, its intellectus agens, is not always 
united to the soul as its form. But then Berthold explains:
[…] tamen dono Dei aliquando etiam in hac mortali vita, non iam suo 
intellectuali, sed etiam suo uniali seu uno altitudine contemplationis 
elevantur in visionem non solum deorum, quos posuit prime Deus suum 
latibulum <Ps. 17(18):12>, sed etiam eius, qui est Deus magnus dominus 
et rex magnus super omnes deos <Ps. 95(96):3>. Sed post hanc vitam 
bene meritae animae Dei gratia (scilicet lumine gloriae) habebunt sibi 
proprios intellectus formaliter unitos, et sic complebitur eorum visio 
W. Verbeke (eds), Pascua Mediaevalia. Studies voor Prof. Dr. J.M. De Smet (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 1983), p. 550: “Un fioco senso della Bibbia basta a ravvisarvi una remi-
niscenza della escatologia paolina: ‘ut sit Deus omnia in omnibus’. […] In altre parole, 
fino alla prima parte della sezione B, l’Expositio filtra il neoplatonismo in un contesto 
etico e soteriologico cristiano. La tradizione patristica illumina la filigrana che traspare 
a Bertoldo dalla pagina di Proclo: il soffio d’una teoria viva ed esperimentale alita in un 
parco archeologico. Anche per il filosofo domenicano, nel giardino degli architipi arde 
l’amor puro di s. Bernardo: ‘et sic, ut dicit Bernhardus, totus homo perget in Deum …’ […].”
56  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 185H, p. 25, l. 356–365: Hae enim secundum Dionysium, 
immo nos toti, 1 cap. De divinis nominibus, ‘tunc, quando incorruptibiles et immortals eri-
mus, christiformem et beatissimum consequemur finem, semper cum Domino secundum 
Eloquium erimus visibili ipsius Dei apparitione in castissimis contemplationibus adimpleti, 
manifestissimis circa nos splendoribus refulgente, sicut circa discipulos in illa divinissima 
transformatione; intelligibili autem luminis datione ipsius impassibili et immateriali mente 
participantes et super mentem unitione in ignotis et beatis immissionibus superclarorum 
radiorum in diviniore imitatione supercaelestium mentium. Nam aequales erimus angelis, 
ut veritas dicit Eloquiorum, et filii Dei resurrectionis filii existentes’.
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beata, inquantum videbunt Deum deorum dominum facie ad faciem 
<i Cor. 13:12> specula in aeterna.57
Not only does Berthold here quote Scripture three times, but he also speaks 
quite naturally of God’s gift, of grace and merit, and – what for Dietrich of 
Freiberg would be horribile dictu – of the lumen gloriae.58
Finally, it should be mentioned that Berthold’s statements at the end of 
the Expositio on the resurrected body are not the typical expressions of the 
Church’s orthodox faith, even though he repeatedly quotes St. Paul. Following 
Honorius (who draws on Eriugena), Berthold understands the resurrected 
body as a purely spiritual substance.59
5 Conclusion
Berthold uses biblical citations for five crucial topics for the Expositio: first, the 
absolute position of the first One and Good (prime unum et prime bonum) and 
its relationship to creation; second, the primordial causes; third, the Trinity; 
fourth, contemplation; and, fifth, eschatology and the Resurrection. Among 
these themes, the last two are particularly important, since they deal with 
57  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202F, p. 188, l. 223–231 (“Nevertheless, through a gift from 
God they are sometimes also raised in this life, not only with their intellectual principle, 
but also with their unifying principle, or with their one, through the height of contem-
plation, not only to the vision of the gods, which the first God has made his hiding place 
<Ps. 17(18):12>, but also to the vision of him who is God, the great Lord and the great King 
over all gods <Ps. 95(96):3>. But after this life the meritorious souls by the grace of God 
(namely by the light of glory) will possess their own intellects as formally united to them, 
and so their blissful vision will be completed insofar as they will see the God of gods and 
the Lord face to face <i Cor. 13:12>, [the souls] being mirrors for all eternity.”). I translate 
intellectuale with “intellectual principle” and uniale with “unifying principle”, for it seems 
that for Berthold the uniale is much more than just a power or a faculty. He understands it 
as the core of man’s being. My translation of the difficult phrase specula in aeterna inter-
prets specula as a nominative plural of speculum. Specula would then be in apposition to 
animae. In aeterna I interpret as a temporal determination. Another possible translation 
is: “from the eternal height”. According to this translation we would assume a “poetical” 
word order, in which the preposition in and the adjective aeterna refer to the ablative 
singular specula (watchtower or height).
58  Berthold’s notion of lumen gloriae, however, is not clear. For Dietrich’s rejection of the 
concept of lumen gloriae see Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, ed. B. Mojsisch, 
Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), 3.2.3, p. 72, 
l. 40–p. 73, l. 64.
59  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 196F, p. 128, l. 171–177; p. 129, l. 223–p. 130, l. 245; 210C, 
p. 249, l. 83–103; 210E, p. 252, l. 185–p. 253, l. 227.
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the perfection of man, which for Berthold is the ultimate goal of the whole 
Elementatio theologica and therefore also of his Expositio. After examining 
many of these citations, we can now answer our initial question about how 
Berthold uses the Bible. It is apparent that he does not merely use the Bible 
as superfluous decoration. Instead, his biblical citations fulfil various impor-
tant functions depending on the context. In some places Berthold uses them 
as authorities or even as evidence on which a further thought is based. By this 
usage, Berthold shows the concordance of Proclean philosophy and Scriptural 
revelation. Several times this opens up a new meaning for the biblical passage 
itself. However, we also find in Berthold the integration of statements from 
Proclus into the coordinate system of revelation. His biblical quotations often 
contribute new points of view and contents that are not found in the text of 
Proclus. For example, the one God is presented as Father and as Lord Jesus 
Christ. Furthermore, the eschatological vision of God is conceived in personal 
categories as a face-to-face vision, that is, not only as a vision of cosmologi-
cal structures, but above all as the vision of God’s face. In the context of the 
passages in which Berthold quotes the Bible, it is also noticeable how often 
he brings up Christian concepts and contents such as in patria, fides, meri-
tum, gratia, donum Dei, lumen gloriae and resurrectio. While citing the Bible, 
Berthold sometimes also refers to dogmatic concepts and doctrines.
Incidentally, the determining influence of Christian doctrine is even more 
evident in other passages in which there are no quotations from the Bible. 
Thus Berthold explains in the commentary on Proposition 106 that a certain 
theory applies even if the movement of heaven and time are not eternal and 
then adds: ut veritas est fidei Christianae.60 When Proclus explicitly denies in 
Proposition 28 that a producer and its product can be equal in their power, 
Berthold contradicts this in his commentary, speaking in detail about the 
Trinity, where there is precisely such equality.61 Without explicit reference to 
the faith, but in keeping with it, Berthold also rejects the Proclean ideas of the 
eternal descent and ascent of human souls62 and the transmigration of souls.63 
In the commentary on Proposition 204, Berthold reaches a determination on 
the question of human animation with a quotation from Thomas Aquinas.64 
Aquinas there argues for the creation of the soul at the very moment of its 
60  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 106B, p. 241, l. 34.
61  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 28A, p. 173, l. 77–81; 28B, p. 174, l. 123–p. 175, l. 141; 28D, 
p. 176, l. 171–173.
62  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206F, p. 223, l. 262–268.
63  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 199E, p. 160, l. 300–p. 161, l. 321.
64  Unlike Dietrich, Berthold does not avoid naming Thomas Aquinas. This is probably due 
to the canonization of Thomas Aquinas in 1323. Accordingly, Berthold calls him Sanctus 
Thomas.
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infusion into the body and names traducianism and the pre-existence of the soul 
as condemned heresies.65 In addition, in the commentary on Proposition 154, 
Berthold gives a quotation from Dionysius that alludes to the sacrament of 
the Eucharist.66
Taken together, this indicates that we cannot consider an equal coexis-
tence of pagan wisdom and the Christian concept of revelation in Berthold’s 
Expositio. Instead, Berthold establishes a synthesis of pagan and Christian 
wisdom. This synthesis is formed under the clear auspices of Christian doc-
trine. It is in this sense that the 73 Biblical citations in the Prologus should 
be understood, for they indicate from the very beginning the auspices under 
which everything else is to be found. Thus, far from being merely a literal com-
mentary on a philosophical text, the Expositio is in fact a Christian interpreta-
tion of Proclean thought.
Finally, I would like to say something very briefly about the distinc-
tion between providentia naturalis and providentia voluntaria in Berthold’s 
Expositio. It has often been claimed, for example by Kurt Flasch, that Berthold 
understood (Proclean) philosophy as an area of providentia naturalis and 
Christian theology as an area of providentia voluntaria.67 But this is inaccu-
rate, because Berthold knows very well that Proclus in his Opuscula deals with 
providentia voluntaria, as the following text shows (important words in bold):
Ista sunt invisibilia Dei transitive accepta, de quibus in ista elemen-
tatione theologica subtilissime pertractatur, quantum pertinet ad 
providentiam naturalem. Sunt praeterea invisibilia Dei providentiae 
voluntariae, puta angeli, qui, ut dicit Proclus De malorum existentia 
3 cap., sunt ‘genus interpretativum deorum continuum existens dis’.68
65  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 204A, p. 203, l. 100–116.
66  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 154A, p. 159, l. 34–44.
67  Flasch, “Einleitung”, p. xiv and p. xxxii. This assessment seems to be confirmed by the 
following lines in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 5B, p. 116, l. 104–112: Sed dices, quod 
Dionysius loquitur ut theologus, qui solum considerat processum rerum a Deo secundum 
ordinem providentiae voluntariae, et ideo aliter est de processu rerum a Deo secundum 
ordinem providentiae naturalis, ubi proceditur ab uno in multitudinem ordinate, de quo 
loquuntur philosophi theologizantes sive theologi philosophantes. Quare, ut videtur, adhuc 
manet eorum principium inconcussum, scilicet quod ab uno solo singulariter existenti non 
debeat procedere nisi unum, et idem eodem modo manens semper natum est facere idem. 
Igitur positio Peripateticorum videtur adhuc esse firma. However, it should be noted that 
Berthold is here presenting the objection (Sed dices) of an imaginary opponent, who sup-
ports the opinion of the Peripatetics (!). Moreover, the solution of this objection shows 
that the positio Platonicae philosophiae (p. 116, l. 130) falls into line with Dionysius.
68  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 5–6, p. 13, l. 264–269 (“These are the invisible reali-
ties of God taken transitively, about which this Elementatio theologica deals with in a 
very subtle way, as far as it belongs to the providentia naturalis. There are also invisible 
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Berthold also never claims in his Expositio that he only wants to talk about 
the area of providentia naturalis and not also about providentia voluntaria. 
Rather, in the prologue he merely excludes the angels, about whom Proclus 
also wrote in his Opuscula, as a topic for his Expositio. What Berthold really 
says is this (important words in bold):
Et quia totus iste liber tractat de rerum divinarum universitate secun-
dum processum eius a summo bono et regressum in ipsum, et hoc secun-
dum dispositionem et proprios modos earum inditos ipsis rebus divinis 
ab eo, quod est divinum principaliformiter sive secundum causam, et 
hoc secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, non iam proprie vol-
untariae, iuxta distinctionem Augustini viii Super Genesim ad litteram, 
necesse est omnia convenire, de quibus hic tractatur, in una ratione subi-
ecti, propter quam etiam ista philosophia est una scientia.69
Thus, according to Berthold, Proclus in his book Elementatio theologica deals 
only with the area of providentia naturalis.70 What is said in Proclus’ book 
forms a part of philosophy and is therefore called “this philosophy” (ista phi-
losophia) by Berthold. However, Berthold admits that even in the Elementatio 
theologica there are some hints and remarks on the area of providentia volun-
taria (non iam proprie voluntaria). In accordance with the Elementatio theolog-
ica, Berthold wants to write in his own Commentary mainly about the area of 
providentia naturalis. In doing so, he very often and at important points brings 
realities of God that belong to the providentia voluntaria, such as the angels who, as 
Proclus says in the third chapter of De malorum existentia, are a ‘genus of interpreters of 
the gods, which is close to the gods’.”).
69  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. i, p. 46, l. 319–326 (“And since this whole book 
deals with the totality of the divine things according to the procession from the supreme 
good and the return to it, and this according to the disposition and the proper modes, 
which are given to these divine things by that which is Divine in the principal or caus-
ative way, and this according to the order of providentia naturalis, and not yet actually 
according to providentia voluntaria (according to the distinction of Augustine in the 
eighth book of the Literal Commentary on Genesis), therefore it is necessary that every-
thing that is dealt with here falls under one subject, which is why this philosophy is also a 
single science.”). Note that Berthold here deliberately inserted the words non iam proprie 
voluntariae into the text, which is mainly a quotation of Dietrich of Freiberg’s De subiecto 
theologiae. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, ed. L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, 
vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik, eds J.-D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1983), 3.5, p. 281, l. 69–77.
70  See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120E, p. 100, l. 303–304: Secundum primum 
actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, qui in hoc volumine exprimitur […].
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in Christian teachings that extend or correct Proclus. However, Berthold also 
wants to say something about providentia voluntaria, about which Proclus in 
the Elementatio theologica, according to its purpose, is largely silent. For this 
purpose he draws frequently on the Proclean Opuscula and above all, how-
ever, on Christian doctrine. And again it is Christian doctrine – whether the 
Bible, the Fathers and other theologians, or dogma – that extends and cor-
rects Proclus. Through this approach Berthold neither completely separates 
the areas of providentia naturalis and providentia voluntaria from each other, 
nor does he keep pagan philosophy and Christian theology apart.71 Like the 
Church Fathers and the earlier Scholastics before him, in both cases Berthold 
wants to integrate the two. The integration of pagan thinking into the Christian 
model of thought has important consequences for the Christian theology of 
revelation. As already with the Church Fathers, with Eriugena and Honorius 
or with Meister Eckhart, there are influences of pagan philosophy which are 
not unproblematic from the point of view of Christian theology.72 An example 
with Berthold is his Eriugenistic conception of the resurrected body.
In the end, Berthold’s Expositio is, of course, not simply a work of Christian 
theology. The Expositio remains principally a philosophical work. Like the 
Church Fathers, however, Berthold’s philosophy is illuminated by Christian 
theology. Thus, the Expositio is best understood as a Christian interpretation 
of the Elementatio theologica.
71  This is also the opinion of Alain de Libera. See A. de Libera, “Philosophie et théologie 
chez Albert le Grand et dans l’école dominicaine allemande”, in A. Zimmermann (ed.), Die 
Kölner Universität im Mittelalter. Geistige Wurzeln und soziale Wirklichkeit (Berlin / New 
York: De Gruyter, 1989), p. 60: “Chez Berthold, sapientia nostra ne s’oppose plus, comme 
chez Dietrich, à la scientia divina philosophorum. C’est que, de Dietrich à Berthold, les 
données du problème ont encore changé. La grande affaire de Berthold n’est plus de dis-
tinguer, voire d’opposer, théologie philosophique et théologie chrétienne, mais bien, et 
plus simplement, théologie et métaphysique, science divine et science de l’être en tant 
qu’être, platonisme et péripatétisme. D’un mot: Berthold reçoit la distinction des deux 
Providences: la naturelle et la volontaire; mais c’est ne plus pour y marquer la différence 
entre une philosophie, quelle qu’elle soit, et une théologie eschatologique. Chaque 
Providence a son porte-parole, et si l’on me passe l’expression, chacun d’eux parle la même 
langue: la Providence naturelle a Proclus, la Providence volontaire a le Pseudo-Denys; 
tous deux parlent le langage du suressentiel, du Bien suprême et de l’Un.” De Libera is 
right that Berthold is not interested in an opposition and separation of philosophy and 
Christian theology. Yet Berthold does make a distinction between them. What is also 
wrong with De Libera’s assessment is the clear assignment of providentia naturalis to 
Proclus and of providentia voluntaria to Dionysius.




The first and second columns indicate the location and scriptural source of Berthold’s 
biblical citations and allusions. In many cases, Berthold explicitly indicates that he is 
drawing on a scriptural source, for instance by writing Ad Hebr. 11, illud Mosis, Audi 
Apostolum, Quod autem Scriptura dicit, sicut ipsa [sapientia] dicit, etc. An asterisk at 
the end of the first column indicates citations or allusions where Berthold does not 
explicitly acknowledge that he is using a biblical text.
If the third column contains the name of an author, the citation or allusion was 
already found in the text that Berthold has taken over from that author. When there is 
no such name, the citation or allusion is introduced by Berthold himself.
The fourth column indicates the specific way in which Berthold makes use of 
the Bible.
The category “exact” means that Berthold quotes the biblical passage in its exact 
wording or with very minor changes (e.g. a slight change in the word order, insertion of 
words like enim, or a modification of the grammatical person of the verb).
The category “cf.” (which the editors of Berthold also use in their footnotes) stands 
for all biblical passages that are quoted with major changes (such as omission of words, 
significant change of word order, insertion of other words). E.g. Sapientia 9:15: corpus 
quod corrumpitur adgravat animam (original) vs. corpus corruptibile, quod aggravat 
animam (see below A., nr. 6).
The category “allusion” includes all passages in which one can no longer speak of a 
quotation in the strict sense, since Berthold (or the author he uses) significantly adapts 
the text of the Bible or mentions only a few words that are characteristic of the biblical 
passage. A small subset of these “allusions” is formed by “vague allusions”, in which the 
identified biblical passage is hardly recognizable. Both types of “allusions” are classi-
fied in the footnotes of the critical edition as “cf.”.
The last category is “references”. Here Berthold only refers to a biblical passage with-
out quoting it.
A. Berthold of Moosburg 1984, vol. vi,1, Expositio. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13
1.  Prol. 1 (5,2–4) Ad Romanos 1:19  exact
2.  Prol. 1 (5,7–8) Ad Romanos 1:20  cf.
3.  Prol. 1 (6,39f.) Ad Romanos 1:19  exact
4.  Prol. 1 (6,43f.) Sapientia 13:1–4  allusion
5.  Prol. 1 (6,44f.) Sapientia 13:5  exact
6.  Prol. 2 (7,56)* Sapientia 9:15  Augustinus allusion
7.  Prol. 2 (7,68f.)* Proverbia 25:27  exact
8.  Prol. 3 (7,80–82) Ad Timotheum i 1:17  exact
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9.  Prol. 3 (8,90) Ad Colosenses 1:15  exact
10.  Prol. 3 (8,115) Ad Hebraeos 11:13  exact
11.  Prol. 4 (12,218)* Psalmus 94:3  exact
12.  Prol. 4 (12,219)* Psalmus 96:9  exact
13.  Prol. 4 (12,220)* Psalmus 49:1  exact
14.  Prol. 4 (12,221–223) Ad Corinthios i 8:5–6  exact
15.  Prol. 4 (12,243f.)* Psalmus 49:1  exact
16.  Prol. 9 (14,308)* Psalmus 148:4  exact
17.  Prol. 9 (14,309) Psalmus 148:5  exact
18.  Prol. 9 (14,309) Psalmus 32:9  exact
19.  Prol. 9 (14,311f.)* Ad Timotheum 6:16  cf.
20.  Prol. 9 (14,312) Psalmus 17:12  cf.
21.  Prol. 9 (15,315) Genesis 1:2  Honorius exact
22.  Prol. 9 (15,341)* Sapientia 8:1  cf.
23.  Prol. 9 (15,341f.)* Sapientia 11:21  cf.
24.  Prol. 10 (16,349f.)* Ad Timotheum 6:15  exact
25.  Prol. 10 (16,355)* Psalmus 94:3  exact73
26.  Prol. 10 (16, 355f.)* Psalmus 96:9  cf.
27.  Prol. 10 (16,360f.)* Psalmus 144:13  cf.
28.  Prol. 10 (16,362)* Psalmus 148:6  cf.
29.  Prol. 10 (17,386)* Ecclesiasticus 42:16  exact
30.  Prol. 10 (17,395)* Psalmus 144:5  cf.
31.  Prol. 10 (17,396)* Isaias 12:5  exact
32.  Prol. 10 (17,397f.)* Daniel 3:56  exact
33.  Prol. 11 (18,420)* Proverbia 9:1  exact
34.  Prol. 11 (18,421f.) Baruch 3:24–25  exact
35.  Prol. 11 (18,428) Psalmus 25:8  exact
36.  Prol. 11 (18,432)* Ad Timotheum i 6:16  cf.
37.  Prol. 11 (18,434)* Daniel 3:54  exact
38.  Prol. 11 (18,435)* Psalmus 144:3  cf.
39.  Prol. 11 (18,437f.)* Proverbia 9:1  exact
40.  Prol. 11(19,453)* Ad Psalmos 103:5  cf.
41.  Prol. 11 (19,460) Ecclesiasticus 24:7  exact
42.  Prol. 11 (19,462f.) Iob 26:11  exact
43.  Prol. 11 (19,472f.) Psalmus 47:4  exact
44.  Prol. 11 (19,473)* Psalmus 86:3  exact
45.  Prol. 11 (20,11f.)* Ad Ephesios 2:21–22  allusion
46.  Prol. 12 (20,501f.)* Genesis 15:5  cf.
73  This citation is mentioned in the footnotes, but not in the Index.
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47.  Prol. 12 (20,502)* Ecclesiasticus 43:10  cf.
48.  Prol. 12 (21,516f.) Genesis 1:27  cf.
49.  Prol. 13 (22,559f.) Psalmus 73:16  cf.
50.  Prol. 13 (22,561)* Sapientia 7:21  cf.
51.  Prol. 13 (22,561)* Sapientia 7:23  exact
52.  Prol. 13 (22,564–566) Psalmus 91:6–7  exact
53.  Prol. 13 (22,566) Psalmus 91:5  exact
54.  Prol. 17 (26,683f.)* Ad Philippenses 4:7  cf.
55.  Prol. 18 (27,735f.)* Genesis 1:27  cf.
56.  Prol. 19 (29,781–783) Ecclesiasticus 43:20  exact
57.  Prol. 19 (29,783) Sapientia 7:26  cf.
58.  Prol. 19 (29,783f.) Ad Hebraeos 1:3  cf.
59.  Prol. 19 (29,800–802) Psalmus 95:6  exact
60.  Prol. 19 (29,802f.) Psalmus 103:1–2  exact
61.  Prol. 19 (30,804f.) Psalmus 96:6  exact
62.  Prol. 19 (30,805f.) Psalmus 104:1–2  exact
63.  Prol. 19 (30,813f.) Ieremias 32:23  exact
64.  Prol. 19 (30,822)* Psalmus 49:11  exact
65.  Prol. 19 (31,859)* Epistula Ioannis i 1:5  exact74
66.  Prol. 19 (31,868f.) Psalmus 4:7  exact
67.  Prol. 19 (31,870f.)* Ad Corinthios i 13:12  cf.
68.  Prol. 19 (32,877f.) Genesis 1:27  cf.
69.  Prol. 20 (33,909f.) Ad Romanos 1:19–20  reference
70.  Prol. 20 (33,939–34,943) Psalmus 41:2–5  exact
71.  Prol. 20 (34,944)* Cantica 2:9  allusion
72.  Prol. 21 (34,970)* Ad Hebraeos 1:3  allusion
73.  Prol. 21 (34,970f.)* Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:9  exact
74.  Expos. tit. E (411,63f.) Ecclesiasticus 1:5  exact
75.  Expos. tit. L (51,489f.)* Ad Timotheum i 2:5  cf.
76.  Prop. 3B (94,77f.)* Ad Romanos 11:36  cf.
77.  Prop. 12E (202,173f.)* Psalmus 71:17  cf.
78.  Prop. 12E (202,191)* Epistula Iacobi 1:17  exact
74  Here the footnote in the text and the Index mistakenly refer to the Gospel of John instead 
of the First Epistle of John.
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B. Berthold of Moosburg 1986, vol. vi,2, Expositio. Propositiones 14–3475
1.  Prop. 15F (22,262)* Ad Romanos 1:25  cf.
2.  Prop. 16D (27,111f.)* Ad Romanos 1:25  cf.
3.  Prop. 18B (46,98) Genesis 1:1  Honorius exact
4.  Prop. 18C (50,244)* Epistula Iacobi 1:17  Dionysius exact
5.  Prop. 26H (158,177f.)* Sapientia 8:1  cf.
6.  Prop. 30D (196,200) Evang. sec. Ioannem  Ioannes Scotus exact
7.  Prop. 32D (209,116) Epistula Ioannis i 3:1–2  reference
8.  Prop. 32F (212, 223)* Sapientia 11:21  exact
C. Berthold of Moosburg 2001, vol. vi,3, Expositio. Propositiones 35–65
1.  Prop. 60D (173,98f.)* Psalmus 94:3 exact
D. Berthold of Moosburg 2003, vol. vi,4, Expositio. Propositiones 66–107
1.  Prop. 69F (23,122)* Ad Corinthios i 8:6  Dionysius exact
2.  Prop. 69F (23,123)* Ad Corinthios i 12:11  Dionysius exact76
3.  Prop. 100I (208,171)* Psalmus 94:3  exact
E.  Berthold of Moosburg 2011, vol. vi,5, Expositio. Propositiones 108–135
1.  Prop. 114A (41,28f.)* Psalmus 94:3  Thomas of York exact
2.  Prop. 115E (54,144)* Deuteronomium 32:4  cf.
3.  Prop. 115E (54,146f.)* Psalmus 17:12  exact
4.  Prop. 115E (54,147)* Ad Timotheum i 6:16  exact
5.  Prop. 117F (72,163) Sapientia 11:21  Augustinus cf.
6.  Prop. 117F (73,174f.) Sapientia 11:21  Augustinus exact
7.  Prop. 118A (76,42) Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:3–4  Augustinus exact
8.  Prop. 119C (84,36)* Ad Romanos 11:36  cf.
9.  Prop. 120D (98,262f.)* Ad Corinthios i 12:11  Honorius cf.
10.  Prop. 122B (116,69f.)* Sapientia 8:1  exact
11.  Prop. 123B (126,55)* Ad Romanos 11:36  Bonaventura exact
12.  Prop. 123K (133,278)* Sapientia 11:21  exact
13.  Prop. 123K (133,283) Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:3  vague  
    allusion
14.  Prop. 123L (134,312) Ad Romanos 9:5  Dionysius exact
15.  Prop. 123L (135,339)* Psalmus 17:12  exact
75  I could not identify the reference for Sapientia 8:1 indicated in the critical edition for 
Prop. 32F (212, 222).
76  Here I omit the two parallel references (Ad Ephesios 4:6 and Ad Ephesios 4:4) indicated 
by the editor for Prop. 69F (23,122) and Prop. 69F (23,123).
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16.  Prop. 126B (154,20f.) Ad Romanos 11:36  exact
17.  Prop. 126B (155,44–46)* Epistula Iacobi 1:17  exact
18.  Prop. 126B (156,77)* Genesis 1:2  cf.
19.  Prop. 126B (157,88) Genesis 1:2  Honorius exact
20.  Prop. 128A (167,31f.)* Psalmus 94:3  Honorius exact
21.  Prop. 128B (168,79)* Sapientia 11:21  cf.
22.  Prop. 129A (176,114)* Evang. sec. Lucam 16:22  allusion
23.  Prop. 129A (177,130)* Ad Corinthios i 15:44  Dietrich of  cf.
   Freiberg 
24.  Prop. 129B (179,189)* Ad Corinthios i 6:16  Bernardus cf.
25.  Prop. 129B (179,191)* Psalmus 35:9  Bernardus cf.
26.  Prop. 129B (179,194)* Ad Corinthios i 15:28  Bernardus cf.
27.  Prop. 129B (179,197)* Ad Ephesios 3:19  exact
28.  Prop. 131A (191,40)* Ad Romanos 1:19  Thomas of  exact
   York 
29.  Prop. 131B (191,52f.) Evang. sec. Ioannem  Thomas of  cf
  1:16 York/August.
30.  Prop. 131B (191,55–192,56) Evang. sec. Ioannem  Thomas of  exact
  1:16 York/August.
31.  Prop. 131B (192,56) Evang. sec. Ioannem  Thomas of  allusion
  1:16 York/August.
32.  Prop. 131B (192,56f.) Ad Philippenses 2:6–11  Thomas of  exact
   York/August.
33.  Prop. 132B (201,30)* Ad Romanos 13:1  exact
34.  Prop. 132C (201,41)* Sapientia 11:21  cf.77
35.  Prop. 133H (211,164)* Ad Romanos 11:36  cf.
36.  Prop. 133H (212,183)* Deuteronomium 32:4  exact
F.  Berthold of Moosburg 2007, vol. vi,6, Expositio. Propositiones 136–159
1.  Prop. 136E (9,178)* Ad Romanos 11:36  cf.
2.  Prop. 140C (39,63)* Sapientia 8:1  exact
3.  Prop. 140D (40,81f.)* Epistula Iacobi 1:17  Honorius exact
4.  Prop. 140D (40,88)* Ad Romanos 11:36  Honorius cf.
5.  Prop. 140E (42,153)* Ad Corinthios i 15:28  Honorius exact
6.  Prop. 140E (42,161)* Ad Corinthios i 15:28  Honorius exact78
7.  Prop. 141A (45,14) Genesis 2:15  exact
8.  Prop. 142B (55,103)* Sapientia 8:1  exact
9.  Prop. 143F (66,217)* Evang. sec. Ioannem 1:5  Honorius cf.
77  Here the footnote in the text and the Index refer mistakenly to Sapientia 8:20.
78  The citations are indicated twice in the footnotes, but only once in the Index for page 42.
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10.  Prop. 143K (68,291)* Epistula Ioannis i 1:5  exact
11.  Prop. 143 L (70,351f.)* Sapientia 7:26  exact
12.  Prop. 143 M (70,357)* Evang. sec. Lucam 1:79  cf.
13.  Prop. 144B (75,25)* Sapientia 8:1  exact
14.  Prop. 144B (75,27f.) Sapientia 11:21  exact
15.  Prop. 144B (76,32) Sapientia 11:21  Ulrich of  cf.
   Strassburg
16.  Prop. 144B (76,40)* Ad Colosenses 1:16  Glossa ord. exact
17.  Prop. 144B (76,41) Ad Colosenses 1:16  Glossa ord. exact
18.  Prop. 144B (76,49) Sapientia 7:17  Ulrich of  exact
   Strassburg
19.  Prop. 144B (76,52) Sapientia 8:1  Ulrich of  exact
   Strassburg
20.  Prop. 144C (77,76)* Sapientia 11:21  cf.
21.  Prop. 146I (96,204)* Epistula Ioannis i 3:1–2  Thomas of vague 
   York  allusion
22.  Prop. 147A (100,16)* Isaias 61:10  allusion
23.  Prop. 147B (102,56)* Ad Romanos 11:36  Dionysius exact
24.  Prop. 151 A (133,38)* Ad Hebraeos 1:3  Damascenus exact
25.  Prop. 151A (133,39)* Ad Corinthios i 1:24  Damascenus cf.
26.  Prop. 151A (133,40)* Ad Colosenses 1:15  Damascenus exact
27.  Prop. 151A (133,51f.)* Epistula Iacobi 1:17  Dionysius exact
28.  Prop. 151A (135,100)* Epistula Iacobi 1:17  Dionysius allusion
29.  Prop. 151B (136,132)* Ad Romanos 11:36  cf.
30.  Prop. 151B (136,137)* Ad Ephesios 3:14–15  exact
31.  Prop. 152B (140,27f.) Ad Ephesios 3:14–15  Damascenus exact
32.  Prop. 156B (171,69) Epistula Ioannis i 1:5  cf.
33.  Prop. 159I (199,311) Sapientia 11:21  cf.
G.  Berthold of Moosburg 2003, vol. vi,7, Expositio. Propositiones 160–183
1.  Prop. 162E (20,142)* Psalmus 17:12  exact
2.  Prop. 162E (20,151f.)* Ad Timotheum i 6:16  Dionysius cf.
3.  Prop. 177D (177,133f.)* Isaias 6:3  cf.
4.  Prop. 178E (196,261)* Ad Romanos 11:36  cf.
5.  Prop. 179B (205,178)* Sapientia 11:21  cf.
H.  Berthold of Moosburg 2014, vol. vi,8, Expositio. Propositiones 184–211
1.  Prop. 185I (25,358) Ad Thessalonicenses i  Dionysius exact 
  4:17
2.  Prop. 185I (25,361f.) Evang. sec Matthaeum  Dionysius allusion
  17:1 
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3.  Prop. 185I (25,364f.) Evang. sec. Lucam 20:36  Dionysius cf.
4.  Prop. 190A (77,37)* Sapientia 11:21  Augustinus cf.
5.  Prop. 190A (77,51f.)* Sapientia 8:1  Thomas of York cf.
6.  Prop. 190A (77,53) Ecclesiastes 7:26  Thomas of York cf.
7.  Prop. 196F (128,174)* Ad Romanos 5:12  Honorius cf.
8.  Prop. 196F (128,183)* Genesis 2:7  Honorius cf.
9.  Prop. 196F (128,186) Genesis 2:7  Honorius cf.
10.  Prop. 196F (128,193)* Ad Corinthios i 15:53  Honorius cf.
11.  Prop. 196F (128,194) Ad Corinthios i 15:44  Honorius cf.
12.  Prop. 196F (129,207) Genesis 1:26  Gregorius Nyss. exact
13.  Prop. 196F (130,243)* Ad Philippenses 2:7  Honorius cf.
14.  Prop. 196F (130,244)* Ad Corinthios 15:54  Honorius cf.
15.  Prop. 202B (185,131f.) Evang. sec Matthaeum Dionysius allusion
     17:1 
16. Prop. 202B (185,135f.) Evang. sec. Lucam 20:36  Dionysius cf.
17.  Prop. 202F (188,225f.)* Psalmus 17:12  cf.
18.  Prop. 202F (188,226)* Psalmus 94:3   exact
19.  Prop. 202F (188,230)* Ad Corinthios i 13:12  cf.
20.  Prop. 203A (190,22)* Isaias 12:4  Avencebrol cf.
21.  Prop. 204A (202,73) Genesis 2:279  Nemesius Emes. cf.
22.  Prop. 204A (202,74) Evang. sec. Ioannem 5:17  Nemesius Emes. exact
23.  Prop. 208A (232,27f.)* Ad Corinthios i 15:44  Dietrich of  cf.
     Freiberg
24.  Prop. 210C (249, 87f.) Ad Romanos 8:21  Honorius exact
25.  Prop. 210C (249,88f.) Ad Corinthios ii 5:1  Honorius exact
26.  Prop. 210C (249,94) Ad Corinthios ii 4:2  Honorius exact
27.  Prop. 210C (249,99f.) Ad Corinthios i 2:9  Honorius exact
28.  Prop. 210E (252,192f.) Evang. sec. Marcum 12:25   Honorius exact
   par.80
29.  Prop. 210M (255,320)* Ad Romanos 8:19  Honorius cf.
30.  Prop. 211A (259,43)* Ad Romanos 11:36  cf.
79  Here I omit the two parallel references from the book Exodus indicated by the editor.
80  Here I omit the two parallel references from the Synoptic Gospels indicated by the editor.
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chapter 2
Avicebron (Solomon Ibn Gabirol) and Berthold of 
Moosburg on Essential Causality
Alessandra Beccarisi
Università del Salento
As is well known, the theory of essential causality plays a central role in Berthold 
of Moosburg’s commentary on Proclus’ Elementatio theologica. Scholars have 
reconstructed its doctrinal genesis, seeing the dependencies on Albert the 
Great, Ulrich of Strassburg, and above all Dietrich of Freiberg.1 In the result-
ing picture, however, one piece is missing, which deserves to be considered, 
namely, the contribution of Avicebron’s Fons vitae to the elaboration of the 
theory of essential causality. It is a contribution which, in quality and quan-
tity, has no precedent amongst the philosophers traditionally considered to be 
Berthold of Moosburg’s main sources and this influence, for reasons that will 
become clear shortly, can be considered unique to the Dominican philosopher.
It is Berthold who emphasizes the centrality of Avicebron, who not only 
appears among the philosophi famosi listed at the beginning of the com-
mentary, but also three times in the Tabula contentorum2 that Berthold 
1 E. King, Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli of 
Berthold von Moosburg, PhD diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016); M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, 
“A propos du néoplatonisme d’Albert le Grand: Aventures et mésaventures de quelques 
textes d’Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg”, in Archives de 
Philosophie 43(1980), p. 635–654; I. Zavattero, “Berthold of Moosburg”, in H. Lagerlund (ed.), 
Encyclopedia of Medieval Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011); A. de Libera, “Résumés des 
conférences”, in École Pratique des Hautes Études – Section des sciences religieuses. Annuaire 
94(1985–1986), 1985, p. 499–519. I would like warmly thank Katie Reid for correcting this text 
and Evan King for his precious suggestions.
2 The Tabula contentorum in Expositione super Elementationem theologicam Procli is an index 
of 580 entries arranged in alphabetical order from Abditum mentis up to Zoegena. It is pre-
served in two 15th-century codices, copied a few years apart in the Cologne area. The sub-
stantial agreement of the two codices in their structural elements makes it certain that the 
structure of the Tabula was already defined in their common exemplar and therefore comes 
from Berthold’s project. A first edition of the Tabula was published by A. Beccarisi, Berthold 
of Moosburg, Tabula contentorum in Expositione super Elementationem theologicam Procli, ed. 
A. Beccarisi (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 2000). The critical edition of the Elementatio 
theologica Procli is now complete: Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam Procli, 8 vols. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984–2014).
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adds to his work. The name of Avicebron appears under the letter A as 
follows:3
Avencebrol
Liber Fons vite frequenter allegatur
De unitione secundum eum 4 (A). Item condiciones unius.
Condiciones derivantis esse aliis secundum eundem 18.
Avicula
199 Quod sicut avicula in aere et navicula in mari sic terra in universo 
secundum Avencebrol libro Fons vite.
The contribution of Avicebron in Prop. 18 is indeed remarkable for bet-
ter defining the characteristics and conditions of what gives being to lower 
entities, a topic explicitly linked to that of essential causality (“De primo sci-
endum quod derivans esse aliis quodcumque, quod etiam necessario est causa 
essentialis […]”).4 Berthold deals specifically with this doctrine in Prop. 172, as 
declared programmatically in the Tabula.5
Causa
[…] Cause essentialis triplex condicio 172. Triplex effectum prehabitio. 
Quod omnis intellectus in actu habet rationem cause essentialis. Cause 
efficientes sunt in triplici differentia.
Causa essentialis
De hac et eius multiplici condicione 172.
It is not surprising, therefore, that in Prop. 172 one also finds an extensive use of 
Avicebron’s Fons vitae which Berthold quotes next to Dietrich’s De cognitione 
entium separatorum.6 In my view, it is significant that, among Dietrich’s many 
works, Berthold chooses the De cognitione entium separatorum to explain this 
point. As is well known, this is a late work, which can be considered a summa 
3 Berthold of Moosburg, Tabula, p. 23, 507–515.
4 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18D, p. 52, l. 291–292.
5 Berthold of Moosburg, Tabula, p. 31, l. 100–p. 32, l. 106.
6 Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitionum entium separatorum et maxime animarum separatarum, 
ed. H. Steffan, in Dietrich of Freiberg, Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik, eds 
J.-D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), p. 151–260.
61Avicebron (Solomon Ibn Gabirol) and Berthold of Moosburg
of Dietrich’s theory of essential causality.7 It is a work, however, which does 
not emphasize the agent intellect as an essential cause and in which Dietrich 
is somewhat cautious about the existence of celestial souls.
It is also important to note that in none of these contexts is Avicebron’s con-
tribution transmitted to Berthold through Thomas of York’s Sapientiale, which 
also uses the Fons vitae extensively.8
In order to understand how Berthold combines Dietrich’s authority with 
Avicebron’s on the question of essential causality, I will proceed as follows: in 
the first part I will present Avicebron’s doctrine on the relationship between 
God and creatures, and then move on in the second section to describe the 
essential points of Dietrich’s De cognitione entium separatorum. Finally, in 
the third part I will present the synthesis offered by Berthold of Moosburg, 
focusing on his commentary on Propositions 18 and 172 of Proclus’ Elementatio 
theologica.
My aim is to show the consonance between the metaphysics of fluxus devel-
oped by Avicebron based on the overflowing of forms, and the doctrine of 
essential causality theorised by Dietrich of Freiberg.
1 Avicebron on the Notions of fluxus and Will
In the medieval Latin West, the name Avicebron was not known before the 
middle of the 12th century. Around 1150, in Toledo, Dominicus Gundissalinus 
and Johannes Hispanus translated the Fons vitae into Latin from an Arabic orig-
inal that is now lost.9 Avicebron or Avencebrol, as he was known to Christian 
authors, is the author of a philosophical summa in five books, published at 
7 K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Dietrich of Freiberg, Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik, 
p. xv–xxxi, in particular p. xxvi; T. Suarez-Nani, “Substances séparées, intelligences et anges 
chez Thierry de Freiberg”, in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, F.-B. Stammkötter (eds), Dietrich von 
Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven seiner Philosophie, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft (Amsterdam: 
Grüner, 1999), p. 49–67, in particular p. 52–57; B. Mojsisch, “Causa essentialis bei Dietrich 
von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart”, in K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart 
(Hamburg: Meiner 1984), p. 106–114.
8 Thanks to the excellent work of Fiorella Retucci, who in a recent article highlighted Berthold’s 
considerable debts to the Sapientiale, it is possible “to isolate” the original interventions of 
the Dominican. Cf. F. Retucci, “Magister Thomas Anglicus minor: Tommaso di York fonte della 
Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli”, in Quaderni di Noctua 5(2020), p. 1–41.
9 S. Pessin, Solomon Ibn Gabirol (Avicebron), in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy https://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/ibn-gabirol/. [accessed October 26, 2020]
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the end of the 19th century by Clemens Baeumker.10 This work is a dialogue 
between a teacher and a pupil, aiming to teach the way human beings can real-
ize their nature and fulfil their purpose, i.e. achieve their happiness. The aim of 
a human being, as it emerges at the end of the fifth book, is to know the exter-
nal world and, going back from the most “contracted” determinations to the 
simplest, to bring the human back to the unity of its origin, which is the source 
of life. Studying the essence of simple substances, the disciple is led into the 
amoenitatibus floridis11 of the intelligible reality, and therefore has a chance to 
rise from the visible to the invisible, from the composite to the simple, from the 
effect to the cause.
Even if the Fons vitae completely lacks explicit quotations (with the excep-
tion of those linked to Sacred Scripture), scholars now agree that it is a gran-
diose synthesis, attempting to harmonize Neoplatonic metaphysics with 
the creationist belief common to Jews, Christians, and Muslims.12 In Latin 
Scholasticism, Avicebron’s thought was often reduced to a few key issues: the 
hylomorphic conception of the totality of reality, the doctrine of the plural-
ity of substantial forms, the existence of rationes seminales in matter, and the 
question of intelligible matter. There are, however, two important exceptions: 
Thomas of York, who in his Sapientiale abundantly cites the Fons vitae, and 
Berthold of Moosburg. Berthold’s magnum opus is perhaps the most Gabirolean 
of all scholastic works.13 In his commentary on Proclus’ Elementatio theologica, 
not only does Berthold show that he knows the Fons vitae firsthand, but also 
that he greatly appreciates Avicebron’s synthesis, which stands in sharp con-
trast to the absolutely negative attitude of Albert the Great.14 In this respect, 
Berthold follows in the footsteps of Meister Eckhart, who also shows great 
10  Avicebron (Ibn Gabirol), Fons vitae. Translationem ex Arabico in Latinum, ed. C. Baeumker 
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1892–1895).
11  Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. v, c. 57, p. 205, l. 8.
12  B. McGinn, “Sapientia Judaeorum: the Role of Jewish Philosophers in Some Scholastic 
Thinkers”, in R.J. Bast, A.C. Gow (eds), Continuity and Change. The Harvest of Late 
Medieval and Reformation History (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 206–228, in particular p. 221–
225; M. Benedetto, Saggio introduttivo, in Avicebron, Fonte della vita, ed. M. Benedetto 
(Milano: Bompiani, 2007), p. 11–197, in particular p. 29–68; N. Bray, “Eckhart e la riforma 
filosofica dell’umiltà cristiana”, in Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, forthcoming. I 
would like to thank her for having made unpublished materials available to me.
13  McGinn, “Sapientia iudeorum”, p. 226; Benedetto, Saggio, p. 193–197; King, Supersapientia, 
p. 189.
14  Bray, “Magis videtur fuisse Stoicus. La ricezione di Avicebron in Alberto il Grande”, in 
A. Beccarisi, A. Palazzo (eds), Flumen Sapientiae, Studi sul pensiero medievale (Roma: 
Aracne Editrice, 2019), p. 69–87; McGinn, “Sapientia iudeorum”, p. 216–217; Benedetto, 
Saggio, p. 173–175.
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interest in Avicebron.15 Among the many themes that attract Berthold’s atten-
tion, two in particular are considered relevant, so much so that they are men-
tioned in his Tabula: the theme of the derivation of entities from others and 
the associated theme of essential causality. In the first case, Berthold uses the 
concepts of largitas and desiderium, in the second that of the flow of radii et 
vires from the simple substances. Let us look at these in detail, before moving 
onto Berthold’s use of them.
Avicebron conceives of God in tripartite terms: as First Essence (which is 
inaccessible), Will (understood as an intermediary between God and Creation, 
but also as the productive aspect of God) and active and manifest Wisdom. 
In this way we can know God only through the manifestation of his Will and 
Wisdom in the ordained structure of entities in the universe (that is, through 
the things he does and sustains, and in particular, through the wisdom revealed 
by them). These entities are called by Avicebron simplices substantiae, by which 
he means the Neoplatonic Universal Intellect and the Soul (or Souls). These 
simple substances (exemplified in the simple substance of the Intellect, that 
is the highest created manifestation of God’s creative Will and Wisdom) are 
theorized as intermediaries between God and the lowest substance.16 In this 
way Avicebron takes up the Neoplatonic formula of the self-diffusive Good – 
which in the Fons vitae coincides with the voluntas Dei – while preserving at 
the same time God’s absolute transcendence, because, according to Avicebron, 
God does not give Himself, but what He has apud se, that is, His forma univer-
salis, which is an agens necessario:
Factor primus excelsus et sanctus largus est ex eo, quod habet apud se, 
ideo omne, quod est ab eo, effluens est. Et quia fons esse primus largitor 
est formae, quae est apud se, idcirco non est prohibens, quin effluat; et 
hic fons est coercens omne, quod est, ambiens et comprehendens. Unde 
necesse est, ut quaecumque substantiae sunt, sint oboedientes actioni 
eius et sequentes eum in dando suas formas et largiendo suas vires, 
quamdiu invenerint materiam paratam ad recipiendum haec. Fluxus 
15  N. Bray, “Eckhart e la riforma filosofica dell’umiltà”; A. Palazzo, “Eckhart’s Islamic and 
Jewish Sources: Avicenna, Avicebron, and Averroes”, in J.M. Hackett (ed.), A Companion 
to Meister Eckhart (Leiden: Brill, 2013), p. 253–298, in particular p. 271–281; F. Brunner, 
“Maître Eckhart et Avicébron”, in J. Jolivet, Z. Kaluza, A. de Libera (eds), Lectionum 
Varietates. Hommage à Paul Vignaux (1904–1987) (Paris: Vrin, 1991), p. 133–154, in particu-
lar p. 150; B. McGinn, “Ibn Gabirol: The Sage among the Schoolmen”, in L.E. Goodman 
(ed.), Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought (Albany, NY: suny Press, 1992), p. 77–109, in par-
ticular 96–97.
16  Cf. Pessin, Solomon Ibn Gabirol (Avicebron) [accessed October 26, 2020].
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autem substantiarum intelligitur motus et desiderium earum circa dandi 
actionem, in quo imitantur factorem primum. Sed sunt diversae in hoc 
secundum perfectionem earum et imperfectionem, quia earum aliae 
fluunt in non tempore, aliae fluunt in tempore, et proportio quarumli-
bet altiorum substantiarum ad inferiores in dando fluxum talis est, qualis 
proportio primi factoris ad altiores substantias et inferiores ad influen-
dum super illas, quamvis fluxus earum in unoquoque modo est diversus. 
Similiter etiam comparatio altiorum substantiarum ad factorem primum 
in recipiendo ab ipso talis est, qualis est inferiorum ad altiores in reci-
piendo ab ipsis. Et omnino prima influxio, quae est complectens omnes 
substantias, ipsa fecit necesse, ut aliae substantiarum influerent aliis.17
This action, which proceeds from the first Creator through the mediation of 
the Will, is transmitted to the inferior entities that wish to imitate the perfec-
tion of the first Creator. This connection of generosity and desire constitutes 
the flow which, according to Avicebron, holds the whole universe together, 
making it intelligible and comprehensible (Fons vitae, iii.25, p. 413). The simple 
substance, which receives the universal form from the Creator, cannot imprint 
on what is composite anything that is not already in its essence. Otherwise, 
a created substance would create from nothing, and thus would appropriate 
what is proper to the Creator. The problem, then, is to relate the multiplic-
ity and extension of sensitive forms to the purity and simplicity of that from 
which they derive. Therefore, Avicebron argues, it is not the substance that 
flows (because in that case we would have an identity of essence at every level 
of reality, without hierarchical order); rather, only the radii et vires of the sub-
stances are communicated.
Just as the first Creator gives only what is apud se, likewise spiritual sub-
stances give to inferior realities only what is near them. As is clearly stated 
in Fons vitae iii.52, this means that they do not give their essences, but their 
perfections, their radii and vires:
Essentiae substantiarum simplicium non sunt defluxae, sed vires earum 
et radii haec sunt, quae defluunt et effunduntur eo, quod essentiae 
uniuscuiusque harum substantiarum finitae sunt et terminatae et non 
extensae usque in infinitum, sed radii earum fluunt ab illis et excedunt 
terminos suos et limites propter continentiam earum sub primo fluxu, 
qui effluit a voluntate, scilicet prime boni, sicut lumen, quod effluit a sole 
in aerem, quia hoc lumen excedit terminos solis et extenditur per aerem, 
17  Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. iii, c. 13, p. 107, l. 11–p. 108, l. 10.
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et sicut vis animalis effluit a virtute rationali, cuius sedes est cerebrum, et 
in nervos et lacertos, quia haec virtus est penetrans et diffusa per omnes 
partes corporis, et substantia animae in se non est diffusa neque extensa, 
similiter quaelibet substantiarum simplicium extendit radium et lumen 
suum et diffundit in id, quod est inferius eo, et tamen substantia in hoc 
retinet ordinem suum et non excedit finem suum.18
According to Fernand Brunner,19 the emanation of creatures is as it is precisely 
because it has a relationship of identity and otherness with respect to its first 
Cause. All things differ from the Cause since they are not the Cause, and yet all 
things are identical to the Cause because they depend on it. The first Creator 
never degrades into its effect, because it never comes out of itself; insofar as it 
remains in itself, it affirms itself, projecting its image (the Will) which is not 
itself but which is nevertheless from itself.
Another important element involved in the process of emanation is 
undoubtedly the Will, whose role is clarified especially in the fifth book of the 
Fons vitae,20 but which Avicebron also mentions in previous books. The Will is 
the link between God and creation, a first hypostasis of the divinity that is – at 
the same time – a hypostasis external to God (but other than the Intellect) 
and an aspect of the divine essence. The Will secundum essentiam coincides 
with God and as God is infinite and indefinable, but secundum effectum is dif-
ferent from him, because it is made finite and accessible by his action. The 
Will is responsible for the order of reality: its being fortior apud deum quam 
est longius ab eo proceeds in parallel with the gradual passage from the purity 
to corporeality of entities, although degradation is a function of the essence 
of what receives it, that is, of the matter in which it is placed. The light of the 
Will spreads everywhere with the same intensity; it is matter which then deter-
mines the greater or lesser opacity of the various substances that receive it.21 
Although Avicebron does not provide a thematic discussion of the Will of God, 
the role assigned to it within Fons vitae is far from marginal: in addition to being 
the limit of human knowledge, the Will functions as a connecting element 
between God and creation, transmitting to the latter what it receives from the 
former. Yet this conception of the Will takes hold only to a limited extent in 
Latin culture, which is attracted more than anything else by the doctrine of 
18  Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. iii, c. 52, p. 196, l. 5–20.
19  F. Brunner, “Création et emanation. Fragment de philosophie comparée”, in F. Brunner, 
Métaphysique d’Ibn Gabirol et de la tradition platonicienne (Aldershot: Ashgate / Variorum, 
1997), p. 39–40.
20  Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. v, c. 37, p. 663.
21  Benedetto, Saggio, p. 116.
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universal hylomorphism, although there are rare occasions in which the name 
of Avicebron is connected with the theme of the Will. One of the exceptions is 
precisely that of Berthold, as we shall see shortly.
To summarise so far: the purpose of the human being is to achieve happi-
ness, that is, to know the universe in which he is inserted as a substance. As a 
substance, the human being is also subject to the law of flow, which transmits 
the divine vis from the first Cause to the lower realities. This process of emana-
tion occurs thanks to the largitas of the first Creator and the desire of simple 
substances to imitate the factor primus. Between God and his creation, how-
ever, there is an intermediary, the Will of God, which, while coinciding with 
him, is at the same time his productive side, so to speak, and therefore other 
than him. In this way, a dynamic of identity and difference is established in all 
degrees of being: identity is guaranteed by the flowing of radii et vires that are 
communicated by the Will to the inferior realities, and difference is guaranteed 
because what flows is not the same essence, but rather the qualities of it. It is 
therefore not surprising that Berthold shows great interest in Avicebron’s solu-
tion to the problem of the One and many, as we shall see in the third section of 
this paper. For now, I will proceed to a quick overview of the other source used 
by Berthold in connection with the concept of essential causality: the treatise 
De cognitione entium separatorum by Dietrich of Freiberg.
2 Dietrich of Freiberg and Essential Causality
Much has been written about essential causality in Dietrich of Freiberg.22 This 
section will not, therefore, add anything to what has already been effectively 
demonstrated. Its purpose is merely a general presentation of what Dietrich 
says about essential causality in De cognitione entium separatorum. The 
choice of this treatise is determined by the fact that Berthold himself in Prop. 
22  B. Mojsisch, “Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Berthold von Moosburg. Zur Proklosrezeption 
im Mittelalter”, in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, O. Summerell (eds), Selbst – Singularität – 
Subjektivität: Vom Neuplatonismus zum Deutschen Idealismus (Amsterdam: Grüner, 2002), 
p. 175–184; B. Mojsisch, “Causa essentialis bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart”, 
in K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 106–
114; M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, “Filosofia della natura e filosofia dell’intelletto in Teodorico 
di Freiberg e Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister 
Eckhart (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 115–127; M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, “À propos du néopla-
tonisme d’Albert le Grand: Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d’Albert dans le 
Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de Moosburg”, in Archives de Philosophie 43(1980), 
p. 635–654; K. Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg. Philosophie, Theologie, Naturforschung um 1300 
(Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2007), p. 201, 534.
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172 – explicitly dedicated to the theme of essential causality – extensively 
quotes this treatise.
According to the schema provided by Proclus’ Elementatio theologica, 
Dietrich of Freiberg states that the structure of reality is organized in four hier-
archical orders, four maneries entium. Although Dietrich addresses this issue 
in many of his works, it is specifically at the beginning of De cognitione entium 
separatorum that one finds a complete formulation of this structure: God 
represents the summit of reality, followed by the intelligences and then the 
celestial souls; then come the angels and lastly human souls. God occupies the 
summit of the hierarchy of reality. He is indeed the first cause of the totality of 
things by the mode of creation, and his perfection exceeds all other perfection. 
God is intellect in essence; he is perfect unity and simplicity.
The second degree of being proceeds immediately from God. These are the 
intelligences, purely intellectual substances or intellects by essence – because 
of their proximity to the first principle, in each of them the totality of the created 
universe is reflected and shines forth. Each intelligence proceeds from another 
through a mode of essential causality conferred upon it by God, but is a mode 
of production inferior to creation, for it presupposes the creative activity of 
the first principle. Dietrich makes an important remark regarding these intel-
lectual substances; their existence is posited in relation to the order of nature 
and according to the opinion of the philosophers, which can be accepted or 
rejected as long as the existence of such substances is not enshrined in Sacred 
Scripture, where no mention is made of them (“[…] si admittatur positio phi-
losophorum eo, quod Scriptura sancta de eis non loquitur […]”).23
The same consideration also applies to the third degree of realities posited 
by the philosophers in the order of nature, the celestial souls (“Ex his tertio 
loco secundum philosophos procedunt quaedam substantiae intellectuales, 
quas animas caelorum dicunt”).24 Just like the intelligences, celestial souls are 
purely intellectual substances, that is to say, intellects by essence, but of a per-
fection inferior to those that precede them: firstly, because they are produced 
by the intelligences and therefore do not proceed directly from the first prin-
ciple, and secondly, because they are ordered to bodies, that is to say, to the 
celestial bodies whose act and form they are. At the fourth level of the hierar-
chy are the angels: although they are purely immaterial realities, the angels are 
spiritual substances and are no longer intellectus per essentiam. In Dietrich’s 
conception this means that angels are not pure and simple essences, because 
23  Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione, 1.1–3, p. 168, l. 34–51.
24  Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione, 1.4, p. 168, l. 52–p. 169, l. 63.
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their faculties and operations differ from their substances: therefore, angels 
are composed, individualized realities, and their action is no longer essential.
Finally, in the fifth and last degree, there are human souls, whether they 
are considered according to their union with the body that they animate or 
according to their separation from it. As with angels, so also with human souls, 
but to a still greater extent, their faculties and operations differ from their sub-
stances. The criterion of this hierarchy is action through a thing’s own essence 
and therefore the exercise of an essential causality. Only this kind of causal-
ity is capable of ensuring continuity between the different levels of reality, in 
order to guarantee its homogeneity and unity. But what is an essential cause? 
First of all, according to Dietrich, the essential cause contains in itself more 
eminently its caused and the being of its effect (“necessarium est ipsam habere 
causatum suum et esse causatum suum nobiliore et eminentiore et perfectiore 
modo, quam ipsum causatum sit in se ipso secundum propriam naturam”).25 
He then enumerates five properties that are required for a cause to be defined 
as essential: it must be 1) substantia, 2) substantia viva, 3) substantia viva essen-
tialiter. The life which the essential cause lives is 4) vita intellectualis and there-
fore is proper to 5) intellectus in actu per essentiam.
Dietrich clearly states that, of the five levels of reality listed above, only 
three can be said to be essential causes: God, intelligences, and celestial souls 
(“Et ista quinque conveniunt substantiis separatis, scilicet Deo et intelligen-
tiis et his, quasi animas caelorum vocant”).26 Three elements should be kept 
in mind. Firstly, according to Dietrich, God and celestial souls are essential 
causes. Secondly, throughout the treatise, Dietrich keeps a prudent distance 
from the vexata quaestio of the animation of the heavens. He presents it as an 
idea of the philosophers, which can be rejected or accepted.27 Thirdly, essen-
tial causality is explained by Dietrich as an inner activity, which institutes a 
homogeneous unity that communicates the divine creative activity, which is 
the essential cause par excellence. In Dietrich’s universe the essential causes 
are therefore necessary mediations: they exert an intermediate causality that 
ensures continuity, homogeneity, order in the totality of reality and, therefore, 
guarantees intelligibility. Causae essentiales exclusively concern intellects by 
essence, which are the only entities free of all composition and are vivae per se.
25  Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione, 22.5, p. 186, l. 84–90.
26  Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione, 23.1–6, p. 186, l. 93–p. 187, l. 110.
27  On this topic cf. L. Sturlese, “Il De animatione caeli di Teodorico di Freiberg”, in R. Creytens, 
P. Künzle (eds), Xenia medii aevi historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli O.P. (Roma: 
Edizioni di storia e letteratura, 1978), p. 175–247; Suarez-Nani, Substances séparées, p. 52.
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Now, what is living is distinguished from what is not living by the fact that 
living being contains its principle of motion within itself, according to which 
each part moves another. In De intellectu et intellegibili Dietrich interprets this 
purely experimental datum as a transfusio of one part on the other, which 
causes an overflow to the outside. Thus, all overflow presupposes an inner 
activity.
Sicut autem dictum est de corporibus, ita se habet de animabus seu ani-
matis, videlicet quod necessarium est inveniri in eis quoad suas partes 
quandam transfusionem, qua una pars fluat in aliam, quo redundet in 
extra. Quod non solum per experientiam patet tam in vivis perfectis, 
videlicet in motu cordis, arteriarum, pulmonis et pectoris et ceteris tali-
bus, verum etiam in imperfectis ut in plantis et conchyliis, ut in ostreis 
et ceteris talibus, non solum, inquam, hoc habetur per experientiam, sed 
etiam ex propria ratione vivi inquantum vivum, quia vivum differt a non 
vivo in habendo in se principium sui motus, quo una pars movet aliam.28
The essential order so described, which links the different orders of reality, is 
thus the result of a model that Dietrich derives from the observations of the 
structure of physical and living beings. The intellectus in actu per essentiam are 
therefore entities living intellectually because of an interiorem transfusionem:
Sed hoc video inquirendum, quomodo in istis intellectibus inveniatur 
aliqua interior transfusio, quo aliquid fluat in aliud, quo etiam in eis 
inveniantur principia activa, et praecipue in eis, qui sunt intellectus per 
essentiam semper in actu.29
This is why the rationality of the universe rests on its unity: this unity is not 
that of a disordered mass but results from the links that join the different com-
ponents of the universe to each other. Essential causes are thus necessary for 
the cohesion of the universe according to Dietrich’s view, and this causality 
can only be exercised by intellects essentially in act, that is, by intelligences 
of the Neoplatonic type. Dietrich thus identifies with Proclus and the Liber de 
causis30 the One and the Good, which refers to the relationship between the 
28  Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intellegibili in Dietrich of Freiberg, Schriften zur 
Intellekttheorie, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), p. 131–210, here i.6.1, p. 139, 
l. 88–p. 140, l. 10.
29  Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu, i.8.1, p. 141, l. 46–49.
30  Cf. D. Calma, Le poids de la citation: Étude sur les sources arabes et grecques dans l’œuvre de 
Dietrich de Freiberg (Freiburg: Academic Press, 2011).
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origin and the originated. Being moves from the One as origin to the Good as 
destination in a cycle that shows origin and destination to be identical. In all 
of the levels of being mentioned above, being necessarily flows into something 
outside of itself, because otherwise it would be redundant and futile in nature, 
as Dietrich claims in De intellectu.31
Dietrich’s doctrine on essential causality does however have a limit: it seems 
to establish a relationship of identity and difference between the various parts 
that make up the structure of the universe (the famous formula “identical 
in essence, but different in being”), but in fact it does not explain how this 
happens – what the process is that grounds essential causality.
Two important issues remain to be clarified: In what sense must the state-
ment “the cause contains its caused in a more eminent and noble way” be 
understood? Could this not lead to an identity of the levels of being, which 
would thereby nullify the hierarchical order?
3 Berthold of Moosburg on Essential Causality: Prop. 18
As recently summed up by Irene Zavattero,32 Berthold explains the structure of 
the Proclean cosmos by means of “the fluxus-doctrine” of Albert the Great and 
Ulrich of Strassburg.33 In order to explain how this fluxus takes place, Berthold 
resorts to Dietrich of Freiberg’s theory of essential causality. As mentioned 
at the beginning of this paper, however, Berthold quotes another authority 
to support his interpretation of the essential cause, namely the Fons vitae of 
Avicebron, whose use goes far beyond the merely doxographical. This clearly 
emerges from his Tabula contentorum where, under the entry “Avencebrol”, he 
recalls the theme of the bestowal of being and the ontological status of the 
giver of being relative to lower realities – a theme that he explicitly connects to 
essential causality. The proposition to which Berthold is referring in his Tabula 
31  Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu, i.10.2, p. 143, l. 6–11: Ex praemissis colligitur substantiam 
illam, et hoc omnem talem, quae est intellectus per essentiam semper in actu, habere in se 
virtutem principii activi, qua agit aliquid extra se in aliud. Alioquin esset frustra in natura. 
Frustra enim est, quod destituitur proprio fine secundum Philosophum in II Physicorum. 
Natura autem nihil agit frustra, quia, sicut non deficit in necessariis, ita non abundat in 
superfluis.
32  I. Zavattero, “Berthold of Moosburg”, in H. Lagerlund (ed.), Encyclopedia of Medieval 
Philosophy (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011), p. 163–165.
33  Tommaso Ferro is dedicating his doctoral work to the theme of essential causality in 
Ulrich of Strassburg under my supervision and that of Prof. Andreas Speer. Cf. also King, 
Supersapientia, p. 155, 168–169.
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is Prop. 18, which states: “Omne derivans esse aliis ipsum prime est hoc, quod 
tradit recipientibus derivationem”.34 By invoking many authorities Berthold 
demonstrates in his commentary the primacy of what gives being over what 
receives it. He cites Avicebron verbatim and extensively to demonstrate the 
conditions (the status) of the giver of being, the necessity of simple substances 
between the first cause and lower realities, and the nature of the action per-
formed by the different levels of reality on each other. Berthold interprets the 
connection of each derivans esse in terms of essential causality, carried out by 
simple substances, which, as we have seen, share the divine virtus with lower, 
composite realities.
Berthold first enumerates the features of every derivans esse: it must be 
(necessarium est) “bonum, unum, perfectum, plenum, simplex, forte sive 
potens, subtile, spirituale, luminosum et quodammodo infinitus seu intermi-
nabilis essentiae”. For the first four condiciones, Berthold summons the author-
ities of Dionysius, Proclus, and Macrobius, while to describe the remaining 
attributes he quotes a very long passage from the third book of the Fons vitae, in 
which Avicebron provides a demonstration of the existence of the simple sub-
stances according to the action performed by these substances on each other. 
We have seen, indeed, that simple substances share their forms both out of 
the desire to imitate the largitas of the primary cause and from their intrinsic 
constitution (nature), because the stronger and more subtle the agent is, the 
more incisive and penetrating its action. Avicebron’s demonstration is based 
on the observation that composed substances such as quantitas et figura do 
not have the capacity to “influence” because of their weakness and coarseness. 
It can be deduced, therefore, that simple substances have the capacity to com-
municate their forms precisely because they are simpler and more luminous 
than composite entities. If this is true, how much subtler and stronger must be 
the virtus Dei that spreads and penetrates everywhere. Berthold therefore fully 
agrees with Avicebron, who believes, as we have seen in the first part, that it is 
not God himself who flows, but rather, his virtus, or universal form.
This dynamic, described bottom-up as a progressive simplification of enti-
ties, implies that everything is simpler, more subtle and luminous in itself than 
in the composite entities to which it is communicated. Simple substances, 
therefore, accept the forms (which they then transmit to what is below) in a 
purer way than they are in composite substances.
34  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18, p. 44, l. 2–3.
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Quinta condicio cum sequentibus patet per Avencebrol libro iii cap. 15, 
ubi dicit: “[…] Effluxio enim est ex impulsu, impulsus autem ex vi; signum 
autem, quod vis et subtilitas faciunt influxum, est hoc, quod quantitas 
et figura non imprimunt suum simile in obstans, cum potens fuerit reci-
pere; et hoc non est nisi propter debilitatem quantitatis et grossitudinem 
eius ad penetrandum. Similiter dicendum de accidente, quia, quo fuerit 
fortius, subtilius et luminosius, erit penetrabilius. Conficiemus ergo ex 
his sex propositionibus hoc, scilicet quod substantiae simplices necesse 
est, ut dent se ipsas et conferant suas formas. Et etiam quia hoc, quod 
vires et radii, qui effluunt de corpore, sunt spirituales, signum est, quo-
niam effluere debent etiam substantiae spirituales. Et etiam quia, cum 
nos invenimus substantiam corpoream prohibitam ad conferendum se 
propter crassitatem quantitatis et tenebrositatem eius, et tamen quan-
titas confert umbram suam corporibus, quae opposita sunt, adeo quod, 
cum invenerit corpus lucidum ut speculum, dat ei formam suam, quanto 
magis necessarium est secundum hanc considerationem, ut substantia 
spiritualis, quae est immunis a quantitate, sit effluens suam essentiam 
et virtutem et lumen suum? … Quanto enim fuerint subtiliores, fortiores 
et meliores, tanto magis aptae sunt ad agendum et conferendum se et 
sua”. Et infra: “Et cum attenderis, quod essentia substantiae simplicis non 
habet finem, et attenderis vim eius, et cogitaveris penetrabilitatem eius 
in rem contra positam, quae parata est recipere eam, et comparaveris 
inter eam et substantiam corpoream, invenies substantiam corpoream 
non potentem esse ubique et debilem ad penetrandum res, et invenies 
substantiam simplicem, hoc est substantiam animae universalis, diffu-
sam per totum mundum et sustinentem illum in se propter subtilitatem 
et simplicitatem suam; et sic invenies substantiam intelligentiae univer-
salis diffusam per totum mundum et penetrantem illum. Causa autem 
huius est subtilitas substantiarum ambarum et vis et lumen earum; et 
propter hoc fuit substantia intelligentiae infusa et penetrans interiora 
rerum. Quanto magis ergo secundum hanc considerationem debet esse 
virtus Dei sancti penetrans omnia, existens in omnibus, agens in omni-
bus sine tempore!”
Ex dictis Avencebrol colligitur evidenter omne derivans esse aliis esse 
simplex, forte, subtile, spirituale, luminosum et quodammodo infinitum 
et interminabilis essentiae.35
35  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18A, p. 45, l. 44–p. 46, l. 84.
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From the passage from the Fons vitae, which Berthold quotes literally and 
extensively, it is clear that he shares two of Avicebron’s aforementioned posi-
tions: 1) both the simple substances and the first Creator share only what is 
apud se, namely, the virtus, radii and vires, and not the same essence. 2) The 
activity of God and of the simple substances, however, extends throughout the 
universe (penetrans omnia, existens in omnibus, agens in omnibus) due to their 
subtility and simplicity, which explains the mechanics of essential causality.
Once the conditions of each derivans esse aliis have been defined, it neces-
sarily follows that it is an essential cause, as Berthold clearly states in section 
18D: “De primo sciendum, quod derivans esse aliis quodcumque, quod etiam 
necessario est causa essentialis […]”. As such, it spreads a univocal intention 
through all its participants. But although this intention exists in the deter-
mined entity, that entity does not lose its intrinsic nature. It remains identical 
in its determinations, varying only in the mode of being of the various reali-
ties that constitute the universe. This, as is well known, is the law of essential 
causality formulated by Dietrich of Freiberg in the treatise De intellectu et intel-
ligibili, where he establishes a difference between the relationship of cause-
caused and that of determinable-determined. Unlike a cause in the caused 
(effect), which “recedes from its proper intelligibility”:
Non sic se habent ad invicem determinabile et id, in quod fit determina-
tio, quia talia non habent se ad invicem ex additione secundum essen-
tiam, quamvis numerentur secundum esse, nec ipsum determinabile 
existens in determinato recedit et cadit a sua propria ratione, sed idem et 
eiusdem rationis et proprietatis per essentiam manet in tali determina-
tione, sed solum variatur secundum esse, et idem et eiusdem rationis per 
essentiam manet sub diverso modo essendi.36
Because of essential causality, every order of reality is always immediately 
intelligible, in that the essence is present in the determined, which guaran-
tees the unity and intelligibility of the entire universe and, at the same time, 
ensures the possibility for the human being to return, through knowledge, to 
its origin.
In support of Dietrich’s position, Berthold cites, once again, long passages 
from the Fons vitae, in order to demonstrate the following points: intellectual 
apprehension occurs by similarity, and every derivans esse aliis knows the spiri-
tuality of things (their essence); every derivans esse aliis has knowledge of all 
36  Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu, iii.21.3, p. 194, l. 111–117. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio, 18D, p. 53, l. 342–354.
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things that derive from it, and knowledge is nothing more than the subsistence 
of known forms in the knower; all forms that flow are united in that from which 
they derive; everything that derives from some origin, is united in that origin. 
Berthold’s elegant mosaic certainly reveals a strong affinity of the metaphysics 
of fluxus developed by Avicebron, based on the overflowing of forms, with the 
essential causality theorised by Dietrich of Freiberg. Compared to Dietrich’s 
formulation, however, Avicebron seems to explicate more clearly the relation-
ship between identity and difference established across the various ranks of 
reality, precisely because, according to Avicebron’s doctrine, what flows is not 
the same essence, but rather, as we have seen, the virtus Dei and radii et vires 
of simple substances, which thus avoids the theoretical possibility of “a night 
in which all cows are black”.37 Berthold himself explicitly links the dialectic of 
identity-difference with the doctrine of essential causality when tracing the 
structure of the last part of his commentary in Prop. 18:
Circa propositum tria faciam, quia primo ponam omnis aliis esse deri-
vantis duplicem considerationem et ex hoc identitatis et diversitatis eius 
ad ea, quae tradit derivationem recipientibus, rationem, secundo addam 
praedictis multiplicem probationem, tertio ex praemissis ostendam pro-
positi intentionem.38
It is therefore worthwhile exploring Avicebron’s contribution to the doctrine 
of the essential cause, which seems to be linked to the metaphysics of the flow, 
that is, to clarify what is communicated from the first Creator to the lowest 
realities. This theme is taken up in Prop. 172, to which we now turn.
4 Berthold of Moosburg on Essential Causality: Prop. 172
As previously shown, according to the intention expressed by Berthold in the 
Tabula contentorum, his commentary on Prop. 172 is dedicated to the definition 
of an essential cause. He skillfully interweaves large excerpts from chapters 6, 
22, 23, and 24 of Dietrich’s De cognitione entium separatorum and Avicebron’s 
Fons vitae. The result is a presentation of the theory of essential causation that 
is apparently faithful to Dietrich’s intentions, but in fact turns out to be an 
original interpretation of it. Let us discuss this in detail.
37  Georg W.F. Hegel, Phänomenologie des Geistes, 4, 16.
38  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18D, p. 52, l. 287–290.
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Berthold aims at three objectives: to demonstrate that each intellectus in 
actu is an essential cause, to describe its conditions, and to show that each 
essential cause contains its own effects. In doing this, Berthold constructs an 
argument taken from chapter 6 of De cognitione entium separatorum, in which 
Dietrich intends to demonstrate that angels (one of the levels of the universe 
described in section 2 of this article) are not essential causes. Dietrich states 
that each active substance acts in a manner corresponding to its own nature: 
therefore, some will act intellectually, others spiritually, and still others bodily. 
Among these, intellectual substances are those that act more eminently than 
the others because they are intellects by essence and, accordingly, their action 
is their essence (intelligendo agunt). As shown in section 2, to act according to 
the essence itself is the criterion that determines the hierarchical order of the 
four maneries and, therefore, distinguishes, Dietrich writes, the essential cause 
from the accidental cause: “est autem proprium et per se causae essentialis per 
suam essentiam causare. Et in hoc distinguitur a causa accidentali”.39
“Omnis autem substantia activa elicit suam propriam actionem modo 
sibi proprio, id est secundum modum ipsius substantiae; unde aliter 
exerunt suas actiones intellectualia, aliter spiritualia et aliter corpora-
lia, inter quae tria intellectualia, quae sunt intellectus per essentiam, 
altissimo modo agunt, quia intelligendo agunt,” ut inferius apparebit, 
“et sic non agunt nisi per suas essentias,” “et in hoc distinguuntur a cau-
sis” substantialibus, quales sunt animae caelorum cum suis corporibus, 
et “a causis accidentalibus, sive tales sint removens prohibens sive sint 
accidentales, quod vestiantur aliquibus accidentibus, quae sint sibi ratio 
agendi, ut calor igni.”40
Thanks to the precise editorial work of Jeck and Tautz, it is possible to recon-
struct Berthold’s intervention in this passage. In the midst of a literal quota-
tion from Dietrich’s text, Berthold introduces a significant variation: intellects 
by essence, which are essential causes, are distinguished not only from acci-
dental causes (as Dietrich remarks), but also from substantial causes, which – 
Berthold explicitly states – are the celestial souls with their own bodies (“‘et in 
hoc distinguuntur a causis’ substantialibus, quales sunt animae caelorum cum 
suis corporibus”). This is a relevant statement, because according to Dietrich, 
even celestial souls are essential causes. Dietrich himself makes a difference 
between essential causes, substantial causes, and accidental causes (see for 
example chapter 75 of De cognitione), and Berthold himself is fully aware of 
39  Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione, 6.2, p. 172, l. 88–89.
40  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 172A, p. 120, l. 20–28.
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this (see for example his comment on Prop. 7C). But the point is that here 
Berthold does not quote chapter 75 of De cognitione, although he knows it, 
but the chapter in which Dietrich speaks about the status of angels. Berthold’s 
intervention is clearly deliberate and, in my opinion, has only one meaning: 
heavenly souls are not intellectus in actu per essentiam and consequently are 
not essential causes.
As for accidental causes, Berthold adds that their manner of action is in a 
sense similar to the motion or power to cause essentially, which is (following 
Dietrich again) nothing other than a “flow of essential power flowing essen-
tially into something else”:
Dico autem “ratio agendi” non tantum “continuandi virtutem causae” ad 
“suum passum, qualia sunt accidentia” “corporis caelestis,” quibus “virtus 
eius continuatur ad passa, puta motus et lumen, quibus mediantibus” vir-
tus caeli continuatur inferioribus passivis; cui quasi consimilis est motus 
seu “causandi virtus essentialis, qui non est nisi defluxio virtutis essentia-
lis essentialiter fluentis in aliud.”41
At this point, Berthold attaches a long passage from Avicebron’s Fons vitae, 
already quoted above in section 1, which states again that it is not the essences 
that flow, but rather their rays that spread usque infinitum because of their 
containment (continentia) in the first fluxus, which flows from the Will, that 
is – Berthold explains – the prime bonum:
Et hoc est, quod dicit Avencebrol libro iii, cap. 52: “Essentiae substan-
tiarum simplicium non sunt defluxae, sed vires earum et radii haec sunt, 
quae defluunt et effunduntur eo, quod essentiae uniuscuiusque harum 
substantiarum finitae sunt et terminatae” et “non extensae usque in infi-
nitum, sed radii earum fluunt ab illis et excedunt terminos suos et lim-
ites propter continentiam earum sub primo fluxu, qui effluit a voluntate,” 
scilicet prime boni, “sicut lumen, quod effluit a sole in aerem, quia hoc 
lumen excedit terminos solis et extenditur per aerem.”42
Then Berthold refers back to Dietrich’s De cognitione and lists the five char-
acteristics of an essential cause, already analysed above in section 2. Here 
41  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 172A, p. 121, l. 29–34, citing Dietrich of Freiberg, De cog-
nitione, 6.3, p. 173, l. 98–105.
42  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 172A, p. 121, l. 35–41, citing Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. III, 
c. 52, p. 196, l. 5–12.
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once again he introduces a slight but important modification to the Dietrich’s 
text. While Dietrich affirms that the five characteristics listed are proper (con-
veniunt) to the separate substances, i.e. God and intelligences, in addition to 
heavenly souls, and, incidenter, also to the agent intellect,43 Berthold limits the 
range of the entities that merit the status of an essential cause by restricting it 
to omni intellectui, and thus excluding de facto God and heavenly souls.44
As previously shown, according to Berthold, God (prime Deus) is beyond 
the intellect.45 In agreement with Avicebron, Berthold argues that what is 
truly knowable by human beings is rather the voluntas Dei, which he identi-
fies with Proclus’ prime bonum. Voluntas in the Fons vitae represents not only 
the connection between the (unknowable) God and universe, but it is also 
the last level of reality that can be known, precisely because of its effects that 
are spread throughout the universe, all the way to composite realities, which 
include the human being.
As argued in section 1, Avicebron interprets the activity of simple substances 
(intellects) as the result of their desire to imitate the action of the primus 
factor, which bestows (largitur) the forms close to it (apud se) through the 
voluntas, its manifestation. This means that the factor primus is always beyond 
all its manifestation and that it is the voluntas that constitutes the primary 
outflowing, from which the outflow of the intelligences derives.
In the context of Berthold’s commentary, Avicebron’s theory of flux is easily 
assimilated to Dionysius’ idea of the superessential Good, which is separated 
from all things (ab omnibus segregatum), but also at the same time is in all 
things (in omnibus).46 According to Dionysius, God moves out of himself to 
establish his effects because of his amorous goodness (bonitas amativa). In 
the same way, Berthold states in his commentary on Prop. 175, every essential 
cause redounds outside itself and is in a certain sense outside itself. In this pro-
cess “every intellectual nature is elevated above nature properly speaking and 
reaches the likeness of the primarily Good” (“omnis intellectualis natura eleva-
tur super naturam proprie dictam et accedit ad similitudinem prime boni”). 
Amor (love) is thus an act of will, which is the perfection of every intellectual 
43  Dietrich of Freiberg, De cognitione, 23.6, p. 187, l. 108–109.
44  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 172B, p. 122, l. 76–77.
45  See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 115E, p. 55, l. 175–177: Haec Dionysius. Ex his satis 
apparet de prime Dei supersubstantialitate. Cum ergo sit superens et ens sit super vitam 
et haec super intellectum per 101, patet prime Deum simpliciter esse supersubstantialem, 
supervitalem et superintellectum.
46  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 175A, p. 146, l. 17.
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nature. It follows that Berthold calls the will of the separate intelligences “the 
communication of divine goodness”, which is “intrinsic to their essence”.47
Evidently influenced by Avicebron’s theory on voluntas, Berthold empha-
sizes the role of the will in the process of emanation, deducing 1) that the 
bonum desires and loves intellectually and 2) that in the communication of the 
divine good, one acts neither for necessitatem coactionis nor for necessitatem 
naturae, but rather for an act of freedom.48
This assumption becomes clearer when Berthold compares two models of 
emanation in 175B:49 one attributed to Avicenna and Algazel (imitator eius), 
the other to Avicebron and Plato.
According to the authority of the former, the intellectus universaliter agens 
acts by actively understanding (active intelligendo), that is, by emitting lower 
separate intelligences (intelligentias emittendo) as well as the various orders of 
intelligences that exist within the souls and celestial bodies.
According to the authority of Avicebron and Plato, instead, the intellectus 
in actu per essentiam produces entities not only by thinking (intelligendo), but 
rather (sed magis) by willing (volendo).50 This means that the activity of intel-
lect derives ex intuitu voluntatis and it is therefore subjected to the superessen-
tial Will.51 As for Avicebron also for Berthold the submission of intelligences 
to the first cause is the result of the desire to imitate the voluntary activity of 
the divine will. For both thinkers, therefore, “the cosmic process is not a neces-
sary and impersonal flow or radiation of all things from the First Principle” (as 
stated by Avicenna), but rather the outcome “of God’s creative will.”52
47  E. King, “Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul”, in Dionysius 36(2018), 
p. 184–199, in particular p. 199.
48  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 175A, p. 147, l. 33–37: Ex hoc enim duo consequuntur 
ipsam voluntatem, unum in se, scilicet quod bonum proprium et eius communionem desid-
erat et amat amore intellectuali, secundum, quod in talis boni redundantis communione non 
agit necessitate coactionis, sed nec proprie necessitate naturae, sed voluntatis libertate, quae 
bene stat cum immutabilitatis necessitate.
49  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 175B, p. 147, l. 60–p. 149, l. 115.
50  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 175B, p. 149, l. 110–115: Hucusque positio Avicennae. 
Alii vero sunt, qui dicunt intellectum in actu per essentiam non solum ‘intelligendo, sed 
magis volendo instituere ea, quae sunt’. Cui positioni videtur consentire Plato in Timaeo 
libro I, ubi dicit: “Voluntatem Dei originem certissimam rerum si quis ponat, recte” “consen-
tiam”, et Avencebrol libro V cap. 17, ubi dicit: “Plato consideravit, quod formae fiunt in intelli-
gentia ex intuitu voluntatis, et fiunt in anima universali ex intuitu intelligentiae universalis”. 
Sicut igitur simpliciter prima causa agit et creat omnia volendo, ita etiam omnis alia causa 
essentialis et praecipue intellectus per essentiam in causando primo se nititur conformare.
51  Cf. King, “Berthold of Moosburg”, p. 199.
52  J.A. Weisheipl, “Albertus Magnus and Universal Hylomorphism: Avicebron. A Note on 
Thirteenth-Century Augustinianism”, in The Southwestern Journal of Philosophy 10/3 
(1979), p. 239–260, at p. 249.
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In my view, the existence of celestial souls and bodies as essential causes is 
proven by the model of Avicenna and Algazel, but not by Avicebron’s model, 
which seems to be the one closest to Berthold’s intentions. This may be the rea-
son for Berthold’s significant silence on the question of heavenly souls in Prop. 
172, a silence that cannot be attributed to a mere synthesis of Dietrich’s theory, 
but rather to Berthold’s specific interpretation of essential causality. His clear 
preference for Avicebron’s emanative model seems also to be confirmed by the 
overlap between the voluntas and prime bonum, which emphasizes the role 
of the Dionysian notion of bonitas amativa, to the detriment of Avicennian 
intellectualism.
One can thus conclude that, combining Dietrich’s authority with that of 
Avicebron, Berthold proposes his own interpretation of essential causality, 
according to which only intellectus in actu per essentiam are causae essentiales.
At the same time, however, the metaphysics of the flow outlined by 
Avicebron seems to diverge from what Proclus affirms in Propositions 72, 7 and 
18, namely, that every intellectus in actu per essentiam presupposes the sub-
ject in which it acts and that it touches (tangit) substantially (substantialiter), 
which suggests an almost ‘physical’ contact between the various hierarchical 
orders.
Omnis intellectus in actu per essentiam et praesupponit subiectum 
suum, in quod agit, praeelaboratum ab omnibus causalioribus se princi-
piis agentibus, per 72, et est simul cum eo et tangit ipsum substantialiter, 
quia, quidquid in eo est, totum est substantia simplex intellectualis, et 
per consequens similem substantiam sibi causat, cum omne agens agat 
sibi simile, licet effectus deficiat in esse a sua per se causa, per 7 et 18 et 
omnis talis coexistentia per essentiam sit causalis active et passive, ut 
inferius apparebit.53
How can this be possible if it is not the substances that flow, but rather their rays 
and forces, i.e. their qualities? To solve this apparent contradiction Berthold 
turns again to the authority of Avicebron to show that, if it is true that radii et 
vires are what flow, they nevertheless emanate from a substantial cause, and 
thus they transmit the same substantiality from higher to lower. It can there-
fore be said, briefly, that these radii et vires of intellectus in actu per essentiam 
are of the same essence as this intellect that diffuses itself intentionally. They 
therefore have a connection both with the essence of the intellect from which 
they come, and with the essences of the things caused, which are of the same 
essence as the emanating intellect, but differ according to the mode of being, 
53  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 172E, p. 124, l. 139–46.
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as shown in the commentary to Prop. 18. This explanation, Berthold empha-
sizes, derives from the text of Avicebron, which seems therefore perfectly con-
sonant with Dietrich’s theory, even if with some correction or clarification.
5 Conclusion
Even after an analysis only of Berthold’s commentary on Propositions 18 and 
172, some conclusions can be drawn:
1) The pivotal role of the Fons vitae in Berthold’s Expositio is confirmed. 
Berthold extensively quotes Avicebron at first hand and without the 
mediation of Thomas of York’s Sapientiale.
2) Without diminishing the contribution of Albert the Great and Ulrich of 
Strassburg, Avicebron’s contribution is particularly significant in relation 
to the theory of essential causality, as documented by Berthold’s Tabula 
contentorum.
3) Berthold uses Avicebron to resolve some ambiguities in the formulation 
of Dietrich’s theory of essential causality: on the one hand, to safeguard 
God’s perfect transcendence and, on the other, to ensure the perfect unity 
and intelligibility of the created universe.
4) Berthold restricts the status of essential cause to the intellectus in actu 
per esentiam, excluding God and the celestial souls, and fully shares 
Avicebron’s theory that it is radii et vires of simple substances that over-
flow and not their essences.
5) To this end Berthold associates the voluntas of the Fons vitae to the 
Proclean prime bonum as the source of the flow of forms spreading 
through all the universe as far as contracted and determined entities. In 
this way he emphasizes the voluntary activity of God and of the intelli-
gences, to detriment of Avicennian intellectualism.
7) Thanks to this chain of forms, the human being is able to go back from 
composite substances to the first source, which however is not God him-
self, but rather the voluntas Dei.
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chapter 3
Between Cologne and Oxford: Berthold of 
Moosburg and Thomas of York’s Sapientiale
Fiorella Retucci
Universität zu Köln / Università del Salento
1 Introduction1
Berthold of Moosburg left us a monumental commentary on the Elements 
of Theology of Proclus, which represents a unique writing of medieval times. 
Berthold’s commentary evolves into a philosophical odyssey, at the end of 
which the human being, solely with the aid of the natural light of the intellect 
(ductu luminis naturalis intellectus),2 reaches his final perfection and becomes 
not only blessed, but also god. Berthold realized his project concerning the 
divinization of the human being by drafting a summa, a broad encyclopedia of 
ancient and modern Platonism, thanks to which the metaphysical and imper-
sonal principles to which Proclus had reduced the Homeric gods acquire a 
new, all-human face.
Little is known about Berthold’s biography, but there is enough to place him 
and his activity in a precise historical and cultural context: Berthold was an 
active member of the German Dominican order and he succeeded Eckhart as 
the head of the Dominican general studium in Cologne; he was, in short, part 
of the circle of thinkers who continued the philosophical tradition that was 
initiated, in Cologne, by Albert the Great.
1 This paper is a reworked version of a paper published in 2019 under the title “Magister 
Thomas Anglicus Minor. Tommaso di York fonte dell’Expositio di Bertoldo di Moosburg,” in 
Tra antichità e modernità. Studi di storia della filosofia medievale e rinascimentale, Quaderni 
di Noctua 5(2019), p. 1–41. The Appendix has been particularly revised and considerably 
increased, especially thanks to the valuable suggestions of Dr. Evan King, whom I would like 
to thank very much here. I am also grateful to Giovanni Lasorella, who studied the relation-
ship between Thomas and Berthold as part of his master’s thesis.
2 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. 
Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), Exp. tit. A, 
p. 38, l. 33.
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The preservation of the philosophical heritage of the so-called Deutsche 
Dominikaner Schule3 and the continuity of the Platonic tradition are both dis-
tinctive features that Berthold almost flaunts in the course of his work. It is 
therefore not a coincidence that he opens his work with a detailed Tabula auc-
toritatum and declares that his Expositio is actually a compilation made on the 
basis of two distinct groups of authors: the doctores ecclesiae, on the one hand, 
and the philosophi famosi, on the other.4
The list of the doctores ecclesiae begins with Dionysius the pseudo-
Areopagite, Augustine, Boethius, Eustratius of Nicaea, John Scotus Eriugena, 
and Calcidius, and ends with six authors chronologically closer to Berthold. 
The first of these six names is that of Thomas Aquinas. Thomas is followed 
by – in order – Albert the Great, who founded the Dominican studium generale 
of Cologne in 1248, Dietrich of Freiberg, a German Dominican active in 
Cologne in the second half of the thirteenth century, and Ulrich of Strassburg, 
a Dominican also linked to the studium of the preachers at Cologne. These are 
all more or less well-known thinkers studied by specialists in medieval philoso-
phy. And they are, above all, Dominican authors, all in some way linked to the 
studium generale of Cologne.
The penultimate name on the list is that of a Frater Arnoldus Luscus. 
Berthold provides some further details about him in the course of his work: 
Arnold is a Dominican (ordinis Praedicatorum) who composed a treatise De 
periodis motuum et mobilium caelestium; he was a diligent observer and calcu-
lator of the movement of celestial bodies and author of a sophisticated table 
on the motion of the stars, which Berthold attached to and with which he 
3 Cf. M. Grabmann, “Der Einfluss Alberts des Grossen auf das mittelalterliche Geistesleben,” in 
Mittelalterliches Geistesleben, vol. 2 (München: Max Hueber Verlag, 1936), p. 325–412; G.M. Löhr, 
Die Kölner Dominikanerschule vom 14 bis zum 16. Jarhundert (Freiburg / Schweiz: Verl. der 
Paulusdr., 1946), p. 29–42; L. Sturlese, “Albert der Grosse und die deutsche philosophische 
Kultur des Mittelalters,” in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 28(1981), p. 133–
147 (reprinted in: L. Sturlese, Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen 
Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007], p. 1–13); N. Largier, “Die 
deutsche Dominikanerschule. Zur Problematik eines historiographiscen Konzepts,” in 
J.A. Aertsen, A. Speer (eds), Geistesleben im 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 
2000), p. 202–213; J.A. Aersten, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip 
the Chancellor (ca. 1225) to Francisco Súarez (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 315–316; H. Anzulewicz, 
“Albertus Magnus und seine Schüler. Versuch einer Verhältnisbestimmung,” in A. Speer, 
Th. Jeschke (eds), Schüler und Meister (Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2016), p. 159–203, esp. 
p. 176–177.
4 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. 
Propositiones 1–13, p. 3–4.
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concluded his commentary on Proposition 198 of the Elementatio theologica.5 
The historical identity of Brother Arnold is still unknown. Isabelle Draelants 
suggested that he should be identified with Arnold of Saxony, a Dominican 
active in Cologne, Erfurt, and Paris in the thirteenth century and author of a 
well-known medieval encyclopedia entitled De floribus rerum naturalium, pre-
served in a single manuscript of the Amplonian collection in Erfurt. Further, 
a work of astrological content, transmitted anonymously in a manuscript pre-
served in Basel (Universitätsbibliothek, O.vi.4), is also attributed to Arnold of 
Saxony.6 Thus, if the identity of Frater Arnoldus was confirmed accordingly, he 
would also be a German Dominican linked to the studium generale of Cologne, 
where Berthold of Moosburg was active as lector generalis.
It is therefore not without reason that scholarly interest has been focused on 
these two aspects of Berthold’s commentary: the reception of the Neoplatonic 
heritage and the continuity of the philosophical tradition of Albert the Great.
The last name on the list of doctores ecclesiae had not been identified 
with any historical figure for a long time. Berthold does not provide any fur-
ther information about him, but provides only a rather generic name. Thus, 
the editors of the text have mostly hesitated to give a face and an identity 
to the Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor, who is the last authority expressly 
mentioned by Berthold in the Tabula auctoritatum.
Only in 1997, Françoise Hudry found some parallel passages in Berthold’s 
text and the incomplete commentary on the Liber XXIV philosophorum by the 
English Franciscan Thomas of York.7 However, after a careful analysis, carried 
out in the context of more recent studies within the editorial project on the 
Sapientiale,8 Berthold’s dependence on Thomas of York proved to be much 
stronger and more consequential than Hudry had indicated at the beginning.
The identification of the Sapientiale as a very important source of the 
Expositio added an important volume to Berthold’s library. An interpretative 
5 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184–
211, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014), 198F, p. 147–148, l. 151–182.
6 I. Draelants, “La transmission du De animalibus d’Aristote dans le De floribus rerum natura-
lium d’Arnoldus Saxo,” in C. Steel, G. Guldentops, P. Beullens (eds), Aristotle’s Animals in the 
Middle Ages and Renaissance (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), p. 126–158, at p. 131–132.
7 Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum, ed. F. Hudry (Turnhout: Brepols, 1997).
8 Cf. especially F. Retucci, “Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor. Eine neue Quelle der Expositio 
super Elementationem theologicam Procli Bertholds von Moosburg – das ungedruckte 
Sapientiale des Franziskaners Thomas von York,” in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prop. 136–159, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 
p. xxiii–xxxix.
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evaluation of Berthold’s reliance on Thomas of York, however, has not yet been 
attempted. There are four good reasons for this: first, Berthold’s commentary 
on Proclus is a monumental work, and Thomas of York’s work is even longer 
and more complex; second, Berthold only tacitly copies large excerpts from 
the Sapientiale, without even indicating that he is quoting from another text; 
third – and this is highly important –, the text of the Sapientiale is still almost 
entirely unpublished and studies devoted to the work of the English Franciscan 
are very rare.
Finally, Thomas’ work was evaluated almost unanimously by scholars: the 
Sapientiale fits perfectly within the Franciscan tradition, and shows very few 
points of contact with the German Dominican one. This influential historio-
graphical idea was introduced by Martin Grabmann, an eminent expert of the 
German Dominican school. According to him, the great historical significance 
of the Sapientiale is due to the fact that it was elaborated not by a Peripatetic 
but by an authentic Augustinian.9 Longpré was more or less of the same opin-
ion, so much so that he defined the philosophical system of Thomas of York as 
a form of “Augustinisme authentique”.10
In an article with a rather unequivocal title (“Great Fighters against 
Averroism”), published in 1930, Cristoforo Krzanic speaks of Thomas’ explicit 
anti-Averroistic and anti-philosophical attitude:
Quando Tommaso di York si accinse a sintetizzare il sapere filosofico 
del mondo antico nella cornice delle idee evangeliche, dovette deci-
dersi: assorbire o l’aristotelismo ellenico e arabico razionaleggiante, o 
il neoplatonismo nel tradizionalismo di Sant’Agostino, di Anselmo, di 
San Bernardo e dei Vittorini, che fino al secolo xiii avevano impresso le 
loro idee su tutte le questioni. […] Tommaso di York per il primo – e lo 
seguirono tutti i maestri francescani – scelse, assorbì la filosofia tradizio-
nale per non toccare la santità dei dommi con l’accettare l’aristotelismo. 
Tommaso fu francescano e non poteva scegliere diversamente, non 
poteva preferire Aristotele ad Agostino. […] È sempre la teologia che fa 
capolino in ogni affermazione del pensiero francescano.11
9  M. Grabmann, “Die Metaphysik des Thomas von York,” in Studien zur Geschichte der 
Philosophie. Festgabe zum 60. Geburtstag Clemens Baeumker (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 
1913), p. 181–193, at p. 191–192.
10  E. Longpré, “Fr. Thomas d’York, O.F.M. La première somme métaphysique du XIIIe siècle,” 
in Archivum Franciscanum Historicum 19(1926), p. 875–930, at p. 893.
11  C. Krzanic, “Grandi lottatori contro l’Averroismo,” in Rivista di filosofia neoscolastica 
22(1930), p. 161–207, at p. 167–168.
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Giulio Bonafede, in his Il pensiero francescano (published in 1952), was con-
vinced that there is no difference between Bonaventure’s philosophical sys-
tem and that of Thomas of York. Thus, Bonafede preferred to describe Thomas’ 
arguments by quoting Saint Bonaventure, who, in his opinion, provided clearer 
expositions than his English confrère.12
Edgar Scully also concluded that
for Thomas of York the Augustinian tradition, after Sacred Scripture 
itself, is, and remains, the very embodiment of Christian wisdom to such 
a degree that Aristotle, or any other philosopher, could not essentially 
alter the time-honoured doctrines of Augustine, Boethius and Anselm.13
As Scully also maintained, the doctrinal content of the Sapientiale was noth-
ing more than a re-presentation of the Augustinianism that was prevalent at 
the time.14
According to the scholarly literature, Thomas of York, a radical Augustinian, 
was, together with Bonaventure and Alexander of Hales, the founder of a uni-
form Franciscan tradition that was later inherited by William de la Mare, John 
Peckam, Peter John Olivi, Peter of Trabibus, and Richard of Middleton.15 It was 
thus a tradition far away from the “deutscher Sonderweg” meticulously recon-
structed by Loris Sturlese in his history of German medieval philosophy.16
More than a century after its publication was first announced, the text of the 
Sapientiale is only recently starting to become available in a modern edition of 
an international editorial project: the third book has just been published;17 the 
first is in print. Some observations about this text and the history of its 
12  G. Bonafede, Il pensiero francescano nel secolo XIII (Palermo: Mori e Figli, 1952), p. 187–189.
13  E. Scully, “Thomas of York and his Use of Aristotle. An Early Moment in the History of 
British Philosophy,” in Culture 20(1959), p. 420–436, at p. 422–423. Scully, however, also 
acknowledged Thomas’ philosophical attitude: “His display of worldly wisdom is, on the 
one hand, a continuation of the spirit of Grosseteste, who was engaged in the work of 
translating and commenting on Aristotle, and whose study of Arabic treatises in optics 
helped to engender and promote his metaphysics of light, all in support of Divinely 
revealed truth. On the other hand, it is in marked contrast to the attitude of some of his 
Franciscan successors on the continent, who, like John Peter Olivy, tend to disparage the 
role of philosophy in the conduct of Christian thought.”
14  Scully, “Thomas of York,” p. 436.
15  Krzanic, “Grandi lottatori,” p. 164.
16  L. Sturlese, Die deutsche Philosophie im Mittelalter. Von Bonifatius bis zu Albert dem Großen 
(784–1280) (München: Beck, 1993), p. 388.
17  Cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, ed. A. Punzi (Firenze: sismel-Edizioni 
del Galluzzo, 2020).
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reception in the work of the Dominican from Moosburg can therefore begin to 
be made on the basis of textual evidence.
The aim of this study is to provide an initial tool for analyzing the relation-
ship between the German Dominican and the English Franciscan, while being 
aware that the list of citations in the Appendix is only a starting point for future 
research. I hope that the laborious work of philology may encourage the work 
of the history of philosophy to answer some questions that still remain. Why 
does Berthold of Moosburg, a Dominican from the Teutonian Province who 
grew up at the school of Albert the Great in Cologne, constantly and literally 
refer to the work of Thomas of York, an English Franciscan active in Oxford in 
the mid-13th century? What makes the Sapientiale so interesting in the eyes of 
the Dominican of Moosburg?
In my opinion, the Sapientiale and the Expositio converge on two points: 
first, the attempt to recover the classical and ancient heritage, aimed at found-
ing self-sufficient philosophical wisdom and, second, the emphasis on the con-
tinuity of the Platonic tradition.
2 The Revival of the Philosophical Heritage
Written between 1250 and 1260, the Sapientiale is a complete treatise on meta-
physics, which Martin Grabmann had already recognized in 1913 as “die einzige 
große Darstellung des Systems der Metaphysik aus der Ära der Hochscholastik”.18
The work is composed of three parts of different length. The subjects of the 
individual parts are theology, ontology, and a special part of metaphysics con-
cerning the world and the soul. Thomas never explicitly uses the expressions 
metaphysica generalis and metaphysica specialis to define the internal division 
of his metaphysics, even though a division conveniently signified by these 
terms is evident in the work.
Thomas constructs his “incomparable monument du savoir philosophique 
au XIIIe siècle”19 by collecting a massive number of theological and philosoph-
ical sources, elaborating a true synthesis of Greek-Arab wisdom and Christian 
wisdom. His familiarity with classical authors prefigures the Oxonian medi-
eval attitude towards antiquity, which characterized the so-called “classicizing 
group” of friars presented in the pioneering, well-documented study English 
Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century, published in 1960 by Beryl 
18  Grabmann, “Die Metaphysik,” p. 191.
19  Longpré, “Fr. Thomas d’York,” p. 891.
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Smalley.20 In the Sapientiale, Apuleius, Hermes, Cicero, Pliny the Elder, Seneca 
Rhetor, Lucius Annaeus Seneca, Valerius Maximus, and Macrobius – all called 
sapientes mundi – join Arabic, Jewish, and Patristic authors – called sapientes 
Dei – in a clear attempt to synthesize Christian and philosophical wisdom.
An unpublished study by Virginia Brown21 allows us to quantify the use that 
Thomas made of the Latin classics in composing his work. In the Sapientiale, 
Cicero is mentioned by name 356 times. Although most of the quotations con-
cern Ciceronian works that were well-known in the Middle Ages, Thomas of 
York also shows that he was familiar with minor works (he quotes De divina-
tione 28 times and the Paradoxa 17 times). Of the 315 mentions of Seneca, 275 
quotations are explicitly derived from the Epistulae.
Now, with very rare exceptions, all quotations from the Latin classics reach 
Berthold’s Expositio only through the Sapientiale by Thomas of York, as the 
analysis of parallel passages in the Sapientiale and the Expositio has shown.
Besides the Latin classics, the Sapientiale is deeply influenced by other 
sources, which we may divide into three distinct groups: Greek philosophers, 
called sapientes mundi; Fathers and medieval Latin authors, called sapientes 
Dei; Arabic and Jewish sources, also defined by Thomas as sapientes mundi.22
The philosophical sources of the Sapientiale by no means have a merely 
decorative function. This is already evident from the number of times they 
appear in the work. The investigation of the explicit sources of the entire first 
book is quite significant: in the first book, which deals with the existence, 
nature, and properties of God, the relation between the sapientes mundi and 
the sapientes Dei is clearly uneven. The sapientes mundi, among whom Thomas 
includes Aristotle, Plato, Averroes, Avicenna, Hermes, Avicebron, Maimonides, 
and Algazel are mentioned by name 1267 times. The sapientes Dei, represented 
above all by Augustine, Boethius, Dionysius the Areopagite, Gregory the Great, 
Anselm, John Damascene, and Bernard of Clairvaux, are mentioned explicitly 
only 397 times.23
20  B. Smalley, English Friars and Antiquity in the Early Fourteenth Century (Oxford: Blackwell, 
1960), esp. p. 45–65.
21  V. Brown, “Latin Classical authors in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York.” The study, kindly 
made available by Prof. James Hankins, is now preserved in the archival material collected 
in the Archivum fratris Thomae Eboracensis at the Thomas-Institut of the University of 
Cologne.
22  For an exhaustive overview of Thomas’s sources, cf. D.E. Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy at 
Oxford (New York: Russell, 1964), p. 53–55.
23  The philosophical authorities explicitly mentioned in the first book are: Aristotle (421 
quotations); Plato (211); Averroes (156); Avicenna (144); Hermes Trismegistus (106); 
Algazel (89); Maimonides (60); Avicebron (46); Themistius (34). The theological authori-
ties explicitly mentioned in the first book are: Augustine (236); Boethius (81); Dionysius 
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These figures alone might be sufficient to prove Thomas’ deep interest in the 
Hellenic and Arabic philosophy. These data become even more interesting if 
we try to understand the true nature of the Sapientiale.
The method and purpose of the work are openly declared by the author 
in the first four introductive chapters: first and foremost, the Sapientiale is 
a work written by a theologian for the purpose of coherently systematizing 
the doctrines of the philosophers in the clear attempt to realize a synthesis of 
Christian and philosophical wisdom.
Has autem utilitates et causas advertens ego minorum minimus elegi 
opus sudore plenum, et propter intellectus nostri imbecillitatem et 
ipsius operis difficultatem, de libris philosophicis congregare aliqua, que 
dixerunt de creatore et creaturis, quod estimo difficile propter eam, que 
paucis facta est, philosophie communicationem, verorum cum falsis con-
fusionem, scientie sub verbis absconsionem.24
In the dense interweaving of sources that constitutes his work, Thomas pro-
ceeds evenly towards a specific goal. His intention is to demonstrate that, 
even though the source of all knowledge is one, the truth can manifest itself 
in two ways: in an authoritative way, that is, through the Holy Scripture, and in 
a rational way, that is, through philosophical inquiry. There is, however, a dis-
tinction between theological, authoritative wisdom and philosophical, ratio-
nal wisdom, since theology and philosophy are separate and distinct in their 
methodology. And if authoritative knowledge secundum traditionem auctori-
tatis allows a broad participation of human beings in wisdom, so much so that 
many may be wise and know the contents of revelation, rational knowledge 
is a difficult task: only few may have access to and acquire this wisdom secun-
dum probationem rationis. That is why it is said that there are not many who 
are wise:
Nempe, cum sint due species sapientie, sicut dicit Rabbi Moses cap. 89, 
una, que est secundum traditionem auctoritatis, et hec dicitur legis, alia 
secundum probationem rationis, possibile est, quod multi sunt sapientes 
Ps Areopagita (41); Gregory the Great (16); Anselm (13); John Damascene (7); Bernard 
of Clairvaux (3). The prevalence of philosophical sources over theological sources has 
already been noted by Sharp, Franciscan Philosophy, p. 50.
24  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 3, Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. 
A.vi.437 (F), f. 4rb; Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301 (V), 
f. 4va; Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 6771 (R), f. 16va.
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priori modo et pauci vero posteriori modo, et propter hoc dictum est, 
quod non multi sapientes.25
The English Franciscan does not at all content himself with delimiting the 
fields of investigation and fixing precise rules for the non-interference of the-
ology and philosophy. Rather, he establishes a real hierarchy, in which greater 
value is attributed to rational investigation than to pure and simple belief in 
the precepts of faith. Human beings are like the servants described by Moses 
Maimonides in the third book of his Dux neutrorum: some servants are so 
distant from the king’s palace that they cannot see the walls; others not only 
enter the king’s palace, but may also look directly into the king’s face. The lat-
ter are those who are advanced in philosophical studies and perfect in every 
science. The approach to the creator is achieved only through perfection in 
the sciences, so that only those who perfectly master the sciences may address 
the king and see his face:
Tertia causa liquet per parabolam, quam super hoc ponit Rabbi Moyses 
cap. 82 comparans Deum regi sedenti in sua munitione, servorum cuius 
quidam sunt extra civitatem, quidam intra, et horum, qui sunt intra, 
quidam vertunt dorsum ad palatium regis et quidam faciem et ad ipsum 
tendunt, ut possint regi appropinquare et ei assistere, et horum quidam 
numquam viderunt murum […]. Nam quamdiu studueris in disciplinali-
bus et dialectica, circuis portam; cum intellexeris naturalia, intrasti muni-
tionem et ambulas per atrium; cum autem intellexeris spiritualia, intrasti 
domum, sed nondum vidisti regem, quousque in hiis omnibus perfectus 
per omnes cogitationes et actus intenderis in creatorem et omnibus aliis 
postpositis posueris omnia opera intellectus tui ad intelligendum essen-
tiam creatoris, quod, cum feceris, videbis faciem regis, hoc est regem in 
decore suo, sicut dixit Ysaias: ‘regem in decore suo videbunt’. Vide igitur, 
qualiter per scientiarum perfectionem maior est appropinquatio ad cre-
atorem, ut soli perfecto liceat alloqui regem et videre faciem eius.26
There is, therefore, no need for a divine intervention into human life. Thanks to 
their own intellectual faculty, human beings alone are responsible for the per-
fection of their own nature. Human beings can emancipate themselves from 
bestiality and, by their own effort, obtain the dignity of humanity (dignitatis 
humane adeptio). The dignity and the superiority of the human beings over 
25  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 3, F, f. 3va; V, f. 3vb; R, f. 15vb.
26  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 3, F, f. 4ra; V, f. 4rb; R, f. 16rb.
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other animals depends exclusively on their wisdom and cognition, which is an 
instrument of reason.
Utilitas omnium scientiarum est acquisitio perfectionis humane pre-
parantis eam in effectu ad futuram felicitatem. […] Et hec perfectio 
tribus modis declarari potest esse per sapientiam. Nam per sapientiam 
est humane creationis consummatio, ab animalitate elongatio et di -
gnitatis humane adeptio. […] Nam sicut dicit Albumasar i tract. diff. 5, 
‘dignitas hominis super cetera animalia non est nisi per sapientiam et 
cognitionem, que est instrumentum rationis, per cognitionem quidem 
rerum, que fuerunt et que future sunt’. Unde nisi esset sapientia, non 
esset homini hec dignitas et ideo, ‘quanto magis auxerit homo scientiam, 
tanto magis augebit prolongationem a ceteris animalibus’, ‘et quanto plus 
minuitur sapientia, tanto magis augebit ceteris animalibus propinqui-
tatem’. Et ‘inter homines, qui fuerit maior sapientia et ratione, ipse erit 
ceteris dignior humanitate’.27
Beatitude, through which the human being becomes god by means of 
participation,28 is not the consequence of a divine illumination or of a divine 
gift, but the result of an intellectual human act, as Thomas argues in a long 
quotation from the Prologue to Book viii of Averroes’ Commentary on the 
Physics, a text that remained almost unknown throughout the Middle Ages:29
27  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1, F, f. 1va–b; V, f. 2va; R f. 13va–b.
28  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10, F, f. 10vb; V, f. 9rb; R, f. 24va: Beatitudo vero est ipsa 
divinitas, unde beatitudinis adeptio beatos deos fieri manifestum est, sed sicut iustitie adep-
tione iusti, ita divinitatem adeptos deos fieri simili ratione necesse est. Omnis igitur beatus 
deus, sed natura quidem unus, participatione vero nihil prohibet esse quam plurimos.
29  The Prologue to Book viii of Averroes’ commentary on the Physics had a very limited cir-
culation in the Middle Ages. For the transmission of this text, see M. Grignaschi, “Indagine 
sui passi del «Commento» suscettibili di aver promosso la formazione di un averroismo 
politico,” in L’averroismo in Italia (Roma: Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, 1979), p. 237–
288, esp. 258–262; H. Schmieja, “Drei Prologen im grossen Physikkommentar des Averroes,” 
in A. Zimmermann (ed.), Aristotelisches Erbe im arabisch-lateinischen Mittelalter (Berlin / 
New York: De Gruyter, 1986), p. 175–189. The quotation from the prologue to the viii Book 
of the Physics with explicit reference to the ambiguity of the word homo is worthy of 
note. As Luca Bianchi has already noted (L. Bianchi, “Filosofi, uomini e bruti. Note per la 
storia di un’antropologia ‘averroista’,” in Studi sull’Aristotelismo del Rinascimento [Padova: 
Il Poligrafo, 2003], p. 41–61, esp. p. 50–52), few medievals followed Averroes on this point. 
The only traces of the presence of this passage in the Latin Middle Ages can be found 
in: (1) Auctoritates Aristotelis, ed. J. Hamesse (Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Publications uni-
versitaires / Béatrice-Nauwelaerts, 1974), 3, 229, p. 159, l. 72–74; (2) Alberich of Reims, 
Philosophia, ed. R.-A. Gauthier, in R.-A. Gauthier, “Notes sur Siger de Brabant. ii. Siger 
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Amplius beatitudo secundum Tullium libro I est in completa visione veri-
tatis, cum totos nos ponemus in contemplandis perspiciendisque rebus. 
Visio autem veritatis sapientia est, quare in ipsa est beatitudinis adim-
pletio. Hec est enim ultima fortunitas, videlicet esse perfectum ultima 
perfectione per scientias speculativas secundum Averroem super princi-
pium viii Physicorum. Et ideo dicit quod homo dicitur quasi equivoce de 
tali homine et de aliis hominibus, et hanc fortunitatem dicit esse vitam 
eternam.30
Thomas thus also concurred with Averroes concerning a point that only few 
medieval theologians agreed to: through an intellectual act, the human being 
can join and be assimilated to God.31 The perfection in the speculative sci-
ences leads the human beings to fully realize their humanity and to obtain 
eternal life, Thomas maintains following Averroes. Instead of being the point 
of departure of an anti-Averroist struggle within the Franciscan Order, which 
had Bonaventure as a protagonist, Thomas of York seems to embrace the 40th 
thesis of the list condemned at Paris in 1277: there is no better way to live than 
philosophically (“Quod non est excellentior status quam vacare philosophiae”).
It is therefore not surprising that Berthold of Moosburg – interested in 
investigating the natural potential of the human intellect rather than in know-
ing its limits – has relied on Thomas to support the philosophical structure of 
his own work.
Thomas and Berthold agree on one thing: every divine revelation is not 
necessarily needed for the well-exercised human intellect. Philosophers, in 
the absence of any revelation or grace, are able not only to reach a partial 
en 1272–1275, Aubry de Reims et la scission des Normands,” in Revue des Sciences philos-
ophiques et théologiques 68/1(1984), p. 3–49, esp. p. 29, l. 12–17; (3) Oliver Brito, MS. Oxford, 
Corpus Christi College 283, f. 151vb (see Gauthier, “Notes sur Siger de Brabant,” p. 29); 
(4) Henry Bate, Speculum divinorum et quorundam naturalium. Parts VI–VII: On the Unity 
of Intellect. On the Platonic doctrine of the ideas, ed. C. Steel, E. Van der Vyver (Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 1994), vi, c. 8, p. 27, l. 93–96. For Henry Bate, cf. G. Guldentops, 
“Henry Bate’s Aristocratic Eudaemonism,” in J.A. Aertsen, K. Emery, A. Speer (eds), Nach 
der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten 
Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts: Studien und Texte (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 657–681, esp. 
p. 673.
30  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1, F, f. 1vb; V, f. 2va; R, f. 13va.
31  Far from being a great opponent of Averroism, Thomas of York constantly refers to 
Averroes’ authority in his work. Averroes’ name appears more than 1000 times in the 
Sapientiale. Very many literal, but implicit quotations can be found in addition to this. 
Except for the doctrine of the eternity of the world, Averroes is invoked by Thomas only to 
support his own doctrines. Thomas defends Averroes even when it seems that he denies 
that God knows singular things. On this point, see n. 35.
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knowledge of God through an oblique vision, but they can also enjoy a direct 
and perfect vision of the divine substance.
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i,  
c. 6, F, f. 6vb; V, f. 6va; R, f. 19va
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Exp. 
tit. D, p. 40, l. 111–115
In priori acceptione ascendit anima 
per laboriosam investigationem 
dividendo, definiendo, communibus 
principiis utendo, a notis ad ignota 
per ratiocinationem progrediendo, 
a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia tran-
scendendo, et inter intelligibilia ab 
uno ad aliud ascendendo, quousque 
perveniat ad ultimum, quod dicit 
Deum.
Primus autem istorum motuum 
precipue fuit in philosophis. 
Verum, quod per motum obliquum, 
qui proprius erat philosophorum et 
erat per laboriosam investigationem 
primi omnium existentium principii 
dividendo, definiendo, communibus 
principiis utendo, a notis ad ignota per 
ratiocinationem progrediendo, a sen-
sibilibus ad intelligibilia ascendendo 
et inter intelligibilia ab uno in aliud 
tendendo, quousque ad simpliciter 
ultimum perveniatur, ascenderit ipse 
Proclus in summi boni notitiam, appa-
ret in praesenti libro, ubi in excelsum 
maximum ascendit per operum condi-
tionem, conditorum gubernationem et 
contrariorum conciliationem. 
The directa Dei visio does not constitute an alternative to the laboriosa investi-
gatio of the philosophers. Quite the contrary, the philosophical pursuit makes 
the direct insight into God’s essence possible:
Secundus autem motus [scilicet rectus – n.n.] paucis datus est, qui 
fuerunt preter donum fidei. Et si quibus datum est hoc tenuiter prop-
ter hoc, quod ille motus non est datus multis in sui excellentia nisi per 
gratiam specialem aut nonnisi propter precedentem obliquam in Deum 
animi motionem et hic perfectam, quod paucissimis datum est.32
On the basis of a purely rational investigation, it is not only possible to prove 
God’s existence, but also God’s unity and trinity. No human being is, indeed, 
deprived of the knowledge of God. The idea of God is, in fact, naturally present 
32  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6, F, f. 6vb; V, f. 6vb; R, f. 19vb.
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in the human intellect. This is one of the doctrines of Thomas of York that 
interested the Dominican of Moosburg most.
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i,  
c. 5, F, f. 6ra, v, f. 6ra; R, f. 18vb
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
116C, p. 63, l. 125–131
Et ex hiis liquet, quod superius dictum 
est nullum hominum penitus scien-
tia Dei privatum, sed ipsum esse in 
consensione omnium. Ex quo etiam 
sequitur ipsum esse naturaliter omni 
homini impressum ratione, qua dixi 
tibi: quod enim non est foris acceptum, 
est intus formatum. Constat autem, 
quod non, nisi a nature humane for-
matore, quo formata est ad imaginem 
Dei secundum intellectum, secundum 
quod dicit Aristoteles x Ethicorum 
capitulo 10, quod intellectus est Deo 
cognatissimus.
Ex quo sequitur necessario ipsum esse, 
et quod nullus hominum est peni-
tus scientia eius privatus, sed ipsum 
esse in consensione omnium. Ex quo 
etiam sequitur ipsum esse naturaliter 
homini impressum ex ea parte, qua est 
ad imaginem Dei, sive tale sit unum 
animae secundum Platonem vel uni-
tio vel unitas secundum Dionysium 
sive abditum mentis secundum 
Augustinum sive intellectus secun-
dum Aristotelem x Ethicorum 10 cap., 
ubi dicit, quod intellectus est Deo 
cognatissimus. 
The very existence of God can be proven on the basis of exclusively rational 
arguments: “quod igitur Deus sit declaraverunt mundi sapientes multipliciter, 
videlicet per universalem hominum consensionem, naturalem impressionem, 
legis nature dictationem.”33
For Thomas, whom Berthold follows in this, the cognitive faculties of philo-
sophical reason are not limited to the pure and simple demonstration of God’s 
existence, but also extend to the knowledge of God’s particular qualities, such 
as his uniqueness. And if some false philosophers (philosophantes) state the 
contrary, Plato’s followers maintain the right position: their error consists only 
in an improper use of terminology (non superstitiosa nisi nomine solum):
33  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 5, F, f. 5vb; V, f. 5va; R, f. 18rb. Parallel text in Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio, ed. F. Retucci, 116C, p. 61, l. 71–73.
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Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, 
c. 10, F, f. 10va–b; V, f. 9ra; R, f. 24rb
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114A, 
p. 40, l. 10–p. 41, l. 27
Nam quorundam positio de diis 
erat superstitiosa et impietate 
plena, quorundam autem nonnisi 
nomine solum. Superstitiosorum 
positio erat, qua ponebant illa 
corpora visibilia esse deos et hoc
De primo notandum, quod positio quo-
rundam de diis, hoc est, quod plures 
essent dii, erat superstitiosa, quorundam 
vero non superstitiosa nisi solo nomine. 
Superstitiosorum positio erat, qua 
ponebant illa visibilia esse deos, et hoc
multipliciter, quia quidam pone -
bant corpora artificialia, quidam 
naturalia esse deos. Et item ponen-
tes corpora artificialia ut ydola esse 
deos, quidam ponebant per solam 
humanam fictionem, et hoc vel 
per poetica figmenta, contra quod 
agit Plinius De naturali historia ii 
capitulo 7 – nam poetica figmenta 
humana transferebant ad deos, 
idest divina, cum tamen melius 
fuisset, si divina transtulissent 
ad humana, sicut dicit Tullius De 
Tusculanis questionibus I y – vel per 
hominum merita, secundum quod 
dicit Plinius in eodem, quod deo-
rum nomina ex hominum meritis 
nata sunt, ad cuius fictionem allexit 
vel amicorum dilectio vel carorum 
recordatio vel artificium adinventio 
vel per hominum merita.
Hee autem omnes positiones 
superstitiose erant et dampnate 
apud omnes vere philosophantes, 
sicut manifestabitur in sermone De 
quiditate Dei. Positio deorum non 
superstitiosa nisi nomine solum 
erat Platonis et Platonicam phi-
losophiam veraciter sectantium, 
quippe secundum Hermetem multi 
dicti sunt dii partecipatione eius, 
qui omnium maximus est ⟨deus⟩ 
deorum.
multipliciter, quia quidam ponebant 
corpora naturalia, quidam artificialia 
esse deos. Et item ponentes corpora arti-
ficialia ut idola esse deos, quidam pone-
bant per solam humanam fictionem, et 
hoc per poetica figmenta, contra quos 
agit Plinius De naturali historia libro ii 
cap. 7 et est summa rationis suae, quia 
transferebant humana ad divina, cum 
deberet fieri econverso. […]
Hae omnes opiniones superstitiosae 
erant et damnatae apud omnes vere 
philosophantes. Positio deorum non 
superstitiosa nisi nomine solum erat 
Platonis et Platonicam philosophiam 
veraciter sectantium, quippe secundum 
Hermetem multi dicti sunt dii partici-
patione eius, qui omnium est maximus, 
scilicet deus deorum.
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Finally, philosophical reason is able to access the Trinitarian mysteries. It 
is not by chance that Berthold, in commenting on Proclus’ Proposition 131 
(“Omnis deus a se ipso propriam operationem orditur”) reports the well-known 
passage from the Logos teleios that Thomas of York had used in his Sapientiale 
as an authoritative testimony to the fact that the philosophers succeeded, 
without any revelation, in grasping the truths of the Trinitarian relationships 
and the Son’s generation:34 Plato spoke of the second Person of the Trinity, and 
Hermes and the Sybil agreed with him. They have also understood that the dis-
tinction between the Father and the Son lies not in their essence, but in their 
person (hec alietas potius in persona quam in essentia).
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i,  
c. 14, F, f. 14ra–b; V, f. 11va–b; R, f. 27va
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
131B, p. 192, l. 61–p. 193, l. 79
Ex quibus liquet, quod secundum 
Platonem due persone invente sunt, 
Pater videlicet et Filius. Huic autem 
concordat Hermes, qui Mercurius 
dicitur, in libro, qui Logosilinus, hoc 
est verbum perfectum, appellatur. […] 
Hec autem Hermetis verba recitat 
Augustinus in libro suo Contra quinque 
Hereses, in quo et sermones Sibille 
recitat sermonibus supradictis concor-
dantes. Alium – inquit – deum dedit 
hominibus fidelibus colendum. Et ne 
intelligas alium in essentia, sed potius 
in persona, subdit: ‘Ipsum tuum cog-
nosce dominum Dei filium esse’, quem 
quidem filium ‘alio loco symbolon 
appellat, idest consilium vel consilia-
rium’, secundum quod nominat eum 
Ysaias consiliarium Deum fortem, et
Ex quibus liquet, quod secundum 
Platonem duae personae inventae 
sunt, Pater et Filius. Huic autem con-
cordat Hermes in libro, qui dicitur 
Logostileos, id est verbum perfectum. 
[…]
Haec autem Hermetis verba reci-
tat Augustinus in libro suo Contra 
quinque haereses, in quo etiam ser-
mones Sibyllae recitat sermonibus 
praedictis concordantes. Alium, 
inquit, deum dedit hominibus fideli-
bus colendum. Et ne intelligatur 
alius in essentia, sed potius in per-
sona, subdit: ‘Ipsum tuum cognosce 
dominum Dei filium esse’, quem 
quidem filium ‘alio loco symbulon 
appellat, id est consilium vel con-
siliarium’. Et prout dicit Trismegistus 
34  For the interpretation of this text from the Asclepius, cf. A. Palazzo, “La ricezione di 
un passo ermetico (Asclepius 8) nel tardo medioevo. Ulrico di Strasburgo, Pietro di 
Tarantasia, Riccardo di Mediavilla, Bertoldo di Moosburg e Dionigi il Certosino,” in 
T. Iremadze, T. Tskhadadze, G. Kheoshvili (eds), Philosophy Theology Culture. Problems 
and Perspectives. Jubilee Volume Dedicated to the 75th Anniversary of Guram Tevzadze 
(Tbilisi: Nekeri-Arche, 2007), p. 104–125.
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(cont.)
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i,  
c. 14, F, f. 14ra–b; V, f. 11va–b; R, f. 27va
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
131B, p. 192, l. 61–p. 193, l. 79
prout dicit Trismegistus Ad Asclepium, 
quod ‘Dei natura consilium est volun-
tatis et bonitas summa consilium’. Ex 
quibus manifestum est, quod hec alie-
tas potius in persona quam in essentia 
intelligenda est.
Ad Asclepium, quod ‘Dei natura 
consilium est voluntatis et bonitas 
summa consilium’. Ex quibus mani-
festum est, quod haec alietas potius 
in persona quam in essentia intelli-
genda est.
And again, Thomas continues, and is in this once more quoted literally by 
Berthold, philosophers do not limit themselves to talking about the genera-
tion of the Son, but also permeate the mysteries with regard to the Holy Spirit. 
Hermes not only mentioned the third Person, but called it by the correct name. 
Aethicus Ister described the Trinity in a perfect way (luculenter). Seneca and 
Cicero treated the operations of the third Person in detail. Averroes also under-
stood and described the Trinity of the divine Persons.
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i,  
c. 14, F, f. 14va; V, ff. 11vb–12ra; R,  
ff. 27vb–28ra
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
131B, p. 193, l. 81–p. 194, l. 117
De tertia persona locuti sunt, licet non 
adeo manifeste. […] Istam autem perso-
nam tertiam, quam nominavit mediam 
Porphirius, nominat nomine proprio 
Trismegistus, videlicet nomine ‘Spiritus’, 
cum dicit Ad Asclepium: ‘Fuit, inquit, 
deus et hyle, quem Grece mundum cre-
dimus et mundo concomitabatur spiri-
tus vel inerat mundo spiritus’ […]. Quis 
autem spiritus est iste animas nutriens 
nisi Spiritus Sanctus, qui tranfert se in 
animas sanctas, secundum quod dicit 
Seneca in Epistula 42a? Ex quibus omni-
bus liquet, quod predicta non possunt 
De tertia vero non sunt locuti adeo 
manifeste. […] Istam autem ter-
tiam personam, quam Porphyrius 
nominat mediam, Trismegistus 
Ad Asclepium exprimit nomine 
proprio, scilicet Spiritu, cum dicit: 
‘Fuit, inquit, deus et hyle et mundo 
concomitabatur spiritus vel ine-
rat mundo spiritus, sed non simi-
liter inerat spiritus mundo ut deo’ 
etc. […] Quis autem spiritus iste 
est animas nutriens, nisi Spiritus 
Sanctus, qui transfert se in ani-
mas sanctas, secundum quod dicit
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(cont.)
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i,  
c. 14, F, f. 14va; V, ff. 11vb–12ra; R,  
ff. 27vb–28ra
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
131B, p. 193, l. 81–p. 194, l. 117
intelligi de spiritu creato, quia nullus 
gubernat, implet et vivificat omnia, nisi 
divinus spiritus, secundum quod premit-
tit Cicero De natura deorum ii capitulo 
15 de operationibus huius spiritus […]. 
Ethicus philosophus Cosmographus in 
sua Cosmografia, quam transtulit beatus 
Ieronimus, luculenter exprimit personas 
tres. […] Unde et Trinitatem per hanc 
viam insinuans Porphirius […] Habes 
igitur ex hoc sermone Patrem et Filium 
et voluntatem, quam superius dixit 
amborum medium, sicut manifestum 
est ex Augustino De civitate Dei X. Huic
Seneca Epistula 42: ‘Sacer’, inquit, 
‘inter nos spiritus sedet malorum 
bonorumque nostrorum observator 
et custos; hic prout a nobis tracta-
tus est, ita nos tractat’. Ex quibus 
omnibus liquet, quod praedicta 
non possunt intelligi de spiritu cre-
ato, quia nullus gubernat, implet 
et vivificat omnia nisi Spiritus 
Sanctus sive spiritus divinus, secun-
dum quod praemittit Cicero De 
natura deorum libro ii cap. 15 de 
operationibus huius spiritus […]. 
Aethicus etiam Cosmographus in 
autem appropriationi, per quam osten-
ditur Trinitas personarum in summo 
Spiritu, attestatur Averroes Super XI 
Pilosophie prime capitulo 15.
sua Cosmographia, quam transtu-
lit beatus Hieronymus, luculenter 
exprimit tres personas. […] 
In the words of Thomas of York, the myth of ancient wisdom and philosophi-
cal revelation live again. Thomas’ complete trust in the potentiality of the 
human intellect and particularly his doctrine of beatitude, considered as the 
result of an intellectual act, became the characteristic feature of Berthold’s 
Expositio.
In the Sapientiale, Berthold of Moosburg had no difficulty in finding a new 
definition of philosophy: no longer a science subordinate to theology, but per-
fect and self-sufficient wisdom. In the recovery of the sapiential tradition of 
antiquity undertaken by Thomas of York, Berthold traced the conditions to 
establish the concordance between revelation and philosophy. He does so not 
by integrating pagan wisdom into the Judaeo-Christian system of revelation, 
but rather with the purpose of legitimizing the autonomous and independent 
coexistence of both. In the Sapientiale, Berthold discovered a well-documented 
history of philosophy written by a theologian in order to legitimize the claims 
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of philosophy to be not only an all-encompassing science of reality, but also a 
valid science of the divine.
3 The Continuity of the Platonic Tradition
Thomas of York dedicates his lengthy and sophisticated work to the restoration 
of the dignity of philosophical wisdom and to the founding of its complete 
legitimacy. Thanks to his profound analytical abilities, his historical reading is 
characterized by the awareness that two fundamentally different alternatives 
characterize the philosophical tradition: Plato, Augustine, Eustratius, and the 
De causis represent the right option; Aristotle’s position is often the wrong one.
Thomas of York corrects Aristotle especially relative to one point: the doc-
trine of Ideas.
The dissent between Plato and Aristotle on the Ideas is mentioned twice 
in the course of Thomas’ work. In the first book of the Sapientiale, with refer-
ence to divine exemplarism, Thomas replies point by point to the arguments 
that Aristotle had advanced against Plato’s doctrine in the Metaphysics. In the 
third book, this time especially referring to the theme of the homonymy of 
the term “good”, he takes the criticism that Aristotle had leveled against Plato 
in the Nicomachean Ethics into consideration.
The doctrinal background is, in the first case, well defined: it is a matter of 
determining precisely how God’s knowledge of the creatures can be defined. 
The problem is not a small one: denying the existence of Ideas either means 
completely denying God’s providence over individual entities or granting God 
only a universal knowledge and not a particular one. According to Thomas of 
York, Cicero had fallen prey to the first error in his De divinatione. Averroes, on 
the contrary, was taken in by the second mistake in his commentary on the 
eleventh book of the Metaphysics.35 Platonic Ideas hence constitute the nec-
essary metaphysical condition for God’s particular and not merely universal 
knowledge and for God’s providence concerning individual creatures.
Thomas of York dedicates four dense chapters of his work to Plato’s doctrine 
of Ideas (chapters 27–30 of the first book). In chapter 27, Thomas demonstrates 
the existence of Ideas (quod idea sit) and deals with their essence or quiddity 
35  According to Thomas, Averroes’ conclusion concerning the divine knowledge of individu-
als is fallacious, but only from a formal and linguistic point of view, and not in substance 
(non tantum in re, sed sermone): cf. Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 25, F, f. 30vb; V, 
f. 24va; R, f. 43ra: Vide ex his sermonibus quomodo non tantum in re, sed sermone expressus 
est sermo Averrois, quomodo sciat singularia.
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(quid sit idea). In chapter 28, he focuses on the multiplicity of Ideas and ana-
lyzes the relationships between the Idea and sensible being in terms of simi-
larity, causality, essence, and denomination. In chapters 29 and 30, Thomas 
scrutinizes the arguments put forward by Aristotle against Plato’s doctrine of 
Ideas in Books i and vii of the Metaphysics.
The in-depth analysis of Aristotle’s objections by Thomas is clearly subor-
dinate to the clear intention of tracing and neutralizing the reasons for the 
dissent between Plato and Aristotle.
The arguments Aristotle used to challenge Plato’s doctrine of Ideas are 
manifold. In Thomas’ view, however, they can be reduced to a single criticism: 
according to Aristotle, by assuming the existence of Ideas, Plato has destroyed 
definition, demonstration and, with them, science, since he considered the 
Idea to be a singular form and denied the existence of any universal form. It is 
indeed altogether impossible to consider the Platonic Idea to be universal, as 
Aristotle points out in his Metaphysics.36 On this specific point, however, the 
reconstruction of Plato’s doctrine that Aristotle had offered in his Metaphysics 
must have seemed inaccurate and misleading to Thomas of York. According to 
Thomas, Aristotle had actually misunderstood Plato at least on one point, as 
is confirmed by Eustratius in his commentary on the first and sixth books of 
the Nicomachean Ethics. Aristotle had considered the universal as something 
exclusively posterior, that is, as subsequent to the existence of any particular 
thing: according to Aristotle, the universal is obtained only through abstrac-
tion from each particular thing. But Plato, according to the more truthful tes-
timony of his theory offered by Eustratius of Nicaea, had first distinguished 
three modes of existence for all things:
Oportet te scire in principio sententiam Platonis memoria dignam, 
quam recitat Commentator super i Ethicorum cap. 7 et vi Ethicorum cap. 
8, consonam per omnia sententie sapientis Augustini Super Genesim 
lib. ii cap. ⟨7⟩, cum dicit triplex esse rei, in verbo scilicet increato, in 
36  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F. 34va; V, ff. 27va–b; R, f. 46rb. For the edition of 
this text, cf. F. Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone,” 
in A. Beccarisi, P. Porro, R. Imbach (eds), Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue 
Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 79–110, here p. 105, l. 73–83: Scias igitur, quod Aristoteles mul-
tis viis contradicit ideis, quarum numerum recolligere est difficile et non multum utile. […] 
Igitur de hoc non multum curans dico, quod una de radicibus primis, quas ponit Aristoteles 
contra ideas, fuit, quod positio idearum negat formam universalem et per consequens sci-
entiam, sicut habetur de hoc ab Aristotele I Metaphysice. Igitur in hoc, quod Plato visus 
est ponere ideas formas sive intentiones singulares, negavit omnem formam universalem. 
Quare non erit definitio nec demonstratio, et ita nec scientia, sicut sensui est manifestum, 
quia species communis definitur, similiter nec demonstratio, cum non sit de singularibus.
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intellectuali natura creata et in materia sive in proprio esse, et quod esse 
primum est prius duobus sequentibus et esse secundum tertio.37
This text is literally quoted by Berthold of Moosburg in the section De ideis of 
his commentary on Proclus:
De secundo sciendum, quod Eustratius super i Ethicorum cap. 7 et 
super vi cap. 8 dicit sententiam Platonis de speciebus sive ideis memoria 
dignam, cum sit consona per omnia sapientiae Augustini, qui in ii Super 
Genesim ad litteram ponit triplex esse rei, in verbo scilicet increato, quod 
est ars plena omnium rationum viventium et incommutabilium, in intel-
lectuali natura creata et in materia sive in proprio esse. Et dicit, quod 
esse primum est prius natura duobus sequentibus et esse secundum est 
prius tertio.38
For Plato, and Augustine entirely agreed with him on this, the esse rei exists 
not only in matter, but also in the uncreated Word (in verbo increato) and in 
created intellectual nature (in intellectuali natura creata). The doctrine of the 
triple esse rei, mentioned in this quotation taken from Eustratius, is nothing 
but a doctrine of Neoplatonic derivation.39 Indeed, as recent studies have 
shown, Eustratius’ doctrine of the universal follows a Byzantine tradition that 
was deeply influenced by the Neoplatonic commentators of Aristotle.40
According to Thomas, who quotes Eustratius on this issue, Aristotle’s mis-
take consists in having considered the universal as the result of a logical-
abstractive process and posterior to the esse rei extra in materia, and therefore 
as produced by abstraction from matter. Plato, and Augustine with him, instead 
describes the forms contained in the intellect as something prior and more 
37  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, ff. 34vb–35ra; V, f. 27vb; R, f. 46va. For the edition 
of this text, cf. Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, 
p. 107, l. 130–135.
38  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
160–183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 178B, p. 190, l. 56–63.
39  For the Neoplatonic influences on the doctrine of the threefold state of the univer-
sal in Eustratius, cf. L. Benakis, “The Problem of General Concepts in Neoplatonism 
and Byzantine Thought,” in D.J. O’Meara (ed.), Neoplatonism and Christian Thought 
(Albany: State University of New York Press, 1982), p. 75–86; K. Giocarinis, “Eustratios 
of Nicea’s Defense of the Doctrine of the Ideas,” in Franciscan Studies 24(1964), p. 159–
204; K. Ierodiakonou, “Metaphysics in the Byzantine Tradition. Eustratios of Nicea on 
Universals,” in Quaestio 5(2005), p. 67–82.
40  Ierodiakonou, “Metaphysics in the Byzantine Tradition,” p. 70.
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noble than the forms contained in matter.41 The universality that Plato speaks 
of has nothing to do with the universality considered in logicis speculationibus, 
as in Aristotle. The universal of Plato is not a logical universal, but an intellec-
tual universal, that is, something substantial that supports other things, which 
are made according to it: “non intelligibiliter, ut universale logicum, sed intel-
lectualiter”. The same text is found in Berthold, who does not limit himself 
to passively copying the sources cited by Thomas, but reads them first-hand, 
checks them and completes them, as can be seen with a view to the quotation 
from Eustratius.
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, 
c. 29, p. 109–110, l. 215–223
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 177I, 
p. 183–184, l. 335–349
Praeterea scire debes, quod quando 
Plato dicit ideas universalia et tota, 
non intelligit, quod idea sit univer-
sale sicut ‘universale’ sumitur ‘in 
logicis speculationibus’, prout dicit 
Commentator super i Ethicorum 
cap. 7, quia ‘illic’ est sermo de 
universali, quod ‘de multis dici-
tur et est posterius generatione, 
hic autem, quod ante multa velut 
praesubsistens eis et illis ad ipsum 
recipientibus subsistentiam’.
 
Ex praemissis elicitur tertium, scilicet 
quod, quando species dicuntur uni-
versales, non intenditur de universali-
tate, prout universale sumitur in logicis 
speculationibus, secundum quod dicit 
Eustratius Super I Ethicorum cap. 7: Illud 
‘quidem enim, de multis dicitur et est 
posterius generatione, hoc autem, quod 
ante multa velut praesubsistens eis et illis 
ad ipsum recipientibus subsistentiam. 
Ita enim qui circa Platonem rationes 
quasdam inducentes enhypostatas, id est 
per se subsistentes divinas intellectuales, 
ad quas dicebant omnia materialia esse 
et fieri, quas et species et ideas vocabant 
et tota et universalia, praesubsistentes 
quidem his, quae in corporibus sunt, 
speciebus, separatas autem ab his omni-
bus, in conditoris’ ‘mente existentes, 
altera quaedam secundum ipsas
41  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, f. 34vb; V, f. 27vb; R, f. 46va (cf. Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 107, l. 146–154: Nam 
Aristoteles estimavit esse rei in anima aut intellectu posterius esse rei extra in materia utpote 
generatum ex ipsa, et esse illud in mente esse universale. […] Plato vero e contrario credidit 
quod species rei in anima est prior ea que est in re extra, quia que fiunt ex ablatione, idest 
abstractione, posteriora sunt et per consequens deteriora naturalibus et sensibilibus uptote 
generationem ex ipsis habentia.)
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(cont.)
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, 
c. 29, p. 109–110, l. 215–223
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 177I, 
p. 183–184, l. 335–349
Ideo igitur ideae ‘dicebantur uni-
versalia et tota, quia unumquo-
dque illorum unum ens habet 
multa ex illo et secundum illud 
facta sunt’; ‘universale quidem et 
totum non intelligibiliter ut uni-
versale logicum, sed intellectuali-
ter. Universale quidem subsistens 
multis separabiliter, quae secun-
dum illud facta sunt’. 
in materia figurantes. Universalia autem 
et tota haec dicebantur, quoniam unum-
quodque illorum unum ens habet multa 
ex illo et secundum illud facta in corpore 
et materialia, ad quae illud universale et 
totum dicebatur non intelligibiliter ut 
universale logicum, sed intellectualiter, 
universale quidem velut praesubsistens 
multis separabiliter, quae secundum’ 
ipsum ‘facta sunt’. Haec Eustratius. 
According to Thomas (and, consequently, for Berthold), the reason for the dis-
agreement between Plato and Aristotle is thus only Aristotle’s coarse misun-
derstanding of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas.
Aristotle’s misreading is neutralized by Thomas – and Berthold follows him 
in this –, once again by appealing to the authority of Eustratius, who opposed 
the Neoplatonic doctrine that establishes the existence of innate universal 
forms in the soul to Aristotle’s arguments. Eustratius’ direct source concerning 
this point is Proclus’ commentary on Plato’s Parmenides:42
Unde cum secundum Platonem anima est multo melior natura et singu-
laribus et sensibilibus, inconveniens est ipsam habere in se ipsa rationes 
sive species subsistentes et non habere ipsas ante sensibilia inherentes 
sibi, rationabiliter et animaliter, hoc est secundum rationem natura-
lem ipsius anime, cum necesse est ipsam habere eas meliores et natura 
priores.43
42  M. Trizio, “Dissensio philosophorum. Il disaccordo tra Platone e Aristotele nei commenti 
filosofici di Eustrazio di Nicea († ca. 1120),” in A. Palazzo (ed.), L’antichità classica nel 
pensiero medievale (Porto: Fédérations Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 
2011), p. 17–37.
43  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, p. 107, l. 155–159. Cf. also Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio, 178B, p. 191, l. 84–88: Unde cum secundum Platonem anima sit multo melior 
natura et singularibus et sensibilibus, inconveniens est ipsam habere in se ipsa rationes 
sive species subsistentes et non habere ipsas ante sensibilia inhaerentes sibi rationabiliter 
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The consequences of such an interweaving of sources are very clear: quot-
ing Eustratius, who in turn quotes Proclus, Thomas of York unconsciously 
defends a form of Neoplatonism that heavily relies on Proclean philosophy. 
It is therefore no coincidence that the defense of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas, as 
elaborated in the Sapientiale, found, more than seventy years after its compo-
sition, a careful reader in Berthold of Moosburg, the commentator of Proclus. 
Berthold’s commentary on propositions 176 and 178, dedicated to the doctrine 
of Ideas, is neither an implicit reference to Dietrich’s doctrine of universals nor 
an allusion to Avicenna’s doctrine mediated by Albert the Great, as Burkhard 
Mojsisch believed.44 Propositions 176 and 178 of the Expositio consist of long 
literal quotations from the Sapientiale of Thomas of York (see Appendix, vii, 
13–32).
The threefold distinction of the esse rei and, moreover, the distinction 
between logicalia and intellectualia established by Berthold are not, as Alain de 
Libera maintained, the most characteristic doctrines of the so-called “school 
of Cologne”, which Berthold inherited from Dietrich and Albert.45 Instead, it 
is a doctrine that Berthold discovered in the Sapientiale of Thomas of York, in 
which, through Eustratius, Proclean philosophy is tacitly revived.46
In reconstructing the continuity of the Platonic tradition, Thomas went 
far beyond his contemporaries. According to him, there is a fil rouge that runs 
through the history of philosophy and links Plato, Augustine, and the Liber de 
causis. This is particularly evident relative to the doctrine of Ideas: Plato and 
Augustine explicitly agree on the existence of this type of universal form in the 
soul; both Plato and Augustine then stand in open contrast to Aristotle. The 
Platonic-Augustinian doctrine is, however, confirmed by the Liber de causis, 
in which the existence of universal forms in the intellect is clearly established:
et animealiter, hoc est secundum rationem naturalem ipsius animae, cum necesse sit, ut 
inferius apparebit, ipsam habere eas meliores et natura priores.
44  B. Mojsisch, “Aristoteles’ Kritik an Platons Theorie der Ideen und die Dietrich von Freiberg 
berücksichtigende Kritik dieser Kritik seitens Bertholds von Moosburg,” in K.-H. Kandler, 
B. Mojsisch, F.B. Stammkötter (eds), Dietrich von Freiberg. Neue Perspektiven seiner 
Philosophie, Theologie und Naturwissenschaft (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: Grüner, 1999), 
p. 267–281.
45  A. de Libera, Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 226–227; A. de 
Libera, “Théorie des universaux et réalisme logique chez Albert le Grand,” in Revues des 
Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 65(1981), p. 55–74; A. de Libera, “Albert le Grand 
et le Platonisme. De la doctrines des Idées à la théorie des trois états de l’Universel,” in 
E.P. Bos, P.A. Meijer (eds), On Proclus and his Influence in Medieval Philosophy (Leiden / 
New York / Köln: Brill, 1992), p. 89–119.
46  On this point see I. Zavattero, “Proclus, Eustrate de Nicée et leur réception aux XIIIe– 
XIV e siècles,” in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1 (Leiden: 
Brill, 2019), p. 327–351, esp. p. 335–347.
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Dico igitur tibi secundum sententiam Augustini et Platonis, quod triplex 
est esse rei, videlicet in mente divina, in intellectuali natura, in propria 
existentia; et quod esse eius in natura intellectiva, anima videlicet et 
intelligentia, medium est inter esse primum et tertium; et quod omnes 
forme, que exprimuntur in materia, prius naturaliter sunt concreate 
in intelligentia sive anima, quoniam natura pares sint. Et hoc est con-
sonum propositioni De causis, que dicit quod omnis intelligentia plena 
est formis.47
Following the fil rouge of the Platonic tradition, Thomas went also far beyond 
the texts that were at his disposal. In his defense of the intelligible world, 
which links Plato to Augustine, Thomas of York explicitly quotes Eustratius of 
Nicaea, who silently borrows the doctrine of the existence of a triplex esse rei 
from Proposition 67 of the Elementatio theologica.48 The result of this maze 
of quotations is evident: Thomas – by quoting Eustratius and by revealing his 
proximity to Plato, Augustine, and the De causis – concludes by unconsciously 
assimilating the De causis to its original source, namely, the Elementatio 
theologica.49
Thanks to the new material made available in translation from Greek into 
Latin, especially by his mentor Robert Grosseteste, and thanks to his pro-
found analytical attitude, Thomas of York succeeds in reconstructing the con-
tours of the Platonic tradition – a tradition he vigorously counterposes to the 
Aristotelian one.
Concerning many points, Thomas of York criticizes and corrects Aristotle’s 
thought and contrasts it with a Platonic option that has been reconstructed on 
the basis of an indirect tradition: the De causis, Augustine, and the Byzantine 
commentators. The very same intention led Berthold of Moosburg, a few 
decades later, to compose his Platonic enterprise. He wanted to trace the points 
of divergence between the Platonic and the Aristotelian tradition and demon-
strate the clear superiority of the former over the latter. Not by chance is the 
Expositio aimed at recovering Platonism as a unified current of thought that 
47  Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 26, F, f. 205va; V, f. 166ra; R, f. 216ra. Concerning the 
influence of the De causis on the Sapientiale, cf. F. Retucci, “The De causis in Thomas of 
York”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1 (Leiden: Brill, 
2019), p. 70–119.
48  On this point, cf. C. Steel, “Neoplatonic Sources in the Commentaries on the Nicomachean 
Ethics by Eustratius and Michael of Ephesus,” in Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 
44(2002), p. 51–57, at p. 53–54; S. Gersh, “Universals, Wholes, Logoi: Eustratios of Nicaea’s 
Response to Proclus’ Elements of Theology,” in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the 
Book of Causes. Volume 2 (Leiden: Brill, 2020), p. 40–55.
49  Cf. Retucci, “The De causis in Thomas of York,” p. 89–92.
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includes Dionysius, Proclus, the De causis, and Eustratius of Nicaea, among 
others. This unified Platonic tradition is proposed, in Berthold’s work, as a 
triumphant antagonist to a form of eclectic Aristotelianism. Berthold often 
realizes his project of writing a comprehensive and erudite encyclopedia of 
Platonism simply by integrating Proclean material into the long excerpts he 
takes from the Sapientiale.50
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, lib. iii, 
c. 13, p. 167–168, l. 28–51
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
151D, p. 137, l. 184–p. 138, 193
Hii enim agentes quatuor operatio-
nem habent, communem et spe-
cialem. Communem, quoniam in 
singulis operibus nature concurrunt 
omnium actiones, sicut supra dictum 
est, quomodo omnis forma inducitur 
in materia per omnes causas medias 
usque ad primam, et sic per ipsam 
plus effluentem (cf. De causis, 1)
[…]
De primo sciendum, quod ipsorum 
deorum quaedam operationes sunt 
communes, quaedam speciales.
Communes, inquantum in singulis 
operibus naturae concurrunt omnium 
actiones. Omnis enim forma inducitur 
in materia per omnes causas medias 
essentialiter sibi subordinatas usque 
ad prime bonum inclusive. ‘Omne 
enim, quod a secundis producitur, et a 
prioribus et causalioribus producitur 
eminentius’ per 56.
Habent et specialem, sicut supe-
rior respectu inferioris. Nichil enim 
habet inferior quod non superior 
instar ordinum angelicorum, sicut 
ponit Sapientia Christianorum; habet 
tamen superior proprium, quod non 
habet inferior vel ad minus non in 
eadem plenitudine; igitur actio virtu-
tis elementi aut elementati actio est 
virtutum omnium superiorum. 
Speciales vero sive proprie opera-
tiones sunt, quas habent superiora 
respectu inferiorum, quidquid enim 
operatur inferius haec et operatur 
superius, sed non econverso. Et de istis 
operationibus dicitur, quod ‘omnis 
deus a se ipso orditur propriam opera-
tionem’ per 131.
Although little is known about Berthold’s biography, as has been said at the 
beginning of this study, it is clear that he was active within the context of the 
German Dominican order. The first certain biographical data on his life, how-
ever, places Berthold in a milieu far away from Cologne. In the proceedings of 
50  Cf. Retucci, “The De causis in Thomas of York” p. 86.
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the General Chapter of the Teutonic Province held in Friesach in 1315, the deci-
sion to send Berthold to Oxford is stated: “Mictimus in Angliam fr. Berchtoldum 
de Mospurg”.51 At Oxford, Berthold discovered how thoroughly the German 
Dominican tradition, initiated by Albert, and the English Franciscan tradition, 
introduced by Robert Grosseteste, converged. With a view to the revival of 
the ancient sapiential heritage and the defense of the Platonic tradition, both 
of which would come to characterize his commentary on Proclus’ Elements 
of Theology, Berthold could therefore not only be considered the spokesman 
for the main features of the so-called Deutsche Dominikanerschule, that is, the 
school of Albert the Great, Dietrich of Freiberg, and Ulrich of Strassburg. With 
regard to the harsh criticism of Aristotle, the defense of the unitary position 
offered by Christianity and Platonism and, at the same time, the recovery of 
ancient pagan wisdom, the Dominican of Moosburg had found a constant 
point of reference in another work: the Sapientiale of Thomas of York.
 Appendix
Thomas of York’s Sapientiale in Berthold’s Commentary
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale, Conv. Soppr. 
A.vi.437 (= F).
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 
Vat. lat. 4301 (= V).
Thomas of York, Sapientiale, Vaticano (Città del), Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, 
Vat. lat. 6771 (= R).
i. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. 
Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984).
1. Prol. 1 (p. 5, l. 13–16): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 7, F, f. 7va52
2. Prol. 1 (p. 5, l. 16–19): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 4, F, f. 5rb
3. Prol. 1 (p. 5, l. 19–22): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 3, F, f. 3va
4. Prol. 1 (p. 6, l. 34–36): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 5, F, f. 5vb
5. Prol. 8 (p. 14, l. 296–299): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
51  Cf. Th. Kaeppeli, “Ein Fragment der Akten des in Friesach 1315 gefeierten Kapitels des 
Provinz Teutonia,” in Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 48(1978), p. 71–75.
52  All references to the Sapientiale are to the manuscript: Firenze, Biblioteca Nazionale 
Centrale, Conv. Soppr. A.vi.437 (F). Starting from Book ii the manuscript Città del 
Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301 has a different book numbering (cf. 
F. Retucci, “The Sapientiale of Thomas of York: The Fortunes and Misfortunes of a Critical 
Edition”, in Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 52 (2010), p. 133–160, esp. p. 140–142. In this 
appendix these differences have been indicated in brackets.
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6. Prol. 9 (p. 15, l. 324–327): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
7. Prol. 9 (p. 15, l. 328–332): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 2, F, f. 212vb
8. Prol. 9 (p. 15, l. 338–339): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
9. Prol. 9 (p. 15, l. 342–p. 16, l. 348): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 37, F, 42rb; ii, 2, F, f. 51ra
10. Prol. 10 (p. 16, l. 364–375): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
11. Prol. 11 (p. 17, l. 402–p. 18, l. 406): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
12. Exp. tit. C (p. 39, l. 73–78). Cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6, F, f. 6vb
13. Tit. D (p. 40, l. 111–115): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6, F, f. 6vb
14. Tit. D (p. 40, l. 119–123): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 7, F, f. 7va
15. Tit. D (p. 40, l. 126–p. 41, l. 144): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 7, F, f. 8ra–b
16. Tit. E (p. 41, l. 163–166): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1, F, ff. 1rb
17. Tit. E (p. 42, l. 175–180): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1, F, ff. 1rb
18. Tit. E (p. 42, l. 181–195): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1, F, ff. 1rb–va
19. Tit. F (p. 43, l. 208–211): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 3, F, f. 3ra–b
20. Tit. K (p. 47, l. 368–p. 48, l. 383): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 5, F, f. 5va
21. Tit. L (p. 49, l. 415–419): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 9, F, f. 10vb
22. Tit. L (p. 49, l. 431–439): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 5, F, f. 5va
23. Tit. L (p. 50, l. 463–468): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 1, F, f. 1va–b
24. Praeamb. A (p. 54, l. 32–p. 56, l. 100): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 23 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 23), F, ff. 166vb–167rb
25. Praeamb. B (p. 57, l. 140–157): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 23 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 23), F, f. 167vb
26. Praeamb. B (p. 59, l. 205–108): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 24 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 24), F, f. 168vb
27. Praeamb. B (p. 61, l. 297–303): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 25 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 23), F, f. 170ra
28. Praeamb. C (p. 63, l. 355–370): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 24 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 24), F, f. 169ra–b
29. Praeamb. C (p. 66, l. 462–480): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 23 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 23), F, f. 168ra–b
30. Praeamb. C (p. 67, l. 504–513): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 23 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 23), F, f. 168rb
31. Praeamb. C (p. 68, l. 541–548): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 23 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 23), F, f. 168rb
32. Prop. 1E (p. 78, l. 253–p. 79, l. 271): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 1 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 1), F, f. 138ra; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 5, l. 47–49; p. 6, l. 59–68
33. Prop. 3C (p. 96, l. 148–151): cf. Sapientiale, lib. ii, c. 30 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. ii, c. 29), F, f. 87vb
34. Prop. 4A (p. 102, l. 48–57): cf. Sapientiale, lib. ii, c. 11 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. ii, c. 10), F, f. 69rb
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35. Prop. 4A (p. 102, l. 58–p. 103, l. 87): cf. Sapientiale, lib. ii, c. 20 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. ii, c. 19), F, ff. 77ra–va
36. Prop. 4E (p. 109, l. 298–p. 110, l. 339): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 1 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 1), F, f. 138ra
37. Prop. 5D (p. 120, l. 264–270): cf. Sapientiale, lib. ii, c. 17, F, f. 75va
38. Prop. 6A (p. 127, l. 11–20): cf. Sapientale, lib. ii, c. 2, F, f. 51va
39. Prop. 6A (p. 127, l. 21–p. 128, l. 33): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 2, F, f. 57rb
40. Prop. 6A (p. 128, l. 38–p. 129, l. 72): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 2, F, f. 57va
41. Prop. 6B (p. 129, l. 95–102): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 2, F, f. 57va
42. Prop. 6B (p. 130, l. 104–111): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 3, F, f. 58rb
43. Prop. 6D (p. 131, l. 144–148): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 2, F, f. 57vb
44. Prop. 6E (p. 131, l. 150–160): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 6, F, f. 62rb
45. Prop. 6E (p. 131, l. 162–169): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 6, F, f. 62ra
46. Prop. 6E (p. 132, l. 171–173): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 6, F, f. 62ra
47. Prop. 6E (p. 132, l. 179–p. 133, l. 231): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 6, F, ff. 62rb–va
48. Prop. 6E (p. 132, l. 202–p. 133, l. 208): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 14, F, f. 14va
49. Prop. 7E (p. 152, l. 493–p. 154, l. 554): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 8 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 8), F, ff. 145va–146ra; 
Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 94, l. 27–p. 100, l. 160
50. Prop. 8B (p. 158, l. 50–56): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 9, F, f. 9va
51. Prop. 9B (p. 170, l. 114–120): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6, F, f. 6va
52. Prop. 10D (p. 182, l. 208–213): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 31, F, ff. 37vb–38ra
53. Prop. 10E (p. 183, l. 217–226): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 31, F, f. 38rb
54. Prop. 11F (p. 192, l. 261–p. 194, l. 331): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 8 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 8), F, ff. 146rb–va; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 101, l. 179–p. 105, l. 270
55. Prop. 12A (p. 197, l. 25–p. 198, l. 30): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 21 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 21), F, f. 164ra
56. Prop. 12C (p. 200, l. 122–p. 201, l. 156): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 21 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 21), F, f. 164ra
57. Prop. 12D (p. 201, l. 163–170): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 25 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 25), F, f. 169vb
58. Prop. 12E (p. 202, l. 175–p. 205, l. 283): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 25 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 25), F, ff. 170ra–va
ii. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 14–34, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1986).
1. Prop. 15D (p. 19, l. 163–p. 20, l. 189): cf. Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 31 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iv, c. 31), F, f. 126vb
2. Prop. 16B (p. 26, l. 71–87): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 17, F, f. 22rb
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3. Prop. 18B (p. 48, l. 157–161): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 9, F, f. 9va
4. Prop. 21B (p. 79, l. 138–p. 80, l. 163): cf. Sapientiale, lib. ii, c. 2, F, ff. 51rb–va
5. Prop. 21K (p. 91, l. 554–p. 93, l. 601): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 14 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 14), F, f. 153ra; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 180, l. 9–p. 181, l. 38
6. Prop. 21M (p. 94, l. 636–645): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 16 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 16), F, f. 158ra; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 222, l. 144–154
7. Prop. 22D (p. 105, l. 250–260): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10, F, f. 11vb
8. Prop. 22D (p. 105, l. 275–p. 106, l. 280): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10, F, f. 11ra
9. Prop. 22D (p. 106, l. 281–313): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10, F, f. 11rb
10. Prop. 22D (p. 107, l. 321–326): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10, F, f. 11va
11. Prop. 22D (p. 107, l. 330–343): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10, F, f. 11va
12. Prop. 22E (p. 107, l. 347–p. 108, l. 374): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10, F, f. 11vb
13. Prop. 22F (p. 108, l. 381–p. 109, l. 387): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10, F, f. 11ra
14. Prop. 23D (p. 116, l. 145–150): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 31, F, f. 37rb
15. Prop. 23D (p. 116, l. 172–p. 117, l. 186): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 31, F, f. 37rb
16. Prop. 23E (p. 117, l. 200–p. 118, l. 223): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 20, F, f. 27rb
17. Prop. 23E (p. 118, l. 243–p. 119, l. 253): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 20, F, f. 27rb
18. Prop. 23E (p. 119, l. 257–268): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 20, F, f. 27rb
19. Prop. 23I (p. 120, l. 315–p. 121, l. 324): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 14 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 14), F, f. 153ra; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 180, l. 17–p. 181, l. 31
20. Prop. 23I (p. 121, l. 325–340): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 16 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 16), F, f. 157va–b; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 218, l. 53–59
21. Prop. 25A (p. 137, l. 23–27): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6, F, f. 6va
22. Prop. 25A (p. 137, l. 28–p. 139, l. 81): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 26 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 26), F, f. 171ra–b
23. Prop. 25G (p. 146, l. 328–p. 148, l. 387): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 15 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 15), F, f. 156va–b; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 206, l. 305–p. 209, l. 365
24. Prop. 25H (p. 148, l. 395–p. 149, l. 415): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 15 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 15), F, f. 157ra; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 210, l. 396–403
25. Prop. 25I (p. 150, l. 448–453): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 15 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 15), F, ff. 157rb–va; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 214, l. 499–p. 215, l. 508
26. Prop. 26A (p. 153, l. 13–19): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 9 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 9), F, f. 147rb; Thomae Eboracensis 
Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 116, l. 145–151
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27. Prop. 26A (p. 154, l. 32–41): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 9 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 9), F, f. 147va; Thomae Eboracensis 
Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 118, l. 191–p. 119, l. 215
28. Prop. 27A (p. 162, l. 51–67): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 12 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 12), F, f. 151va; Thomae Eboracensis 
Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 163, l. 173–p. 164, l. 207
29. Prop. 28A (p. 171, l. 13–p. 173, l. 76): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 42, F, ff. 46va–47rb
30. Prop. 28B (p. 173, l. 95–p. 174, l. 112): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 42, F, ff. 46vb–47ra
31. Prop. 28B (p. 174, l. 122–124): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 42, F, f. 47ra
32. Prop. 34A (p. 221, l. 42–63): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 21 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 21), F, f. 165ra
33. Prop. 34A (p. 221, l. 64–p. 223, l. 110): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 13 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 13), F, f. 245ra–b
34. Prop. 34A (p. 223, l. 114–126): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 13 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 13), F, f. 245rb
35. Prop. 34B (p. 224, l. 134–p. 227, l. 247): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 15 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 15), F, ff. 245rb–246vb
iii. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 35–65, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001).
1. Prop. 35B (p. 4, l. 50–59): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 8 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 8), F, f. 145va–b; Thomae Eboracensis 
Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 94, l. 35–p. 95, l. 60
2. Prop. 35C (p. 5, l. 106–p. 7, l. 155): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 17 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 17), F, ff. 247rb–va
3. Prop. 35D (p. 7, l. 164–p. 8, l. 171): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 17 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 17), F, f. 247va
4. Prop. 36C (p. 18, l. 112–114): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 7, F, f. 24vb
5. Prop. 38F (p. 29, l. 98–p. 30, l. 101): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6, F, f. 6rb
6. Prop. 59A (p. 163, l. 11–p. 164, l. 47): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 28 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 28), F, ff. 173rb–174ra
7. Prop. 59B (p. 164, l. 51–57): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, 28 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 28), F, f. 174rb
iv. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 66–107, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003).
1. Prop. 67C (p. 9, l. 60–p. 10, l. 89): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, f. 35rb; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 91, l. 66–p. 93, 
l. 153
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v. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prop. 
108–135, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011).
1. Prop. 114A (p. 40, l. 10–p. 41, l. 39): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10, F, f. 10va–b
2. Prop. 116C (p. 61, l. 69–p. 63, l. 128): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 5, F, ff. 5vb–6ra
3. Prop. 120A (p. 90, l. 11–20): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 5, F, f. 6ra–b
4. Prop. 120A (p. 90, l. 21–p. 91, l. 42): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6, F, f. 6rb
5. Prop. 120A (p. 91, l. 43–50): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 10, F, f. 10va
6. Prop. 120D (p. 93, l. 113–p. 97, l. 204): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, cc. 35–36, F, ff. 40va–42rb
7. Prop. 122A (p. 114, l. 13–p. 115, l. 52): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 7, F, f. 8ra–b
8. Prop. 131A (p. 190, l. 10–p. 191, l. 44): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 6, F, ff. 6rb–vb
9. Prop. 131B (p. 191, l. 46–p. 194, l. 115): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 14, F, ff. 14ra–va
10. Prop. 132B (p. 200, l. 23–p. 201, l. 38): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 10, F, f. 224va–b
11. Prop. 132D (p. 201, l. 50–53): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 10, F, f. 224vb
12. Prop. 132D (p. 202, l. 56–62): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 10, F, f. 224vb
13. Prop. 132D (p. 201, l. 50–p. 202, l. 62). cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 10, F, f. 224vb
14. Prop. 133A (p. 206, l. 18–27): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 2 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 2), F, ff. 184vb–185ra
15. Prop. 133B (p. 207, l. 50–55): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 32, F, f.37vb
16. Prop. 133B (p. 208, l. 66–82): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 32, F, ff. 37vb–38rb
17. Prop. 133D (p. 209, l. 112–113): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 16, F, f. 17vb
18. Prop. 133D (p. 210, l. 116–117), cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 16, F, f. 17vb
19. Prop. 133H (p. 211, l. 166–174): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 32, F, f. 37vb
20. Prop. 135A (p. 220, l. 12–23): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 2 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 2), F, ff. 184vb–185ra
21. Prop. 135A (p. 221, l. 33–p. 223, l. 80): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 2 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 2), F, f. 185ra–b
vi. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 136–159, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007).
1. Prop. 136A (p. 3, l. 13–p. 5, l. 56): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 18; Liber viginti quattuor 
philosophorum, p. 94, l. 205–p. 96, l. 261
2. Prop. 136B (p. 5, l. 58–p. 6, l. 87): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 8, F, f. 9ra
3. Prop. 136E (p. 6, l. 109–p. 7, l. 138): cf. Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 10 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iv, c. 10), F, f. 104rb
4. Prop. 136E (p. 8, l. 143–168): cf. Sapientiale, lib. iii, c. 11 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iv, c. 11), F, ff. 104vb–105ra
5. Prop. 137E (p. 19, l. 145–p. 21, l. 201): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 11 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 11), F, f. 149va–b; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 143, l. 65–p. 146, l. 136
115Between Cologne and Oxford
6. Prop. 137E (p. 21, l. 202–205): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 11 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 11), F, f. 150rb; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 151, l. 260–265
7. Prop. 137E (p. 21, l. 206–211); cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 11 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 11), F, f. 150va; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 153, l. 305–312
8. Prop. 142A (p. 52, l. 18–p. 54, l. 65): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 16, F, ff. 17ra–19rb; ii, 
30 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. ii, 29), F, 
f. 87vb
9. Prop. 143N (p. 71, l. 401–p. 72, l. 426): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 26 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 26), F, f. 171ra
10. Prop. 146D (p. 91, l. 58–p. 92, l. 71): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 5 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 5), F, f. 188rb
11. Prop. 146E (p. 92, l. 73–p. 93, l. 93): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 5 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 5), F, f. 188rb
12. Prop. 146G (p. 93, l. 106–p. 94, l. 124): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 18; Liber viginti quat-
tuor philosophorum, p. 90, l. 73–p. 91, l. 107
13. Prop. 146H (p. 94, l. 144–p. 96, l. 182): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 17, F, f. 22rb
14. Prop. 146I (p. 96, l. 198–p. 97, l. 209): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 5 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 5), F, f. 188rb–va
15. Prop. 146L (p. 97, l. 232–p. 98, l. 249): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 21 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 21), F, f. 164ra–b
16. Prop. 147E (p. 103, l. 94–108): cf. Sapientiale, lib. ii, c. 2, F, f. 51rb
17. Prop. 149D (p. 114, l. 91–p. 115, l. 130): cf. Sapientiale, lib. iii, cc. 24–26 (Città del 
Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iv, cc. 24–26), F, 
ff. 119ra–121rb
18. Prop. 150D (p. 121, l. 70–p. 125, l. 193): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 8 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 8), F, ff. 145va–146ra; 
Thomae Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 94, l. 27–p. 95, l. 64
19. Prop. 151A (p. 134, l. 70–81): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 14, F, f. 14rb
20. Prop. 151D (p. 137, l. 184–p. 138, l. 193); cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 13 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 13), F, f. 151vb; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 167, l. 28–p. 168, l. 51
21. Prop. 153A (p. 148, l. 12–p. 149, l. 40): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 26 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 26), F, f. 171ra
22. Prop. 153E (p. 153, l. 181–p. 154, l. 210): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 26 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 26), F, f. 171vb
23. Prop. 157D (p. 179, l. 67–79): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 16, F, ff. 19rb–20va; lib. i, c. 17, 
F, f. 23vb
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24. Prop. 159A (p. 189, l. 14–p. 191, l. 73): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 21 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 21), F, ff. 164vb–165rb
25. Prop. 159B (p. 191, l. 75–p. 193, l. 137): cf. Sapientiale, lib. ii, c. 11, F, ff. 68vb–69ra
26. Prop. 159D (p. 194, l. 177–p. 195, l. 182): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 29 (Città del 
Vaticano, Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 29), F, f. 175ra
27. Prop. 159D (p. 196, l. 215–227): cf. Sapientiale, lib. ii, c. 11, F, f. 69ra
vii. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 160–183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003).
1. Prop. 160G (p. 7, l. 126–137): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 26 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iii, c. 26), F, f. 172ra
2. Prop. 162D (p. 19, l. 95–p. 20, l. 135): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 15, F, ff. 15rb–va
3. Prop. 164D (p. 33, l. 66–71): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
4. Prop. 164D (p. 33, l. 81–87): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1, F, f. 212rb
5. Prop. 164E (p. 34, l. 101–p. 35, l. 131): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1, F, f. 212ra
6. Prop. 165D (p. 40, l. 79–p. 41, l. 107): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 5, F, f.60vb
7. Prop. 166B (p. 48, l. 70–p. 49, l. 99): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 11, F, f. 227rb
8. Prop. 166B (p. 49, l. 102–p. 50, l. 124): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 12, F, f. 227rb–va
9. Prop. 166G (p. 52, l. 206–p. 55, l. 266): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 12, F, f. 63vb–64va
10. Prop. 166H (p. 55, l. 267–276): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 12, F, f. 64va
11. Prop. 171D (p. 114, l. 158–p. 115, l. 210): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 17, F, ff. 220vb–221rb
12. Prop. 174G (p. 142, l. 197–205): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 13 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. III, c. 13), F, ff. 152ra–vb; Thomae 
Eboracensis Sapientiale. Liber III. Cap. 1–20, p. 175, l. 240–243; p. 166, l. 9–19
13. Prop. 176A (p. 157, l. 15–p. 160, l. 87): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 27, F, ff. 32va–33ra; 
Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 91, 
l. 66–p. 93, l. 153
14. Prop. 176B (p. 160, l. 90–93): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 27, F, f. 33ra; Retucci, “Tommaso 
di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 93, l. 154–157
15. Prop. 176B (p. 160, l. 102–p. 161, l. 120): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 27, F, f. 33ra; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 94, l. 158–177
16. Prop. 176B (p. 161, l. 121–124): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 28, F, f. 33va; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 98, l. 85–88
17. Prop. 176B (p. 161, l. 132–133): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 27, F, f. 33ra; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 94, l. 178–179
18. Prop. 176C (p. 161, l. 137–142): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 28, F, f. 33rb; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 96, l. 12–24
19. Prop. 176C (p. 162, l. 147–161): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 28, F, f. 33rb; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 96, l. 25–38
20. Prop. 176C (p. 162, l. 162–p. 163, l. 175): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 28, F, f. 33va; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 97, l. 48–64
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21. Prop. 176C (p. 163, l. 176–181): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 28, F, f. 33rb; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 98, l. 72–80
22. Prop. 176C (p. 164, l. 214–p. 165, l. 239): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 28, F, ff. 33va–b; 
Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 98, 
l. 95–p. 99, l. 120
23. Prop. 176D (p. 165, l. 244–263): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, ff. 34rb–va; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 103, l. 18–p. 104, 
l. 37
24. Prop. 176D (p. 165, l. 265–p. 166, l. 270): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, f. 34va; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 104, l. 52–58
25. Prop. 176D (p. 166, l. 272–279): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, f. 34va; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 104, l. 62–p. 105, 
l. 68
26. Prop. 177I (p. 183, l. 335–p. 184, l. 349): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, f. 35rb; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 109, l. 215–p. 110, 
l. 223
27. Prop. 178A (p. 188, l. 12–p. 190, l. 54): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, f. 34va–b; 
Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 105, 
l. 73–p. 106, l. 129
28. Prop. 178B (p. 190, l. 56–p. 191, l. 111): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, f. 34vb; 
Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 107, 
l. 130–p. 108, l. 178
29. Prop. 178B (p. 192, l. 114–120): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, f. 35rb; Retucci, “Tommaso 
di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 108, l. 190–p. 109, l. 196
30. Prop. 178B (p. 192, l. 137–139): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, f. 35rb; Retucci, 
“Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 109, l. 197–199
31. Prop. 178C (p. 193, l. 148–p. 194, l. 193): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 30, F, ff. 35vb–36ra
32. Prop. 178E (p. 196, l. 258–p. 197, l. 283): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 27, F, f. 33ra–b; 
Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 95, 
l. 184–204
33. Prop. 179A (p. 200, l. 12–27): cf. Sapientiale, lib. v, c. 1 (Città del Vaticano, Biblioteca 
Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. iv, c. 33), F, f. 128ra
34. Prop. 180D (p. 213, l. 53–p. 214, l. 79): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 19 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 19), F, f. 194ra–b
35. Prop. 180E (p. 214, l. 81–p. 216, l. 122): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vi, c. 19 (Città del Vaticano, 
Biblioteca Apostolica Vaticana, Vat. lat. 4301: lib. v, c. 19), F, ff. 194rb–vb
viii. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 184–211, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014).
1. Prop. 184A (p. 3, l. 13–p. 5, l. 83): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 15, F, ff. 212vb–213rb
2. Prop. 184C (p. 6, l. 101–116): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 16, F, f. 213va–b
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3. Prop. 186A (p. 30, l. 11–p. 31, l. 44): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 17, F, ff. 214vb–215rb
4. Prop. 186B (p. 31, l. 55–p. 32, l. 71): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 18, F, ff. 215vb–216va
5. Prop. 186D (p. 34, l. 153–p. 35, l. 178): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 19, F, f. 217ra–vb
6. Prop. 187A (p. 43, l. 37–p. 44, l. 68): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 23, F, ff. 222rb–va
7. Prop. 187A (p. 44, l. 81–83): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 23, F, f. 222rb
8. Prop. 187C (p. 47, l. 180–p. 48, l. 212): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 24, F, f. 223ra
9. Prop. 190A (p. 76, l. 15–22): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 18, F, f. 216ra
10. Prop. 190A (p. 77, l. 43–57): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 18, F, f. 216ra
11. Prop. 190A (p. 79, l. 103–106): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 18, F, f. 216ra–b
12. Prop. 190A (p. 80, l. 138–p. 81, l. 193): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 18, F, ff. 216rb–va
13. Prop. 190A (p. 82, l. 212–223): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 18, F, f. 216va
14. Prop. 190B (p. 82, l. 215–217): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 18, F, f. 216va
15. Prop. 199A (p. 151, l. 12–p. 153, l. 64): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 1, F, f. 212ra–b
16. Prop. 199B (p. 153, l. 72–p. 155, l. 131): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 6, F, f. 62ra–b
17. Prop. 199C (p. 156, l. 158–178): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 6, F, f. 61vb
18. Prop. 207C (p. 227, l. 94–p. 228, l. 104): cf. Sapientiale, lib. i, c. 29, F, f. 35ra–b; 
Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di Platone”, p. 108, 
l. 179–190
19. Prop. 208D (p. 235, l. 128–139): cf. Sapientiale, lib. vii, c. 24, F, f. 223ra
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chapter 4
Die Kontinuität der intellektuellen Tradition des 





In der heute nur in zwei Handschriften aus dem 15. Jahrhundert erhaltenen 
Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, dem ersten von den insge-
samt drei bisher bekannten mittelalterlichen Kommentaren zu der Στοιχείωσις 
θεολογική des spätantiken Neuplatonikers Proclus (412–485), behandelt 
Berthold von Moosburg in seiner Exegese der Propositionen 160–183 haupt-
sächlich die Intellektlehre.1 Die 24 Propositionen mit den sie begleitenden 
1 Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
160–183, hg.v. U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz. Prolegomena und Indices hg.v. N. Bray (Hamburg: Meiner, 
2003). Zu Person und Werk Bertholds cf. S. Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content 
and Method of Platonic Philosophy“, in J.A. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (Hgg.), Nach der 
Verurteilung von 1277 (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), S.493–503. M. Führer, S. Gersh, 
„Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg“, in S. Gersh (Hg.), Interpreting Proclus. From 
Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), S.305–317. Die 
lateinische Kommentartradition zu der Elementatio theologica des Proclus und zum Liber de 
causis, das Neuland der Mittelalterforschung, hat neuerlich D. Calma mit seinen Mitarbeitern 
im großen Umfang aufgearbeitet. Calma hat damit die Grundlagen für die weitergehen-
den, von ihm koordinierten Forschungs- und Editionsprojekte auf diesem Gebiet geschaf-
fen. Mehrere Studien aus diesen Projekten weisen punktuelle Überschneidungen mit den 
Themen dieses Beitrags auf; zu nennen sind folgenden Publikationen: A. Baneu, D. Calma, 
„Notes sur un commentaire inédit au Liber de causis (Augsburg, Staats- und Stadtbibliothek, 
4° Cod. 68)“, in Bulletin de Philosophie Médiévale 54(2012), S.286–293, 295–296. D. Calma, „The 
Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations on a Recently Discovered 
Corpus of Texts“, in D. Calma (Hg.), Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. I. New Commentaries 
on Liber de causis (ca. 1250–1350) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), S.30. D. Calma, „A Medieval 
Companion to Aristotle: John Krosbein’s Paraphrases on Liber de causis“, in D. Calma (Hg.), 
Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. II. New Commentaries on Liber de causis and Elementatio 
theologica (ca. 1350–1500) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), S.11–97. F. Retucci, „Sententia Procli alti 
philosophi. Notes on Anonymous Commentary on Proclus’ Elementatio theologica“, in Calma 
(Hg.), Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. II, S.99–179. D. Calma, „Reading Proclus and the Book 
of Causes: Notes on the Western Scholarly Networks and Debates“, in D. Calma (Hg.), Reading 
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commenta Procli bilden insofern zwei ungleiche Vorlagen für Bertholds 
Kommentar, als die konzisen Propositionen sowohl den eigentlichen Bezug 
der Exegese als auch die Grundlage für die Entfaltung von Bertholds eigener 
Lehren darstellen, während die Kommentare des Proclus zu den einzelnen 
Propositionen einer gesonderten, viel kürzeren Auslegung unterzogen werden. 
Beides organisiert Berthold nach einem feststehenden Muster, indem er bei der 
Auslegung der Propositionen, die er als das elementum bezeichnet,2 zuerst den 
in ihnen enthaltenen Lehrgehalt (suppositum) erschließt und in einem zweiten 
Schritt auf dieser Basis sein eigenes Lehrgebäude (propositum) aufbaut. Seine 
Auslegung der Proklischen commenta zu den einzelnen Propositionen eröffnet 
er mit einem syllogistischen Beweis der jeweiligen Proposition (probatio ele-
menti) und geht anschließend zu einer nach Lemmata strukturierten Erklärung 
des Textes über. Bertholds Hermeneutik der inhaltlichen Erschließung der 
Propositionen und ihrer Beweise im Anschluss an die commenta des Proclus 
hat S. Gersh als einen dialektischen Dreischritt rekonstruiert. Dieser wird 
durch eine Erweiterung (‘expansion’), eine Einschränkung (‘restriktion’) und 
eine Transformation (‘alteration’) der Lehrinhalte der Vorlage bei einer inte-
gralen, die Auslegung sämtlicher Propositionen einbeziehenden Lektüre des 
Werkes vollzogen.3 Der dritte Schritt, die Transformation, ist insofern beson-
ders aufschlussreich, wie Gersh unterstreicht, als er Bertholds Verständnis des 
Platonismus und sein Verhältnis zur aristotelischen Philosophie widerspie-
gelt. Er verdeutlicht auch, fügen wir hinzu, die Bedeutung der durch Albert 
den Großen begründeten, an Pseudo-Dionysius anschließenden intellektuel-
len Tradition für Bertholds Auffassung der divinissima philosophia, wie sie im 
Einklang mit Proclus und in der Differenz zu Proclus entfaltet wird.4
Die Bindung des Kommentars an eine Textvorlage gibt naturgemäß den 
Rahmen für seine inhaltliche Ausgestaltung vor. Dies gilt auch für Bertholds 
Intellektlehre, die er in seiner Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 
Procli entwickelt und die im Fokus der nachfolgenden Ausführungen steht. 
Eine systematische Erarbeitung eines geschlossenen intellekttheoretischen 
Lehrstücks hat der Verfasser der weitschweifigen Expositio nicht angestrebt, 
Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1: Western Scholarly Networks and Debates (Leiden / 
Boston: Brill, 2019), S.1–13.
2 Für die etymologische Erklärung des Begriffs elementum und des Werktitels sowie des 
Namens des Autors siehe Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of 
Platonic Philosophy“, S.498.
3 Berthold’s Hermeneutik hat S. Gersh in seiner Analyse der Proposition 174 rekonstruiert, 
siehe Führer, Gersh, „Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg“, S.310–316, insbes. 
S.310–311. Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content“, S.500.
4 Cf. unter Anm. 28.
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da sich ihm seitens der Textvorlage ein hierfür geeigneter Ansatz offenbar 
nicht bot. Aus diesem Grund bildet seine Intellekttheorie auf das Ganze gese-
hen ein untereinander zwar vernetztes, aber auch deshalb fast nicht mehr 
zu durchschauendes Konglomerat verschiedener, durch die Vorlage und die 
verwendeten Quellen vorgegebener Elemente. Ihre Erschließung, genetische 
Bestimmung und Systematisierung, wie sie hier angestrebt und nur partiell 
durchgeführt werden kann, verlangen unter diesen Vorzeichen viel Aufwand, 
werfen aber einen geringen Ertrag ab, so dass ihre vollständige Aufarbeitung 
weiterhin ein Forschungsdesiderat bleibt. Diese Einschränkungen in Kauf neh-
mend wird mit Blick auf die auffälligsten Gemeinsamkeiten der Intellektlehre 
und der Erkenntnismetaphysik von Berthold und Albertus Magnus auf einen 
Bereich in einigen Punkten einzugehen sein, der bislang nicht erforscht 
wurde. Hierbei wird es primär um die Klassifikation der Intellekte und ihre 
Erklärungen gehen, um den erkenntnis-metaphysisch und existenziell aufge-
fassten intellektiven Aufstieg des Menschen, um Lehrinhalte, die bei Berthold 
einerseits systematisch konsistenter elaboriert und andererseits in der 
Tradition des Albertus Magnus entweder direkt oder vermittelt durch Ulrich 
von Straßburg und Dietrich von Freiberg verankert sind.
Die nachfolgenden Analysen der lehrinhaltlichen Koinzidenz und der sug-
gerierten Einflüsse Alberts auf Bertholds Typologie und Interpretation der 
Intellekte konzentrieren sich auf seine Auslegung der Propositionen 160, 163, 
167, 174 und 181 der Elementatio theologica des Proclus. Eine erste Durchsicht 
des Kommentars zu den Propositionen 160–183 hat gezeigt, dass in den 
genannten fünf Texteinheiten Berthold sich bei seiner Proclus-Exegese und 
seinen intellekttheoretisch zentralen Aussagen auch der von Albert einge-
führten und entfalteten Typologie und des Verständnisses der Intellekte bzw. 
deren Vollendungsstufen und der darauf gestützten Theorie der intellekti-
ven Selbstüberschreitung des Menschen bedient und sie weiterentwickelt. 
Eine genetische Retrospektive von Bertholds Intellektlehre aus wirft Licht 
auf sein Verständnis der Lehre des unum animae und die epistemologische 
Fundierung der Mystik. Sie lässt eine nicht-reduktionistische Interpretation 
der Berthold’schen divinissima philosophia als eine „theologische Philosophie“ 
alternativlos werden, welche die gegenwärtige theologie- und philosophie-
historische Forschung, um ihre Konfundierung mit der Mystik und ‘einer 
»Philosophie«’ zu vermeiden, unter ebendiesem Namen, d.h. der „theolo-
gischen Philosophie“, zu entdecken und systematisch wiederzugewinnen 
begonnen hat.5
5 Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content“, S.499–500, und unten Anm. 30.
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Die zu erwägenden Fragestellungen veranlassen zunächst einen Rückblick 
auf die allgemeine und aktuelle Forschungslage in Bezug auf Bertholds 
Intellektlehre. Diskussionswürdig sind manche in der neueren Forschung pro-
nonciert vertretenen Auffassungen in Bezug auf Bertholds Grundeinstellung 
gegenüber der Theologie und der biblisch-christlichen Offenbarung im 
Besonderen, sein Selbstverständnis als Philosoph, sein Verhältnis zum kirch-
lichen Lehramt und zu dem sogenannten „Schularistotelismus“ einschließlich 
der aristotelischen Erkenntnismetaphysik. Nicht zuletzt sind die als exklusiv 
dargestellte Rolle Dietrich von Freibergs Philosophie, insbesondere ihre intel-
lekttheoretischen und ethischen Ansätze zu hinterfragen, sowie die These, dass 
sie „als ein Fundament für jeden Interpretationsversuch des Bertholdschen 
Werkes betrachtet werden muß“.6
2 Ein Rückblick auf die Forschungen zu Berthold von Moosburg
2.1 Die Wiederentdeckung der Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam Procli
Der zwischen 1327 und 1361 von Berthold von Moosburg verfasste Kommentar 
zu der Elementatio theologica Procli geriet im Verlauf der Jahrhunderte, 
sofern er nicht von vornherein gemäß dem Willen des Verfassers ein ver-
borgenes Dasein führte, in Vergessenheit und wurde erst im Jahr 1900 durch 
W. Rubczyński im Kodex Vat. lat. 2192 wiederentdeckt.7 Im Jahr 1926 erfolgte 
die Edition eines Teils des Prologs durch Raymond Klibansky, nachdem er eine 
zweite Handschrift von Bertholds Werk im Kodex Oxford, Balliol Coll. 224B 
6 L. Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg und die Probleme 
der nacheckhartschen Zeit“, in K. Ruh (Hg.), Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion 
Kloster Engelbert 1984 (Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1986), S.147; repr.: „Der 
Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg und die philosophischen Probleme der nach-
eckhartschen Zeit“, in L. Sturlese, Homo divinus: Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwi-
schen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), S.139.
7 W. Rubczyński, „Studia neoplatońskie“, in Przegląd Filozoficzny 3(1900), S.41–69. H. Struve, 
„Die polnische Philosophie der letzten zehn Jahre (1894–1904)“, in Archiv für Geschichte der 
Philosophie 18(1905), S.568–571. Da Rubczyński Anknüpfungen an die von ihm wiederauf-
gefundene, in der Handschrift Berthold explizit zugeschriebene Expositio bei Cusanus fin-
det und ihren Verfasser für einen Vorläufer des Cusanus hält, gibt er den Verfassernamen 
der Expositio in der von Cusanus überlieferten, irrtümlichen Variante mit ‘Johann Mosbach’ 
wieder.
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entdeckt hatte.8 Mit den beiden Funden und der Teilveröffentlichung, auf 
die im Jahr 1971 die Edition des Kommentars zu den Propositionen 49–54, die 
B. Faes de Mottoni ins Werk setzte, und im Jahr 1974 der erste, von L. Sturlese 
herausgegebene Band der historisch-kritischen Edition des Kommentars zu 
den Propositionen 184–211 folgten, begann die Forschung zu Berthold von 
Moosburg und seinem Werk.9 Sie gewann rasch an Fahrt, nachdem K. Flasch 
die kritische Edition des Gesamtwerkes Dietrich von Freibergs in Bochum 
initiiert und hierfür sowie für weitere Editionsvorhaben das Projekt eines 
Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi begründet und ein interna-
tionales Forscher- und Editorenteam zur kritischen Herausgabe der Werke 
von Autoren, die der „Deutschen Dominikanerschule“ des 14. Jahrhunderts 
zugerechnet werden, gebildet hatte. Nach der Fertigstellung der kritischen 
Ausgabe des Gesamtwerkes Dietrich von Freibergs nahm das ursprünglich 
durch K. Flasch und L. Sturlese, später auch durch R. Imbach und B. Mojsisch 
koordinierte Editorenteam die Arbeit an der kritischen Edition Berthold 
von Moosburgs Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli auf.10 Die 
Edition wurde in acht Teilbänden der Bochumer Corpus Philosophorum 
Teutonicorum Medii Aevi-Reihe (und einem bereits 1974 in der römischen Serie 
Temi et Testi, Edizioni di Storia e letteratura veröffentlichten 18. Band) im Jahr 
2014 vollendet.
Ein Überblick über die zurückliegende und aktuelle Forschung zu Berthold 
von Moosburg muss an dieser Stelle selektiv auf einige für die Fragestellung die-
ses Beitrags einschlägigen Untersuchungen beschränkt bleiben. Vorgestellt und 
im Hauptteil der Darstellung punktuell berücksichtigt werden die Pionierarbeit 
von W. Eckert,11 die für das Editionsprojekt und die Werkinterpretation 
8  R. Klibansky, Ein Proklos-Fund und seine Bedeutung. Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger 
Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, Jahrgang 1928/1929, 5. 
Abhandlung (Heidelberg: Winter, 1929).
9  B. Faes de Mottoni, „Il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg all’Elementatio theologica di 
Proclo. Edizione delle proposizioni riguardanti il tempo e l’eternità“, in Studi medievali 
Ser. 3, 12(1971), S.417–461. Cf. R. Imbach, „Chronique de Philosophie: Le (néo-)platonisme 
médiéval, Proclus latin et l’école dominicaine allemande“, in Revue de Théologie et de 
Philosophie 110(1978), S.437–438, 448; repr.: R. Imbach, Quodlibeta. Ausgewählte Artikel / 
Articles choisis, hg.v. F. Cheneval et al. (Freiburg, Schweiz: Universitätsverlag, 1996), 
S.149–151.
10  Cf. K. Flasch, L. Sturlese, „Vorwort“, in Berthod von Moosburg, Expositio super Elemen-
tationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1–13, hg.v. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, 
L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), S.ix–x.
11  W. Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im 
Spätmittelalter“, in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 65(1957), S.120–133.
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richtungsweisende „Einleitung“ von K. Flasch12 und die sie vertiefende und 
weiterführende Studie von L. Sturlese.13 Thematisch zentral für die nachfolgen-
den Rekonstruktionen sind zwei Untersuchungen aus der Bochumer Schule, 
weshalb sie besondere Aufmerksamkeit auf sich ziehen. Die Erstere, bei der 
es sich um die Dissertation der Mitherausgeberin des intellekttheoretischen 
Teils der Bertholdschen Expositio, I.J. Tautz, handelt, analysiert Bertholds 
Intellektlehre anhand seines Kommentars zu den Propositionen 168–183.14 Die 
zweite Studie, ein Beitrag von B. Mojsisch zu einer Essaysammlung, bietet eine 
konzise Charakteristik der Intellekttheorie Bertholds und ihre Einordnung in 
den Gesamtkontext seines philosophischen Denkens.15 Wichtig sind ebenfalls 
Untersuchungen von T. Iremadze zur Erkenntnislehre und der Intellekttheorie 
Bertholds sowie die Studien von M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese und A. de Libera zum 
Einfluss Alberts des Großen auf dessen Intellektlehre.16 Diese hier genannten 
einschlägigen Arbeiten und die schon herangezogenen Untersuchungen von 
S. Gersh werden im Hauptteil dieser Studie berücksichtigt.
2.2 Der Beitrag von Willehad P. Eckert
Die bedeutendsten Untersuchungen aus der frühen Phase der Berthold- 
Forschung sind die ungedruckte Dissertation von W. Eckert und sein im Phi-
losophischen Jahrbuch unter der Überschrift „Berthold von Moosburg O.P. 
Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im Spätmittelalter“ veröffentlichter 
12  K. Flasch, „Einleitung“, in Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13, hg.v. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), S.xi–xxxviii.
13  Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.145–161 (repr. S.137–154).
14  I.J. Tautz, Erst-Eines, Intellekte, Intellektualität. Eine Studie zu Berthold von Moosburg 
(Hamburg: Kovač, 2002).
15  B. Mojsisch, „Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Berthold von Moosburg. Zur Proklosrezeption 
im Mittelalter“, in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, O.F. Summerell (Hgg.), Selbst – Singularität – 
Subjektivität. Vom Neuplatonismus zum deutschen Idealismus (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: 
Grüner, 2002), S.175–184.
16  T. Iremadze, „Der intellekttheoretische Ansatz der Selbstreflexivität des Denkens gemäß 
Kapitel 168 der Elementatio theologica des Proklos und seine Deutung sowie Entfaltung 
im Proklos-Kommentar Bertholds von Moosburg“, in W. Geerlings, C. Schulze (Hgg.). Der 
Kommentar in Antike und Mittelalter, Bd. 2: Neue Beiträge zu seiner Erforschung (Leiden / 
Boston: Brill, 2004), S.237–253; T. Iremadze, Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. 
Zur Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter: 
Dietrich von Freiberg – Berthold von Moosburg – Joane Petrizi (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: 
Grüner, 2004). M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, „À propos du néoplatonisme d’Albert le Grand. 
Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d’Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus 
de Berthold de Moosburg“, in Archives de Philosophie 43(1980), S.635–654. A. de Libera, 
La Mystique rhénane. D’Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1994), 
S.326–384.
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Aufsatz, in dem der Verfasser die wichtigsten Ergebnisse seiner in der Disser-
tation dargelegten Forschungen zusammenfasst.17 Er stellt den Moosburger 
als einen Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik dar und unterstreicht seine enge 
Beziehung zu Albert dem Großen. Diese manifestiere sich in der Expositio 
durch weitläufige Anleihen aus Alberts Summa theologiae, in der die Elemen-
tatio theologica des Proclus nach der lateinischen, am 12. Mai 1268 in Viterbo 
vollendeten Übersetzung des Wilhelm von Moerbeke erstmalig rezipiert und 
zitiert werde.18 Hinsichtlich der Intellektlehre beschränkt sich Eckert auf die 
Feststellung, Berthold habe Dietrichs Lehre vom Seelengrund übernommen. 
Diese wird als eine Verbindung des augustinischen Konzepts des abditum men-
tis mit der aristotelischen intellectus agens-Lehre begriffen.19
Mit Blick auf die später entfachte Polemik gegen Eckert’s Auffassung, 
Berthold sei ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik, und die Verneinung 
des Befunds, dass Berthold’s christliche Glaubensüberzeugung das herme-
neutische Prinzip seines Werkverständnisses darstellt, sind zwei Aspekte 
hervorzuheben: Erstens, Berthold bekennt sich zur (neu-)platonischen 
Einheitsmetaphysik, indem er wie Platon und im Unterscheid zu Aristoteles 
die Priorität des Einen und/oder des Guten vor dem Sein annimmt. Am 
Prinzipiencharakter dieses Sein und Erkennen transzendierenden Einen bzw. 
des Guten ändert die Methode eines diskursiv-aufsteigenden oder eines intuiti-
ven Zuganges nichts.20 Ob Berthold sich in dieser Hinsicht von den Positionen 
des Meister Eckhart wesentlich unterscheidet und konsequenter als Eckhart 
ist, sofern das System des Letzteren sich als ein Versuch verstehen lässt, das 
Seinsprinzip und das Einheitsprinzip miteinander zu verbinden, wie Eckert 
17  W. Eckert, Berthold von Moosburg O.P. und sein Kommentar zur Elementatio theologica des 
Proklos, PhD Diss. (Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München, 1956); Eckert, „Berthold 
von Moosburg O.P.“, S.120–133.
18  Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P.“, S.127: „Die Summa theologiae Alberts des Großen 
schreibt er [sc. Berthold] seitenweise mitsamt ihren Zitaten aus“. Zur Rezeption der 
Elementatio theologica des Proclus durch Albert in seiner Summa theologiae siehe 
D. Siedler, P. Simon, „Prolegomena“, in Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mira-
bili scientia dei, libri primi pars I, quaestiones 1–50A, hg.v. D. Siedler, W. Kübel, H.-J. Vogels 
(Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), S.xvi–xvii. Für die Datierung und den Ort der latei-
nischen, von Moerbeke angefertigten Übersetzung der Elementatio theologica siehe 
H. Boese, „Einleitung“, in Proclus, Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de 
Morbecca, hg.v. H. Boese (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987), S.ix.
19  Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P.“, S.127. Cf. A. Colli, „Intellectus agens als abditum men-
tis. Die Rezeption Augustins in der Intellekttheorie Dietrichs von Freiberg“, in Theologie 
und Philosophie 86(2011), S.360–371. E. Krebs, Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de 
Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, Seine Wissenschaft (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1906), 
S.100.
20  Cf. Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content“, S.499.
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annimmt, kann man wie bisher geteilter Ansicht sein.21 Zweitens, Berthold 
bekennt sich unmissverständlich zur biblisch-christlichen Offenbarung, 
indem er deren Lehrinhalte, darunter die innertrinitarischen Hervorgänge 
und Relationen sowie die Schöpfung im Rückgriff auf die pseudo-dionysische 
Emanationslehre und die von Proclus und von Pseudo-Dionysius inspirierte, 
von Albert erläuterte und von Dietrich von Freiberg entfaltete Providenzlehre 
zu erklären sucht und nicht zuletzt auf das Verhältnis von Theologie und 
Philosophie im Sinne der Auffassung von Albert und Dietrich reflektiert.22 
Eine willkürliche Einwendung, Berthold wollte unter keinen Umständen ein 
Offenbarungstheologe sein (der er als Predigermönch ex professo war), eine 
Einwendung, die einen von mehreren Kritikpunkten an Eckert’s Lektüre der 
Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli darstellt, erweist sich aus 
dieser Perspektive und aufgrund der Rolle, welche die theologischen Quellen, 
in erster Linie die biblischen Bücher, erfüllen, als unzutreffend.23
2.3 Hermeneutische Neuausrichtung durch K. Flasch
Die acht Teilbände umfassende kritische Ausgabe des Werkes Berthold von 
Moosburgs wird im ersten Teilband, der den Prolog und die Auslegung der 
Propositionen 1–13 enthält, doktrinell durch K. Flasch eingeleitet.24 Flasch 
beleuchtet die in Dunkel gehüllte Geschichte des Werkes von seiner Abfassung 
um die Mitte des 14. Jahrhundert bis zum Erscheinen der ersten Bände der 
kritischen Edition und revidiert die von Eckert vorgenommene philosophiesy-
stematische Einordnung des Kommentars in die Tradition. Er bietet eine neue 
Interpretation der neuplatonischen Leitideen und Grundsätze dar, die das 
Denken des Autors bestimmen. Bertholds Hauptquellen, darunter die Rolle 
des Averroes, stellt er ebenso wie seine Sicht auf das Verhältnis des Autors 
21  Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P.“, S.129–131.
22  Eckert, „Berthold von Moosburg O.P.“, S.132–133; cf. Ps.-Dionysius Areopagita, De divinis 
nominibus, hg.v. B.R. Suchla (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1990), c. 4 n. 33, S.178 L.8–17; 
die lateinische Übesetzung des Johannes Sarracenus in Dionysiaca. Recueil donnant 
l’ensemble des traductions latines des ouvrages attribués au Denys de l’Aréopage, hg.v. 
Ph. Chevallier, vol. i (Brugge: de Brouwer, 1937), c. 4, S.311–313. Albertus Magnus, Super 
Dionysium De divinis nominibus, hg.v. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff 1972), c. 4 n. 
224, S.298, L.4–37, S.297, L.78–84. Dietrich von Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae ( fragmen-
tum), hg.v. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), S.279–282, bes. 3 (9), S.281, L.100–S.282, 
L.109. Albertus Magnus, Commentarii in III Sententiarum, hg.v. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 
1894), d. 24, a. 3, S.468a: fides et scientia sunt de eodem, non secundum idem. H. Anzulewicz, 
Die theologische Relevanz des Bildbegriffs und des Spiegelbildmodells in den Frühwerken 
des Albertus Magnus (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1999), S.159. M. Roesner, Logik des 
Ursprungs. Vernunft und Offenbarung bei Meister Eckhart (Freiburg / München: Alber, 
2017), S.101–103.
23  Siehe unten Anm. 26 und insbesondere den Beitrag von P.D. Hellmeier in diesem Band.
24  Hierzu und zum Folgenden: Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.xi–xxxviii.
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der Expositio zur ihrer Proklischen Vorlage und zur biblisch-christlichen 
Offenbarungstheologie vor. Die Kritik, Korrekturen und Präzisierungen frühe-
rer Interpretationen von Bertholds Werk und philosophischem Denken bilden 
den Haupttenor der Einleitung.25 Zu den darin dargelegten, einen bemerkens-
werten Erkenntnisfortschritt markierenden Einsichten, die mit der Edition 
der ersten Teilbbände des Kommentars und mit der doktrinellen Erschließung 
des Prologs erzielt und in der Einleitung präsentiert wurden, seien einige kriti-
sche Bemerkungen angebracht. Sie beziehen sich vornehmlich auf die herme-
neutisch relevanten Deutungen, die auch mit den Kritikpunkten an den von 
Eckert gewonnenen Erkenntnissen zusammenhängen und die für sich eine 
historisch mögliche, bisweilen ausschließliche, die Werkinterpretation maß-
geblich bestimmende Valenz beanspruchen.
An erster Stelle seien das Ausschließen offenbarungstheologischer Ele-
mente und Motive im Denken von Berthold und die Verneinung seines 
Selbstverständnisses als Theologe zu erwähnen, die selbst bei seinem Rekurs auf 
die biblische Überlieferung reklamiert werden, wobei ihm auch eine dem kirch-
lichen Lehramt und dem „Schularistotelismus“ gegenüber kritische Attitüde 
attestiert wird.26 Vor dem Hintergrund von Bertholds Bezugnahmen auf die 
biblische und die ps.-dionysische „Epistemologie“ der Gotteserkenntnis und 
in Anbetracht seiner Heranziehung theologischer Autoritäten wie Ambrosius, 
Augustinus, Johannes von Damaskus, Maximus Confessor und Eriugena sowie 
philosophischer Erörterung dezidiert theologischer Fragen wie die Trinität 
und Schöpfung, überzeugt eine die Theologie gänzlich ausschließende 
Interpretation nicht. Werden indes offenbarungstheologische und philosophi-
sche Gründe und Erklärungsmuster nicht als Gegensätze sondern als korre-
lative, sich modal unterscheidende Interpretationen derselben Sachgehalte 
aufgefasst, lassen sich die dem Anschein nach unüberbrückbaren Divergenzen 
25  Cf. Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.xi–xii, xiv–xv, xix–xxi, xxv.
26  Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.xiv, insbesondere Section 3: „Es gibt weitere Selbstinterpretationen 
Bertholds, die zu nutzen sind. Ohne darüber zum Offenbarungstheologen werden zu wol-
len, intendierte er, die Invisibilia Dei durch das Geschaffene zu erkennen (Römerbrief 1,20), 
und interpretierte diese Erkenntnis als den intellektuellen Weg vom Abbild zum Urbild 
(Expos. prol. 1 Sturlese 5.5–12 u.ö.).“ Andere Akzente setzt bei der Interpretation dieser 
Stelle Sturlese, der auf die „‘propria’ Gottes, d.h. die Trinität“, verweist und trotz seiner 
tendenziellen Enttheologisierung des Werkes Berthold unwillkürlich als Theologen aus-
weist; er gibt auch zu, dass Bertholds „divinissima philosophia“ als „Mystik“ bezeichnet 
werden kann, und charakterisiert sie als eine „deutsche Mystik“, hält aber letztlich an der 
Bestimmung „Philosophie“ und an der in diesem Sinne verstandenen Formel „divinissima 
philosophia“ fest. Schließlich räumt er ein, dass Bertholds Bestimmung dieser „göttlich-
sten Philosophie“ als „sancta religio“ sie als „Theologie“ zu bezeichnen erlaubt; cf. Sturlese, 
„Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.153–154, 155 (repr. S.147–148, 150–151).
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auflösen.27 Gleichwohl besteht kein Zweifel, dass bei der Kommentierung die-
ser philosophischen Schrift ein Theologe mit einem zuhöchst philosophischen 
Anspruch am Werk ist, der die Gegenstände seiner Vorlage in ihrer doktrinell 
ursprünglichen Verankerung methodisch gerecht, d.h. ausschließlich philo-
sophisch, sachlich jedoch nicht ohne Transformationen, Erweiterungen und 
Indienstnahme im Sinne seines spezifischen, in der biblisch-christlichen 
Offenbarungstheologie gründenden Gott- und Weltverständnisses auslegt. Er 
entfaltet im Anschluss an Proclus eine neue Art der „göttlichsten Philosophie“ 
(divinissima philosophia), die sich von jener der theologi philosophantes aus der 
Vorgeschichte der griechischen Philosophie wesentlich unterscheidet und, wie 
S. Gersh gezeigt hat, sich nicht allein auf die Proklische Theologie ohne die 
Berücksichtigung der sie voraussetzenden Rolle des Pseudo-Dionysius zurück-
führen lässt.28 Seine „theologische Philosophie“ des biblisch-christlichen 
Zuschnitts reiht sich in die platonische Tradition von Augustinus und Boethius 
über Pseudo-Dionysius, Eriugena und Honorius Augustodunensis bis hin 
zur Albert-Schule ein, wobei neben den Dominikanern Albert dem Großen, 
Ulrich von Straßburg, Meister Eckhart und Dietrich von Freiberg auch der 
Franziskaner Thomas von York mit dem Werk Sapientiale zu den einschlä-
gigen Quellen von Berthold’s Expositio zählt.29 Es sei angemerkt, dass die 
27  Cf. Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.149–151 (repr. S.143–145).
28  Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy“, 
S.493–503. Cf. I. Zavattero, „La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo die Moosburg“, in 
Arkete. Rivista di studi filosofici 1(2005), S.52. H. Anzulewicz, „Albertus Magnus über die phi-
losophi theologizantes und die natürlichen Voraussetzungen postmortaler Glückseligkeit: 
Versuch einer Bestandsaufnahme“, in C. Steel, J. Marenbon, W. Verbeke (Hgg.), Paganism 
in the Middle Ages: Threat and Fascination (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2012), 
S.60–76, 80–83. Führer, Gersh, „Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg“, S.306–
317. Andere Akzente setzt in dieser Frage Sturlese, indem er die vermittelnde Rolle des 
Pseudo-Dionysius (dessen Werk Berthold als die Grundlage der Elementatio theologica 
des Proclus betrachtet haben muss) und die synthetisierende Eigenleistung des Berthold, 
welche die Gestalt der nostra divinalis philosophia im Sinne der christianisierten theologi-
schen Philosophie annimmt, wenig zu beachten scheint und sich darauf konzentriert, die 
Rolle des Proclus und der ‘Proklischen Theologie’ in der Sicht Bertholds zu verabsolutisie-
ren; cf. Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.150–151 (repr. S.144–
145). Speziell zu der chronologischen Priorität des Pseudo-Dionysius gegenüber Proclus 
und dem corpus Dionysiacum als Voraussetzung, Maßstab und Garant der ‘Orthodoxie’ 
der Elementatio theologica des Proclus aus der Sicht Bertholds cf. Gersh, „Berthold von 
Moosburg and the Content“, S.501–502; Führer, Gersh, „Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold 
of Moosburg“, S.309.
29  Cf. Gersh, „Berthold von Moosburg and the Content“, S.495; de Libera, La Mystique 
rhénane, S.319–325. Die Bedeutung des Thomas von York als Bertholds Quelle erörtern 
E. King im Beitrag „Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg’s Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam Procli“, in Calma (Hg.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1, 
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gegenwärtige theologie- und philosophiehistorische Forschung des christ-
lichen und des arabisch-islamischen Kulturraumes begonnen hat, die divi-
nissima philosophia, wie sie Berthold bezeichnete und entfaltete, unter 
ebendiesem Namen, d.h. der „theologischen Philosophie“, zu entdecken und 
systematisch wiederzugewinnen.30
Auf die kritisch gesicherte Textgrundlage des Kommentars zu den Propo- 
sitionen 1–13 gestützt, lehnt Flasch die von J. Koch eingeführte Unterscheidung 
zwischen der neuplatonischen Einheitsmetaphysik und der aristotelischen 
Seinsmetaphysik sowie die Charakterisierung Bertholds als Vertreter der neu-
platonischen Einheitsmetaphysik ab. Er wendet gegen diese auch durch Eckert 
übernommene und durch dessen eigene Forschungen bestätigte Auffassung 
ein und erläutert seine Position u. a. folgenderweise:
Berthold vertrat nicht eine immer schon vorhandene Einheitsmetaphysik, 
sondern er restaurierte um die Mitte des 14. Jahrhunderts eine 
durch kirchenamtliche Interventionen und den konventionellen 
Schularistotelismus bedrohte Tradition, deren Inhalt Berthold präzise 
angab: Sie betrachtete die Welt nicht nur als bewirkt und teleologisch 
bestimmt durch das höchste Gute, sondern sie sah sie zu ihm im Verhältnis 
des Akzidens zur Substanz. Diese Metaphysik des höchsten Guten wußte 
sich im polemischen Gegensatz zum Schularistotelismus und erhielt 
von daher, besonders von der im Jahre 1323 erfolgten Kanonisation des 
Thomas von Aquino, ihre zeitgeschichtliche Prägnanz: Sie wollte eine 
immanent philosophische Deutung des Weltganzen geben, unter beson-
deren Berücksichtigung seines dynamischen Charakters; processus und 
regressus der Welt wollte sie thematisieren als Ausdruck des ‘ersten 
Guten’ und der ontologischen Unselbständigkeit der ‘Substanz’ der 
Aristoteliker. Bertholds Traditionsbezug war reicher als man bisher sah; 
S.408–410, und F. Retucci in ihren früheren Arbeiten (siehe King, „Eriugenism in Berthold 
of Moosburg’s Expositio, S.408 Anm. 44) sowie im Aufsatz „Between Cologne and Oxford: 
Berthold of Moosburg and Thomas of York’s Sapientiale“ in diesem Band.
30  Dass Bertholds Begriff divinissima philosophia, d.h. „theologische Philosophie“, gegenwär-
tig keinen Anachronismus darstellt und eine Wiederbelebung erfährt, zeigen exempla-
risch die Arbeiten, Lehrprogramme und Forschungsprojekte von L. Schumacher (King’s 
College London, Department of Theology and Religious Studies), darunter insbesondere 
ihre Studie Theological Philosophy. Rethinking the Rationality of Christian Faith (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2015). Ähnliche Entwicklung ist neuerlich auf dem Gebiet der religionsphiloso-
phischen Forschung des Islams zu beobachten, wie exemplarisch die Essays-Sammlung 
von A. Shihadeh, J. Thiele (Hgg.), Philosophical Theology in Islam. Later Ashʿarism East and 
West (Leiden: Brill 2020) belegt.
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er umfasste die averroistische Aristotelesdeutung und ihre Aktualisierung 
durch Dietrich ebenso wie das von Albertus Magnus genährte Interesse 
an Hermes Trismegistus.31
Bezüglich dieser Interpretation stellen sich einige Fragen, darunter insbe-
sondere die, ob Berthold eine derart konsequente und gewissermaßen dia-
lektische Vorgehensweise zuzuschreiben ist, dass er eine nur immanent 
philosophische Welterklärung im Ganzen geben will und kann, wenn er sich 
hierbei theologischer Quellen, Begriffe, Inhalte, Gründe und Muster bedient, 
zugleich die räumlichen Assoziationen der Aufstiegsmetapher, die als der 
Innbegriff der Kontingenz verstanden wird, aufhebt.32 Weisen Bertholds expli-
zite Bezüge auf die biblische Offenbarung und seine Anlehnungen an die 
theologischen Autoritäten einerseits und die hermeneutische Struktur einer 
im Sinne der theologischen Philosophie begriffenen Deutung des Weltganzen 
nicht auf eine christliche Adaption eines neuplatonischen Denkmodells seines 
Weltverständnisses hin? Bewegt sich Berthold auf einem offenbarungstheo-
logisch absolut freien, „immanent philosophischen“ Weg des intellektuellen 
Aufstiegs des Menschen von seinem göttlichen Ursprung, an dem er teilhat, 
zu dem wesenhaft Göttlichen und dadurch zu dem erstursächlich Guten?33 
31  Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.xiv.
32  Cf. Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.xv.
33  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, 
hg.v. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), Expos. tit. L, S.49 L.408–
414: Comprehenditur etiam ultimo per li elementatio theologica finale perfectivum 
sive causa finalis ita, ut elementatio theologica, id est divinae rationis, importet scalarem 
ascensum a divinis per participationem ad divina per essentiam et per hoc ad divinum 
principaliforme, quod est divinum secundum causam, contemplandum; cuius contempla-
tione contemplator non solum efficitur beatus in assequendo ‘statum omnium bonorum 
aggregatione perfectum’, sed etiam deus. Cf. Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.xiv–xv: „Wenn man 
das Denken Bertholds als ‘Einheitsmetaphysik’ kennzeichnet, dann muß man hinzu-
fügen: ‘Einheitsmetaphysik’ verstand Berthold mit Dionysius als Lehre vom höchsten 
Guten, mit Augustinus als Ideenlehre und Logosspekulation, mit Eriugena und wie-
derum mit Dionysius als Theorie der causae primordiales. Dabei legen die hier erstmals 
edierten Texte zwei weitere Korrekturen an dem von Josef Koch und Willehad Eckert 
gezeichneten Bild des ‘Einheitsmetaphysikers’ Berthold nahe. Beide Autoren erklärten, 
‘Einheitsmetaphysik’ sei „immer ‘Metaphysik von oben’, d.h. sie geht von der absoluten 
Einheit als dem Erstgegebenen aus und steigt von da zum Verständnis der Welt herab. 
Abgesehen davon, daß kein entwickeltes philosophisches Denken sich in dieser vorstel-
lungsorientierten Weise (Seinsmetaphysik = „Metaphysik von unten“; Einheitsmetaphysik 
= „Metaphysik von oben“) adäquat beschreiben lässt, so trifft diese Charakteristik auf den 
Text Bertholds faktisch nicht zu. Wie Proklos ging Berthold vom Vielen aus, um denkend 
zum Einen zu gelangen […]. Das Urbild ist nicht das Erstgegebene, sondern wir müssen, 
wie Berthold gleich zu Beginn seines Kommentars (Sturlese 5, 18) erklärt, durch das Abbild 
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Wird dieser Weg, genauer: welcher Weg wird von Berthold konsequent durch-
schritten, und wird er sich für ihn am Ende, vergleichsweise wie für Albert den 
Großen gemäß dem Schluss seiner Schrift De intellectu et intelligibili, als ziel-
führend erweisen? Widerspricht die Verkürzung der Metaphysik des Guten, 
die Berthold, Meister Eckhart und Albert entwickeln, und die Begrenzung des 
processus und regressus bzw. des exitus, der perfectio und der reductio, der her-
meneutisch erschließenden Struktur der Seinswirklichkeit auf ein „immanent 
philosophisch“ begreifbares Problem nicht dem onto-theologischen Charakter 
und Ausmaß der hier in Rede stehenden Sachgehalte? Welche Signifikanz 
ist der hermetischen Tradition in Bertholds Intellektlehre beizumessen, in 
der sie keine explizite Erwähnung findet? Die Idee der Vergöttlichung des 
Menschen ist nicht ausschließlich und auch nicht genuin ein hermetischer 
Gedanke; sie wird bei Albert nicht weniger mit den Peripatetikern als mit 
Hermes Trismegistus verbunden.34 Dabei ist die Tatsache zu unterstreichen, 
dass Berthold die Theorie der Welten und vor allem hermetische Doktrin des 
Menschen als Mikrokosmos wörtlich aus dem Metaphysikkommentar Alberts 
des Großen übernimmt, obwohl er einen viel breiteren Zugang zu dieser 
zum Urbild kommen, in einer laboriosa investigatio, […]. Doch tilgte Berthold die ver-
räumlichenden Assoziationen dieser Metapher, indem er den Aufstieg und seine Stufen 
inhaltlich bestimmte als den Weg a divinis per participationem ad divina per essentiam 
et per hoc ad divinum principaliforme, quod est divinum secundum causam (Expos. tit. 
L Sturlese 49, 410–412).“
34  Cf. Albertus Magnus, De anima, hg.v. C. Stroick (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1968), lib. 3, tr. 
3, c. 11, S.221, L.93–S.222, L.9: et cum sic acceperit [sc. intellectus possibilis] omnia intelligibi-
lia, habet lumen agentis ut formam sibi adhaerentem, et cum ipse sit lumen suum, eo quod 
lumen suum est essentia sua et non est extra ipsum, tunc adhaeret intellectus agens possibili 
sicut forma materiae. Et hoc sic compositum vocatur a Peripateticis intellectus adeptus et 
divinus; et tunc homo perfectus est ad operandum opus illud quod est opus suum, inquan-
tum est homo, et hoc est opus, quod operatur deus, et hoc est perfecte per seipsum contem-
plari et intelligere separata. Albertus Magnus, De anima, lib. 3, tr. 3, c. 11, S.222, L.80–87: 
Mirabilis autem et optimus est iste status intellectus sic adepti; per eum enim homo fit similis 
quodammodo deo, eo quod potest sic operari divina et largiri sibi et aliis intellectus divinos 
et accipere omnia intellecta quodammodo. Haec igitur dicta sunt ad praesens de solutione 
istius quaestionis. Aristoteles autem distulit eam usque ad x Ethicae suae ad solvendum. Die 
Rolle des Hermes Trismegistus im Werk Albert dem Großen beurteilt D. Porreca wesent-
lich zurückhaltender und kritischer als Sturlese, cf. D. Porreca, „Albertus Magnus and 
Hermes Trismegistus: An Update“, in Mediaeval Studies 72(2010), S.245–81. Dem Urteil 
von D. Porreca schließt sich J.C. Lastra Sheridan, „La influencia de los principales tópicos 
filosóficos del Asclepius en la obra de Alberto Magno“, in V. Buffon, C. D’Amico (Hgg.), 
Hermes Platonicus. Hermetismo y platonismo en el Medioevo y la Modernidad temprana 
(Santa Fe: Universidad Nacional del Litoral, 2016), S.127–146 an.
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Tradition durch Thomas von York hatte.35 Inwiefern aber trifft zu, dass Berthold 
wie Proclus nicht von Einem ausgeht, sondern von der Analyse des Vielen, 
welches gleichsam als Abbild begriffen wird, um zur Betrachtung des Einen, 
zu dem Urbild aufsteigend zu gelangen?36 Legitimiert Bertholds Aussage, 
dass der stufenweise Aufstieg vom Göttlichen durch Teilhabe zum Göttlichen 
durch Wesenheit und durch dieses zum ursprünglich-formal Göttlichen, wel-
ches das Göttliche der Ursache nach ist, die bereits erwähnte Aufhebung der 
Aufstiegsmetapher und die totale Ablehnung der Einheitsmetaphysik, die 
Koch und Eckert als „Metaphysik von oben“ interpretieren?
Andere Themen aus der Forschung zu Berthold von Moosburg, die eine 
Neukonturierung seines individuellen philosophischen Profils bezwek-
ken, hier aber nicht diskutiert werden können, sind für die Streitfrage des 
Charakters von Bertholds Metaphysik und für seine Intellekttheorie nur inso-
fern relevant, als sie die beiden Extreme der onto-theologischen Struktur von 
Hervorgang und Rückkehr (processus und regressus) der Seinswirklichkeit und 
damit des Intellekts berühren. Albert bedient sich dieser Struktur, welche die 
theologische Philosophie des Neuplatonismus bereitstellt, und der peripate-
tischen Philosophie als des geeignetsten Werkzeugs für eine Fundierung und 
philosophische Explikation des Mittelstücks dieser Struktur, das ihre beiden 
Extreme verbindet, d.h. die raumzeitlich-materielle Ebene der Verwirklichung 
des Seienden. Berthold folgt Albert darin.37 Der heuristsche Nutzen aus der 
Anwendung dieser Struktur für die Intellektlehre, auf die Flasch nicht näher 
eingeht, die von Albert und Berthold im Modus der theologischen Philosophie 
mit einem „expansiven Optimismus“38 in Ausrichtung auf die Erkenntnis alles 
Intelligiblen, auf Gott als das höchste Ziel des Wissens interpretiert wird, liegt 
auf der Hand. In analoger Weise zu dem biblisch-christlichen Verständnis von 
Gott, Welt und Mensch und im Einklang mit diesem Verständnis bindet sie 
den Ursprung und das Ziel der menschlichen Seele und alles Seienden, den 
Hervorgang und die Rückkehr, an den göttlichen Ursprung als das Ziel-Prinzip, 
das sie als das Eine (unum) bzw. das Erste (primum) begreift und bezeichnet. 
Diese durch Albert vor allem in den Kommentaren zum corpus Dionysiacum 
35  Cf. Iremadze, Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus, S.133–134. E. Ludueña, „La 
recepción del Asclepius en Bertoldo de Moosburg“, in Buffon, D’Amico (Hgg.), Hermes 
Platonicus, S.165–181; und unten Anm. 41.
36  Siehe oben Anm. 33.
37  Cf. K. Flasch, „Procedere ut imago. Das Hervorgehen des Intellekts aus seinem göttlichen 
Grund bei Meister Dietrich, Meister Eckhart und Berthold von Moosburg“, in K. Ruh 
(Hg.), Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984 (Stuttgart: 
Metzler, 1986), S.125, 132.
38  Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.xviii, xix.
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und in De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa elaborierte und für 
sein theologisches wie philosophisches Denken gleichermaßen gültige und 
sein Verständnis der Wirklichkeit ordnende Struktur samt ihrer inhaltlichen 
Ausgestaltung haben Dietrich von Freiberg und Berthold von Moosburg offen-
sichtlich inspiriert.39 Alberts Einfluss auf Berthold ist stärker als bislang ange-
nommen und steht dem von Dietrich wenig nach, wie dies gleich verdeutlicht 
werden soll.
2.4 Ausführung Kurt Flaschs Vorgaben durch Loris Sturlese
Die Neuausrichtung der Interpretation des Werkes Berthold von Moosburgs, 
die Flasch in seiner Einführung eingeleitet hat, wird in einer Studie von Sturlese 
thematisch erweitert, vertieft und konsequent umgesetzt.40 In ihrem Fokus ste-
hen das Verhältnis von Berthold, Proclus und Dietrich zueinander, das unum 
animae als die göttlichste, für Gott eigentümliche und für den Menschen mög-
liche Erkenntnisweise jenseits der diskursiven ratio und des Intellekts sowie 
die Vergöttlichung des Menschen im kontemplativem Aufstieg vom Göttlichen 
durch Teilhabe zum Göttlichen der Ursache nach einschließlich der hermeti-
schen Motive der Divinisierung des Menschen, die Berthold offenkundig von 
Albert übernimmt.41 Den doktrinellen Einfluss Dietrichs auf Berthold, insbe-
39  Cf. H. Anzulewicz, „Die Denkstruktur des Albertus Magnus. Ihre Dekodierung und 
ihre Relevanz für die Begrifflichkeit und Terminlogie“, in J. Hamesse, C. Steel (Hgg.), 
L’Élaboration du vocabulaire philosophiques au Moyen Âge (Turnhout: Brepols, 2000), 
S.369–396; H. Anzulewicz, „Pseudo-Dionysius Areopagita und das Strukturprinzip 
des Denkens von Albert dem Großen“, in T. Boiadjiev, G. Kapriev, A. Speer (Hgg.), Die 
Dionysius-Rezeption im Mittelalter (Turnhout: Brepols 2000), S.251–295; H. Anzulewicz, 
„Hervorgang – Verwirklichung – Rückkehr. Eine neuplatonische Struktur im Denken 
Alberts des Großen und Dietrichs von Freiberg“, in K.-H. Kandler, B. Mojsisch, N. Pohl 
(Hgg.), Die Gedankenwelt Dietrichs von Freiberg im Kontext seiner Zeitgenossen (Freiberg: 
Technische Universität Bergakademie Freiberg, 2013), S.229–244, bes. S.237–244. Flasch, 
„Einleitung“, S.xv, xxiii. Flasch, „Procedere ut imago“, S.132.
40  Siehe oben Anm. 13.
41  Bertholds Inspiration durch das Werk Alberts des Großen kommt bereits im Prolog der 
Expositio, der ihre programmatische Outline darstellt, klar zur Geltung. Kennzeichnend 
und maßgeblich sind hierfür die Anleihen aus Alberts Metaphysikkommentar, wel-
che zusammen mit den Entlehnungen aus der hermetischen Schrift des Ps.-Apuleius 
Asclepius – beide umrahmt durch Rm 1,20 – die hermeneutische und textuelle Grundlage 
(das Lemma) von Bertholds Interpretation der geschöpflichen Welt als Makrokosmos 
(Ps.-Apuleius) und des vergöttlichen Menschen als Mikrokosmos (Albert) bilden. Cf. 
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, Prol. 14–19, 
S.23, L.570–S.32, L.19. Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, hg.v. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: 
Aschendorff, 1960), lib. 1, tr. 1, c. 1, S.2, L.5–15. Ludueña, „La recepción del Asclepius en 
Bertoldo de Moosburg“, S.178–179. H. Anzulewicz, „Solus homo est nexus Dei et mundi. 
Albertus Magnus über den Menschen“, in S. Fernández, J. Noemi, R. Polanco (Hgg.), 
137Berthold von Moosburgs Theorie des Intellekts
sondere auf seine Auffassung der visio beatifica und auf die Intellektlehre, stellt 
Sturlese radikaler als dies Flasch tat, heraus. Er meint, wie in der Einführung 
dieses Beitrags gleichsam als eine unabgeschlossene Frage erwähnt wurde, 
dass die weitgehende Übereinstimmung von Bertholds Ansichten mit denen 
von Dietrich „als ein Fundament für jeden Interpretationsversuch des 
Bertholdschen Werkes betrachtet werden muß“.42 Ohne dieser Annahme 
zu widersprechen, sei unterstrichen, dass die doktrinelle Nähe zu Dietrich 
das Interesse Bertholds an den Schriften Alberts des Großen nicht schmä-
lerte, sondern offenkundig steigerte, zumal ihr theologisch-philosophischer 
Skopus und Quellenfundus weit über das Werk Dietrichs hinausreicht. Dieses 
Interesse Bertholds wird u.a. dadurch eindrucksvoll bestätigt, dass er meh-
rere Handschriften der Werke Alberts, darunter einige seiner Autographa, zur 
persönlichen Verfügung hatte und sie bei der Abfassung seiner Expositio als 
einschlägige primäre Quelle sowie als Vermittler weiterer Quellenliteratur 
und Ideen nutzte, wie im Fall der hermetischen Tradition und des corpus 
Dionysiacum erwiesen werden kann.43 Er rezipierte Alberts Gedankengut auch 
Multifariam. Homenaje a los profesores A. Meis, A. Bentué, S. Silva (Santiago de Chile: 
Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, 2010), S.323, 330. Bei der Auslegung der 
Makrokosmos- und Mikrokosmos-Lemmata zieht Berthold weitere Texte des Doctor 
universalis vom Anfang des Metaphysikkommentars, aus der Summa theologiae und aus 
De animalibus heran. Die Art und Weise der Verwendung der Schriften des Ps.-Dionysius 
Areopagita als Quelle des Prologs setzt einen unmittelbaren Zugriff auf das corpus 
Dionysiacum voraus; eine Benutzung der Dionysius-Kommentare Alberts ist allerdings, 
wie sich im Folgenden zeigen wird, erwiesen.
42  Siehe oben Anm. 6. Cf. Flasch, „Einleitung“, S.xxx–xxxv.
43  In Bertholds Besitz befanden sich zwei Autographa-Handschriften Alberts mit seinen 
naturphilosophischen Schriften: (1) Köln, Hist. Archiv der Stadt, Codex W 258a, darin 
De animalibus einschließlich De natura et origine animae und De principiis motus proces-
sivi; der Codex enthält mehrere eigenhändige Vermerke von Bertholds Hand und seinen 
eigenhändigen Besitzvermerk, f. (i)r: „Liber fratris Bertholdi de Mosburch (darunter von 
einer anderen Hand: Verburch) ordinis predicatorum“. (2) Wien, önb 273, darin Physica 
(Fragment: lib. 8 c. 2 – Ende: f. 65r–72v), De caelo et mundo, De natura loci, De causis pro-
prietatum elementorum. Cf. W. Fauser, Die Werke des Albertus Magnus in ihrer handschrift-
lichen Überlieferung. Teil I: Die echten Werke (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1982), S.26–27, 
35, 39, 47, 143, 161, 167. E. Meyer, K. Jessen, „Appendices“, in Albertus Magnus, De vege-
tabilibus libri VII, hg.v. E. Meyer, K. Jessen (Berlin: Reimer, 1867), S.672–673; am Schluss 
des Bandes Abbildungen von De animal., f. 132r und 390r. H. Ostlender, „Die Autographe 
Alberts des Großen“, in H. Ostlender (Hg.), Studia Albertina. Festschrift für Bernhard 
Geyer zum 70. Geburtstage (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1952), S.11 und Tafel ii–iii am 
Schluss des Bandes. L. Sturlese, „Introduzione“, in Bertoldo di Moosburg, Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam Procli: 184–211, De animabus, hg.v. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni 
di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), S.xlvi–xlvii. H. Stehkämper, Albertus Magnus. Ausstellung 
zum 700. Todestag [Katalog] (Köln: Historisches Archiv der Stadt, 1980), S.229 Abb. 13 und 
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indirekt durch die Schriften des Dietrich und, wie M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese aufge-
zeigt hat, Ulrichs von Strassburg.44 Seine besondere Wertschätzung für Albert 
und Dietrich kommt nicht nur durch die Nennung ihrer Namen im Verzeichnis 
der ‘kirchlichen Gelehrten’ (doctores ecclesiae) zum Ausdruck, deren Werke 
er bei seiner Auslegung der Elementatio theologica des Proclus benutzte. Die 
zweifache Erwähnung des Namens von Dietrich in der Expositio wurde unter 
dem Hinweis auf die seltene Praxis namentlicher Zitierung zeitgenössischer 
Autoren zu dieser Zeit als Ausdruck einer besonderen Ehrung und als sol-
che als eine Ausnahme interpretiert.45 Sie ist in Wirklichkeit jedoch keine 
Ausnahme, denn bei der Auslegung der Proposition 118 zitiert Berthold aus der 
Summa theologiae I Albert des Großen unter ausdrücklicher Nennung seines 
Namens.46 Die Auffassung von der Sonderstellung Dietrichs erweist sich unter 
der genannten Hinsicht als überzeichnet und dürfte aus unserer Sicht nicht 
nur mit Blick auf Albert, sondern auf alle von Berthold verarbeiteten Quellen 
relativiert werden.
Sturlese stimmt mit Eckert hinsichtlich der Intellekttheorie des Dietrichs 
insofern überein, als er für Dietrich (wie Eckert für Berthold) die Vermittlung 
der augustinischen Auffassung des abditum mentis mit der aristotelischen 
intellectus agens-Lehre bescheinigt. Die Betonung, Dietrich habe „immer 
darauf verzichtet, in seiner Intellekttheorie die Übereinstimmung zwi-
schen Augustin (abditum mentis) und den Aristotelikern (intellectus agens) 
auf die Platoniker auszudehnen“, wirft die Frage nach dem Grund die-
ses Verzichtes, die Dietrich nicht beantwortet. Sturlese lässt durchblicken, 
dass der Freiberger an der konstitutiven Funktion des Intellekts gemäß der 
Proposition 174 („Omnis intellectus in intelligendo instituit que post ipsum, et 
factio in intelligere et intelligentia in facere“) des Proclus konsequent festhält, 
die er kosmologisch und nicht vermögenspsychologisch auf jeden individuel-
len Menschen bezogen interpretiert.47 Berthold geht indes weiter als Dietrich, 
14. L. Sturlese, „Note su Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P., scienziato e filosofo“, in Freiburger 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 32(1985), S.257–259.
44  Pagnoni-Sturlese, „À propos du néoplatonisme d’Albert le Grand“, S.635–654.
45  Cf. Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.146–147 (repr. S.139).
46  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
108–135, hg.v. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), 118A, S.76, L.38–55.
47  Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.148–149 (repr. S.142). 
Dietrich unternimmt offenbar keinen Versuch, die systemische Inkompatibilität kos-
mologischer und vermögenspsychologischer Interpretationen des Intellekts vor dem 
Hintergrund ihrer aristotelischen und platonischen Quellen zu überwinden, wie 
Sturlese nahelegt, und vertritt somit eine nicht reduktionistische Auffassung von 
Differenz und Einheit der beiden Interpretationen. Einig sind sich indes Dietrich und 
Berthold in der Auffassung der Konvenienz der Konzepte des abditum mentis und des 
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unterstreicht Sturlese, indem er die peripatetische intellectus adeptus-Lehre 
in die Erkenntnistheorie des Proclus integriert. Er unterscheidet außer einer 
zweifachen Sinneserkenntnis gemäß der äußeren und inneren Wahrnehmung 
und einer diskursiven sowie einer intuitiven Erkenntnis eine höhere, fünfte 
Stufe der menschlichen Erkenntnis, die er als die cognitio providentiae oder 
cognitio unialis bezeichnet. Ihren vermögenspsychologischen Grund sieht 
er im tätigen Intellekt (intellectus agens), sofern er zur Form des universalen 
Sinngehaltes des Verstandes (des intellectus possibilis gemäß der peripateti-
schen Begrifflichkeit) und folglich zum erworbenen Intellekt (intellectus adep-
tus) wird, der nach Proclus ‘das Eine’ (unum) unseres intellektiven Seelenteils 
genannt wird. Diese ‘uniale Erkenntnis’, der die Vereinigung des intellec-
tus agens als Form mit dem intellectus possibilis gleichsam als die Materie 
zugrunde liegt, ist nach Berthold ‘die göttlichste Art der Gotteserkenntnis, die 
qua Unwissenheit gemäß der Erkenntnis über dem Verstand gewonnen wird’.48
Dreierlei Schlüsse können aus diesen Aussagen gezogen werden: Erstens, 
Berthold begreift die Vereinigung des intellectus agens mit dem intellectus 
possibilis ähnlich wie Albert der Große ontologisch als ein Eines (unum). 
Albert interpretiert dieses Eine als ein Kompositum aus dem intellectus agens 
und dem intellectus possibilis analog einer Zusammensetzung aus Form und 
Materie. Zweitens, Albert und Berthold bezeichnen dieses compositum bzw. 
unum mit den Peripatetikern als den intellectus adeptus und verstehen darun-
ter die vom Menschen erworbene intellektuelle Vollendung, welche Berthold 
als die göttlichste Erkenntnis über dem Intellekt, Albert als die Gottähnlichkeit 
und die Vollendung der menschlichen Natur in diesem Leben interpretieren. 
Drittens, Berthold identifiziert den intellectus adeptus mit dem Proklischen 
unum animae, genauer mit dem unum ipsius partis nostrae intellectualis, einem 
intellectus agens, die systemisch verschieden sind, sowie in der Zurückweisung der im 
Wesentlichen durch die islamisch-arabischen Philosophen vertretenen, kosmologischen 
Interpretation des getrennten intellectus agens. Auf diesen Konsens, auf den es im hier 
erörterten Zusammenhang ankommt, verweisen E. Krebs, W. Eckert und A. Colli, die 
eine Identifikation des intellectus agens mit dem ‘Versteck’ der Seele (Krebs) oder abdi-
tum mentis (Colli) für Dietrich und für Berthold (Eckert) bescheinigen; cf. oben Anm. 19. 
H. Anzulewicz, „De intellectu et intelligibili des Albertus Magnus: Eine Relektüre der Schrift 
im Licht ihrer peripatetischen Quellen“, in Przegląd Tomistyczny 25(2019), S.78.
48  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 121L, S.110, L.172–201; 123D, S.127, L.91–S.129, l.155, esp. 
p 129, L.148–155; cf. Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologi-
cam Procli, Propositiones 184–211, hg.v. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014), 197F–G, S.135, 
L.104–S.138, L.186. E. Massa, „La deificazione nel Commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg 
a Proclo, Elementatio theologica, 129. Edizione del testo e primi analisi“, in R. Lievens, 
E. Van Mingroot, W. Verbeke (Hgg.), Pascua Mediaevalia: Studies voor Prof. Dr. J.M. De Smet 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), S.559–562.
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Konzept, das Albert zwar über Pseudo-Dionysius rezipiert, aber in seine peri-
patetische Intellektlehre dem exakten Begriff nach nicht integriert. Seine im 
Kommentarwerk De anima, lib. 3, tr. 3, c. 11, dargelegte Auffassung des intellec-
tus adeptus nimmt Bertholds Theorie des unum animae vorweg und bildet ihre 
sachliche Vorlage.49 Genetisch betrachtet indes, geht das von Berthold entfal-
tete Konzept auf das Opusculum des Proclus De providentia (cap. 8) zurück. 
Diese Frage haben Massa, Sturlese und de Libera sowie zuletzt E. King hin-
reichend beleuchtet.50 Bertholds Kenntnis der Übernahme dieses Konzeptes 
durch Pseudo-Dionysius (De divinis nominibus, c. 7), die er in der Proposition 
193E erläuterte, blieb offensichtlich nicht folgenlos für seine Proclus-Exegese 
und ihre Quellen.51
Albert der Große interpretiert in seinem Kommentar zu De divinis nomi-
nibus dieses epistemologische Konzept, welches mit den Termini unitio 
(gemäß der lateinischen Übersetzung des Johannes Sarracenus) bzw. unitas 
(nach der Übertragung des Johannes Scotus Eriugena) gekennzeichnet wird, 
als die aus allen Sinnen zu Einem gesammelte Kraft (virtus). Diese übersteigt 
die Natur des menschlichen Verstandes, vereinigt ihn in diesem Überstieg 
mit dem Göttlichen und macht den Menschen göttlich. Durch diese unitio 
soll der Mensch das Göttliche über seinem Verstand, der alles zurücklässt 
und sich selbst aufgibt, erkennen.52 Die uniale Erkenntnis des Göttlichen 
49  Siehe oben Anm. 34. Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.153–
154 (repr. S.148–150); siehe auch die vorige Anm.
50  Massa, „La deificazione nel Commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg“, S.559–563, 570. Sturlese, 
„Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.152–153 (repr. S.147). De Libera, La 
Mystique rhénane, S.331–332. E. King, „Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of 
the Soul“, in Dionysius 36(2018), S.184–199, hier bes. 184–186, 191–195, 198–199. Cf. Proclus, 
De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis ad Theodorum Mechanicum, hg.v. H. Boese, 
in Procli Diadochi Tria Opuscula (De providentia, Libertate, Malo) Latine Guilelmo de 
Moerbeka vertente et Graece ex Isaacii Sebastocratoris aliorumque scriptis collecta, hg.v. 
H. Boese (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960), c. 8 (xxiv.31–32), S.139–140. W. Beierwaltes, „Der 
Begriff des ‘unum in nobis’ bei Proklos“, in P. Wilpert, W.P. Eckert (Hgg.), Die Metaphysik 
im Mittelalter: Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1963), S.264–265.
51  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, 193E, S.103, 
L.121–S.104, L.134.
52  Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, c. 7. S.341, L.64–74: Autem, 
idest sed, virtutem istam dico unitionem, prout scilicet in se colligitur in unum et a multis 
sensibus revocatur, excedentem naturam mentis nostrae, quae immixta est sensibilibus, 
per quam unitionem coniungitur ad ea quae sunt supra ipsam. Igitur divina, quae sunt 
supra mentem, oportet intelligere secundum hanc unitionem, non secundum nos, idest 
non secundum proportionem et mensuram mentis nostrae, sed oportet intelligere nos ipsos 
statutos extra nos ipsos, totos deificatos, relinquentes ea quae sunt secundum nos, et immit-
tentes nos divinis secundum modum ipsorum, quantum possibile est. (Die nicht in Kursiv 
gesetzten Wörter entstammen der Kommentarvorlage Alberts).
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bzw. die unitio mit dem Göttlichen gemäß der littera Dionysii, die Berthold 
als die Erkenntnis des Göttlichen über dem Verstand begreift, übernimmt 
Albert in seine aristotelisch-peripatetische Intellekttheorie nicht, sondern 
er belässt sie wie seine pseudo-dionysische Vorlage als den Gegenstand der 
mystischen Epistemologie, deren wissenschaftssystematischer Ort die mysti-
schen Theologie ist.53 Den fehlenden Zugriff auf die Opuscula des Proclus 
hat er durch das Werk des Pseudo-Dionysius sachlich weitestgehend rekom-
pensiert. Eine Aufhebung der in erster Linie begrifflich und hinsichtlich der 
reflexiven Reichweite auffallenden Differenz zwischen der aristotelisch-
peripatetischen und der Proklisch-pseudodionysischen, der philosophischen 
und der theologisch-mystischen Epistemologie hatte er, wie auch Berthold, 
nicht intendiert. Offensichtlich bestand für die beiden Denker insofern kein 
Widerspruch zwischen der unialen Auffassung der Erkenntnis und dem peri-
patetischen Verständnis der Intellektion qua intellectus adeptus, als die Erstere 
die Grundlage der Erkenntnis des Göttlichen über dem Verstand und der 
Vereinigung mit dem göttlichen Einen darstellte, die Letztere hingegen die 
diskursive Erkenntnis und die unter den Bedingungen der Kontingenz erwor-
bene intellektive Vollendung des Menschen krönte. Mit seiner Interpretation 
des unum animae und der mystischen unio kommt Berthold der Auslegung 
derselben durch Albert nahe, wenn man die Letztere aus dem Blickwinkel 
des Kommentars zu De mystica theologia betrachtet. Da Ulrich von Straßburg 
Alberts Interpretation der mystischen Epistemologie des Pseudo-Dionysius 
qua unitio getreu wiedergibt und Meister Eckhart das ‘Eine in uns’ aus der 
Proklisch-pseudodionysischen Tradition als den ‘einfaltig einen Grund der 
Seele’ deutet, kann Sturlese schwerlich einer „Restauration der verlorenen und 
wiederaufgefundenen Wahrheit“ durch Berthold das Wort reden.54 Tatsächlich 
nimmt Alberts Auffassung der intellektiven Vollendung des Menschen auf-
grund der Überformung des intellectus possibilis durch den intellectus agens, 
die in der peripatetischer Tradition unter dem Namen des intellectus adeptus 
etabliert wurde, den für Meister Eckhart’s und Berthold von Moosburg’s zen-
tralen Topos der Divinisierung des Menschen vorweg.55
Sturlese’s Darstellung einer unmittelbaren Gottesschau, wie diese 
Berthold im Anschluss an seine Proklische Vorlage und an Pseudo-Dionysius 
53  Cf. H. Anzulewicz, „Scientia mystica sive theologia – Alberts des Großen Begriff der 
Mystik“, in Roczniki Filozoficzne 63(2015), S.37–58.
54  Ulrich von Straßburg, De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6, hg.v. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 2007), lib. 2, tr. 5, c. 2, S.11, L.93–110; zu Meister Eckhart siehe Beierwaltes, „Der 
Begriff des ‘unum in nobis’ bei Proklos“, S.264–265. Cf. Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der 
Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.152–153 (repr. S.147).
55  Cf. Albertus Magnus, De anima, lib. 3, tr. 3, c. 11, S.222, L.4–5.
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interpretiert, erscheint aus zwei Gründen als kritikwürdig. Zum einen gibt 
sie zwar allgemein einen Zusammenhang der Expositio des Berthold mit den 
Kommentaren Alberts des Großen zum corpus Dionysiacum zu, aber sie lässt 
deren Vorbildfunktion und Einfluss beinahe gänzlich außer Acht. Zum andern 
verneint sie apodiktisch, abgesehen von einer einzigen Ausnahme, die Präsenz 
jeglicher offenbarungstheologisch-christlichen Motive in der Expositio.56 In 
Alberts Verständnis führt die analytische Methode der Wissenschaft über 
die Gottesnamen und dieselbe Methode der mystischen Theologie zu der 
Erkenntnis der Ursache, insofern diese ihren Effekt (causatum) auf univoke 
Weise hervorbringt bzw. aufgrund der Erhabenheit (eminentia) als Ursache 
unbekannt ist.57 Sie liefert die Erkenntnis der Existenz Gottes (quia), aber 
keine begrifflich-definitorische Erkenntnis der Wesenheit Gottes (quid und 
propter quia).58 Wird die unmittelbare Gottesschau als eine Gotteserkenntnis 
bezeichnet und in Verbindung mit der Intellektlehre reflektiert, wie dies insbe-
sondere für Dietrich von Freiberg gilt, ist zu bedenken, dass diese ‘Erkenntnis’ 
nach Albert und Berthold (sowie auch nach Proclus) in strengem Sinne keine 
intellektive Tätigkeit mehr ist, sondern ihr Endziel, mit Bertholds Worten die 
cognitio patriae.59 Albert beschreibt sie im Anschluss an Pseudo-Dionysius als 
die Verstandesnatur übersteigende Vereinigung mit Gott (unitio excedens men-
tis naturam), eine ‘Erkenntnis, die ihren Ort über dem Verstand hat’ (cogni-
tio, quae est supra intellectum).60 Berthold stimmt darin mit Albert unter 
Bezugnahme auf Pseudo-Dionysius vollkommen überein. Er instanziiert zwar 
die Mystik und die theologische Philosophie in ihrem Wechselbezug historisch, 
56  Cf. Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.147 (repr. S.140): „Auch 
das Werk Alberts des Großen, das doch die Koordinaten zeichnete, zwischen denen sich 
ein großer Teil der deutschen Kultur bewegte, hatte keine vergleichbare Sprengkkraft 
[wie die visio beatifica und die Intellektlehre Dietrichs, H.A.]“, ferner S.149–152, bes. S.152 
(repr. S.143–146, bes. S.146): „Diese flüchtigen Redewendungen stellen allerdings den ein-
zigen Hinweis zum Thema der »besonderen Gnade« dar, der in den über zweitausend 
Seiten des Kommentars aufzufinden ist. An keiner Stelle ist von Sakramenten, Kirche, 
Offenbarung, guten Werken und Glaube die Rede. Berthold leugnete nicht die Rolle der 
Gnade und die freie Intervention Gottes […]“. In der dazugehörigen Fußnote 16 (repr. 
30) sieht sich Sturlese in der Konfrontation mit dem gegenteiligen Tenor einiger Texte 
Bertholds zur Einschränkung oder vielmehr zur Rechtfertigung seiner Aussage gezwun-
gen. Die angeblich im Werk nicht vorhandenen und dennoch durch Bertholds Texte 
ausgewiesenen Theologumena interpretiert er tendenziell gegen ihren für die theologi-
sche Philosophie eigentümlichen, zweifellos univoken Sinngehalt und damit gegen das 
Verständnis und die Intention des Autors.
57  Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, c. 1, S.3, L.1–15.
58  Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, c. 1, S.2, L.51–56.
59  Cf. Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 202B, S.185, L.127–137.
60  Cf. oben Anm. 52 und 53.
143Berthold von Moosburgs Theorie des Intellekts
wie Sturlese festhält, doch im Vordergrund steht letztendlich die Aufhebung 
der Historizität und die Andersheit der auf dem investigativen Weg erlangten 
Erkenntnis des Einen in seiner unmittelbaren Anschauung und in Vereinigung 
mit ihm. Er begreift sie wie Albert im Anschluss an Pseudo-Dionysius als „eine 
Erkenntnis durch Unwissenheit über dem Verstand, wenn er alles aufgibt und, 
sich selbst zurückgelassen, mit überstrahlender Herrlichkeit Gottes geeint, 
durch unergründliche Weisheit erleuchtet ist“61 Als der Aufstiegsweg des 
menschlichen Verstandes vom Göttlichen durch Teilhabe durch Göttliches der 
Wesenheit nach zum Göttlichen gemäß der Ursache und zur Vergöttlichung 
des Menschen erhält die Theologie bzw. die theologische Philosophie des 
Proclus bei Albert durch die Vermittlung des Pseudo-Dionysius und bei 
Berthold in dessen Auslegung der Proklischen Elementatio theologica einen 
mystischen Charakterzug, der den heuristischen Horizont der aristotelischen 
Tradition transzendiert.62
Die Bestimmung der von Berthold aufgearbeiteten theologischen Philo- 
sophie des Proclus als eine philosophische Offenbarung und die Charakterisie-
rung des Proclus als einen philosophischen Propheten bergen in sich gewisse 
Verständnisschwierigkeiten, die durch die bisherige Forschung offenbar 
nicht aufgelöst wurden. Wann und inwiefern ist ein philosophisches System 
als eine philosophische Offenbarung zu begreifen? Gründet die theologische 
Philosophie, die sich durch die ratio ausweist, in einer Offenbarung? Was 
macht einen philosophischen Propheten aus? Ist es nicht die besondere Gabe, 
theologisch gewendet Gnade Gottes, von denen Berthold in der Auslegung der 
Propositionen 129F und 202 spricht? Können die Elementatio theologica und die 
Opuscula des Proclus als eine Beschreibung eines philosophie-immanenten, 
systemisch im Neuplatonismus verankerten Lebensentwurfs als Hervorgang, 
Verwirklichung im Sinne einer existenziellen Vollendung und Rückkehr des 
Seienden zu jenem Einen, welches das Ursprungs- und Zielprinzip zugleich 
von allem ist, gelesen werden? Berthold las sie als die ‘Theorie des Einen’ und 
vermochte darin eine offenbarungstheologisch konforme, wesentlich auf 
die Intellekttheorie bis hin zu der „divinissima cognitio Dei, quae est per igno-
rantiam cognita secundum unitionem super mentem“ gestützte theologische 
61  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 123D, S.129, L.152–155: „Haec est ‘divinissima Dei cogni-
tio, quae est per ignorantiam cognita secundum cognitionem super mentem, quando mens 
ab aliis omnibus recedens, postea et se ipsam dimittens unita est supersplendentibus radiis 
divinorum, inde et ibi non scrutabili profundo sapientiae illuminata’“. Cf. Albertus Magnus, 
Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, c. 7, S.359, L.42–56.75–78.
62  Cf. B. Mojsisch, „Dynamik der Vernunft bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart“, 
in K. Ruh (Hg.), Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelbert 1984 
(Stuttgart: Metzlersche Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1986), S.138–139.
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Philosophie zu erkennen und sich zu ihr zu bekennen63 – so viel kann man 
aus Sturleses tiefgründigen Ausführungen entnehmen. Die Antwort auf die 
vorausgeschickten Fragen bieten sie nicht. Sie findet sich bei Albert in sei-
ner Summa theologiae i und, wie man ihr entnehmen kann, gibt sie der von 
Sturlese und Flasch vertretenen Auffassung, für die sie keine Begründung lie-
fern, im Wesentlichen Recht:
dicendum, quod duo modi sunt revelationis. Unus modus est per lumen 
connaturale nobis. Et hoc modo revelatum est philosophis. Hoc enim 
lumen non potest esse nisi a primo lumine dei, ut dicit Augustinus in 
libro De magistro, et hoc optime probatum est in Libro de causis. Aliud 
lumen est ad supermundana contuenda, et hoc est elevatum super nos. 
Et hoc lumine revelata est haec scientia. Primum relucet in per se notis, 
secundum autem in fidei articulis.64
(man muss sagen, dass es zwei Arten der Offenbarung gibt. Die eine Art 
geschieht durch das uns natürliche Licht [des Verstandes]. Auf diese 
Weise ist es den Philosophen offenbart worden. Denn dieses Licht kann 
nur vom ersten Licht Gottes sein, wie Augustinus im Buch «Über den 
Lehrer» sagt; und den besten Beweis für dieses Licht bietet das «Buch von 
den Ursachen». Ein anderes Licht gibt es zur Betrachtung des Göttlichen; 
und dieses ist emporgehoben über uns. Durch dieses Licht ist diese 
Wissenschaft [Theologie] geoffenbart. Das erste [Licht] widerscheint in 
den Dingen, die durch sich selbst bekannt sind, das zweite indes in den 
Glaubensartikeln.)
Albert klärt auf, wie die im erörterten Zusammenhang verwendeten, aber in 
ihrer eigentlichen Bedeutung nicht erläuterten und daher missverständlichen 
Begriffe der „philosophischen Offenbarung“, des „philosophischen Propheten“ 
und der „Proklischen Theologie“ bzw. „Mystik“ aus seiner Sicht zu verstehen 
sind. Seine Unterscheidung und ihre Erklärung helfen dem Bertholdschen 
Verständnis der divinissima philosophia auf die Spur zu kommen. Die 
von Sturlese erwogene Möglichkeit, den mit diesem Begriff verknüpften 
63  Cf. Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.154 (repr. S.149).
64  Albertus Magnus, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia dei, hg.v. D. Siedler, W. Kübel, 
H.-J. Vogels (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), Iib. 1, tr. 1, q. 4, S.15, L.41–50. Cf. Anzulewicz, 
„Albertus Magnus über die philosophi theologizantes“, S.82. H. Jorissen, H. Anzulewicz, 
„Lumen naturale“, in W. Kasper et al. (Hgg.), Lexikon für Theologie und Kirche, vol. vi 
(Freiburg / Basel / Roma / Wien: Herder, 1997), col. 1120–21.
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Topos des homo divinus mit dem Begriff der Mystik zu kennzeichnen, löst 
das Problem genauso wenig wie ein willkürlicher, mit einem Verweis auf 
die Übereinstimmung mit Bertholds Wortwahl legitimierter Rückgriff auf 
einen Philosophiebegriff, der von der ‘Schulphilosophie’ unterschieden und 
dennoch „als »Philosophie«, wohl eine »divinissima philosophia«„ zu bezeich-
nen wäre.65
3 Berthold von Moosburgs Theorie des Intellekts
3.1 Einleitende Vorbemerkungen
Bausteine zu seiner Theorie des Intellekts hat Berthold an vielen Stellen 
in seiner Expositio zusammengetragen. Den eigentlichen intellekttheo-
retischen Teil seines Kommentarwerkes hat er, wie eingangs dargelegt 
und wie er selbst vermerkt, auf die Auslegung der Propositionen 160–183 
konzentriert.66 Im Folgenden sollen die Typologien des Intellekts, die sich aus 
seiner Kommentierung der Propositionen 160, 163, 167, 174 und 181 erheben las-
sen, vorgestellt und hinsichtlich ihrer Einbettung in die intellektuelle Tradition 
Alberts des Großen untersucht werden. Es sei angemerkt, dass die sekundären 
Quellen zu Bertholds Intellekttheorie, von denen die Untersuchungen von 
M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, A. de Libera, I.J. Tautz und B. Mojsisch zu nennen sind,67 
dieses Vorhaben nur marginal unterstützen, da sie sowohl den Grundbegriffen 
als auch der Systematisierung von Bertholds Intellektlehre nicht nachgehen. 
Die Studie von Tautz, die einem Superkommentar (d.h. einem Kommentar 
zum Kommentar) zu den Propositionen 168–183 gleichkommt, teilt mit die-
ser Untersuchung zwar partiell ihre Textgrundlage, aber sie weist eine relativ 
geringe inhaltliche Überschneidung mit der Zielsetzung dieses Beitrags auf. 
M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese verdeutlicht an einem Fallbeispiel, dass der Einfluss 
Alberts des Großen auf Bertholds Auffassung des allgemein wirkenden 
Intellekts durch Ulrich von Straßburg vermittelt wird. Die von de Libera und 
Mojsisch gebotenen Darstellungen der Intellekttheorie Bertholds sind sehr all-
gemein und auf wenige zentrale Aussagen beschränkt, da sie aber gelegentlich 
auf Bertholds Verhältnis zu Albert reflektieren, sind sie unter dieser Rücksicht 
für den Ansatz dieser Untersuchung bedeutsam. Ähnliches gilt für eine neuere 
65  Sturlese, „Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds“, S.155 (repr. S.150).
66  Cf. Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 111B, S.20, L.50.
67  Siehe oben Anm. 14–16.
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Studie von R. Imbach, in welcher ihr Verfasser die Bedeutung von Bertholds 
Werk für die mittelalterliche Metaphysik herausarbeitet.68
3.2 Rekonstruktion
Mit der Auslegung der 160. Proposition, der ersten des intellekttheoretischen 
Teils seiner Expositio, beginnt Berthold eine durch die Proklische Vorlage vor-
gegebene, axiologisch aufgefasste und innerhalb der Kommentierung die-
ser Proposition entfaltete Typologie und Charakterisierung der «göttlichen 
Intellekte». Da sein Kommentar naturgemäß an die Abfolge und die Inhalte 
der einzelnen Propositionen gebunden ist, bleibt der eigentliche Kern seiner 
Erörterungen jeweils auf die Binnenstruktur der einzelnen Propositionen 
beschränkt. Diese wird zwar durch die Querverweise auf die thematisch ein-
ander ergänzende Propositionen und ihre Auslegung aufgebrochen, aber die 
Intellekttheorie Bertholds als Ganzes gewinnt dadurch keine organische Einheit 
und doktrinelle Geschlossenheit eines Lehrstücks. Ein solches wird offensicht-
lich nicht intendiert, wie sich auch beim Hinsehen auf die unterschiedlichen 
Typologien der Intellekte und ihre Quellen abzeichnet. Der Befund lässt jedoch 
keine Beliebigkeit in dieser Hinsicht erkennen, sondern vielmehr ein konse-
quentes Festhalten an dem Proklischen Einen als dem Konstitutionsprinzip 
der Differenz und Einheit, die im Ausgang von diesem und in der Rückwendung 
auf dieses Eine gedeutet und gleichsam als eine systemische totalitas begrif-
fen werden.69 Diesem Ziel sind die internen Querverweise auf die Inhalte 
des Gesamtwerkes untergeordnet, die es innerhalb der Kommentare zu den 
einzelnen Propositionen gibt, die Bertholds Ausführungen kartieren und ihre 
inhaltliche Verwobenheit bewirken, eine Einheit, die nicht selten auch durch 
inhaltliche Wiederholungen und Redundanzen erkauft wird.
i. Die 160. Proposition des Proclus definiert jeden «göttlichen Intellekt» als 
gleichförmig, vollkommen und als den «Erst-Intellekt», der aus sich andere 
Intellekte hervorbringt.70 Die Definition gibt die Pluralität und Einförmigkeit 
göttlicher Intellekte an und grenzt sie von einem «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt» 
ab. In seinem Kommentar erläutert Berthold ausführlich die Einzigkeit des 
68  R. Imbach, „Au-delà de la métaphysique: Notule sur l’importance du Commentaire de 
Berthold de Moosburg op sur les Éléments de théologie“, in Calma (Hg.), Reading Proclus 
and the Book of Causes, Volume 1, S.376–393.
69  Cf. Massa, „La deificazione nel Commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg a Proclo, Elementatio 
theologica, 129“, S.546.
70  Proclus, Elementatio theologica, 160, S.78, L.1–2: Omnis divinus intellectus uniformis est et 
perfectus et prime intellectus, a se ipso alios intellectus producens. Berthold von Moosburg, 
Expositio, 160, S.3, L.2–4. Zum Begriff des Erst-Intellekts cf. Iremadze, „Der intellekttheo-
retische Ansatz der Selbstreflexivität des Denkens“, S.241.
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«göttlichen Erst-Intellekts» und die Unterordnung der auf ihn folgenden, der 
Gattung oder der Art nach bestimmten Intellekte, mit anderen Worten, die 
Subordination aller sekundär «göttlichen Intellekte» unter den «göttlichen 
Erst-Intellekt».
Beim «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt» setzt Berthold seine erste Typologisierung 
der Intellekte an, mit welcher er eine dreistufige Hierarchie des «göttlichen 
Intellekts» annimmt. Die oberste Stufe dieser Ordnungsstruktur weist er dem 
«göttlichen Intellekt» zu, dem er wie Proclus eine universale Ursächlichkeit 
in Bezug auf alles Seiende beimisst. Von diesem «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt» 
unterscheidet er zwei Arten: erstens, einen «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt», der sich 
zu aller Intellektualität und zu allen Intellekten als einziger in der Weise des 
Ursprungs verhält und seiner Wesenheit und Ursächlichkeit nach göttlich ist; 
zweitens, einen vom Ersteren verschiedenen «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt», der 
nur zu einer gattungsmäßig oder spezifisch bestimmten Reihe des Seienden 
im Ursprungsverhältnis steht.71 Indem er den ersten «göttlichen Erst-Intellekt» 
mit Gott ausdrücklich identifiziert, seine Singularität und vollkommene 
Einheit hervorhebt, deutet er diesen zentralen Begriff der theologischen 
Philosophie seiner paganen Vorlage offenbarungstheologisch, genauer im 
Sinne der theologischen Philosophie der biblisch-christlichen Prägung um.72 
In der Charakterisierung des «göttlichen Erst-Intellekts» als die Erstursache 
allen Seins und in seiner Gleichsetzung mit Gott ist eine Nähe zu Ulrich von 
Straßburgs Auffassung des Intellekts als Gottesname und zur Darstellung 
seiner Eigenschaften erkennbar, die Berthold aus der Schrift De summo bono 
71  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 160A, S.3, L.14–20: triplex est divinus intellectus; ex quo 
enim omne, quod qualitercumque subsistit, aut secundum causam principaliformiter aut 
secundum existentiam aut secundum participationem subsistit per 65 [cf. Berthold von 
Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35–65, hg.v. 
A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001), 65, S.201, L.1–4: Omne, quod qualitercumque subsistit, 
aut secundum causam principaliformiter aut secundum essentiam aut secundum participa-
tionem exemplariter. Proclus, Elementatio theologica, 65, S.35, L.1–3: „Omne quod qualiter-
cumque subsistit aut secundum causam est principaliformiter aut secundum existentiam 
aut secundum participationem exemplariter“]. Ideo divinus intellectus potest accipi et pro 
eo, qui est prime ad totam seyram intellectualitatis, qui etiam est singularis, cum sit mon-
archa omnium intellectuum principaliformiter subsistens in intellectualitae, licet sit divinus 
secundum essentiam; 160L, S.9, L.187–190: Ex iam dicitis apparet, quod divinum intellectum 
esse prime intellectum accipitur dupliciter, quia vel principaliformiter respectu totius sey-
rae intellectualitatis, et sic est divinus secundum essentiam et intellectus principaliformiter, 
scilicet secundum causam, et talis est unus tantum, vel respectu alicuius generis vel speciei 
determinatae intra totalitatem intellectualis seyrae conclusorum, et talis intellectus prime 
existens est intra ordinem intellectualium hypostasum.
72  Cf. Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 160A, S.4, L.32: qui est deus per essentiam et intellec-
tus prime.
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des Albert-Schülers, einer seinen Quellen der Expositio, vertraut war. Ulrichs 
Position hingegen spiegelt auch in diesem Punkt die Lehre seines Meisters 
Alberts des Großen und ihre Quellen wider.73
Den «göttlichen Intellekt», dem die Intellektualität an sich eignet und 
der eine an der Göttlichkeit teilhabende und multiplizierbare Natur ist, ord-
net Berthold der zweiten Hierarchiestufe zu. Mit Verweis auf seine parallele 
Unterscheidung der Intellektualität, die er bei der Auslegung der Proposition 111 
vornahm, schränkt er ein, dass nicht jeder «göttliche Intellekt» dieser Ordnung 
wesenhaft göttlich ist, obwohl er grundsätzlich zuerst und durch sich selbst 
seinem Wesen nach Intellekt schlechthin und göttlich gemäß der Teilhabe ist. 
Diesem Intellekt gilt seine Interpretation der 160. Proposition der Proklischen 
Elementatio.74
Der drittletzten Stufe in der Hierarchieskala des «göttlichen Intellekts» 
rechnet er einen «göttlichen Intellekt» zu, der seine «göttliche» Eigenschaft 
durch Teilhabe an der göttlichen Einheit erlange. Er habe keine eigenstän-
dige Subsistenz einer intellektiven Hyposthase und bedürfe wie der höhere 
Teil der Seele einer Seinsgrundlage, deren Teil er sei. In der Rangordnung der 
73  Cf. Ulrich von Straßburg, De summo bono, lib. 2, tr. 5, S.3–8. Das Werk Ulrichs, der zu den 
„begeistertsten und treuesten Schülern Alberts“ (Grabmann) zählte, gehört zu den von 
Berthold verzeichneten Quellen seiner Expositio. Außer dieser Nennung wird er, anders 
als im Fall von Dietrich von Freiberg und Albert dem Große, im Werk namentlich nicht 
zitiert, und daher bleibt sein Anteil an der Lehre Bertholds unauffällig und in der kriti-
schen Edition relativ selten nachgewiesen. Auf seinen Einfluss auf Berthold weisen hin: 
M. Grabmann, „Studien über Ulrich von Straßburg“, in M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliches 
Geistesleben [vol. i] (München: Hueber, 1926), S.218; M. Grabmann, „Der Einfluss Alberts 
des Großen auf das mittelalterliche Geistesleben“, in M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliches 
Geistesleben, vol. ii (München: Hueber, 1936), S.366; Imbach, „Chronique de Philosophie“, 
S.434–435 (repr. S.143–144). Pagnoni-Sturlese, „A propos du néoplatonisme d’Albert le 
Grand“, passim; L. Sturlese, „Proclo ed Ermete in Germania da Alberto Magno a Bertoldo 
di Moosburg“, in K. Flasch (Hg.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1984), S.28; A. Beccarisi, „Einleitung“, in Ulrich von Straßburg, De summo bono. 
Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6, hg.v. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), S.viii, xix, xx; E. King, 
„Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg’s Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 
Procli“, S.401–403, 405, 407, 410.
74  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 160A, S.3, L.21–25: Secundo accipitur divinus intellectus 
pro eo, qui est intellectus secundum existentiam, scilicet primo et per se habens intellectuali-
tatem, sed participat divinitate, et talis est plurificabilis, licet non omnis intellectus per essen-
tiam sit divinus: Omnis enim intellectualis seyrae hi quidem divini sunt intellectus deorum 
suscipientes posthabitationem, hi autem intellectus solum per 111 [hg.v. Retucci, S.19, L.2–9. 
27–29; hg.v. Boese, S.56, L.1–7]; S.4, L.34–36: Secundus est intellectus primo et per se per 
essentiam absolute et divinus secundum participationem, omnis scilicet intellectus, qui est 
intra ordinem intellectualium hypostasum. Et de talibus intelligo elementum.
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«göttlichen Intellekte» folgt er auf die «göttlichen Seelen».75 Diesen «gött-
lichen Intellekt» der drittletzten Hierarchiestufe und den erst-göttlichen 
Intellekt lässt Berthold bei seiner Analyse der Definition dieses Theorems aus.
Gemäß dieser ersten, sich aus dem Kommentar zu der Proposition 160 
erschließenden Typologie des «göttlichen Intellekts» wird dieser durch Berthold 
dreifach hierarchisch unterschieden und wie folgt näher bestimmt:
intellectus divinus
1. secundum causam principaliformiter




– primo et per se habens intellectualitatem
– participat divinitate
– plurificabilis
– omnis intellectus intra ordinem intellectualium hypostasum
3. secundum participationem divinae unitatis
– non habens fixionem subsistentiae suae se ipso
– innititur quodammodo sicut suprema »portio residuae substantiae 
animae«, cuius est pars
Was lässt sich in Bezug auf Bertholds Typologie und Interpretation des 
«göttlichen Intellekts», ihre Einordnung in die theologisch-philosophische 
Tradition und deren Verhältnis zu Albert genau ermitteln?
Es ist zunächst festzuhalten, dass der quellenkritisch auf den ersten Blick 
gut erschlossene Text des Kommentars in der kritischen Edition keinen 
Hinweis für die Existenz einer anderen Quelle der Typologie des «göttlichen 
Intellekts» als diese und andere Propositionen der Elementatio theologica des 
Proclus und Bertholds eigene Invention bei deren Auslegung gibt. Eine gene-
tische Erschließung der Typologie leistet Berthold insofern selbst, als er bei 
ihrer Erläuterung auf seine identische Aufteilung und Interpretation des «gött-
lichen Intellekts» verweist, die er zuvor im Kommentar zur Proposition 134 
75  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 160A, S.3, L.26–30: Tertio accipitur intellectus divinus 
pro eo, qui est «intellectus per essentiam», licet non primo modo, qualis est divinarum ani-
marum sive totalium sive partialium, qui etiam est divinus participatione divinae unitatis. 
Omnis enim intellectus divinus est huiusmodi secundum participationem divinae unitatis 
per tertiam partem 129 [Omnis autem intellectus divinus secundum participationem divinae 
unitatis: hg.v. Retucci, S.173, L.4–5; hg.v. Boese, S.65, L.2–3].
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vornahm, welche die Erkenntnis- und Providenzweise des «göttlichen 
Intellekts» definiert.76 Von dort verweist er auf die Proposition 65 der 
Elementatio theologica des Proclus zurück, die den eigentlichen Ursprung sei-
ner Typologie des «göttlichen Intellekts» bildet. Sie gibt die im Kommentar 
zu der 160. Proposition angenommene Dreiteilung des «göttlichen Intellekts» 
wortwörtlich mit dem einen Unterschied wieder, dass sie formal dieselbe 
Unterscheidung auf die Seinsweise von allem, was auch immer existiert 
(omne quod qualitercumque existit), bezieht. Die eingehende und aus der 
Gesamtperspektive des Werkes betrachtet sich wiederholende Erläuterung 
der Seinsmodi der einzelnen Intellekte ist offenbar Bertholds eigene Leistung. 
Auf der Kommentierungsebene indes bot sich ein Raum für die Einbeziehung 
von Quellen und Inspirationen unterschiedlicher Traditionen und Herkunft. 
Diese narrativen Seiten seiner Expositio bergen in sich zumeist stillschwei-
gende Auskünfte zu den Fragen, inwiefern er sich die intellektuelle Tradition 
des Albertus aneignete und schöpferisch fortführte.
Bertholds distinkter Begriff des «göttlichen Intellekts» und seine dreifa-
che Unterscheidung rühren zwar unmittelbar aus der Proklischen Vorlage 
her, aber sie sind weder in Proclus’ Schrift noch in der neuplatonischen 
Tradition exklusiv verankert. Wenn Berthold in seiner Interpretation dieses 
Begriffs der genuin neuplatonischen Tradition folgt, was durch die explizi-
ten Rückverweise aus dem Kommentar zur 160. Proposition auf eine Reihe 
der Proklischen Propositionen und ihre Auslegung belegt ist,77 schließt diese 
Tatsache nicht einen erweiterten Traditionsbezug des Kommentars aus, wie 
schon K. Flasch gesehen hat und wie es sich auch in diesem Fall zeigt. Dieser 
explizite und indirekte, in der Edition quellenkritisch nachgewiesene, erwei-
terte Traditionsbezug erstreckt sich im Kommentar zur Proposition 160 von 
Aristoteles über Ps.-Dionysius, Albertus Magnus und Dietrich von Freiberg bis 
hin zu den arabisch-islamischen Philosophen Avicenna und Averroes.
Will man nun Bertholds Verhältnis speziell zu Albert mit Bezug auf des-
sen Auffassung des «göttlichen Intellekts» charakterisieren, ist zu berück-
sichtigen, dass Albert sich dieses Begriffs bereits im Frühwerk bediente. Eine 
Strukturanalyse und Erklärung der drei unterschiedenen Intellekte hat er im 
Metaphysikkommentar unternommen. Im Unterschied zu Berthold gründete 
sein Begriffsverständnis vornehmlich im corpus Dionysiacum und im Liber 
76  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 134B, S.214, L.21–S.215, L.45.
77  Berthold rekurriert bei der Auslegung der Proposition 160 explizit auf folgende 
Propositionen bzw. Kommentare des Proclus zu den Propositionen der Elementatio (in 
der Reihenfolge der Verweise): 134, 65(bis), 111, 129, 110, 122, 119, 52(bis), 26, 153, 34, 64, 114, 
8, 22, 75, 11, 99(bis), 131, 134, 125, 28; bei der Auslegung des Proklischen Kommentars zur 
Proposition 160 nimmt Berthold Bezug auf die Propositionen 18 und 97.
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de causis; die Elementatio theologica stand ihm vorerst nicht zur Verfügung. 
Das Bekanntwerden und die Aneignung der aristotelischen Intellektlehre ein-
schließlich ihrer spätantiken griechischen und arabisch-islamischen Auslegung 
und Fortführung erweiterten sein Begriffsverständnis. Der genuin neuplatoni-
sche Begriff wurde folglich zum Bestandteil von Alberts Intellektspekulation, 
die unterschiedliche Traditionen amalgamierte. Diese Entwicklung nahm 
ihren Lauf im theologischen Frühwerk De resurrectione und De quattuor 
coaequaevis78 und setzte sich in den Aristoteles-Kommentaren zu De caelo 
et mundo, zur Physik bei der Diskussion der Unendlichkeit, zu De anima bei 
der Erörterung der Natur der intellektiven Seele, zur Nikomachischen Ethik 
und Metaphysik, wo sich gewisse Anklänge an das Proklische Verständnis 
finden, fort.79 In Alberts neuplatonisch inspirierten Werken De natura et ori-
gine animae und De intellectu et intelligibili, in De causis et processu universitatis 
78  Albertus Magnus, De resurrectione, hg.v. W. Kübel (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1958), tr. 4 q. 2, 
a. 5, S.344, L.76–82; Albertus Magnus, De quattuor coaequaevis (Summa de creaturis pars i), 
hg.v. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1895), tr. 2, q. 3, a. 2, S.345b: ideae sunt in intellectu divino. 
Albertus Magnus, De quattuor coaequaevis, tr. 4, q. 34, a. 1, S.522a–b: Dicit Dionysius in libro 
de Coelesti hierarchia, quod ‘Archangeli Angelis communicant illuminationes, et Angeli 
nobis, secundum uniuscujusque illuminatorum analogiam’. Et ita videtur, quod dant nobis 
illuminationes, et ita faciunt in nobis intellectum divinum. Albertus Magnus, De quattuor 
coaequaevis, tr. 4, q. 34, a.2, S.524a: Secundo quaeritur, Per quem modum faciunt in nobis 
Angeli intellectum divinum? Albertus Magnus, De quattuor coaequaevis, tr. 4, q. 36, a. 2, 
part. 2, S.541b: Et hoc patet iterum ex hoc quod intelligentia angelica non est nisi in triplici 
consideratione. Cum enim in ipsa sit medium inter intellectum divinum et humanum, potest 
accipi in se […]. Albertus Magnus, De quattuor coaequaevis, tr. 4 q. 53, S.593b: Et quidem 
omnino in participatione sapientiae et scientiae esse commune est omnibus deiformibus 
intellectibus. Attente autem et primo aut secundo aut infra nequaquam commune, sed sicut 
unicuique ante propria diffinitur analogia. Haec autem et de omnibus divinis mentibus non 
fortassis quis errans diffiniet. Albertus Magnus, De quattuor coaequaevis, tr. 4, q. 60, a. 2, 
S.635a: Praeterea cum dicat Dionysius, quod intellectus divini per tria dividuntur, scilicet 
essentiam, virtutem, et operationem […]. Albertus Magnus, De quattuor coaequaevis, tr. 4, 
q. 60, a. 2, S.637b: Dionysius secundum denominationem dividit intellectus divinos in tria: 
quia a tribus denominantur. Dicuntur enim coelestes essentiae, et coelestes virtutes, et coele-
stes nuntii sive Angeli. Albertus Magnus, De quattuor coaequaevis, tr. 4, q. 67, a. 5, S.689b: 
quilibet intellectus illustratur ex hoc quod conjungitur superiori. Intellectus enim hominis 
accipit illustrationem ab intellectu Angeli, et intellectus Angeli ab illuminatione intellectus 
divini.
79  Cf. Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica. Commentum et quaestiones, hg.v. W. Kübel (Münster 
i.W. 1987), lib. 10, lect. 3, S.719, L.23: intellectualitas divina. Albertus Magnus, Super Ethica, 
lib. 10, lect. 11, S.752, L.74–75: quaestio de intellectu divino. Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, 
lib. 1, tr. 2, c. 4, S.22 L.2–5. Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, hg.v. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: 
Aschendorff, 1964), lib. 6, tr. 2, c. 6, S.311, L.70–71.86–87, S.312, L.20–21.25–26.44.53. Albertus 
Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. 7, tr. 1, c. 4, S.320, L.38. Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, L.11, tr. 2, 
c. 32, S.524, L.14.
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a prima causa sowie in den theologischen Schriften, darunter De homine, die 
Bibelkommentare, Quaestio de prophetia, der Sentenzenkommentar und 
Summa theologiae, ist der Begriff stets präsent. Albert verband ihn auch mit 
dem Timaeus des Platon, obwohl die Bestimmung „göttlich“ (divinus) dort 
fehlt.80
Berthold hat sich bei der Kommentierung der Proklischen Propositionen 
im intellekttheoretischen Teil seines Werkes mehrerer Schriften Alberts als 
Quelle bedient. Einen ersten Eindruck über seine Anleihen vermitteln die 
entsprechenden Nachweise im Quellenapparat der kritischen Edition der 
Expositio. Die Reihe der herangezogenen Werke Alberts ist vermutlich länger 
als die oben erwähnten Werktitel und der Umfang der verarbeiteten, vielfach 
durch Ulrich von Straßburg vermittelten Texte größer als er in der kritischen 
Edition ausgewiesen werden konnte.81 Bezüglich der Typologie des «göttli-
chen Intellekts» und ihrer Erläuterung finden sich in Alberts Kommentierung 
der ps.-dionysischen Schrift De caelesti hierarchia, im Metaphysikkommentar 
und in der Summa theologiae Interpretationen, die mit denen Bertholds punk-
tuell oder weitgehend, wenn nicht gänzlich übereinstimmen. Sie betreffen 
sowohl die Dreiteilung des Intellekts und seine Instanziierung82 als auch die 
universale Kausalität des göttlichen, aus sich selbst die Allheit hervorbringen-
den Intellekts.83 Als besonders auffällig ist eine große Ähnlichkeit zwischen 
Bertholds Auslegung der Dreiteilung des «göttlichen Intellekts» mit Alberts dies-
bezüglicher Auffassung hervorzuheben, die in seinem Metaphysikkommentar 
(Buch ii, Kap. 2) vorliegt. Einen zwingenden Beweis, dass Berthold bei der 
Entfaltung seiner Lehrmeinung vom «göttlichen Intellekt» sich durch Werke 
Alberts leiten ließ oder sich ihrer als einer vermittelnden Quelle der Lehren 
80  Albertus Magnus, De quattuor coaequaevis, tr. 4, q. 72, a. 1, S.735a: generatio mundi sensi-
bilis prima mixta erat, ex coetu quoque constitit necessitatis et intelligentiae, hoc est, mate-
riae et idearum, quae fuerunt in intelligentia prima: et constitit postea formata dominante 
intellectu divino super materiam, et trahente ipsam materiam rigidam, hoc est, nulli formae 
inclinatam, ad optimos actus uniuscujusque formae substantialis. Cf. Plato, Timaeus, transl. 
Calcidius, hg.v. J.H. Waszink (London / Leiden: Warburg Institute and Brill, 1962), 48E, 
S.45, L.11–13: mixta siquidem mundi sensilis ex necessitatis intelligentiaeque coetu consistit 
generatio dominante intellectu et salubri persuasione rigorem necessitatis assidue trahente 
ad optimos actus.
81  Cf. Pagnoni-Sturlese, „À propos du néoplatonisme d’Albert le Grand“, S.637ff.
82  Cf. Albertus Magnus, De quattuor coaequaevis (Summa de creaturis i), tr. 4, q. 60, a. 2, 
S.635a, S.637b; Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium De caelesti hierarchia, hg.v. P. Simon, 
W. Kübel (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), c. 11, S.174, L.38ff., L.82ff.; Metaphysica, lib. 2, c. 
2, S.93, L.62ff.: Triplex est autem Intellectus […].
83  Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. 1, tr. 2, c. 4, S.22, L.2–4; Summa theologiae, lib. 1, tr. 3, 
q. 13, c. 1, S.39, L.79–80.
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des Ps.-Dionysius und des Aristoteles, des Avicenna und des Averroes bedient 
hat, liefert diese Auffälligkeit zwar nicht. Die hier angedeuteten und die im 
Quellenapparat der Expositio nachgewiesenen doktrinellen und strukturellen 
Übereinstimmungen zwischen den beiden Autoren sowie die gemeinsamen 
Quellen legen dennoch eine tiefgreifende hermeneutische Koinzidenz nahe, 
welche in der neuplatonischen, onto-theologischen Reflexionsstruktur besteht. 
Sie ist für die beiden Autoren wie auch für Ulrich von Straßburg, Dietrich von 
Freiberg, Meister Eckhart, bis zu Heimericus de Campo der Schlüssel und das 
Ordnungsprinzip von Denken, Verstehen und Erklären der Seinswirklichkeit 
ausgehend vom „Erst-göttlichen Intellekt“ als ihrem transzendenten Grund.84 
Diese onto-theologische Struktur, die auf Proclus und Pseudo-Dionysius als 
ihr Vermittler an das Christentum und zugleich Garant ihrer Vereinbarkeit mit 
der Orthodoxie zurückgeht, öffnet Berthold wie Albert den Zugriff auf phi-
losophische Traditionen, um mit deren heuristischem Instrumentarium die 
Wirklichkeit im Ganzen, soweit dies nur dem menschlichen Verstand möglich, 
zu erschließen.
ii. Weiterführende Einsichten in Bezug auf Bertholds doktrinelle Gemein-
samkeiten mit Albert und seine unmittelbaren Einflüsse auf die Expositio 
liefert der Kommentar zur Proposition 163. Das Proklische Theorem „Jede 
Viellheit von Einheiten, an welcher der Intellekt teilhat, der keine Teilhabe 
zulässt, ist eine intellektuale [Viellheit]“85 veranlasst Berthold in einem ersten 
Schritt die Eigenschaften des Intellekts zu bestimmen, der keine Teilhabe 
zulässt. Im nächsten Schritt erläutert er zwei Typen einer intellektualen 
Teilhabe, eine tätige (participatio activa) und eine erleidende (participatio pas-
siva), und geht in einem dritten Schritt der Aussageabsicht des Proklischen 
Theorems nach. Er unterscheidet und instanziiert das, was nicht-teilhaftig 
ist, bestimmt die Arten der Teilhabe, ihre Modi und ihren Gegenstand.86 Es 
genügt unter dem Blickwinkel der Intellektlehre an dieser Stelle festzuhalten, 
dass Berthold in diesem Kontext das Erst-Eine und das Erst-Gute (prime unum 
et bonum) ausdrücklich als schlechthin nicht-teilhaftig (simpliciter impar-
ticipabile) bestimmt. Hierzu zählt offenbar auch der Erst-Intellekt, sofern er 
als Erst- und Ursprünglich-Seiendes aus sich selbst im absoluten Sinne begrif-
fen wird. Den Erst-Intellekt kennzeichnet er indessen wie jedes Erst- und 
84  Cf. oben Anm. 39; ferner H. Anzulewicz, „Zum Einfluss des Albertus Magnus auf 
Heymericus de Campo im Compendium divinorum“, in K. Reinhardt, H. Schwaetzer, 
F.-B. Stammkötter (Hgg.), Heymericus de Campo: Philosophie und Theologie im 15. 
Jahrhundert (Regensburg: S. Roderer-Verlag, 2009), S.83–112.
85  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 163, S.24, L.2–4: Omnis multitudo unitatum, quae parti-
cipatur ab imparticipabili intellectu, intellectualis est.
86  Hierzu und zum Folgenden: Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 163A, S.24, L.12–19.
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Primär-Seiende einer Reihe von Seienden als nicht-teilhaftig unter gewisser 
Rücksicht (imparticipabile in determinata intentione). In diesem Sinne ist jeder 
Intellekt einer intellektualen Ordnung, der an sich vollkommen konstituiert ist, 
nicht-teilhaftig, resümiert Berthold.87 Nicht-teilhaftig ist demnach alles, was 
getrennt und unvermischt ist, was keine Gemeinsamkeit und kein wesenhaftes 
Verhältnis zu einem anderen vorweist, mit dem es zwar wesenhaft vereint ist, 
aber dennoch als von diesem in jeder Beziehung wesenhaft getrennt besteht. 
Mit dieser Darstellung zielt Berthold unmissverständlich auf die Auffassung 
der anima rationalis des Aristoteles (De anima iii, 4–5) ab, genauer auf den 
menschlichen Intellekt. Da die an Aristoteles’ Schrift De anima angelehnten 
Versatzstücke seiner Theorie sich wörtlich in Alberts De anima-Kommentar, 
andere bei Dietrich von Freiberg de De animatione caeli finden und er keine 
Auskünfte hinsichtlich der Quellen macht, gilt es für Dietrich als bewiesen und 
für Albert als plausibel, dass ihre Schriften als eine unmittelbare Quelle bzw. 
als eine Brücke zu der littera des Aristoteles bei der Abfassung der Expositio 
fungiert haben.88
Auf die inhaltliche und formale Erschließung der Proposition 163 lässt 
Berthold in gewohnter Manier sein eigenes Lehrstück, sog. Propositum, folgen. 
Den Ausgangpunkt und inhaltlichen Kern bildet der Begriff der Intellektualität 
sowohl als Adjektivattribut (intellectualis), das Proklos zur Bestimmung einer 
Vielheit von Einheiten verwendete, welche am Intellekt teilhat, der selbst 
nicht-teilhaftig ist, als auch als Nomen (intellectuale). Wie Pseudo-Dionysius 
und Albert der Große verknüpft Berthold das Verständnis dieses Begriffs mit 
dem Begriff der Intelligibilität und der Klärung der Differenz zwischen den 
beiden Begriffen. Gemeinsam für sie ist, wie er darlegt, die Erkenntnisfähigkeit 
(aptitudo ad intelligendum) desjenigen, dem sie zukommen. Auf Seiten des 
«Intellektualen» sei sie eine aktive Fähigkeit, wem auch immer sie formal oder 
wesenhaft oder ursächlich oder in herausragender Weise zukommt. Auf Seiten 
des «Intelligiblen», das seinem Sinngehalt nach abstrakter und herausragen-
der als das Intellektuale begriffen wird, sei sie eine passive oder eine zuhöchst 
aktive Fähigkeit, entsprechend der Art und Weise seiner Konstituierung als 
Gegenstand des Intellekts. Ersteres ist gegeben, sofern das Intelligible unter 
Teilhabe an der Spezies eines anderen zum Gegenstand des Intellekts wird; 
87  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 163A, S.24, L.19–22, S.25, L.39–40: Et sic acceptum impar-
ticipabile subdistinguitur in simpliciter imparticipabile, quod est prime unum et bonum, et 
imparticipabile in determinata intentione. Et sic omne prime et principaliter ens in quacu-
mque seyra dicitur et est imparticipabile ut prime intellectus etc. […] Et sic omnis intellectus 
intra ordinem intellectualem per se perfectum constitutus dicitur et est imparticipabilis.
88  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 163A, S.24, L.23–27, S.25, L.37–38. Cf. Albertus Magnus, 
De anima, lib. 3, tr. 2, c. 17 und 18, S.201, L.63–65.80 (Arist.), S.204, L.64–65, S.203, L.89 
(Arist.).
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Letzteres indessen, wenn das Intelligible teilhaftig des Intellektualen ist (die-
sen Satzteil gibt Berthold mit participatur ad esse intelligibile wieder und 
verändert dadurch den Sinngehalt seiner Vorlage, die diese Stelle, wie die 
nachfolgende Gegenüberstellung der Texte zeigt, mit participatum ad esse 
intellectuale überliefert).89
In diesem Lehrstück kommen wie in einem Brennglas Informationen 
zusammen, welche die Frage nach Bertholds Einbettung in die Tradition 
Alberts des Großen in einem wichtigen Punkt der Intellektlehre beantwor-
ten und die Kontinuitätsthese in Bezug auf diese Tradition nachdrücklich 
bestätigen. Das Lehrstück erlaubt die verborgene Originalität einer subtilen 
Distinktion aufzudecken, die Berthold sich ohne ihre tatsächliche Herkunft 
preiszugeben zu eigen machte, indem er sie in ihrer Detailliertheit und 
Ausführlichkeit wortwörtlich, sieht man von einigen geringen Abweichungen 
ab, aus Alberts Kommentar zu De divinis nominibus (c. 4) in sein Werk auf-
nahm.90 Zur Verdeutlichung der Qualität, des Ausmaßes und der Art und 
Weise der Verarbeitung dieser Anleihe, die Berthold bei der Auslegung der 
Proposition 163 zur Erläuterung zweier Schlüsselbegriffe der Epistemologie 
und Intellektlehre aus dem Werk Alberts des Großen stillschweigend machte, 
seien nachfolgend der Quellentext in seiner Ursprungsform, wie er in der kri-
tischen Edition von P. Simon vorliegt, und derselbe Text in der von Berthold in 
seiner Expositio überlieferten Gestalt gegenübergestellt:
Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium 
De div. nominibus, c. 4, hg.v. Simon, 
S.121, L.20–56
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio 
super Elem. theol., 163D, hg.v. Jeck, 
Tautz, S.27, L.106–130
Dicendum, quod sicut duplex est 
visibile, quoddam quod est obiec-
tum visus suba specie aliena, qua 
informatur ad esse visibile, sicutb 
color, qui non potest esse obiectum 
visus, nisi perficiatur per lucem in 
esse spirituali et efficiatur
sciendum, quod, sicut est duplex 
visibile, quoddam, quod est obiec-
tum visus non sine specie aliena, qua 
informatur ad esse, et tale visibile est 
color, qui non potest esse obiectum 
visus, nisi perficiatur per lucem in  
esse spirituali et efficiatur visibile
a sub Alb. non sine Berth.
b visibile, sicut Alb. et tale visibile est Berth.
89  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 163C–D, S.26, L.88–S.28, L.134.
90  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 163D, S.26, L.91–92, S.27, L.104–130. Cf. Albertus 
Magnus, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, c. 4, S.120, L.2–3, S.121, L.20–56.
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(cont.)
Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium 
De div. nominibus, c. 4, hg.v. Simon, 
S.121, L.20–56
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio 
super Elem. theol., 163D, hg.v. Jeck, 
Tautz, S.27, L.106–130
visibile actu, est etiam quoddam 
visibile quod participatur ad  
naturam visibilitatis, sicut lux, si 
poneremus, quod non posset per 
se videri,c sed videretur tantum, 
secundum quod est participata in 
hoc colore vel illod quibus  
dat esse visibilitatis, quamvis  
quod moveante secundum rationes 
determinatas,f non habeantg  
a luce, sed potius ab esseh quod 
habenti in materia: itaj est duplex 
intelligibile, quoddam quod est 
obiectum intellectus, secundum 
quod participat de specie aliena, 
sicut species intelligibilis non est 
intelligibilis, nisi inquantum  
participat de actu intellectus  
agentis, qui dat sibi esse spirituale  
et simplex, quod possit esse per-
fectio intellectus possibilis. Hoc 
enim non habet a re, quia lapis non  
est in anima, sicut dicit Philosophus, 
sed intentio lapidis constituta in 
esse intelligibili per actum intel-
lectus agentis, quamvis ab ipso  
non habeat, quod determinet intel-
lectum, sed potius ab ipsa re, cuius 
est intentio. 
actu, est etiam quoddam visibile,  
quod participatur ad naturam  
visibilitatis, sicut lux, si poneremus, 
quod non posset videri in se, sed  
videretur tantum, secundum  
quod est participata in hoc vel  
illo colore, quibus  
dat esse visibilitatis, quamvis, quod  
moveat secundum rationes determi-
natas ipsum visum, non habeat  
a luce, sed potius ab esse rei, quod 
habet in materia, ita proportionali-
ter est duplex intelligibile: quoddam, 
quod est obiectum intellectus,  
secundum quod participat de specie 
aliena, sicut species intelligibilis  
non est intelligibilis, nisi quantum 
participat de actu intellectus agentis, 
qui dat sibi esse spirituale et simplex, 
quod possit esse perfectio intellectus 
possibilis. Hoc enim non est a re,  
cuius est species, quia lapis non  
est in anima, sed intentio lapidis  
constituta in esse tali intelligibili  
per actum intellectus agentis,  
quamvis ab ipso non habeat,  
quod determinet intellectum,  
sed potius a re ipsa vel phantasmate, 
cuius est intentio. 
c per se videri Alb. videri in se Berth.
d colore vel illo Alb. vel illo colore Berth.
e moveant Alb. moveat Berth.
f determinatas Alb. ipsum visum add. Berth.
g habeant Alb. habeat Berth.
h esse Alb. rei add. Berth.
i habent Alb. habet Berth.
j ita Alb. proportionaliter add. Berth.
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Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium 
De div. nominibus, c. 4, hg.v. Simon, 
S.121, L.20–56
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio 
super Elem. theol., 163D, hg.v. Jeck, 
Tautz, S.27, L.106–130
Quoddam vero est intelligibile  
sicut participatumk ad esse  
intellectuale,l sicut lumen intel-
lectus agentis participatur in 
specie intelligibili et esse etiam 
intellectuale.m
Dicimus ergo,n quod intelligibile 
primo modo dictum dicit aptitudi-
nem passivam, sed secundo modo 
dictum dicit maxime activam, eto 
hoc convenit semper superiori  
naturae respectu inferioris,  
quia lumen superioris simplicius  
est et formale respectu inferioris  
et movens illud, lumen vero  
inferioris est motum a lumine  
superioris et possibile etp oboe-
diens sibi. Et secundum hoc lumen 
superioris intelligentiaeq moventis 
secundum philosophos recipiturr 
in inferiori per omnes ordines 
decem, quos ponunt,s perficiens 
ipsum in esse intellectualitatis.
Quoddam vero intelligibile  
sic participatur ad esse  
intelligibile, sicut lumen intellectus 
agentis participatur in specie  
intelligibili, et est etiam esse 
intelligibile.
Dico igitur, quod intelligibile  
primo modo dictum dicit aptitudinem 
passivam, sed secundo modo dictum 
dicit maxime activam, et secundum 
hoc semper convenit naturae  
superiori respectu inferioris, quia 
lumen superioris simplex  
est et formale respectu inferioris  
et movens illud, lumen vero  
inferioris est motum a lumine  
superioris et oboediens sibi.  
Et secundum hoc lumen  
potentiae superioris moventis  
radicatur in  
inferiori  
perficiens ipsum in esse  
intellectualitatis.
k sicut participatum Alb. sic participatur Berth.
l intellectuale Alb. intelligibile Berth.
m intellectuale Alb. intelligibile Berth.
n Dicimus ergo Alb. Dico igitur Berth.
o et Alb. secundum add. Berth.
p possibile et Alb. om. Berth.
q superioris intelligentiae Alb. potentiae superioris Berth.
r secundum philosophos recipitur Alb. radicatur Berth.
s per – ponunt Alb. om. Berth.
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Alb., Super Dionysium De div. nomi-
nibus, c. 4, S.119, L.76–S.120, L.1.9–11; 
S.122, L.8–10
Berth., Expositio super Elem. theol., 
163D, hg.v. Jeck, Tautz, S.28, L.131–134
dicit (Dionysius) superiores  
substantias esse intelligibiles et 
intellectuales […]. Item, dubitatur 
Et secundum hoc etiam distinguit 
Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis nominibus 
intelligibiles substantias ab 
de differentia, quam ponit 
Commentator inter ista; dicit enim 
sic: Superiores dicit intelligibiles 
[…]. Et ideo dicuntur superiores 
intelligibiles, et inferiores intellectu-
ales, quasi constituti in intellectuali-
tate per lumen superiorum. 
intellectualibus intendens secundum 
Commentatorem, quod superiores 
sunt intelligibiles et inferiores intellec-
tuales quasi constituti in intellectuali-
tate per lumen superiorum.
Das aus Alberts Werk übernommene Material ergänzt Berthold mit einer 
Bemerkung über die natürliche Vorsehung und den genetischen Zusam-
menhang der Intention mit der Intellektualität und deren graduellen, drei-
stufigen Differenzierung. Diese umfasst intellektuale Hypostasen, die sich 
selbst gänzlich, wesenhaft und aktual erkennen und als Intelligenzen (intel-
ligentiae) bezeichnet werden, ferner die göttlichen Seelen (animae totales 
et divinae) und Engel (angeli) einschließlich der Seelen, denen ein zweifa-
ches Prinzip der Intellektualität, «der tätige Intellekt» als die Mitursache 
des ganzen niederen Seelenteils und der «mögliche Intellekt» als der innere 
Grund einer natürlichen Erkenntnis, eignet, weshalb sie als animae parti-
ales bezeichnet werden. Die nachfolgende Erklärung der Intellektualität der 
letzten Hierarchiestufe, der Engel und der «partialen Seelen», übernimmt 
Berthold wortwörtlich aus Alberts Kommentar zu De divinis nominibus.91 
Dass außer dem Begriffsverständnis von Intellektualität und Intelligibilität 
auch die Instanziierung dieser Begriffe eine – sieht man von geringfügigen 
Umformulierungen am Anfang und punktuellen Abänderungen resp. einzel-
nen Varianten – buchstäbliche stillschweigende Übernahme der Lehraussage 
Alberts darstellt, und dass sie den Kerngehalt seines gesamten Propositums bei 
der Auslegung der 163. Proposition der Proklischen Elementatio bildet, zeigt 
die nachfolgende Gegenüberstellung der entsprechenden Texte:
91  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 163E, S.29, L.157–170. Albertus Magnus, Super 
Dionysium De divinis nominibus, c. 4, S.122, L.40–63.
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Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium 
De divinis nominibus, c. 4, S.122, 
L.40–63
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio 
super Elem. theol., 163E, hg.v. Jeck, 
Tautz, S.28, L.153–S.29, L.170
dicendum, quod eadem differentia 
non potest esse diversorum secundum 
speciem univoce reperta in eis; potest 
tamen utriusque esse differentia, si sit 
in eis secundum prius et posterius.
In omnibus etiam enumeratis  
intellectualibus intellectualitas est per 
prius et per posterius. 
Primo enim invenitur in intellectualibus 
hypostasibus, quibus primo et per se
Hoc enim verum est in omnibus totis 
potestativis, quod superius est aliquo 
modo in inferiori secundum modum 
possibilem sibi et per posterius; et 
secundum hoc intellectualitas  
per prius est in angelis, quorum 
natura accipit simplices quiditates 
rerum, in nobis vero est per poste-
rius, obumbrataa per continuum  
et tempusb propter hoc quod  
accipit a sensu et phantasmate. Et 
secundumc hoc dicit Isaac,  
quod ratio oriturd in umbra  
intelligentiae; ex hoc enim quod  
non accipit simplicem quiditatem 
rei per propria principia, sed per 
quaedam consequentia, sicut per
accidentaliae et effectus, oportet, 
quod deveniat in cognitionemf  
disquirendog et comparando unum 
ad alterum, et accidit in ea dubitatio, 
quae non est in intelligentia, quaeh
competit, deinde in illis, quibus  
competit per se, sed non primo,  
post quae in illis, quibus competit  
nec per se nec primo, inter  
quae tamen  
prius est in angelis, quorum natura  
accipit simplices quiditates rerum,  
in nobis vero est per posterius,  
obumbratum per continuum et  
tempus, et propter hoc quod  
accipit a sensu et phantasmate. Et  
propter hoc dicit Isaac, quod ratio 
creata est in umbra intelligentiae;  
ex hoc enim,  
quod non accipit simplicem quidita-
tem rei per propria principia, sed per 
quaedam consequentia principia,  
accidentia et effectus, oportet, quod 
deveniat in cognitionem rerum  
discurrendo et comparando unum  
ad alterum, et accidit in ea dubitatio, 
quod non est in angelo,  
a obumbrata Alb. obumbratum Berth.
b tempus Alb. et add. Berth.
c secundum Alb. propter Berth.
d oritur Alb. creata est Berth.
e sicut per accidentalia Alb. principia, accidentia Berth.
f cognitionem Alb. rerum add. Berth.
g disquirendo Alb. discurrendo Berth.
h quae … intelligentia, quae Alb. quod … angelo, qui Berth.
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Albertus Magnus, Super Dionysium 
De divinis nominibus, c. 4, S.122, 
L.40–63
Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio 
super Elem. theol., 163E, hg.v. Jeck, 
Tautz, S.28, L.153–S.29, L.170
simplici actione accipit quiditatem 
rei. Unde etiam dicit
Commentatori super vi  
Ethicorum: Cave, ne animam 
aliquando simpliciter dicas intel-
lectualem; sic enim non differret 
ab intelligentiis; sed dic eam ratio-
nalem, intellectualem vero per 
accidens; et hoc est: inquantum 
participat de luce naturae superioris.
qui simplici actione, ut dictum est, 
accipit quiditatem rei. Unde etiam 
Eustratius super vi Ethicorum  
dicit: Cave ne animam aliquando  
simpliciter dicas intellectualem; sic 
enim non differret ab intelligentiis; 
sed dic eam rationabilem, intellectu-
alem vero per accidens, hoc est:  
inquantum participat de luce naturae 
superioris.
i Commentator Alb. Eustratius Berth.
Aus Bertholds wortwörtlichen Anleihen bei Albert, die aber als solche nicht 
gekennzeichnet werden, ist zu schließen, dass der Exeget des Proclus sich 
deren Lehrgehalt uneingeschränkt zu eigen macht und ihn als seine eigene 
Auffassung präsentiert. Diese Intention wird man Berthold auch bei weniger 
durch Worttreue auffallenden Anlehnungen an Alberts Intellektlere bei der 
Auslegung der Propositionen 167 und 174 der Elementatio theologica unter-
stellen dürfen. Die Kommentare zu den beiden Theoremen spiegeln seine in 
Entwicklung und Differenzierung begriffene Klassifikation der Intellekte wider, 
für die sich ihm bei Albert eine inhaltlich breitere Grundlage als bei Dietrich 
von Freiberg bot. Die systematisierenden Ansätze von Bertholds Intellektlehre 
sollen hier nur in groben Strichen umrissen und in ihrem Verhältnis zu Albert 
beleuchtet werden. Auf die Berücksichtigung seiner diesbezüglichen, an 
Dietrich von Freiberg, Aristoteles und Averroes angelehnten Erläuterungen 
muss verzichtet werden, da dies den Rahmen dieses Beitrags sprengen würde.
iii. Nach der Unterscheidung und Erläuterung der göttlichen Intellekte 
im Kommentar zur Proposition 160 und nach einer Differenzierung der 
Intellekte, die keine Teilhabe zulassen, im Kommentar zur Proposition 163 
sowie nach der Erörterung der für alle Intellekte gemeinsamen Eigenschaften 
im Kommentar zur Proposition 166 unternimmt Berthold im Kommentar zur 
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Proposition 16792 eine weitere, soweit wir sehen seine vorletzte Gliederung, 
Systematisierung und Charakterisierung der Intellekte. Ihren Ausgangspunkt, 
ihre Grundlage und Richtschnur bilden nicht nur die Inhalte dieser Proposition 
und des sie begleitenden commentum des Proclus, sondern auch und vor allem 
der weitere Kontext der Expositio und die Traditionen, in denen das Werk ein-
gebettet ist. Der philosophiehistorisch und systematisch offene Horizont der 
Exegese und ihr Anschluss an die Philosophy of Mind seiner Protagonisten, 
Dietrich von Freiberg und Albert der Großen, wird zum theoriebildenden 
Faktor des Bertholdschen Denksystems. Der erste, „suppositionale“ Teil sei-
ner Auslegung der Proposition 167, der eine Klassifikation der Intellekte, 
die Erläuterung der einzelnen Typen und ihrer jeweils unterschiedlichen 
Bestimmung beinhaltet, ist derart mit Versatzstücken aus der Intellektlehre 
Dietrichs durchsetzt, dass er stellenweise einer literarischen Collage aus des-
sen Schrift De intellectu et intelligibili nahekommt. In Anlehnung an diese 
Schrift entwickelt Berthold eine generische, die bisherige Unterscheidung 
des göttlichen Intellekts erweiternde oder vielmehr nuancierende Typologie 
der Intellekte. Ohne eine ausdrückliche Bezugnahme auf die vorausliegende 
Typologie des göttlichen Intellekts – die Verknüpfung ist durch Analogie 
in struktureller und inhaltlicher Hinsicht offenkundig – geht er von der 
Unterscheidung eines schlechthin getrennten Intellekts (intellectus separa-
tus simpliciter) und eines im uneigentlichen Sinne getrennten, gleichsam 
verbundenen und mit-geteilten Intellekts (intellectus non proprie separatus, 
sed quasi coniunctus scilicet participatus) aus. Die weitere Differenzierung 
und Bestimmung dieser beiden Intellekte soll im Folgenden kurz vorgestellt 
werden, um sie anschließend in ihrer Beziehung zur Intellektlehre Alberts zu 
beleuchten.
Beim schlechthin getrennten Intellekt unterscheidet Berthold zwischen 
dem Intellekt gemäß der Ursache in ihrer Ursprungsform (secundum causam 
principaliformiter) und dem Intellekt gemäß der Existenz in ihrer Wesensform 
(secundum existentiam essentialiter). Während der Erstere als ein einziger 
(unus tantum) und schlechthin getrennter Intellekt charakterisiert wird, 
92  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 167, S.58, L.2–8: Omnis intellectus se ipsum intelligit, sed 
primus quidem se ipsum solum, et unum secundum numerum in hoc intellectus et intelligi-
bile. Unusquisque autem consequentium se ipsum simul et quae ante ipsum, et intelligibile 
est huic hoc quidem quod est, hoc autem a quo est. [„Jeder Intellekt erkennt sich selbst, der 
erste aber nur sich selbst, und der Intellekt und das Intelligible (sind) darin numerisch 
Eines. Jeder einzelne der nachfolgenden Intellekte indessen (erkennt) sich selbst und 
zugleich das, was vor ihm ist, und das Intelligible ist für ihn das ‘was es ist’, dies aber ‘von 
was es ist’“]; S.75, L.518–533: Commentum.
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wird der Letztere als ein durch intellektuale Hypostasen vervielfältigter 
begriffen. Den schlechthin getrennten Intellekt gemäß der Ursache in ihrer 
Ursprungsform bezeichnet Berthold in Analogie zur Bestimmung des «göttli-
chen Erst-Intellekts» als die sprudelnde Quelle aller Intellektualität ( fontana 
scaturrigo omnis intellectualitatis), die ursprüngliche und wesentliche Einheit 
und die «Erst-Intellektualität», welche keine Teilhabe zulässt, ein in ausge-
zeichneter Weise Erstes und ursprungsloses Prinzip. Der getrennte Intellekt 
gemäß der Existenz in ihrer Wesensform hingegen ist nach seiner Auffassung 
absolut frei von jeder Abhängigkeit, einfach und nicht zusammensetzbar, Akt 
durch sich selbst.93
Beim uneigentlich getrennten Intellekt, der mit-geteilt wird, unterschei-
det Berthold wie die Peripatetiker einen tätigen Intellekt (intellectus agens) 
und einen möglichen Intellekt. Der tätige Intellekt ist und heißt seiner 
Interpretation zufolge insofern verbunden (coniunctus) bzw. mit-geteilt (par-
ticipatus), als er jeweils einem Individuum, sei es Engel sei es Mensch, eignet 
und dadurch numerisch vervielfältigt wird. Diesen Intellekt fasst er als das 
intrinsische und eigentliche Prinzip auf, welches Erkennen, Leben und Sein, 
im (neu-)platonischen Sinne die Gutheiten der Erstursache, zum individuellen 
Prinzip des Lebens als Erkennen eint, zum Prinzip, in dem Erkennen, Leben 
und Sein Eines sind. Dieser Intellekt besteht durch seine Wesenheit, da er aber 
ein intrinsisch-kausales Prinzip des mit ihm verbundenen Teils der Substanz 
ist, die er selbst ist, ist er in gewisser Weise abhängig, zusammensetzbar und 
nicht einfach; in seiner Substanz ist er die Tätigkeit.94
93  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 167, S.58, L.18–21, S.59, L.40–46: Et iste est duplex, sci-
licet secundum causam principaliformiter et secundum existentiam essentialiter. Primus 
est unus tantum, et est simpliciter separatus, secundus autem multiplicatur intra ordinem 
intellectualem. […] Verum primus intellectus, scilicet secundum causam, principaliformiter 
est fontana scaturrigo omnis intellectualitatis, qui, licet primo et per se sit unitas, tamen 
est prime intellectualitas et simpliciter imparticipabilis et amethectus et per consequens, 
inquantum huiusmodi, principium et ingenitum per 99. Secundus autem est essentia-
liter intellectus stans per essentiam suam ab omni dependentia, ut dictum est, absolutus 
et sic simplex et incomponibilis se ipso actus. Cf. Iremadze, Konzeptionen des Denkens im 
Neuplatonismus, S.156–157.
94  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 167, S.58, L.22–S.59, L.35.47–50: Alius autem est intel-
lectus non proprie separatus, sed quasi coniunctus, scilicet participatus. Et iste est duplex, 
scilicet agens et possibilis. Quorum primus, puta intellectus agens, est singulis singulorum 
et unus uniuscuiusque secundum singulos angelos et homines multiplicatus et numeratus. 
Supponimus enim intelligere esse vivere, sicut et vivere est esse, cum omnia sint in omni-
bus per 103. Vivum autem a non vivo differt in habendo in se principium sui motus. Istius 
autem vitae principium est intellectus agens, in quo est omnia facere secundum Aristotelem 
III De anima. Igitur intellectus agens est principium intrinsecum et proprium talis vitae. 
Non autem esset intrinsecum principium motus vitalis et per consequens nec proprium, si 
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Der «mögliche Intellekt» hingegen ist „alles Seiende in Möglichkeit“ (omne 
ens in potentia), wie ihn Aristoteles in De anima iii 5 mit der Formel „in ihm 
ist möglich, alles zu werden“ (possibile est in eo omnia fieri) definiert hat. Da er 
bei jedem Individuum, dessen Intellekt er ist, den vermögenspsychologischen 
Grund der Erkenntnis bildet, kann er seiner Verfasstheit nach als «möglicher» 
weder aus sich selbst bestehen noch ist er ein ursächliches Prinzip, sondern 
er ist abhängig von der Substanz, die er mit dem intellectus agens teilt und 
wird durch die intelligiblen Spezies in den Akt überführt.95 Diese Typologie 
der getrennten Intellekte und die Kernpunkte ihrer Bestimmungen können 
überblicksweise wie folgt dargestellt werden:
1. intellectus separatus simpliciter
1.1. secundum causam 
principaliformiter
– unus tantum et per se unitas
– prime intellectualitas




1.2.  secundum existentiam  
essentialiter
–  multiplicatur intra ordinem 
intellectualem
– essentialiter intellectus




esset communis pluribus individuis, quia non esset intrinsecum secundum substantiam, sed 
solum secundum efectum, quod non sufficit ad hoc, quod aliquid dicatur et sit principium 
vitae […] Tertius vero »intellectus, scilicet agens, et stat aliqualiter per essentiam suam, 
et nihilominus, cum sit principium intrinsecum causale residuae portionis substantiae, 
cuius est, est aliquo modo dependens. Et sic recedit a simplicitate, cum sit componibilis, et 
est cum hoc in sua substantia actio«. Bertholds Auffassung der Eigenschaften des tätigen 
Intellekts rekonstruiert Iremadze, „Der intellekttheoretische Ansatz der Selbstreflexivität 
des Denkens“, S.246–250; dasselbe auch in: Iremadze, Konzeptionen des Denkens im 
Neuplatonismus, S.143–146, und vertiefend S.147–159.
95  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 167A–B, S.59, L.36–38.51–54: Secundus etiam, puta intel-
lectus possibilis, est universaliter omne ens in potentia, quod solum verum est quantum ad 
hoc, quod secundum Aristotelem III De anima possibile est in eo omnia fieri. […] Quartus et 
ultimus intellectus, scilicet possibilis, cum sit ratio intelligendi coniuncto, in quo est, nec stat 
se ipso sicut agens nec est principium intrinsecum causale, cum sit possibilis, sed est depen-
dens et speciebus intelligibilibus actuatur. Bertholds Verständnis des intellectus possibilis, 
seiner Wirksamkei und sachlichen sowie nominellen Formhaftikeit ist auch von Albert 
beeinflusst, cf. Iremadze, „Der intellekttheoretische Ansatz der Selbstreflexivität des 





– in quo est omnia facere
– participatus (quasi coniunctus)
–  principium intrinsecum causale 
residuae portionis substantiae
– stans aliqualiter in essentia sua
– aliquo modo dependens
2.2. intellectus possibilis
– in quo possibile est omnia fieri
– participatus (quasi coniunctus)




Was verbindet diese Typologie der Intellekte aus dem Kommentar Berthold 
von Moosburgs zur Proposition 167 der Elementatio theologica des Proclus mit 
Albertus Magnus? Ihre Grundstruktur, Begrifflichkeit und die Bestimmung der 
Intellekte sind von Dietrich von Freiberg inspiriert und teilweise wörtlich von 
ihm übernommen. Bertholds Verständnis des «tätigen» und des «möglichen 
Intellekts», entspricht zwar weitgehend der Auffassung Alberts, aber diese 
Übereinstimmung erklärt sich durch die gemeinsame für Berthold, Dietrich 
und Albert aristotelische Quellengrundlage. Andererseits ist nicht zu bezwei-
feln, dass Berthold sie auch durch die Brille Alberts liest. Eine Bestätigung 
dafür sind die signifikanten Übereinstimmungen mit seinen Lehransichten 
und wörtliche Anleihen aus seinem Werk im sogenannten propositum-Teil 
der Expositio Bertholds zur Proposition 167 bei der Charakterisierung des 
Intellekts im Akt. Seine Begründung der Immaterialität und der Getrenntheit 
des Intellekts entnimmt er dem Kommentar Alberts zum Buch Lambda der 
Metaphysik des Aristoteles; seine Quelle gibt er auch diesmal nicht preis. Wie 
getreu er seine Vorlage kopiert und sie nur um ein Geringes kürzt, zeigt die 
nachfolgende Gegenüberstellung der korrespondierenden Texte:
Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. 11  
tr. 2 c. 31, S.523, L.19-44
Berthold von Moosburg, 
Expositio, 167D, S.61, L.108–115, 
S.62, L.119-123
De primo igitur, qualis sit intellectus 
substantiarum divinarum, determinando 
dicimus, quod intellectus nomine  
suo sonat substantiam separatam  
et immaterialem, quae nulli  
aliquid habet commune.  
Quidquid enim est illud quod formis,
Ex his apparet, quod intellectus 
nomine suo sonat substantiam 
seu essentiam immaterialem et 
separatam, quae nulli aliquid 
habet commune. Quidquid enim 
est illud quod formis, quae in ipso
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(cont.)
Albertus Magnus, Metaphysica, lib. 11  
tr. 2 c. 31, S.523, L.19–44
Berthold von Moosburg, 
Expositio, 167D, S.61, L.108–115, 
S.62, L.119-123
quae in ipso sunt vel ab ipso, ad nullum 
esse alicuius formae distinguitur, omnino 
est separatum a materia. Talis autem est 
omnis intellectus, et agens et possibilis et 
quocumque alio nomine significetur. Si 
enim formis distingueretur et  
determinaretur ad esse, oporteret,  
quod ipse omnia esset quae  
intelligeret; quod falsum est. Est autem 
materiae proprium, quod omni et  
soli convenit, formis, quas habet,  
ad esse determinari. Patet igitur  
omnem intellectum a materia esse  
absolutum. 
Si autem alicui aliquid haberet  
commune, iam esset intellectivus  
eorum quae essent  
de natura illorum, sicut oculus non  
videt, nisi quae communicant cum 
natura perspicui, et auris non audit,  
nisi quae communicant cum aëre  
tremente, et oporteret, quod esset virtus 
harmonica et organica. Quae omnia 
impossibilia sunt et improbata a nobis in 
libro iii De anima. Et quia non est virtus 
in corpore nec actus alicuius corporis, 
ideo omnia intelligit et universaliter est 
omnium et naturalium et mathemati-
corum et divinorum. Est igitur natura 
intellectualis talis ut dicta est.
sunt vel ab ipso, ad nullum esse 
alicuius distinguitur, omnino est  
separatum a materia. Talis autem 
est omnis intellectus.  
Si  
enim formis distingueretur et 
determinaretur ad esse, oport-
eret, quod ipse esset omnia, quae 
intelligeret; quod falsum est. Est 
autem materiae proprium, quod 
omni et soli convenit, formis, 
quas habet, ad esse determinari. 
Patet igitur omnem intellectum 
esse a materia absolutum […]  
si enim alicui aliquid haberet 
commune, iam esset intellectivus 
eorum, quae essent de natura illo-
rum, sicut oculus non videt, nisi 
quae communicant cum natura 
perspicui,  
et  
oporteret, quod esset virtus har-
monica et organica, tum etiam  
quia non est virtus in corpore 
nec alicuius corporis actus, ut 
superius est ostensum.
Trotz ihres begrenzten Umfangs fällt diese Anleihe bei Albert insofern ins 
Gewicht, als sie exemplarisch dokumentiert, dass und wie Berthold die intel-
lektuelle Tradition Alberts des Großen fortführt, indem er aus seinem Werk 
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schöpft, die Inhalte seiner stillschweigend übernommenen Ausführungen 
sich zu eigen macht und diese als seine eigene Auffassung bis auf geringfü-
gige Abweichungen mit Alberts Worten wiedergibt. Das Beispiel gewährt 
einerseits einen tiefen Einblick in seine Arbeitsweise und den Umgang mit 
seinen Quellen, andererseits gibt es Auskunft über seine Kenntnisse und 
Wertschätzung der Werke und der philosophischen Ansichten Alberts, mit 
denen er sich in solchen Fällen wie diesem offensichtlich uneingeschränkt 
identifiziert. Doktrinelle Überschneidungen im großen Stil sind überdies auch 
durch die gemeinsamen Quellen erklärbar, insbesondere durch die Schriften 
des Aristoteles De anima und Metaphysica, aber auch durch die Vertrautheit 
und Benutzung der Kommentare Alberts zum corpus Aristotelicum einschließ-
lich des Liber de causis sowie zu den Schriften des Pseudo-Dionysius.
iv. Die dritte und letzte Typologie der Intellekte, die aus dem intellekttheo-
retischen Teil der Expositio Bertholds gewonnen wird, bildet das heuristi-
sche Gerüst der Erschließung und Entfaltung der Annahme (suppositum) der 
174. Proposition der Elementatio theologica des Proclus. Das Theorem „Jeder 
Intellekt setzt im Erkennen ein, was nach ihm ist, und sein Tun ist sein Erkennen 
und seine Erkenntnis ist sein Tun“96 interpretiert Berthold dahingehend, dass 
er es zur Vorlage für eine sechsfache Unterscheidung der Intellekte macht, die 
im Vergleich mit seinen früheren Typologien am weitesten ausdifferenziert 
ist. Da sie weder die Eigenschaften des Intellekts wie seine Immaterialität und 
Getrenntheit noch seine Hierarchisierung und Instanziierung noch ein ande-
res Kriterium explizit zum Ausgangspunkt nimmt oder diese als Erweisziel 
verfolgt, erscheint sie zunächst als eine Aneinanderreihung der unterschied-
lich spezifizierten Intellekte, die nur geringe oder gar keine Gemeinsamkeiten 
mit den früheren Typologien aufweist. Genetisch und systematisch erscheint 
sie als dissoziiert und inkonsistent, als eine Zusammenstellung, die von sich 
aus kein klares und einendes Ordnungsprinzip zu erkennen erlaubt. Es steht 
dennoch außer Frage, dass diese Reihe, die folgende sechs Unterscheidungen 
des Intellekts umfasst, nicht willkürlich zustande kommt und dass sie durch 
die Integration in das System Bertholds ihren eigentlichen Sinn und ihre 
Funktion erhält, in dem sie zu einem vorzugsweise epistemologisch orientier-
ten und von diesem Ansatz her aristotelisch inspirierten Interpretament des 
Proklischen Theorems wird:97
96  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 174, S.136, L.2–3: Omnis intellectus intelligendo instituit, 
quae post ipsum, et factio intelligere et intelligentia facere; S.145, L.296–302 (Commentum 
Procli). Cf. Tautz, Erst-Eines, Intellekte, Intellektualität, S.35–40.
97  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 174A, S.136, L.10–12: De primo sciendum, quod, ut suf-
ficiat ad propositum, intellectus est multiplex: speculativus sive contemplativus, practicus 
sive operativus, adeptus, possibilis, formalis et universaliter agens.
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1.  intellectus speculativus sive contemplativus 
2.  intellectus practicus sive operativus
3.  intellectus adeptus
4.  intellectus possibilis
5.  intellectus formalis
6.  intellectus universaliter agens
Durch diese Typologie und ihre Erklärung erschließt Berthold, wie erwähnt, 
die Aussageintention des Proklischen Theorems. Er führt sie auf den 
Kausalitätsmodus des Wissens, der jedem der angeführten Intellekte eigen-
tümlich ist, und das Wissen oder die Wissenschaft, die durch den Intellekt 
generiert wird, zurück. Der Ausgangspunkt, das leitende Prinzip und das Ziel 
der Unterscheidung, der Anordnung und der Analyse der Intellekte ist also 
die Wissenschaft, deren Charakter die Intellekte bestimmen, nämlich ob sie 
eine allgemeine (universalis) oder partikuläre (particularis), in der Möglichkeit 
(in potentia) oder in Wirklichkeit (in actu) bzw. in Anwendung (in agere) ist. 
Dieser Typologie der Intellekte kann ein axiologischer Wesenszug insofern 
abgewonnen werden, als sie einem epistemologischen Finalitätsprinzip 
untergeordnet ist, das auf die Vollendung der Theorie selbst, nicht aber auf 
den Vollendungszustand der jeweiligen Stufe des Intellekts abzielt.98 Mit die-
sem Ansatz schließt Berthold an die aristotelische Epistemologie der Ersten 
Analytiken an, wobei offen bleibt, ob der Zugriff auf die Analytiken direkt oder 
vermittelt duch Albert den Großen erfolgt.99 Er setzt beim theoretischen 
bzw. betrachtenden Intellekt an, der über die Sinneswahrnehmung die Dinge 
betrachtend das Wissen von ihnen erzeugt. Die Charakterisierung der ein-
zelnen, auf den theoretischen Intellekt folgenden Intellekte beschränkt er 
auf wenige Bemerkungen und Verweise auf seine im Kommentar zu der 
Proposition 171 zurückliegenden Erörterungen, die den möglichen Intellekt 
(intellectus possibilis) und den formalen Intellekt (intellectus formalis) betref-
fen. Bezüglich der Letzteren sei angemerkt, dass sie weitgehend die Auffassung 
98  Bezüglich der Vollendungsstufen des Intellekts cf. Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 111, 
S.19–21.
99  Aristoteles, Analytica priora, lib. 2, c. 21 (67b3–5); transl. Boeth.: Aristoteles Latinus, iii.1–
4, hg.v. L. Minio-Paluello (Brugge / Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1962), S.131, L.18–19: Nam 
scire dicitur tripliciter, aut in universali, aut ut propria aut ut agere. Cf. Albertus Magnus, 
Analytica priora, lib. 2, tr. 6, c. 9, hg.v. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1890), S.781b. H. Anzulewicz, 
„Alberts Konzept der Bildung durch Wissenschaft“, in L. Honnefelder (Hg.), Albertus 
Magnus und der Ursprung der Universitätsidee (Berlin: Berlin University Press, 2011), 
S.395–396, 543–544.
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des Dietrich von Freiberg, des Aristoteles und des Averroes widerspiegeln, 
eine Tradition, die man gelegentlich als den deutschen Sonderweg bezeich-
net, der durch Albert den Großen maßgeblich vorbereitet wurde. Bertholds 
Bestimmungen des praktischen, des erworbenen und des allgemein tätigen 
Intellekts lassen sich kurz wie folgt zusammenfassen: Der praktische Intellekt 
empfängt keine Erkenntnisinhalte von den Dingen, sondern er prägt viel-
mehr, sich des Körpers bedienend, den Dingen seine Form ein; er wirkt durch 
sich selbst wie etwa die formende Kraft im Samen, oder akzidentell wie ein 
Handwerker, der gemäß einer angeeigneten Form ein Werk gestaltet, welches 
das Ziel des praktischen Intellekts sei. Der erworbene Intellekt (intellectus 
adeptus) ist indessen Intellekt im Akt, der diesen Zustand durch den tätigen 
Intellekt (intellectus agens) als Akt des eigenen, möglichen Intellekts erlangt 
hat. Der allgemein wirkende Intellekt (intellectus universaliter agens) ist, wie 
Aristoteles in De anima iii 5 ihn beschreibt, das Prinzip, ‘wodurch alles Tun 
ist und kein Aufnehmen’. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese hat minutiös aufgezeigt, 
dass Bertholds Darstellung des allgemein wirkenden Intellekts die von Ulrich 
von Straßburg vermittelte Auffassung Alberts des Großen widerspiegelt, wie 
diese in dessen Werk De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, lib. i 
tr. 2 c. 1 vorliegt.100
Wird Bertholds Typologie der Intellekte und ihre Erklärung mit den 
Einteilungen der Intellekte verglichen, die Albert in seinen Schriften vom 
Frühwerk De homine bis zu De intellectu et intelligibili entwickelte, sind die 
meisten Übereinstimmungen mit seinen Einteilungen in der letztgenannten 
Schrift feststellbar. Sie decken sich aber weder in der Anordnung der einzelnen 
Glieder noch in deren Zahl. Im Unterschied zu Berthold begreift und ordnet 
Albert die Intellekte nicht von ihren als theoretisch bzw. praktisch aufgefassten 
Ziel her, d.h. dem Wissen bzw. der Wissenschaft, sondern vom Subjekt her als 
dessen konstitutives Formprinzip und Vermögen, dessen Vollendungsstufen 
die einzelnen Intellekte verkörpern.101 Die unterschiedlichen Ansätze der 
beiden Denker schließen dennoch nicht aus, dass Berthold sich von Alberts 
Auffassung inspirieren ließ und ähnlich wie Albert drei Vollendungsstufen des 
Intellekts annahm, wie dem kritischen Quellenapparat zum Kommentar der 
Proposition 174 und der Auslegung der Proposition 111 zu entnehmen ist, in der 
Ausgestaltung der Intellektlehre indes, deren Kernstück die Klassifikation der 
100 Pagnoni-Sturlese, „À propos du néoplatonisme d’Albert le Grand“, S.638–644.
101 Cf. H. Anzulewicz, „Entwicklung und Stellung der Intellekttheorie im System des Albertus 
Magnus“, in Archives d’Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du Moyen Âge 70(2003), S.165–218, 
esp. S.193–198.
169Berthold von Moosburgs Theorie des Intellekts
Intellekte und ihre Kriterien bilden, einen durch Dietrich von Freiberg vorbe-
reiteten, letztlich aber doch eigenen Weg gewählt hat.102
Bestimmen die Proklische Vorlage den inhaltlichen Fluss und Dietrich von 
Freibergs Doktrin Bertholds Exegese, gehört Albert mit seinen Schriften, von 
denen De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa und die Kommen-
tarwerke Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, Metaphysica und Physica her-
vorzuheben sind, zu den wichtigen Quellen der Intellekttheorie Bertholds. 
Es lag offenkundig nicht nur an punktuellen Übereinstimmungen in der 
Intellekttheorie dieser beiden Denker, sondern an deren weit größeren doktri-
nalen Nähe, die sich auf dem Gebiet der theologischen Philosophie fruchtbar 
erwies. Diese systemische Koinzidenz zeigt sich auch am Schluss des intellekt-
theoretischen Teils der Expositio Bertholds Exegese der 181. Proposition „Jeder 
mit-geteilte Intellekt ist entweder göttlich als einer, der mit den Göttern äußer-
lich verbunden ist, oder allein intellektual“.103 Zur Erklärung der partizpato-
risch aufgefassten Verbindung der göttlichen Intellekte mit den Göttern greift 
Berthold auf Alberts Interpretation der Emanationslehre aus dem ersten Buch 
der Schrift De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa zurück. Sie bot 
sich insofern als hilfreich zur Erschließung der Sinngehalte des Proklischen 
Theorems an, als sie die Teilhabe emanatistisch interpretiert.104 Ein derart lei-
stungsfähiges, die Proclus-Exegese dieses Theorems wie auch der Elementato 
theologica insgesamt unterstützendes Rüstzeug bot seitens der lateinischen 
Tradition in dieser Zeit außer Dietrich und Albert kaum ein anderer bedeuten-
der Denker, auch nicht Thomas von Aquin.
4 Schlussbemerkungen
Berthold von Moosburg vertritt mit seinem Kommentar zur Elementatio 
theologica des Proclus zwar die neuplatonische Tradition in ihrer genuinen 
Verankerung, aber nicht in ihrer absolut reinen Form, wie sich an seiner 
Intellektlehre u. a. an der drittletzten Typologie der Intellekte und durch-
gängig an seinen Quellen ablesen lässt. Seine Intellektlehre, ihre neuplato-
nischen, durch die Theoreme des Proclus fixierten und um aristotelische 
102 Cf. Quellen- und Similia-Nachweise in Bertholds Expositio, 174, S.136–144. Tautz, Erst-Eines, 
Intellekte, Intellektualität, S.97; oben Anm. 98.
103 Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 181, S.221, L.2–4: Omnis participatus intellectus aut 
divinus est tamquam diis extra iunctus aut intellectualis solum. Cf. E. Ludueña, „El poli-
teísmo de Proclo en la Expositio de Bertoldo de Moosburg“, in S. Filippi, M. Coria (Hgg.), 
La Identidad propia del Pensamiento Patrístico y Medieval: ¿Unidad y Pluralidad? (Rosario: 
Paideia Publicaciones, 2014), S.393–403.
104 Cf. De Libera, La Mystique rhénane, S.352ff.
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Grundannahmen ergänzten Positionen sowie sein Verständnis der Metaphysik 
des Einen und des Guten weisen ihn als einen konsequenten Vertreter der 
„theologischen Philosophie“ aus. Sein onto-theologisch fundiertes, in der 
(neu-)platonischen und biblisch-christlichen Tradition verankertes Denken 
lässt sich weder mit einem „absoluten philosophischen Immanentismus“ 
ausweisen, noch durch angebliche innere Zerrissenheit in seiner Konsistenz 
in Frage stellen.105 Es wäre aber auch ein reduktionistischer Fehlschluss, 
seine Expositio super Elementationem des Proclus nur als einen Versuch der 
Neukonstituierung des Verhältnisses von Platonismus und Aristotelismus 
unter den veränderten Einsichten bezüglich der pseudo-aristotelischen 
Autorschaft des Liber de causis und des vermeintlich endgültigen Scheiterns der 
Harmonisierung der heterogenen Traditionen auf dem Gebiet der Metaphysik 
resp. des paganen (Neu-)Platonismus und des Christentum zu sehen.106 Die 
Bertholds Denken und Werk kennzeichnende Permeabilität von Philosophie 
und Theologie, von (Neu-)Platonismus und Aristotelismus bricht aus dem 
systemisch geschlossenen und historisch gefestigten Denkraster, will man das 
Werk als dessen Projektionsfläche betrachten und beurteilen, statt dem Autor 
selbst und seiner «theologischen Philosophie» das Wort reden lassen. Albert 
der Große dürfte für Berthold der Prototyp seines an die littera Procli gebun-
denen Philosophierens sein. Obwohl ihm, dem ersten Proclus-Kommentator 
im lateinischen Westen kaum gelungen ist, diese neuplatonische Tradition in 
der Lateinischen Welt nachhaltig zu festigen, ist er mit seinem Vorhaben, die 
Kontinuität der Platonischen Tradition im Mittelalter und über das Mittelalter 
hinaus zu sichern, nicht gescheitert, denn sein Text spricht auch zu uns heute 
und ruft ein „Gezänk seiner Ausleger“107 hervor.
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chapter 5
The Gods and Causality. On Aquinas’ Presence in 
Berthold’s Expositio
Ezequiel Ludueña
Universidad de Buenos Aires
1 Introduction
Almost ten years ago, I decided to dedicate my attention to Berthold’s mas-
sive commentary on Proclus’ Elementatio theologica, a text considered to be a 
philosophical alternative to Thomism, a summa ad mentem Platonicorum, as 
Imbach wrote in the 1970s.1 But, as I began my readings, I must confess I felt a 
little disappointed, for at that time I had the rather dismal impression that the 
myriad of quotations composing the Expositio would diminish its philosophi-
cal value. I was particularly interested in Berthold’s interpretation of Proclus’ 
henads, how he managed to present that concept to a Christian audience. And 
one day I noted a specific paragraph: it was compelling, coherent, brief, and 
best of all, it was not indicated by the editors as a quotation. Apparently, it 
was something Berthold himself had written. It became my favorite passage in 
the Expositio, at least until a few months later, when, while reading Aquinas’ 
commentary on the Liber de causis, I came across the same paragraph: it was 
another fragment copied by Berthold, yet it had not been identified. This study 
is, somehow, a consequence of that rather painful incident.
Of course, Aquinas’s citations in the Expositio are not many. And yet, 
I would argue that in regard to certain aspects some of them are quite impor-
tant to Berthold. Here is a preliminary, surely imperfect, table of citations from 
Aquinas in Berthold’s Expositio:
1 R. Imbach, “Le (néo-)platonisme medieval. Proclus latin et l’école dominicaine allemande”, in 
Revue de théologie et philosophie 110(1978), p. 427–448, at p. 438. I am grateful to E. Butler and 
E. King for kindly helping me with my English writing. Also, I thank D. Calma and E. King for 
their extremely useful comments on the paper.
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Thomas Aquinas Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam Proclia
Super Librum de causis Expositio,  
lect. 26 / p. 128, l. 1–12
43D / p. 70, l. 165–173 [citation, 
modified]*
Super Librum de causis Expositio,  
lect. 2 / p. 12, l. 1–6
52A / p. 117, l. 21–31 [citation, 
modified]
Super Librum de causis Expositio,  
lect. 19 / p. 105, l. 16–19
111C / p. 21, l. 64–67 
[reformulation]*
Super Librum de causis Expositio,  
lect. 19 / p. 106, l. 21–24
111C / p. 21, l. 67–69 [citation, 
modified]
Super Librum de causis Expositio,  
lect. 19 / p. 107, l. 2–3
111C / p. 21, l. 69–71 [reformulation]
Super Librum de causis Expositio,  
lect. 19 / p. 107, l. 3–11
111C / p. 21, l. 71–77 [citation, 
modified]
Contra errores Graecorum, c. 23 / 
p. 84a, l. 11–13
137E / p. 21, l. 216–217 [citation]
Contra errores Graecorum, c. 23 / 
p. 84a, l. 16–23
137E / p. 22, l. 222–226 [citation, 
modified]
Super Librum de causis Expositio,  
lect. 24 / p. 122, l. 19–p. 123, l. 4
142B / p. 55, l. 105–p. 56, l. 115  
[citation, modified]
Super Librum de causis Expositio,  
lect. 24 / p. 122, l. 13–15
149A / p. 112, l. 41–43 
[reformulation]
Super Librum de causis Expositio,  
lect. 24 / p. 122, l. 24–25
149A / p. 112, l. 45–46 
[reformulation]*
In De divinis nominibus iv,  
lect. 18, §524 / p. 188
156A / p. 170, l. 33–38 [citation, 
modified]
a All citations of Berthold refer to the critical edition: Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, 
L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984); id., Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 
Procli. Propositiones 14–34, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1986); id., Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35–65, 
ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001); id., Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 
Procli. Propositiones 66–107, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); id., Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 
2011); id., Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159, ed. 
F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); id., Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 160–183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); id., Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184–211, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 




Thomas Aquinas Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam Procli
Super librum De causis Expositio, lect. 
18 / p. 102, l. 19–27
155A / p. 164, l. 33–39 [citation, 
modified]
Quaestiones disputatae de veritate, 
q. 1, a. 1 / ed. H.-F. Dondaine: p. 6, 
l. 186–187b
179A / p. 204, l. 150–151 
[reformulation?]
Quaestiones disputatae de potentia Dei, 
q. 3, a. 9 / ed. P.M. Pession: p. 65a–b
204A / p. 203, l. 100–116 [citation, 
modified]
b The text in the Expositio reads: Verum etiam circa intellectum idem patet, cum veritas sit 
adaequatio rei ad intellectum secundum Isaac. In De veritate, a. 1, q. 1 (the source listed in the 
apparatus of the Expositio), Aquinas writes: sic dicit Isaac quod veritas est adaequatio rei et 
intellectus. Admittedly, we are dealing with a Thomistic commonplace (the definition of truth 
with the misattribution to Isaac Israeli), and the context of the passage in 179A offers no clues 
about Berthold’s precise source. However, I think the following sentence of the anonymous 
Summa totius logicae, which was circulated with a misattribution to Aquinas, is a likely source 
since the phrasing is much closer to Berthold’s: Quantum ad primum sciendum, quod ut com-
muniter dicitur, veritas est adaequatio rei ad intellectum, secundum Isaac, verum dicitur adae-
quatum, falsum vero non adaequatum (tr. 6, c. 4, accessed online at corpusthomisticum.org).
If I am correct, between citations and reformulations we can count, for the 
moment, at least 15 instances of Aquinas’ presence in the Expositio. In this 
chapter, I will focus my attention on two moments in the Expositio when 
Berthold has recourse to Aquinas’ texts. Both cases relate to topics that, in my 
view, are central to Berthold’s commentary project: the nature of Proclus’ gods 
or unitates (what Berthold calls the unum secundum essentiam), and the rela-
tion between the causality of the unitates and the causality of the absolute One 
(unum secundum causam).
First of all, I offer a very brief presentation of Berthold’s metaphysical 
scheme. Then, I will present Berthold’s main concern regarding the Proclean 
gods, namely, to show that they are per se subsistentes not because they are 
uncreated, but on account of their simplicity. Here I consider a text by Aquinas 
that Berthold uses to make this point, and how he modifies it. Afterwards, I 
show how Berthold understands the way that the One’s causality relates to 
the causality of the unitates or primordial causes in light of a text by Aquinas 
that Berthold cites precisely to explain how those modes of causation work 
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together. Also, in this same section, I consider the possibility that Berthold 
could have used, while not explicitly citing, another text by Aquinas on instru-
mental causality. Finally, I will share some concluding remarks.
2 The Three Ones
In the beginning of his Expositio, Berthold presents his interpretation of 
Proclus’ metaphysical universe. The supreme Principle of reality is the One. 
The One, says Berthold, is an unum quod non est in multis sive multitudine. In 
a strict sense, is not unity but excess of unity. It is not an unum among oth-
ers, but an unum ante omne unum et multitudinem,2 an unum non plurificabile. 
And it is omnium productivum:3 it creates everything. It is not possible to know 
what it is in itself. But its product is unity. And for this reason, Berthold calls 
it the unum secundum causam. The One pre-contains every unity4 and every 
unity presupposes the One, but the One does not have its unity from another, 
but from itself. It is, then, prime unum. It is one in a way that is most simple, 
absolute, and limitless.5 According to Berthold, the One, and only the One, 
creates. Then there is a second one – an unum quod est in multitudine sicut ab 
ea participatum.6 This unum is simplex, but not simpliciter simplex (as is the 
2 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1D, p. 77, l. 232–233.
3 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 2E, p. 88, ll. 244, 241.
4 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 65D, p. 203, l. 82–84: […] et sic praehabet omnia, in quibus 
ipsa eadem intentio contracta est vel contrahibilis, nobiliori, quia absolutiori modo, quam sint 
in se ipsis, et sic etiam dicitur prime […].
5 In this sense, the One is not one. It transcends unity because is limitless unity. See Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio, 160K, p. 8, l. 168–181: De primo sciendum, quod […] prime adverbium, 
quod secundum grammaticos est vi verbi adiectivum, modificat terminum, cui addicitur ad 
standum pro simplicissimo, absolutissimo et sic illimitatissimo intentionis seu proprietatis per 
terminum denotatae, verbi gratia prime intellectus stat pro simplicissimo, absolutissimo et illim-
itatissimo intellectu, qui non est aliud quam quod dicitur, cum sit monarcha totius intellectualis 
seyrae, et per consequens est unus solus […] et extra omnem effectum […]. Est autem duplex 
prime, vel simpliciter vel in determinata entium manerie. Primum est unum tantum, scilicet 
prime unum, quod solum et simpliciter est monarcha non unius maneriei entium, sed simplic-
iter totius universi […]. Prime autem secundo modo acceptum adhuc est duplex, quia vel sim-
pliciter principaliforme respectu alicuius determinatae maneriei entium totaliter vel respectu 
alicuius generis vel speciei entium intra determinatam maneriem conclusorum. Cf. Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 136B, p. 5, l. 73–74: […] quod est per se, est limitatum et contractum in ipsa 
intentione, prime autem est illimitatum et incontractum et sic dignius limitato et contracto. Cf. 
K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 
Procli, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. xi–xxxviii, at p. xvii.
6 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1D, p. 77, l. 229–230.
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One);7 it is a quoddam unum.8 Considered in itself, its essence is unity, and so 
Berthold calls it unum secundum essentiam. No composition, no division, no 
multiplicity can be found in it.9 Like the One, it is a cause, but it does not cre-
ate: it determines. And, for this reason, because he understands it as a cause 
of determination, Berthold discerns in it six different principles. For he thinks 
that every determination can be ultimately reduced to six primordial determi-
nations: possibility, being, life, intellect, soul, and corporality. And he identifies 
these six causes with Proclus’ henads. Following William of Moerbeke’s trans-
lation of the Elementatio theologica, Berthold calls them unitates or bonitates, 
and also “primordial causes”.
In regard to their essence, the unitates are pure unity, in respect to multiplic-
ity, they are principles of determination.10 From this point of view, they consti-
tute a plurality of causes, the very first and supreme multiplicity immediata ad 
ipsum prime unum.11 These the six unitates that originate all determination are:






7  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 59B, p. 165, l. 65–74: Simplex primi […] modi est simplic-
iter et absolute simplex, cuius simplicitas est omnimoda, in qua nulla est plica diversitatis 
secundum esse aliquo modo. Et hoc non convenit nisi prime bono, quod nulla plica habitudi-
nis ad aliquid intra vel extra dependet secundum esse diversum a se ipso. Et hoc est simplex 
omnino et omnimode in fine simplicitatis, cuius simplicitas nulli causato convenire potest. 
Est et alia simplicitas, quae non habet plicam habitudinis secundum esse ad compositio-
nes intra, cum non constet ex diversis intentionibus, licet habeat dependentiam ad causam 
extra, a qua accipit id, quod est. Et hoc non est omnino simplex, sed contractum ad deter-
minatum modum et ex hoc conclusum intra ordinem partialem, scilicet unialem, et intra 
totalem ordinem universi.
8  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 2E, p. 88, l. 245–247: Unum autem secundum essen-
tiam est quoddam unum eo, quod deficit a superplenitudine simpliciter unius: tum quia 
est contractum, illud vero illimitatum, tum quia licet sit simplex, tamen non est simpliciter 
simplex […].
9  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1D, p. 78, l. 236–237.
10  On determination, cf. E. King, Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementa-
tionem theologicam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg, PhD diss. (University of Cambridge, 
2016), part ii, ch. 3.
11  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 5B, p. 116, l. 134–135.
unum secundum essentiam
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The use of the adverb prime indicates that the unitates are, with regard to 
multiplicity, what the prime unum is with regard to everything else (includ-
ing the unitates). They transcend the properties or intentions they confer, for 
they are those determinations in a most simple, absolute, and limitless way.12 
They mediate between the One and the multiplicity of differently determined 
things. Their causal action presupposes that of the One, i.e., it presupposes 
creation.
Finally, each determined thing (everything besides the One and the uni-
tates) is one secundum participationem. This third one is found in omni unito 
et multitudine and is a one ab alio sive per aliud.13 That “other” (aliud) is the 
unum secundum essentiam, which is an unum tantum; whereas this third one 
is one – because everything created is one – but is not unum tantum. It is one 
and possible; or one, possible, and existing; or one, possible, existent, and alive, 
etc. In other words, it is the result of composition.
Thus, Berthold’s metaphysical scheme is as follows: an absolutely simple 
unum, a simple (but not absolutely simple) unum, and an unum by participa-
tion (and this means composition).
3 The unitates as per se subsistentes
While explaining the Proclean doctrine of self-constituted principles, Berthold 
says that there are two ways in which an intellectual nature can be called 
per se subsistens or antipostaton. An intellectual nature converts upon itself 
intentionaliter or essentialiter.14 The first case is that of the possible intellect.15 
The second is the case of many substances (like the animae totales, the agent 
intellect, the intellectual hypostases), but the main examples of them are the 
prime unum and the unitates. They convert upon themselves se totis totaliter 
because they subsist in just one intention, the intentio unius. They represent 
the supreme instances of the antipostata – according to Berthold, the absolute 
One is also antipostaton.16
Now a question that occurs here and there in the Expositio is what it means 
to be per se subsistens in the case of the unitates. It is obvious that the abso-
lute One is per se subsistens because its existence is not the effect of some 
12  See note 7, above.
13  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1D, p. 77, l. 229–230 and 234.
14  See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 43A, p. 66, l. 14–20; 43C, p. 69, l. 132–p. 70, l. 141.
15  On this point, see Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 43B, p. 67, l. 57–p. 69, l. 133.
16  Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 43C, p. 70, l. 142–153.
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external, superior cause. But are the unitates per se subsistentes for the same 
reason? Berthold’s answer is that they, like everything else besides the absolute 
One, participate in the One, but their mode of participation is peculiar. He 
addresses the question while commenting on the second proposition of the 
Elementatio. He explains that the mode in which the unitates participate in the 
One is unique: each unitas is one with what it essentially participates, both in 
re and in intentione.17 To illustrate this, he has recourse to the Clavis physicae, 
where it is said that the primordial causes are per se because they participate in 
the causa omnium by themselves, not through something else, whereas every-
thing else participates in the causa omnium through them:
Summae ac verae naturae est prima consideratio, qua intelligitur summa 
ac vera bonitas, quae nullius particeps per se bonitas est, cuius prima 
donatione et participatione est per se ipsam bonitas, cuius item partici-
patione bona sunt, quaecumque bona sunt. Quae ideo per se ipsam boni-
tas dicitur, quia per se ipsam summum bonum participat, cetera autem 
bona non per se ipsa summum et substantiale bonum participant, sed 
per eam, quae est per se ipsam summi boni participatio. Similiter dicen-
dum de reliquis primordialibus causis, quod sint principales eo, quod 
per se ipsas sunt participantes unius omnium causae, quae Deus est, alia 
autem omnia illarum participatione sunt, quod sunt.18
The primordial causes, which Berthold identifies with Proclus’ unitates, occupy 
the highest metaphysical position after the first principle. Their relation to it is 
immediate, and so they participate in it immediately, by themselves. And yet, 
17  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 2B, p. 84, l. 97–9.
18  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 2B, p. 82, l. 16–25. Cf. Honorius Augustodunensis, Clavis 
physicae, ed. P. Lucentini (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), c. 118, p. 88, l. 4–14: 
Summe ac vere nature prima consideratio est qua intelligitur summa ac vera bonitas, que 
nullius particeps per se ipsam bonitas est, cuius prima donatione et participatione est per 
se ipsam bonitas, cuius item participatione bona sunt quecumque bona sunt. Que ideo per 
se ipsam bonitas dicitur quia per se ipsam summum bonum participat, cetera autem bona 
non per se ipsa summum substantiale bonum participant, sed per eam que est per se ipsam 
summi boni participatio. Similiter dicendum de reliquis primordialibus causis quod sint 
principales eo quod per se ipsas sunt participantes unius omnium cause que Deus est, alia 
autem omnia illarum participatione sunt quod sunt. For an analysis of this passage, see 
S. Gersh, “Remarks on the Method and Content of the Clavis physicae”, in W. Beierwaltes 
(ed.), Eriugena redivivus (Heidelberg: Winter, 1987), p. 162–173, at p. 167. Cf. also S. Gersh, 
“Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy”, in 
J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277 (Berlin / New York: 
De Gruyter, 2001), p. 493–503, at p. 497.
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Berthold understands that each unitas, each primordial cause, is one secun-
dum essentiam, not secundum participationem. A few pages later he deals with 
this issue directly:
Nec obstat, quod supra dixi tale unum esse participans uno et modo 
dico ipsum esse unum per essentiam seu per se, quia alio respectu dici-
tur participare, alio vero per essentiam esse unum. Cum enim deficiat 
a superplenitudine et superexcessu simpliciter unius, ideo dicitur ipso 
quasi extrinseco participare […]. Sed quia unum, quod est sua propria 
essentia, non est per aliud unum formaliter, sed se ipso, ideo dicitur per 
essentiam esse unum, cum ratione suae simplicitatis non sit distinguere 
in ipso inter participans et participatum, sicut distinguitur in omni 
unito […].19
There is no contradiction in saying that each unitas is an unum secundum 
essentiam and that it participates in the One. Because the unum secundum 
essentiam is not the One, given that it cannot match its superplenitudo, it par-
ticipates in the One quasi extrinseco. However, when Berthold says that each 
unitas is an unum secundum essentiam he means that formaliter an unitas is 
not an unum per aliud other than itself. It is its essence; it is simple.
To formulate this point, Berthold quotes a text from Albert’s Summa theolo-
giae which makes a reference to the Boethian distinction between quo est and 
quod est. As we see in the next citation, according to Albert, only of God it is 
possible to say that there is no such distinction, for only God is simple. But for 
Berthold, the simplicity expressed by the refusal of any distinction between 
quo est and quod est also characterizes the primordial causes. As we saw, for 
him, the absolute One is supersimplex, while each unitas, i.e., each primordial 
cause, is simplex. This means that in the case of the unitates too there is no 
distinction between quo est and quod est. This explains the following modifica-
tion of Albert’s text introduced by Berthold:20
19  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 2E, p. 89, l. 253–261. See also Expositio, Prologus 4, p. 12, 
l. 243–p. 13, l. 250. I owe this reference to E. King.
20  A similar modification occurs in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 149A, p. 112, l. 41–43 
with Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 
2002), lect. 24, p. 122, l. 13–15.
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Albert the Great, Summa theologiae
Et hoc etiam dicit Boethius in libro 
De Trinitate, quod ‘vere unum est, in 
quo nullus est numerus, nullum in 
eo aliud praeter id quod est’. In omni 
autem quod est citra primum, aliud 
est id ‘quod est’, et aliud ‘quo est’, 
et propter hoc non vere simplex 
est […].21
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio
[…] nullum secundorum est vere sim-
plex. In omnibus enim, quae sunt 
citra primordiales causas, aliud est 
id, quod est, et aliud, quo est, et prop-
ter hoc nullum eorum vere simplex 
est […].22
The distinction between quod est and quo est does not apply to the unitates 
or primordial causes. On account of its simplicity, therefore, each unitas, is 
one secundum essentiam, not secundum participationem. Elsewhere, Berthold 
explains the nature of the unum secundum essentiam by making a distinction 
between two manners of speaking: efficienter and formaliter. Each unitas is one 
secundum or per essentiam, not efficienter but formaliter:
non dicitur per se unum, quod careat simpliciter efficiente, sed quia 
non est unum per participationem, sed per essentiam se ipso, scilicet 
formaliter.23
The unitates exist by themselves:
formaliter, non efficienter, quia causaliter effective nihil gignit se ipsum 
[…] licet formaliter et procedat a se ipso et convertatur ad se ipsum.24
Berthold clarifies the exact meaning of the adverb formaliter when he deals 
with Proclus’ propositions about the antipostata. There, he avails himself of 
the concept of forma. To illuminate the sense of Proposition 43, he explains 
what an antipostaton (i.e., something per se subsistens) is, and he observes:
21  Albert the Great, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I, quaestiones 
1–50A, ed. D. Siedler (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), pars i, tr. 4, q. 20, c. 2, p. 101, l. 61–65.
22  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 127B, p. 162, l. 49–51.
23  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 4F, p. 111, l. 362–364.
24  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 9B, p. 170, l. 108–112. Unum […] secundum essentiam […] 
licet nulli innitatur formaliter, innititur tamen prime uni causaliter, quod solum est unum 
universaliter. See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 2D, p. 87, l. 183–188.
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[…] cum haec praepositio ‘per’ denotet causam, illud dicitur per se stare 
sive subsistere, quod non habet causam essendi aliam nisi se ipsum. 
Est autem duplex causa essendi, scilicet forma, per quam aliquid actu 
est, et agens, quod facit actu esse. Si igitur dicatur stans per se ipsum, 
quod non dependet ab agente superiori, sic stare per se ipsum convenit 
solum prime bono et uni, ut inferior apparebit. Si autem dicatur per se 
stans illud, quod non formatur per aliquid aliud, sed ipsummet est sibi 
forma, sic esse stans per se ipsum convenit omnibus rebus immateriali-
bus. Substantia enim composita ex materia et forma non est stans per se 
ipsam nisi ratione partium.25
The preposition per designates two kinds of causa essendi: agent (quod facit 
actu esse) and formal (per quam aliquid actu est). The absolute One is per 
se subsistens because its being does not depend on a superior agent. But all 
immaterial things can also be called per se subsistentes because they are their 
form. This means that they are simple.
If I am correct, this is another, more developed, way of explaining how the 
unitates are an unum per essentiam even if they participate in the absolute One. 
The notion of forma plays a key role in this analysis: ipsummet est sibi forma. 
Now, the text mentioned above is in fact a quotation from Aquinas’ commen-
tary on the Liber de causis:
Aquinas, Super Librum de causis 
Expositio
[…] considerandum est quod cum 
praepositio ‘per’ denotet causam, illud 
dicitur «per se» stare sive subsistere 
quod non habet aliam causam essendi 
nisi seipsum. Est autem duplex causa 
essendi, scilicet: forma per quam aliq-
uid actu est et agens quod facit actu 
esse. Si ergo dicatur stans per seipsum 
quod non dependet a superiori agente, 
sic stare per seipsum convenit soli Deo 
qui est prima causa agens a qua omnes 
secundae causae dependent, ut ex 
superioribus patet.
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio
Sed cum haec praepositio ‘per’ deno-
tet causam, illud dicitur per se stare 
sive subsistere, quod non habet 
causam essendi aliam nisi se ipsum. 
Est autem duplex causa essendi, sci-
licet forma, per quam aliquid actu 
est, et agens, quod facit actu esse. 
Si igitur dicatur stans per se ipsum, 
quod non dependet ab agente supe-
riori, sic stare per se ipsum convenit 
solum prime bono et uni, ut inferior 
apparebit.
25  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 43D, p. 70, l. 165–173.
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Si autem dicatur «per se» stans illud 
quod non formatur per aliquid aliud, 
sed ipsummet est forma, sic esse stans 
per seipsum convenit omnibus sub-
stantiis immaterialibus. Substantia 
enim, composita ex materia et forma, 
non est ‘stans per seipsam’ nisi ratione 
partium […].26
Si autem dicatur per se stans illud, 
quod non formatur per aliquid aliud, 
sed ipsummet est sibi forma, sic esse 
stans per se ipsum convenit omnibus 
rebus immaterialibus. Substantia 
enim composita ex materia et forma 
non est stans per se ipsam nisi rati-
one partium.27
The formula per se, Aquinas says, can be predicated of all immaterial sub-
stances because their form is independent from matter.28 An immate-
rial substance does not need anything else ad sui formationem; it is its own 
form.29 Consequently, what is per se is a substantia stans per essentiam suam,30 
although this does not mean its being is uncaused – quasi non dependeat ex 
alia causa superiori.31
In his commentary on the De divinis nominibus, in order to explain 
Dionysius’ critique of the separate hypostasis of the pagans, Aquinas men-
tions the Platonici philosophi and their doctrine of separate forms,32 which 
they considered “dii existentium et creatores, quasi per se operantes ad rerum 
productionem”.33 He affirms that Dionysius did not think of, for example, “Life 
itself” as a certain deity that causes life (quamdam deitatem causativam vitae), 
as if it were something different from the life of the supreme God. Only God’s 
26  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 26, p. 128, l. 1–12.
27  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 43D, p. 70, l. 165–173.
28  On this topic, cf. Th. Scarpelli Cory, “Reditio completa, reditio incompleta. Aquinas and the 
Liber de causis, prop. 15, on Reflexivity and Incorporeality”, in A. Fidora, N. Polloni (eds), 
Appropriation, Interpretation and Criticism. Philosophical and Theological Exchanges 
between the Arabic, Hebrew and Latin Intellectual Traditions (Barcelona / Roma: Fédération 
Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2017), p. 185–229.
29  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 25, p. 126, l. 2–4.
30  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 25, p. 124, l. 28–p. 125, l. 2.
31  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 25, p. 126, l. 14.
32  Thomas Aquinas, In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio, ed. C. Pera 
(Torino / Roma: Marietti, 1950), c. 11, lect. 4, §931, p. 346: Ad cuius evidentiam sciendum est 
quod Platonici, ponentes ideas rerum separatas, omnia quae sic in abstracto dicuntur, posu-
erunt in abstracto subsistere causas secundum ordinem quemdam; ita scilicet quod primum 
rerum principium dicebant esse per se bonitatem et per se unitatem et hoc primum princi-
pium, quod est essentialiter bonum et unum, dicebant esse summum Deum. Cf. L. Sturlese, 
“Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 136–159, p. ix–xv, at p. ix–x.
33  Thomas Aquinas, In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio, c. 11, lect. 4, §933, 
p. 346.
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life is the cause of everything that is alive (causa omnium quae vivunt).34 There 
are no separated essences or hypostases that are “creative” principles of beings: 
“non dicimus esse aliquas essentias et hypostases separatas quae sint principia 
rerum et creatrices earum.”35 Now, in the Liber de causis, intelligences are said 
to be substances stantes per seipsas. Thus Aquinas, in his commentary on the 
Liber, through his double interpretation of the formula per se, tried to show 
that the doctrine of the Liber is not that of the Platonici.
When Berthold cites Aquinas’ text, however, he makes several changes to 
fit the explanation to his own terminology and his own metaphysical scheme. 
The formula per se subsistens indicates, first of all, something whose being does 
not depend on a superior agent. According to this meaning, only the prime 
bonum et unum can be said to be per se subsistens. But per se subsistens can also 
designate something whose constitution does not depend on something else 
because it itself is form for itself: ipsummet est sibi forma, and forma is that per 
quam aliquid actu est. When a thing’s simplicity lies in an identity of form and 
being, it can also be called per se subsistens. So not only the prime unum is per 
se subsistens: every immaterial thing (res) can be said to be per se subsistens.
Of all things that are per se subsistentes, Berthold affirms, the prime unum 
and the unitates (or bonitates) merit the name most of all:36
[…] sciendum, quod rerum […] separatarum quaedam stant in una 
intentione tantum. Et hoc dupliciter, sive simpliciter, ut prime unum, sive 
contracte, ut bonitates. Et istae cum prime uno proprie et principaliter 
dicuntur antipostaton sicut stantes se ipsis totis et totaliter sub absoluta 
formali independentia ad omnem aliam intentionem.37
Like the prime unum, the unitates return to or reflect on themselves se ipsis 
totis et totaliter, determining themselves sub absoluta formali independentia. 
Even if they depend on the prime unum, formally they subsist by themselves.38
34  Thomas Aquinas, In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio, c. 11, lect. 4, §932, 
p. 346.
35  Thomas Aquinas, In Librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio, c. 11, lect. 4, §933, 
p. 346.
36  Unlike Proclus, Berthold thinks that the prime unum is self-constituted. Its triadic 
structure is the expression of its reflexivity. Cf. E. Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en 
Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013), 
p. 150–154.
37  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 43E, p. 71, l. 177–181.
38  Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 9B, p. 170, l. 108–113.
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Therefore, Berthold applies the notion of per se subsistens as Aquinas 
understood it to a realm Aquinas rejects, that of Proclus’ gods.39 For, accord-
ing to Aquinas, the Platonici postulated an ordinem formarum separatarum. He 
indicates that the they called these forms “gods”, and that they posited them 
above the domain of separate intellects and below the supreme God.40 But 
Christians, says Aquinas, “non ponimus alias formas separatas supra intellec-
tuum ordinem, sed ipsum bonum separatum ad quod totum universum ordi-
natur sicut ad bonum extrinsecum”.41 In other words, he accepts the domain of 
separate intellects, which he identifies with the angels, but rejects the existence 
of a plurality of gods. As de Libera observed: “Thomas substitue au rapport 
formes-intellects la structure Dieu-anges”.42 This means that Aquinas accepts 
the Proclean notion of per se subsistens, but used it only to describe God or the 
angelic intellectual nature, whereas for Berthold it applies proprie et principali-
ter to God and to the unitates, i.e., to those Platonic gods Aquinas rejects.43
The idea expressed in Aquinas’ commentary plays an important role in the 
Expositio. As we have seen, Berthold has two ways to introduce the Proclean 
gods to his readers. The first is to identify them with the causae primordiales 
of Eriugena (quas Pater in Filio fecit, according to the Irish thinker). He takes 
this path already in the Prologus.44 The second is to establish their simplicity. 
He does this through Boethius and through Aquinas’ interpretation of the for-
mula per se subsistens. Because of their simplicity, one cannot distinguish in 
the gods between participant and participated, whereas one can in the case of 
what is unum secundum participationem.45 A principle “perfect by itself” pos-
sesses its unity and goodness eternally in virtue of its own nature, even if it has 
its nature by virtue of being produced by something prior to it.
39  Indeed, Aquinas rejects the existence of a realm of gods if they are understood as some-
thing else than an erroneous interpretation of Christian angels, i.e. as a sphere beyond 
being and intellect. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, De substantiis separatis, c. 1.
40  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 3, p. 18, l. 8–p. 20, l. 4.
41  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 10, p. 67, l. 27–29.
42  A. de Libera, “Albert le Grand et Thomas d’Aquin interprètes du Liber de causis”, in Revue 
des sciences philosophiques et théologiques 74(1990), p. 347–378, at p. 370.
43  Furthermore, Aquinas understands that these Platonic gods are secundum se intelligibiles. 
See Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 3, p. 18, l. 24. Even if Berthold 
speaks once about the intellectual nature of the unitates (cf. 43A and C), he does it in the 
broadest sense possible (generalissime), as when he predicates ens of the prime unum. Cf. 
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 14A, p. 3, l. 20–21, and E. Ludueña, “Eriúgena en el siglo 
XIV. Su presencia en la Expositio de Bertoldo de Moosburg”, in Scintilla 10(2013), p. 99–154, 
at p. 124–125.
44  Cf. Ludueña, “Eriúgena en el siglo XIV”.
45  Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 2E, p. 89, l. 253–262.
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Finally, we should note that Berthold could have quoted Albert the Great’s 
clarification of the formula per se. In his commentary on chapter 11 of De divi-
nis nominibus, Albert seeks to determine if there is some per se Life made by 
God. He indicates that per se can be understood in two ways: as opposed to per 
accidens or as opposed to per aliud. In the first case, it is the opposite of illud 
praedicatum quod ponitur in diffinitione. In the second, Albert makes a fur-
ther distinction: per aliud can mean either (a) that something proceeds from 
another as from a cause or (b) that something occurs through another thing.46 
Albert writes that, understood as the opposite to this last sense of per aliud, 
there is a per-se-vita.
Albert’s interpretation of the meaning of per se, we may note, coincides 
with that expressed in the Clavis physicae: the causae primordiales are per 
se because they participate in the causa omnium immediately, “not through 
another thing”. Berthold knew Albert’s text. He could have used it, but he had 
already stated the same idea by quoting the Clavis. It seems Aquinas offered 
him another point of view by bringing the concept of form into the discussion.
4 The prime unum, the unitates, and Their Modes of Causation
Another recurring issue concerning the gods is their mode of causation, 
namely: (1) the nature of their causal action and (2) how their causation relates 
to that of the absolute One.
Berthold reads the Elementatio through the Liber de causis. As I have said, 
the prime unum, the First Cause of the Liber, creates, while the unitates or gods 
cause per modum formae. They determine or inform the product of creation: 
the unum tantum. Now, Berthold adopts Albert the Great’s reading of the Liber, 
according to which, “si secundum ulterius fluat vel influat […] non fluit nisi 
virtute primi”.47 In other words, the creative act is exclusive to the One, and the 
gods do not create; furthermore, even their activity (to determine or to inform) 
is only possible because of the virtus granted to them by the One. The One, like 
the First Cause of the Liber, does everything the gods do in a more eminent 
way (eminentiori modo). Berthold affirms this by quoting a passage by Ulrich 
46  Albert the Great, Super Dionysium De divinis nominibus, ed. P. Simon (Münster i.W.: 
Aschendorff, 1972), c. 11, §26, p. 424, l. 15–28.
47  Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, lib. i, tr. 4, c. 2, p. 44, 
l. 37–48: Si quaeritur vero, cum dicitur ‘influere’, in qua sit continentia importata, per prae-
positionem, dicendum quod in possibiliitate rei, cui fit influxus. Quae possibilitas rei est ex 
seipsa. […] Ex quo patet, quod si secundum ulterius fluat vel influat, quod non fluit nisi vir-
tute primi.
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of Strassburg, which is itself a paraphrase from Albert’s De causis.48 Berthold 
modifies the text he quotes, as he prefers the verb derivare to fluere.
Albert the Great, De causis 
et processu universitatis
Si quaeritur vero, cum 
dicitur ‘influere’, in qua sit 
continentia importata, per 
praepositionem, dicendum 
quod in possibilitate rei, 
cui fit influxus. Quae pos-
sibilitas rei est ex seipsa. 
[…] Ex quo patet, quod si 
secundum ulterius fluat 
vel influat, quod non fluit 
nisi virtute primi.
Ulrich of Strassburg, De 
summo bono
[…] cum secundum 
ex se nihil habeat nisi 
receptionem, si ipsum 
fluit, hoc non facit nisi 
virtute primi.49
Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio
[…] cum secundum ex se 
nihil habeat nisi recep-
tionem, si ipsum est der-
ivans esse aliis, hoc non 
facit nisi virtute primi 
derivantis.50
Modified in this way, the text suits the terminology of the Elementatio, because 
William of Moerbeke used derivo to render the Greek χορηγέω – thus, proposi-
tion 18 reads: “omne derivans esse aliis ipsum prime est hoc, quod tradit recipi-
entibus derivationem”. Berthold links Ulrich’s (and, by extension, Albert’s) 
theory of fluxus with Proclus’ text, but also, simultaneously, to the Eriugenian 
doctrine of theophany. Even if their modes of causation differ, both the action 
of the prime unum and that of the unitates are some kind of derivatio.51 Because 
of this, and based on the way Berthold edits his materials, we can say that, 
within the Expositio, the Eriugenian doctrine of theophania is equivalent to the 
doctrine of the Liber’s first Proposition on the virtus of the first cause. Berthold 
himself suggests this equivalency, since to explain Proposition 18 he cites the 
following text from the Clavis physicae:
48  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 4. Tractatus 1–2,7, ed. S. Pieperhoff (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1987), lib. iv, tr. 1, c. 5, §8, p. 30, l. 88–90.
49  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. iv, tr. 1, c. 5, §8, p. 30, l. 88–90.
50  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18C, p. 51, l. 273–275.
51  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18F, p. 55, l. 411–416: […] omne derivans esse aliis est prime 
hoc, quod tradit. Cum enim sit fontale seu primordiale principium, et hoc sive simpliciter et 
absolute sive respectu determinatae maneriei entium, et sit causa sive superessentialis sive 
essentialis omnium sub universalitate intentionis suae contentorum, necessarium est ipsum 
absolutius et eminentius esse omnibus suis effectibus et esse fontaliter et originaliter hoc, 
quod tradit.
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‘Nihil ergo est participatio nisi ex superiori essentia secundae post eam 
essentiae derivatio et ab ea, quae primum habet esse, secundae, ut sit, 
distributio. Sicut ex fonte totum flumen principaliter manat et per eius 
alveum aqua, quae primum surgit in fonte, in quantamcumque longi-
tudinem protendatur, semper ac sine ulla intermissione diffunditur, sic 
divina bonitas et essentia et vita et sapientia et omnia, quae in fonte 
omnium sunt, primo in primordiales causas defluunt et eas esse faciunt, 
deinde per primordiales causas in earum effectus ineffabili modo per 
convenientes sibi universitatis ordines decurrunt per superiora semper 
ad inferiora profluentia iterumque per secretissimos naturae poros occul-
tissimo meatu ad fontem suum redeunt. Inde enim omne bonum, omnis 
essentia, omnis vita, omnis sensus, omnis ratio, omnis sapientia, omne 
genus, omnis species, omnis plenitudo, omnis ordo, omnis unitas, omnis 
aequalitas, omnis differentia, omne tempus, omnis locus et omne, quod 
est, et omne, quod non est, et omne, quod intelligitur, et omne, quod sen-
titur, et omne, quod superat sensum et intellectum’. Haec Theodorus.52
In a certain way, the prime unum has an immediate relation with every effect 
in every sense, precisely because all the subordinate causes act in sua virtute – 
or, in Eriugenian terms, because God is not only the beginning and end of all 
things but is also the medium, for he flows through everything. The prime unum 
can claim the authorship of the causal operation of every subordinate cause, 
just like the artificer is responsible for what the instrument does. In fact, in sev-
eral places, Berthold speaks of the unitates or causae primordiales as an instru-
ment. He affirms, for example, that:
52  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 18B, p. 47, 107–122, citing Honorius Augustodunensis, 
Clavis physicae, c. 126–127, p. 93, l. 7–p. 94, l. 7. The last part (not identified as such by 
the editor) is quoted once again in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 119B, p. 84, l. 45–57: 
Gaudium ergo etc., quia omne gaudium, quod est diffusio rei, in conceptione boni est. Si vero 
est a summo bono et potissimo est, potissimum autem est in ratione omnium causalium 
rationum omnis seyrae sive ordinis totorum et, sicut dictum est, ambit omne bonum. ‘Inde 
enim est omne bonum, omnis essentia, omnis vita’, omne intellectus, ‘omne genus, omnis 
species, omnis plenitudo, omnis ordo, omnis unitas, omnis aequalitas, omnis differentia’ ‘et 
omne, quod est, et omne, quod non est, et omne, quod intelligitur, et omne, quod sentitur, et 
omne, quod superat sensum et intellectum’. Sic ergo gaudium veritatis, non vanitatis, omnis 
essentiae est sua vita, quam habet a bono et uno. Et quia omnis vita stat in unione sicut et 
mors in separatione, necessarium est, quod omnis vita est ab unitate. Haec quidem enim est 
ab interiori indivisione. Quanto igitur aliquid est magis unum, magis vivit, ergo, quod est sua 
unitas, est summa vita. Cum itaque bonum prime sit simpliciter sine omni divisione, ipsum 
erit infinitas virtutum, qua nihil potest melius cogitari.
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omnis unitas constituit cum prime uno determinatam maneriem boni 
compositi cooperatrix et instrumentum ipsius prime unius simpliciter 
omnia producentis.53
Similarly, we read that:
omne inferius est quasi instrumentum superioris causae, quanto enim 
aliquid est altius, tanto intimius ingreditur in effectum, et per conse-
quens inferius non propria virtute, sed magis virtute principalis agentis 
pertingit ad effectum.54
This allows Berthold to say that the prime unum not only creates, but even 
determines its effects in and through the unitates or causae primordiales: “the 
prime deus determines his own causality in and through them, using them like 
an instrument of his own operation”.55 The absolute God brings order to every-
thing, even if per medias causas, as it is said in the following text:
Prime autem Deus […] existens causa simpliciter omnium omnia ordinat 
per se ipsum, licet per causas medias, in quibus et cum quibus opera-
tur per 57, exequatur. Et in ipsa executione quodammodo immediate se 
habet ad omnes effectus, inquantum omnes causae mediae sibi subordi-
natae agunt in sua virtute, ut quodammodo ipsum primum in omnibus 
agere videatur et omnia opera secundarum causarum ei possunt attribui 
eminentius per 56, sicut artifici attribuitur opus instrumenti. Item etiam 
habet se immediate ad omnes res, inquantum ipsum solum per se est 
causa boni sive secundum essentiam sive secundum participationem. 
Item, quia omnia ab ipso conservantur seu continentur in sua existentia.56
53  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 137F, p. 22, l. 243–245.
54  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 75A, p. 59, l. 16–18.
55  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 176C, p. 164, l. 211–212.
56  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 142B, p. 55, l. 83–94. See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
103F, p. 225, l. 103–p. 226, l. 108: […] ergo prime bonum est causa immediata non solum 
creationis et conservationis rerum, sed etiam cuiuslibet operis creaturae, et cum hoc etiam 
est causa mediata, quia illa una numero operatio causatur a natura creata operante virtute 
prime causae, qualiter prime bonum est eius causa mediata, sicut efficiens per instrumen-
tum, et nihilominus ipsa operatio causatur a prime bono per se operante, qualiter ipsum est 
causa immediata. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 103F, p. 226, l. 125–134: […] duplic-
iter dicitur aliquid operari per aliud sive mediante alio. Uno modo sicut mediante instru-
mento cooperante, et sic tam prime bonum quam etiam primordiales causae immediate 
operantur quaelibet suo modo, inquantum sua praesentia sunt in effectibus, ut iam dictum 
est; unde sic operans est principale, et medium est secundarium. Alio modo operator aliquid 
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Several times in his paraphrase of the De causis, Albert the Great employs 
the example of the artificer and the instrument through which he accom-
plishes his work. The forma in the mind of the artificer preserves its essential 
identity all through the process of production – flowing from the mind to the 
spiritus, from it to the organa membrorum, and then to the instrumenta, to flow 
finally into the materia exterioris. It flows through all these instances without 
losing its identity; only its mode of being changes.57 However, the point Albert 
is trying to make regards the identity maintained throughout the causal pro-
cess, not the problem of immediacy or mediation. At this stage of my research, 
it seems to me that, whenever Berthold speaks of the primordial causes as 
instruments, he rather has in mind a distinction made by Aquinas in his com-
mentary on the first proposition of the Liber. There Thomas says that a series 
of causes can be ordered (ordinari) in either of two ways: per se or per accidens.
Per se quidem quando intentio primae causae respicit usque ad ultimum 
effectum per omnes medias causas, sicut cum ars fabrilis movet manum, 
manus martellum qui ferrum percussura extendit, ad quod fertur inten-
tio artis. Per accidens autem quando intentio causae non procedit nisi ad 
proximum effectum; quod autem ab illo effectu efficiatur iterum aliud, 
est praeter intentionem primi efficientis, sicut cum aliquis accendit can-
delam, praeter intentionem eius est quod iterum accensa candela accen-
dat aliam et illa aliam; quod autem praeter intentionem est, dicimus 
esse per accidens. In causis igitur per se ordinatis haec propositio habet 
veritatem, in quibus causa prima movet omnes causas medias ad effec-
tum; in causis autem ordinatis per accidens est e converso, nam effectus 
qui per se producitur a causa proxima, per accidens producitur a causa 
prima, praeter intentionem eius existens. Quod autem est per se potius 
est eo quod est per accidens, et propter hoc signanter dicit: causa univer-
salis, quae est causa per se.58
per aliud, scilicet mediante virtute alterius, et sic in quolibet ordine causarum sola prima 
causa est causa immediata, quia propria virtute causat et non per alicuius alterius virtutem 
sibi communicatam per 99 et 100, et omnes sequentes causae sunt causae mediatae caus-
antes mediante virtute causae primae ab eis omnibus participata.
57  Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, lib. i, tr. 4, c. 6, p. 50, 
l. 2–11: Et forma, qua fluit primum, magis et magis determinatur et coarctatur, secundum 
quod fluit in secundo vel tertio vel deinceps. Sicut in exemplo diximus de arte, quae a mente 
artificis fluit in spiritum, de spiritu in organa membrorum, de organis in instrumenta et de 
instrumentis in materiam exteriorem. In omnibus enim his idem est quod fluit, licet secun-
dum aliud esse sit in primo, et secundum aliud in secundo et secundum aliud in tertio et sic 
deinceps.
58  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 1, p. 9, l. 29–p. 10, l. 15.
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In fact, it seems possible that Berthold often has this text in mind while 
commenting on other topics of the Elementatio. In two places (commenting 
on Propositions 129 and 201), for example, he has recourse to the distinction 
between per se and per accidens regarding the concepts of part and whole.59 
And while dealing with the content of Proposition 199, he observes: “Artifex 
enim, puta faber, nec esse nec actum artis habet a martello, sed tamen per mar-
tellum inducit formam artis in materiam artificiati”.60 My sense is that in those 
passages Berthold is following Aquinas’ observations.61 I would not considered 
this a citation of Aquinas, but rather a utilization of a certain line of thought or, 
better, a genuine appropriation by Berthold – something, perhaps, even more 
important than a citation. However, be that as it may, it is certain that Berthold 
cites at least one text by Aquinas to deal with the articulation of the causation 
of the prime unum and the unitates.
The commentary on Proposition 137 of the Elementatio shows “omnem uni-
tatem productam in producendo praesupponere causalitatem prime unius, cui 
cooperatur in suum causatum constituendo”. In the second point of the pro-
positum, Berthold refers to “primarii in omnibus secundariis operationem et 
nihilominus secundariorum primario comparationem”. To this end, he brings 
in a passage from Aquinas’ Contra errores Graecorum:
59  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129F, p. 181, l. 259–270: Qualiter autem divinae animae 
deificentur per suspensionem earum ad proprios intellectus, considerandum. Et ut exem-
plariter deducatur, sciendum, quod intellectus substantialis in anima partiali habet modum 
partis, pars autem, quia habet quodammodo modum substantiae completae, potest agere 
vel pati. Et hoc dupliciter. Uno modo per modum instrumenti, et sic agere et pati convenit 
toti per se, parti autem per accidens, ut si dicatur: ‘oculus videt’. Alio modo potest intelligi 
aliqua pars totius agere vel pati per se. Et hoc dupliciter: uno modo, ut tantum ipsa pars 
agat vel patiatur, ita videlicet, quod talis actio et passio partis non communicetur toti. Et 
secundum hoc convenit agere et pati toti per accidens et parti per se. Alio modo, ut talis 
actio et passio partis communicetur toti, et tunc primo et per se convenit talis actio vel passio 
parti, per se autem, sed non primo modo, convenit ipsi toti. See also Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio, 201E, p. 178, l. 196–204: […] pars dicitur operari dupliciter: uno modo per modum 
instrumenti – et sic operari convenit toti per se, parti vero per accidens, sicut visio est oculi 
sicut instrumenti et per accidens, hominis autem per se –, alio modo intelligitur pars operari 
per se, et hoc dupliciter: uno modo, ut tantum ipsa pars agat sive operetur, ita videlicet, ut 
talis operatio non communicetur toti, et sic ipsa operatio convenit parti per se, toti vero per 
accidens, sicut manus infrigidata infrigidans aliquid, cui apponitur; alio modo, ut talis ope-
ratio partis communicetur toti, et tunc primo et per se convenit talis operatio parti, per se 
autem, sed non primo convenit ipsi toti.
60  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 199D, p. 159, l. 254–267.
61  Moreover, for Aquinas, an instrumental cause cannot create, it can only inform (or deter-
mine). See J.-L. Solère, “Duns Scotus versus Thomas Aquinas on Instrumental Causality”, 
in Oxford Studies in Medieval Philosophy 7(2019), p. 147–185, at p. 158. This is exactly the 
case for the unitates in Berthold’s Expositio.
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Thomas Aquinas, Contra errores 
Graecorum
… sciendum, quod aliquid dicitur 
cooperari alicui dupliciter. Uno 
modo, quia operatur ad eundem 
effectum, sed per aliam virtutem; 
sicut minister cooperatur dom-
ino, dum eius praeceptis obedit, 
et instrumentum artifici, a quo 
movetur.
Alio modo dicitur aliquid cooperari 
alicui, inquantum operatur ean-
dem operationem cum ipso: sicut 
si diceretur de duobus portantibus 
aliquod pondus, vel de pluribus 
trahentibus navem, quod unus 
alteri cooperetur.
Secundum ergo primum modum 
creatura potest dici creatori coop-
erari quantum ad aliquos effectus, 
qui fiunt mediante creatura …62
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio
[…] licet prime unum solum perfecte 
operetur in omnibus, tamen per hoc 
non excludit subordinata sibi principia 
activa rerum constitutiva, quorum nul-
lum aspirat ad puritatem actionis cum 
prime uno, cum omnis causa et ante 
causatum operetur et cum ipso et post 
ipsum plurium sit substitutiva per 57. 
Unde notandum, quod aliquid dicitur 
aliqui cooperari dupliciter. Uno modo, 
quia operatur ad effectum eundem, sed 
per aliam virtutem. Et hoc est duplic-
iter, vel inquantum superius operatur 
ad effectum inferioris virtute eminen-
tiori, et sic prime unum cooperatur 
omnibus nec actio eius excluditur in 
cuiuscumque operantis operatione 
vel inquantum inferius per virtutem, 
quam habet a superiori, cooperatur ipsi 
superiori, et sic divinissimum operum 
est esse cooperatorem Dei secundum 
Dionysium. Alio modo dicitur aliquid 
cooperari alicui, inquantum operatur 
eandem operationem cum ipso, sicut si 
diceretur de duobus trahentibus navim, 
quod unus alteri cooperetur, et sic nulla 
creatura cuiuscumque eminentiae 
cooperatur prime uni, sed solum secun-
dum primum modum creatura dicitur 
cooperari prime uni quantum ad illos 
effectus, qui fiunt mediante creatura.63
62  Thomas Aquinas, Contra errores Graecorum, ed. Commissio Leonina, vol. 40A (Roma: 
Santa Sabina, 1967), pars i, c. 23, p. 84, l. 11–23.
63  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 137E, p. 21, l. 212–p. 22, l. 226.
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According to Aquinas, a creature can cooperate with God only if it does so 
with regard to the same effect but through another virtus. Berthold copies the 
passage but makes a further distinction. He adds that cooperation can happen 
in two ways: either (a) when something superior cooperates virtute eminen-
tiori with something inferior, or (b) when something inferior cooperates with 
something superior. In the first case (a), the prime unum can be said to coop-
erate with everything – “nec actio eius excluditur in cuiuscumque operantis 
operatione”. In the second case (b), the inferior cooperates with the superior 
through the virtus conferred upon it by the superior. 
Berthold expands Aquinas’s distinction by making room for the affirmation 
that the absolute One can cooperate with the unitates. Interestingly, he does 
not retain the example of the artificer and his instrument. Instead, he indi-
cates that the unitates cooperate with the absolute One through the virtus the 
One itself gave them. In this regard, he is consistent with the idea expressed 
elsewhere in the Expositio: the unitates are used by the One as an instrument. 
The additions made by Berthold redefine or even correct the idea expressed by 
Aquinas. For Berthold focuses on an expression used by Aquinas, namely, per 
aliam virtutem, and he warns us that such a virtus is not exactly alia. The One 
grants the unitates their virtus agendi.64
64  See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 75A, p. 58, l. 13–18: Item sciendum, quod in essen-
tialiter ordinatis priora et ex hoc causaliora agunt in submissis, tum quia dant eis esse et 
virtutem agendi, tum quia datam conservant, tum quia applicant virtutes secundorum ad 
agendum, tum etiam quia omne inferius est quasi instrumentum superioris causae, quanto 
enim aliquid est altius, tanto intimius ingreditur in effectum, et per consequens inferius non 
propria virtute, sed magis virtute principalis agentis pertingit ad effectum. See also Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio, 57F, p. 153, l. 180–188: Et quia omne, quod a secundis seu causa-
tis producitur, eminentius producitur a prime causa per praemissis, necessarium est etiam 
prime bonum operari cum omni et in omni suo causato, si tale causatum fuerit etiam causa, 
tum quia causaliora agunt in submissis, ut dictum est, tum quia dant eis et quod sunt et 
per consequens agendi virtutem, tum quia datam virtutem conservant, tum quia applicant 
virtutes secundorum ad agendum, tum etiam quia omne inferius est quasi instrumentum 
superioris, quia, quanto agens est altius et actualius, tanto intimius ingreditur in effectum. 
Instrumentum autem non propria virtute, sed virtute principalis agentis pertingit ad effec-
tum ipsius agentis. It is worth noting that the verb applico appears also in Aquinas’ treat-
ments of instrumental causality. See Thomas Aquinas, De potentia, q. 3, a. 7: sequitur de 
necessitate quod Deus sit causa actionis cuiuslibet rei naturalis ut movens et applicans vir-
tutem ad agendum; id., Summa contra Gentiles, lib. iii, c. 67: quicquid applicat virtutem 
activam ad agendum, dicitur esse causa illius actionis: artifex enim applicans virtutem rei 
naturalis ad aliquam actionem, dicitur esse causa illius actionis, sicut coquus decoctionis, 
quae est per ignem. Sed omnis applicatio virtutis ad operationem est principaliter et primo 
a Deo. Applicantur enim virtutes operativae ad proprias operationes per aliquem motum vel 
corporis, vel animae. Primum autem principium utriusque motus est Deus. Est enim primum 
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One cannot but help noting a certain friction between the idea of the self-
constitution of the unitates, their metaphysical excellence, and their being 
reduced to mere instruments of the action of the prime unum. One can say, 
with Eugenia Paschetto, that “per Bertoldo solo la causa prima e veramente 
tale: le altre al contrario non sono che mezzi attraverso cui si esplica, sotto altre 
forme, l’azione della causa prima; tanto e vero che Bertoldo alluderà ad esse 
come instrumenta nature”.65
5 Concluding Remarks
I have shown that Berthold used at least two texts by Aquinas to address two 
important issues regarding the presentation of Proclus’ gods: their simple self-
constituted nature, and their mode of causation and its relation to the creative 
causality of the One. I also suggested that he may have relied as well on yet 
another text by Aquinas, which helped him to define the role played by the uni-
tates in the process of determination of the tantum unum, which is the product 
of creation: they do not create, they determine, and, in doing so, they cooper-
ate with the absolute One like an instrument cooperates with an artificer. In 
this sense, Berthold can say the One creates and determinat suam causalitatem.
Thirty-seven years ago, in order to draw a clear line between the teachings 
of Aquinas and Berthold, Kurt Flasch pointed out that for Thomas admit-
ting creaturas per se subsistentes would be a blasphemy.66 I think the relation 
between Berthold and Aquinas might be more complex than this.
Furthermore, there are other aspects of Aquinas’ influence in the Expositio, 
which I have not focused on. For example, there is a passage from Aquinas’ 
commentary on Dionysius quoted in the Expositio, in which Aquinas explains 
how angels participate in intellectual light. Berthold uses it to show that what 
happens in the case of the angels (which come immediately after the Creator 
according to the order of voluntary providence) happens a fortiori in the case 
movens omnino immobile, ut supra ostensum est. I take these references from Solère, “Duns 
Scotus versus Thomas Aquinas”, p. 157, n. 20, and p. 162.
65  E. Paschetto, “L’Elementatio theologica di Proclo e il commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg. 
Alcuni aspetti della nozione de causa”, in Filosofia 27(1976), p. 353–378, at p. 367.
66  K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologi-
cam Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13, p. xvii–xviii: “Das Autarke ist nach Berthold per 
se subsistens (Expos. prop. 9E Pagnoni-Sturlese 173,240; vgl. prop. 3B Sturlese 94,74–75: 
creaturae per se subsistentes!), was, auf Geschaffenes bezogen, im Sinne der thomis-
tischen Terminologie eine Blasphemie wäre, bei Berthold aber die Transzendenz des 
höchsten Gutes nicht antastet, gleichwohl einen Wertzuwachs kreatürlicher Instanzen 
zum Ausdruck bringt.”
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of the unitates (which immediately follow the prime unum according to the 
order of natural providence).67
Another interesting case concerns a passage from Aquinas’ Expositio, which 
Berthold uses at least twice. On Proposition XXIII(XXIV) of the Liber de cau-
sis (“causa prima existit in rebus omnibus secundum dispositionem unam”), 
Aquinas explains that divine action is double: God creates and God governs 
creation. In the first case, God is the efficient cause of all diversity. Otherwise, 
there would be things not created by God. But in the second case, diversity 
arises entirely from the recipients, not from God. Berthold endorses this state-
ment in 142B, and he has recourse to it once again in 149A. In 149A, he points 
out that certain people (who can certainly be identified with Eriugenians, 
including Dionysius and the author of the Clavis physicae) would not agree 
with this distinction: they would argue that diversity arises from the recipients 
in both governance and creation.68 This view holds that creation, understood 
as participatio unius, does not require a pre-existing participans, whereas all 
subsequent participation (informatio or determinatio) does imply a pre-
existing participans.
If not in quantitative terms, I would say that Aquinas deserves more of our 
attention as a source of the Expositio. In any case, we can confirm, with Dragos 
Calma, the enduring relevance of Thomas Aquinas, and his Super Librum 
de causis Expositio, with respect to “the medieval understanding of Greek 
Neoplatonism”.69
67  See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 156A, p. 169, l. 12–p. 170, l. 52. We can also think of 
111C. There Berthold cites Aquinas once on the way the different orders of intellects par-
ticipate in God and he even adopts Aquinas’ reading of Dionysius. These are just exam-
ples to show that Berthold knew his Aquinas, and especially the Super Librum de causis 
Expositio. In fact, as Evan King pointed out to me, further research would likely reveal that 
Berthold often made recourse to Aquinas’ commentary to glean what he could from the 
Angelic Doctor’s remarks on Proclus’ propositions.
68  Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis Expositio, lect. 24, p. 122, l. 13–p. 123, l. 4. Cf. 
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 142B, p. 55, l. 104–p. 56, l. 116, and 149A, p. 112, l. 40–44.
69  D. Calma, “The Exegetical Tradition of Medieval Neoplatonism. Considerations on a 
Recently Discovered Corpus of Texts”, in D. Calma (ed.), Neoplatonism in the Middle Ages. 
Vol. 1 New Commentaries on Liber de causis (ca. 1250–1350), (Turnhout: Brepols, 2016), 
p. 11–41, at p. 11. Also, on the basis of what has been said, we may think about Aquinas him-
self, and consider a suggestion recently made by Scarpelli Cory, “Reditio completa, reditio 
incompleta”, p. 192: “for Aquinas, the translation of Proclus’s Elements provided indisput-
able confirmation of a long-dawning intuition: namely, that the various principles of his 
(Aquinas’s) own unified philosophical system might actually be rooted in different meta-
physical traditions that he had originally conceived as fundamentally in tension with each 
other.” Cf. L. Sturlese, “Homo divino (Il commento a Proclo di Bertoldo di Moosburg)”, in 
L. Sturlese, Eckhart, Tauler, Suso. Filosofi e mistici nella Germania medievale (Firenze: Le 
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chapter 6
Berthold of Moosburg, Reader of Ulrich of 
Strassburg. On Natural Providence
Tommaso Ferro
Università del Salento / Universität zu Köln
The present article focuses on the concept of “natural providence” in the 
Expositio of Berthold of Moosburg, stressing the role of Ulrich of Strassburg’s 
De summo bono in the theoretical elaboration and textual drafting of Berthold’s 
work. Indeed, the question of natural providence was discussed by many 
Dominican masters of Cologne during the 13th and 14th centuries. Berthold 
was no exception, and he referred not only to Dietrich of Freiberg’s works, as 
most modern scholars claim, but he also made use of a large portion of Ulrich’s 
De summo bono.
To understand the aim of this article, it is appropriate first to give a pre-
liminary survey of the status quaestionis of critical studies. Indeed, a brief his-
tory of the historiography of this issue can provide us with some clues as to 
how and why scholars have traditionally emphasised Berthold’s reception of 
Dietrich more than Ulrich.1 As Kurt Flasch stressed in his introduction to the 
critical edition of Berthold’s Expositio,2 at the beginning of the 20th century 
Grabmann3 and Krebs4 were the first to draw attention to Berthold’s philo-
sophical work. Rightly, they considered the medieval theologian to be one of 
the most important authors of the “German Dominican School” established by 
Albert the Great in Cologne during the 13th century.5 They assumed Berthold 
1 This paper will not address the influence of Dietrich of Freiberg’s works on the Expositio of 
Berthold of Moosburg because this subject has already received extensive study from other 
scholars.
2 K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 
Procli. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 
1984), p. xi–xxxix.
3 Cf. M. Grabmann, “Studien über Ulrich von Strassburg”, in Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie 
29(1905), p. 626.
4 Cf. E. Krebs, Meister Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, 
seine Wissenschaft (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1906), p. 50, n. 2.
5 The Studium of Cologne was founded in 1248 by Albert the Great (cf. Acta capitulorum gener-
alium Ordinis Praedicatorum, ed. B.M. Reichert, vol. 3 [Roma / Stuttgart: Monumenta Ordinis 
Fratrum Praedicatorum Historica, 1898], i rec., p. 41). For the specific characteristics of this 
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to be the most important disciple of Dietrich of Freiberg.6 Grabmann was also 
the first to understand the particular “philosophical features” of the Cologne 
authors. In his opinion, Albert’s intellectual heritage divided itself into two 
different schools: the first one, established in Paris, was characterised by an 
Aristotelian influence and set the trend for Thomas Aquinas and his followers; 
the second one, established in Cologne, was characterised by a certain fidelity 
to Neoplatonic metaphysics and was the trend followed by Ulrich of Strassburg, 
Dietrich of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart, and Berthold of Moosburg. Klibansky 
accepted and defended this historical interpretation.7 The Anglo-German 
scholar played a particularly important role in the discussion surrounding 
Berthold’s role in the history of Proclus’ reception during the Middle Ages. 
Klibansky found that in no other late-medieval school did Proclus have such 
prominence as he did in Cologne and, moreover, that it was within this tradi-
tion that Berthold reached the summit of the medieval reception of Proclus.8 
Indeed, the primacy of the Byzantine philosopher for Berthold is made per-
fectly clear in the Expositio tituli, where Berthold lists the reasons that led him 
to write a commentary on Proclus. According to Berthold, the virtues of the 
ancient philosopher are the capacity to reorder Plato’s doctrines and the abil-
ity to understand the nature of the First Principle as far as possible for a man, 
that is, by exclusively using his natural intellect:
Excellentia namque eius et praepollentia ad alios Platonicos evidenter 
apparet in hoc, quod ipsius Platonis theoremata ordinavit in praesenti 
libro et ordinata subtilissime declaravit. […] Item in hoc apparet excel-
lentia eius, quod per triplicem motum, […] scilicet circularem, rectum et 
Dominican “School of Cologne”, cf. L. Sturlese, “Proclo ed Ermete in Germania da Alberto 
Magno a Bertoldo di Moosburg. Per una prospettiva di ricerca sulla cultura filosofica tedesca 
nel secolo delle sue origini (1250–1359)”, in K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister 
Eckhart (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 22–33.
6 We do not have much biographical information on Berthold of Moosburg: he entered the 
Dominican Order and studied at Oxford in 1315; he was also a lector at Regensburg in 1327 
and, after this period, he worked in Cologne between 1335 and 1361, where he probably wrote 
his Expositio on Proclus’ Elementatio theologica. For a general introduction to Berthold of 
Moosburg’s philosophy and for his personal and intellectual relationship with Dietrich 
of Freiberg, cf. A. de Libera, Introduzione alla mistica renana (Milano: Jaca Book, 1998), 
p. 239–326.
7 Cf. R. Klibansky, Ein Proklosfund und seine Bedeutung (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger 
Akademie der Wissenschaften. 1928/29, 5. Abhandlung) (Heidelberg: Winter, 1929).
8 Berthold’s Expositio is one of the few known medieval commarites on Proclus’ Elementatio, 
and it is certainly the most famous; this fact also stresses its significance for the history of 
philosophy in general.
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obliquum, ascendendo pervenit, quantum fuit possibile homini mortali 
ductu luminis naturalis intellectus, in notitiam summi boni.9
According to Berthold, Proclus’ masterpiece should be considered a purely 
philosophical work in which the author proves his excellence in understanding 
the Truth through the exclusive use of his natural intellect (“Proclus namque 
philosophus fuit auctor istius libri, unus de excellentissimis Platonis discipulis. 
[…] Ipse enim omnes Platonis sectatores procul excellebat et in philosophia sic 
omnibus praepollebat”).10
Other important developments of Berthold studies took place in 1974, with 
Sturlese’s edition of the Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli 
184–211. De animabus,11 and in the 1980s, thanks to the impressive project of 
the Corpus Philosophorum Teutonicorum Medii Aevi started by Kurt Flasch and 
scholars of the “Bochumer Schule”. Thanks to this initiative, the editions of 
the Cologne masters became available to researchers. The edition of Dietrich 
was already partially available at that time, so it was included as an integral 
part in the Corpus and was completed in 1985.12 The first work edited in the 
Corpus properly speaking was the volume containing the first 13 propositio-
nes of Berthold’s commentary in 1984.13 This work was followed by the edi-
tion of propositiones 14 to 34 of the Expositio in 1986.14 It was during the 1980s 
that scholars began to study Berthold’s thought more closely and, moreover, 
it was during this period that Dietrich’s philosophical influence began to be 
recognised in the Expositio. Meanwhile, Ulrich of Strassburg still was not pub-
lished and only a few very specific sections of the De summo bono were avail-
able to scholars.15 Moreover, at that time Ulrich was considered an unoriginal 
9  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, Expositio tituli 
A, p. 37–38, l. 25–34.
10  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Exp. tit. A, p. 37, l. 10–15.
11  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super elementationem theologicam Procli 184–211. De 
animabus, ed. L. Sturlese (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974).
12  Dietrich of Freiberg, Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie, ed. B. Mojsisch 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1977); Dietrich of Freiberg, Opera omnia, vol. 2. Schriften zur Metaphysik 
und Theologie, eds R. Imbach et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980); Dietrich of Freiberg, 
Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik, eds J.-D. Cavigioli 
et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983); Dietrich of Freiberg, Opera omnia, vol. 4. Schriften zur 
Naturwissenschaft, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985).
13  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. 
Propositiones 1–13.
14  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
14–34, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986).
15  S.J. Seleman, Procession and Spiration in the Trinitarian Doctrine of the Summa de Bono of 
Ulrich of Strasbourg. Edited text and Analysis, ma thesis (University of Saint Joseph, 1973); 
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author, without real theoretical relevance, whose only merit was his having 
summarised Albert the Great.16 I think that these elements help to explain why 
scholars did not explore the importance of Ulrich’s De summo bono and par-
ticularly, for our purposes, its textual and theoretical influence on Berthold’s 
Expositio. Therefore, beginning in the 1980s, it became the established histori-
cal and hermeneutical trend to consider Berthold’s Expositio primarily in rela-
tion to Dietrich’s works. This is clear in some important volumes of critical 
literature, such as Alain de Libera’s remarkable book Introduction à la mystique 
rhénane:
[…] non è dunque sufficiente dire che la dottrina di Bertoldo è la stessa 
di quella di Teodorico, è quasi alla lettera che il freibergense è rispettato 
[…] il Commento a Proclo proposto da Bertoldo è anche, per non dire 
in primo luogo, una valorizzazione delle dottrine più caratteristiche del 
pensiero di Teodorico di Freiberg […] È inutile insistere di più, la noetica 
di Bertoldo è quella di Teodorico di Freiberg.17
S.J. Seleman., Law and Justice in the Philosophical Doctrine of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Edited 
text and Philosophical Study, PhD diss. (Fordham University, 1979); W.J. O’Callaghan, The 
Constitution of Created Composite Being in Liber de summo bono (Book IV, Tract. II, 1–8), 
of Ulrich of Strasbourg, O.P. Philosophical Study and Text, PhD diss. (Marquette University, 
1970); F.J. Lescoe, God as First Principle in Ulrich of Strasbourg. Critical Text of Summa de 
Bono, IV, 1, Based on Hitherto Unpublished Mediaeval Manuscripts and philosophical study 
(New York: Alba House, 1979); L.B. Geoghegan, Divine Generation, Its Nature and Limits, 
in the Summa de Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Philosophical Study and Text, ma thesis 
(University of Saint Joseph, 1974); C.J. Fagin, The Doctrine of Divine Ideas in the Summa de 
Bono of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Text and Philosophical Study, PhD diss. (University of Toronto, 
1948); J. Daguillon, Ulrich de Strasbourg, O.P., La Summa de bono, Livre I. Introduction et 
édition critique (Paris: Vrin, 1930); J. Daguillon, “Ulrich de Strasbourg, prédicateur. Un ser-
mon inedit du XIIIe siècle”, in La vie spirituelle 27(1927), p. 84–98; F. Collingwood, The 
Theory of Being in Summa de Bono, (Book II) of Ulrich of Strasbourg. Philosophical Study 
and Text, PhD diss. (University of Toronto, 1952).
16  Cf. B. Hauréau, Histoire de la philosophie scholastique (Paris: Durand et Pedone-Lauriel, 
1880), part ii, vol. 2, p. 42; M. Grabmann, “Studien über Ulrich von Straßburg”, in 
M. Grabmann, Mittelalterliches Geistesleben. Abhandlungen zur Geschichte der Scholastik 
und Mystik (München: Hueber, 1926), vol. i, p. 147–221; G. Théry, “Originalité du plan de la 
Summa de bono d’Ulrich de Strasbourg”, in Revue thomiste 27(1922), p. 376–397.
17  A. de Libera, Introduzione alla mistica renana, p. 258. Cf. also K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, 
p. xi–xxxix; L. Sturlese, “Homo divinus. Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg 
und die Probleme der nacheckhartschen Zeit”, in K. Ruh (ed.), Abendländische Mystik im 
Mittelalter. Symposion Kloster Engelberg 1984 (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986), p. 145–161.
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It was at the end of the 1980s that Book i of De summo bono, a part of Book ii, 
and a part of Book iv become available in the Corpus.18 The edition of Ulrich’s 
work was interrupted for fifteen years and it began again approximately twenty 
years ago with the publications of Palazzo, Beccarisi, Retucci, Sannino, and 
other scholars.19 The completion of the edition of De summo bono and the 
recent publication of some contributions which rediscovered Ulrich’s philo-
sophical relevance are opening up a new approach that stresses his theoretical 
prominence and his key role in the Dominican School of Cologne.20 I would 
like to include my paper in this newer wave of scholarship, taking into account 
the fundamental question of natural providence in Berthold’s Expositio.21
18  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 1, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989); 
Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 1–4, ed. A. de Libera (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1987); Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 1–2,7, ed. 
S. Pieperhoff (Hamburg: Meiner, 1987).
19  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 1–3, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 2004); Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 3, ed. A. Palazzo 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 2005); Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6, 
ed. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 3, 
Tractatus 4–5, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. 
Liber 4, Tractatus 2,15–24, eds B. Mojsisch, F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008); Ulrich 
of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 6, Tractatus 1–3,6, ed. S. Tuzzo (Hamburg: Meiner, 
2011); Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 2,8–14, ed. A. Palazzo 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 2012); Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 6, Tractatus 3,7–29, 
ed. S. Ciancioso (Hamburg: Meiner, 2015); Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 6, 
Tractatus 4,1–15, eds I. Zavattero, C. Colomba (Hamburg: Meiner, 2017).
20  Cf. A. Beccarisi, “La scientia divina dei filosofi nel De summo bono di Ulrico di Strasburgo”, 
in Rivista di storia della filosofia 61(2006), p. 137–63; A. Palazzo, “La sapientia nel De 
summo bono di Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in Quaestio 5(2005), p. 495–512; A. Palazzo, “Ulrico 
di Strasburgo, un maestro nel citare. Nuove evidenze del ricorso alle opere di Alberto il 
Grande in De Summo Bono IV, 2, 8–14”, in F. Meroi (ed.), Le parole del pensiero. Studi offerti 
a Nestore Pirillo (Pisa: ets, 2013), p. 49–75; B. Faes de Mottoni, “La distinzione tra causa 
agente e causa motrice nella Summa de summo bono di Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in Studi medi-
evali 20(1979), p. 313–355; B. Mojsisch, A. de Libera, “Einleitung”, in Ulrich of Strassburg, 
De summo bono. Liber 1, p. ix–xxviii; L. Malovini, “Noetica e teologia dell’immagine nel 
De summo bono di Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in Rivista di Filosofia Neoscolastica 90(1998), 
p. 28–50; C. Trottmann, “La théologie des théologiens et celle des philosophes”, in Revue 
thomiste 98(1998), p. 531–561; A. de Libera, “Ulrich de Strasbourg, lecteur d’Albert le Grand”, 
in R. Imbach, C. Flüeler (eds.), Albert der Grosse und die deutsche Dominikanerschule 
(Fribourg: Universitätsverlag, 1985), p. 105–136.
21  For a general introduction to the main topics of Expositio and for Berthold’s methodologi-
cal approach, cf. G.L. Potestà, “Per laboriosam investigationem ascendendo. L’edizione di 
Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 76/4(1984), p. 637–643. For a 
detailed study of Berthold’s work and philosophy, cf. E. King, Supersapientia. A Study of 
the Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg, PhD 
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According to the Dominican theologian, as he writes in the Prologus, 
Proclus’ Elementatio explicitly deals with the invisibilia Dei according to the 
order of natural providence:
Ista sunt invisibilia Dei transitive accepta, de quibus in ista elementa-
tione theologica subtilissime pertractatur, quantum pertinet ad provi-
dentiam naturalem.22
The question concerning the invisibilia Dei (the divine ideas), can be exam-
ined in two different ways according to Berthold: intransitive and transitive.23 
The first one considers the eternal and immutable reasons (the exemplaria) 
existing in God and in the divine Word in their absoluteness; the second one 
considers the same reasons as models of all things in the cosmos. According 
to the transitive way, the divine ideas have the necessary function of explain-
ing and making possible the passage from God to the world, that is, from the 
principle that pre-contains in itself the reasons of all things to the effects and 
individual entities. In Berthold’s Expositio these invisibilia Dei are considered 
in their transitive way only – in relation to the world and according to their 
productive and regulative functions. Furthermore, this transitive way is con-
sidered exclusively quantum pertinet ad providentiam naturalem. The point of 
view of natural providence considers the world according to its causal rela-
tions; this kind of knowledge is a philosophical one and it is only attainable by 
assiduous study (per laboriosam investigationem):
Verum, quod per motum obliquum, qui proprius erat philosophorum et 
erat per laboriosam investigationem primi omnium existentium prin-
cipii dividendo, definiendo, communibus principiis utendo, a notis ad 
ignota per ratiocinationem progrediendo, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia 
ascendendo et inter intelligibilia ab uno in aliud tendendo, quousque ad 
simpliciter ultimum perveniatur, ascenderit ipse Proclus in summi boni 
notitiam, apparet in praesenti libro, ubi in excelsum maximum ascendit 
per operum conditionem, conditorum gubernationem et contrariorum 
conciliationem.24
diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016); E. King, “Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the 
One of the Soul”, in Dionysius 36(2018), p. 184–199.
22  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prologus 5, p. 13, l. 264–266.
23  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 2–7, p. 7, l. 77–p. 14, l. 292. See also Potestà, “Per 
laboriosam investigationem ascendendo”, p. 640.
24  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Exp. tit. D, p. 40, l. 110–117.
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In Berthold’s Expositio the choice to deal with the invisibilia Dei according 
to the order of natural providence places Proclus among the “philosophers” 
and not among the “theologians”. In fact, according to Berthold, the choice of 
a particular “point of view”, between natural providence or voluntary provi-
dence, is what distinguishes theologians from philosophers. It concerns the 
method, not the object of research nor the goals. Indeed, the theologians deal 
with the same God as the philosophers and with the same divine ideas, but 
according to the order of voluntary providence. This is confirmed in a text of 
the Expositio in which the author explains that Dionysius belongs to the ranks 
of the theologians:
Sed dices, quod Dionysius loquitur ut theologus, qui solum considerat 
processum rerum a Deo secundum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, et 
ideo aliter est de processu rerum a Deo secundum ordinem providen-
tiae naturalis, ubi proceditur ab uno in multitudinem ordinate, de quo 
loquuntur philosophi theologizantes sive theologi philosophantes.25
Dionysius is a theologian and not a philosopher because he considers the 
processum rerum according to the order of voluntary providence, unlike the 
philosophi theologizantes or theologi philosophantes to whom Proclus belongs. 
A philosopher connects all things to the First Cause and considers the uni-
verse according to the causal necessary order. He never goes beyond this ratio-
nally determinable order. The theologian, instead, uses the Holy Scriptures 
and examines all things according to the divine will, which is teleological and 
eschatological. Ultimately, the philosopher studies the determination of the 
rational order that rules the cosmos; the theologian, instead, considers every-
thing that exists in accordance with divine revelation.
The question of the two providences has an absolute priority in the Expositio 
and it is so important that it establishes whether an author belongs to the 
group of philosophers or to the ranks of theologians. The two providences, 
as well as philosophy and theology, are not to be understood in opposition, 
but in continuity. This is evident in the Expositio not only from a theoretical 
point of view, but also from the methodological one: Berthold always tries to 
find the affinities between Proclus’ philosophical thought and Dionysius’ theo-
logical thought.26 In the study of Proclus’ Expositio, Berthold normally uses 
25  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 5B, p. 116, 104–108.
26  For the general agreement between Dionysius and Proclus in Berthold’s Expositio and 
for the textual references, cf. I. Zavattero, “La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo di 
Moosburg”, in ARKETE. Rivista di studi filosofici 1(2005), p. 51–67.
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the Christian authority of Dionysius who certifies philosophy and ensures its 
veracity.
In terms of historiography, the topic of the difference between the two prov-
idences is traced back to Augustine27 from whom Dietrich took it up. Scholars28 
think that Dietrich was the first to deepen this matter, which was later trans-
mitted to his pupil Berthold. This is traced back to a very well-known passage 
by Dietrich taken from De subiecto theologiae:
Scientia enim divina philosophorum considerat universitatem entium 
secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, quo videlicet res stant in sui 
natura et secundum suos modos et proprietates naturales gubernantur 
per principem universitatis, nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem 
ulteriorem finem attendit. Nostra autem divina sanctorum scientia 
attenditur in entibus, secundum quod stant et disponuntur sub ordine 
voluntariae providentiae, in quo attenditur ratio meriti et praemii et ea, 
quae attenduntur circa bonam et sanctam vitam et adeptionem aeternae 
beatitudinis et perventionem ad finem ulteriorem sive in bono sive in 
malo etiam post terminum huius mundi, quando scientia divina sapien-
tium huius mundi destruetur, i Cor., 13.29
Dietrich divides philosophy from theology in a stronger manner than Berthold. 
In Dietrich’s opinion this division is not only methodological, but also con-
cerns the objectives and areas of pertinence: unlike Berthold, Dietrich does not 
distinguish between the philosophi theologizantes or theologi philosophantes. 
According to this passage, providentia voluntaria refers to the nostra divina 
sanctorum scientia: it concerns the goals, the merits and rewards that man can 
gain through a good and holy life in his search for eternal bliss. On the other 
hand, providentia naturalis belongs to the divina scientia philosophorum and 
takes into account the universe as a result of certain natural principles that can 
be determined rationally. This natural providence does not consider higher 
27  Cf. Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, ed. J. Zycha (Praha / Wien / Leipzig: 
Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum, 1894), viii.9, p. 243, l. 25–p. 244, l. 20.
28  Cf. L. Sturlese, “Il De animatione caeli di Teodorico di Freiberg”, in R. Creytens, P. Künzle 
(eds), Xenia Medii Aevi Historiam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli O.P. (Roma: 
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1978), p. 183–197; L. Sturlese, Storia della filosofia tedesca 
nel Medioevo. Il secolo XIII (Firenze: Olschki, 1996), p. 208–209. K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, 
p. xxxi–xxxii.
29  Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, ed. L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften 
zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik, eds J.-D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 
3.9, p. 281, l. 100–p. 282, l. 109.
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aims or eschatological values (“nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem ulte-
riorem finem attendit”); it guarantees only a stable, coherent, and rationally 
determinable order of entities and events:
Aliud autem genus entium, scilicet corpora caelestia, procedunt a Deo in 
ordine naturalis providentiae secundum dispositionem naturae et natu-
ralium proprietatum et motionum entium naturalium, in quibus natura-
lem conexionem inveniri necesse est.30
The philosopher’s point of view is to consider the cosmos as a conexio naturalis 
that links different entities arranged in separate ontological orders, at the top 
of which there is the First Principle. In the same way, for Berthold the conexio 
naturalis is a philosophical manner of considering the action of the invisibilia 
Dei in their transitive aspect, that is, in their efficient causation on the world. 
Natural providence guarantees the ontological order in the universe, its stabil-
ity, its harmony, and its intelligibility.
I would now like to reconsider Dietrich’s paternity of the theorem of these 
two providences in the School of Cologne. I intend to prove that this doctrine 
is already present in Ulrich’s De summo bono. I will also try to stress that Ulrich 
already conceived natural providence as a conexio naturalis before Dietrich. 
Finally, I aim to show the textual and philosophical debts of the Expositio 
towards the De summo bono on the matter of natural providence. This will also 
give me the opportunity to consider some methodological issues and to anal-
yse the general assessment of philosophy’s cognitive limits in the works of the 
two thinkers. Indeed, I think that Berthold found in Ulrich’s De summo bono an 
idea more similar to his own proposal about the status of philosophical knowl-
edge and its limits, than in Dietrich of Freiberg; and this could explain why the 
Expositio uses a large part of Ulrich’s work.
Seeking Berthold’s sources is a challenge, since he does not make quotations 
easy to distinguish or textual references recognizable.31 The only place where 
philosophers and the theologians are cited as sources is at the beginning of 
the Expositio, in two lists entitled philosophi famosi and doctores ecclesiae.32 
30  Dietrich of Freiberg, De animatione caeli, ed. L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften 
zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik, 20.3, p. 30, l. 92–95.
31  Barbara Faes de Mottoni shares also this opinion. See B. Faes de Mottoni, “Il commento 
di Bertoldo di Moosburg all’Elementatio theologica di Proclo. Edizione delle proposizioni 
riguardanti il tempo e l’eternità”, in Studi medievali 12(1971), p. 417–61.
32  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. 
Propositiones 1–13, p. 3–4. There are actually three explicit mentions of Dietrich of Freiberg 
in the Expositio: two in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 
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Ulrich is counted among the doctores ecclesiae, as are Thomas Aquinas, Albert 
the Great, and Dietrich of Freiberg. Proclus, instead, is included among the phi-
losophi famosi, as are Plato, Aristotle, and Hermes Trismegistus. As far as Ulrich 
of Strassburg is concerned, in my research I have found at least 32 propositions 
(out of the 211) of the Expositio that are connected to the De summo bono.33 
On a purely quantitative level, without taking into account specific theoretical 
aspects, as much as 15% of the Expositio’s propositiones is clearly influenced by 
Ulrich’s De summo bono. Indeed, in these propositions, Berthold copies exten-
sive parts of Ulrich’s work. Moreover, these quotations faithfully follow the text 
of the De summo bono while often keeping the original text unchanged. This 
suggests that Berthold found in Ulrich’s work convincing arguments that can 
be reused without the need for any change.
Proclus deals with the topic of providence in Proposition 120 (“Omnis deus 
in sua existentia totis habet providere et primitus providere in diis”) and in 
those immediately following in his Elementatio. I will take into consideration 
all those propositions in which Berthold refers to natural providence and, at the 
same time, all propositions in which he uses Ulrich’s De summo bono. I would 
like to prove how, using only this comparison with Ulrich, we can properly 
analyse the doctrine of natural providence in Berthold. Therefore, I will refer to 
Proposition 120, but also to Propositions 114 (“Omnis deus unitas est per se per-
fecta et omnis per se perfecta unitas est deus”), 121 (“Omne divinum essentiam 
quidem habet bonitatem, potentiam autem unialem et cognitionem occultam 
et incomprehensibilem omnibus simul secundis”), 141 (“Omnis providentia 
deorum haec quidem est exempta ab his, quibus providetur, haec autem coor-
dinatae”), and 144 (“Omnia entia et omnes entium dispositiones intantum pro-
cesserunt inquantum et deorum ordinationes”).34 Propositions 114, 120, and 
141 correspond to two specific chapters of De summo bono, Book ii, treatise 5: 
chapters 16 (“De providentia divina et de hoc nomine Deus, quod est nomen 
providentiae”) and 18 (“De fato et de his, quae ad eius notitiam requirun-
tur, quae sunt casus et fortuna, contingens et occasio et frustra et vanum et 
Procli. Propositiones 66–107, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 107A, p. 246, l. 11 and 
p. 247, l. 58–59; one in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 
Procli. Propositiones 136–159, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 143O, p. 73, l. 455. 
There is also one explicit mention of Albert the Great in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio 
super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 2011), 118A, p. 76, l. 55.
33  I refer to Propositions 5, 11, 12, 18, 23, 29, 57, 59, 108, 112, 114, 116, 117, 118, 120, 121, 122, 123, 134, 
140, 141, 144, 145, 149, 155, 164, 184, 185, 188, 200, 201, and 203 of the Expositio.
34  The relevant passages from Ulrich’s De summo bono and Berthold’s Expositio are included 
at the end of this paper.
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otiosum”). These two chapters deal with divine providence and its definition 
through an analysis that reports the authoritative opinions of Boethius, John 
of Damascus, Dionysius, and Augustine. Here Ulrich studies the concept of 
“fate” and the causal principle that governs the activity of fate in the world. 
The fifth treatise of Book ii of De summo bono is devoted to God’s intellectual 
perfection: sapientia, mens, ratio, veritas, and fides. Proposition 121 refers to 
chapter 17 (“De aliis tribus nominibus pertinentibus ad providentiam, in qua 
est de legibus aeternis”) of the same treatise, where Ulrich takes into consid-
eration the concepts of dominus, rex, and sanctus: three names that proclaim 
God’s kingship on the world and his ordering power. Finally, Berthold analyses 
Proposition 144, taking parts of Ulrich’s chapter 15 (“De dispositione, in quo 
est de vestigio”), again in the fifth treatise of Book ii. This chapter refers to the 
book of Wisdom, chapter 8, Disponit omnia suaviter, and concerns the nature 
of God’s governance of creation. Providence is defined as “cura de omnibus et 
de illius vestigiis, quae sunt ordines rerum in se et in motibus suis et conve-
nientia et permanentia, per quod scitur mundus regi sapientis providentia et 
non casu”.35 Therefore, when Berthold writes about providence in his analysis 
he has in mind and reports a very specific part of Ulrich’s work, namely chap-
ters 15, 16, 17, and 18 of the fifth treatise of Book ii of De summo bono.
Proposition 114 presents the general characteristics of providence. The idea 
that Ulrich and Berthold try to prove is how, in the arrangement of the causes 
that comprise the ontological structure of the cosmos, all causes share the 
same perfection that the First Cause has in itself simpliciter. This is also the 
case for the name Deus considered in relation to providentia. Indeed, the name 
Deus is appropriate only to the First Cause, but it can also be communicated to 
other beings that participate in divine qualities:
Et per consequens hoc nomen ‘Deus’ convenit prime bono principalifor-
miter et sic incommunicabiliter, ut dictum est, communicatur autem per 
se bonitatibus, scilicet rebus divinis ordinem unialem constituentibus 
essentialiter […]. Dicitur tamen hoc nomen ‘deus’ esse de participantibus 
aliquam proprietatem divinam, et hoc sive per naturam sive per gratiam 
secundum ordinem duplicis providentiae, naturalis videlicet et volun-
tariae, de quibus inferius disseretur.36
Providence is the most appropriate name for God when God is no longer con-
sidered in himself, but in relation to something else, namely, according to his 
35  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 15, §15, p. 107, l. 346–349.
36  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114A, p. 43, l. 101–p. 44, l. 105 and l. 117–119.
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regulatory and causal power on the cosmos. God in his perfection and infinity 
est simplex et definiri non potest37 but we can know Him, although in an imper-
fect way, from his effects and from His causal action on the universe. From an 
ontological point of view, the effects connected to the First Principle through 
the name “God”, as in the case of providence (“quod hoc nomen ‘Deus’ quan-
tum ad primum significatum, quod est ratio, a qua imponitur nomen, significat 
providentiam”),38 are such because they share, although imperfectly, the same 
essence of the First Principle. We can know something of God through every-
thing that exists, acts, and participates in divine qualities. Therefore, provi-
dence can be correctly defined as “God” when we consider the divine power 
over the cosmos, which is carried out through prudentia, cura, bonitas, and 
providentiae circuitus.39 Berthold and Ulrich propose that providence should 
be understood as an ordo qui cuncta complectitur.40 There is nothing outside of 
this ordo that holds everything together. In other words, there is nothing that 
can be outside of the power of God and subject to casus, as Ulrich and Berthold 
say (temeritas in regno providentiae non licet).41 Every entity exists because it 
is preserved in being by the power of its cause, but ultimately, every cause 
depends on the power of the First Universal Cause. Ulrich writes in a passage 
taken up identically by Berthold:
Quod vero res non conservantur nisi virtute suae causae, solum prime 
bonum, quod est prima et universalis causa omnium simpliciter, et est 
ultra omnium conservativa per providentiam propriae virtutis.42
Ulrich stresses some of the main elements of providence here and it is impor-
tant to underline its multiple philosophical implications. First of all, this provi-
dential order has an intellectual nature. Citing Boethius,43 Berthold and Ulrich 
write: “Providentia est divina ratio in summo omnium principe constituta, 
37  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 43, l. 79.
38  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 1–2; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 41, l. 41–42.
39  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §2, p. 108, l. 19–p. 109, l. 19; Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 42, l. 63–67.
40  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 8–9; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 42, l. 53.
41  Cf. Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, p. 108, l. 8–10; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 42, l. 53–55.
42  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 49–51; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 43, l. 85–87.
43  Boethius, Consolatio philosophiae, ed. C. Moreschini (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2005), 
lib. iv, pr. 6, §9, p. 122, l. 30–32.
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quae cuncta disponit”.44 The intellectual nature of providence, its divina ratio, 
is recognised by Ulrich at the beginning of the fifth treatise of Book ii of De 
summo bono in two fundamental texts:
Intellectum in Deo esse constat ex huius nominis significato, quod 
est prima omnium causa, et ex nominis ratione, quae secundum 
Damascenum consistit in universali providentia. Nec enim prima causa 
potest in causando ab alio regi, nec providentia potest esse sine intellectu, 
quia confert convenientiam ad consequendum finem […]. Secundum 
rem est ipsa essentia divina, quae inter nomina exprimentia perfectio-
nem naturae divinae sumpta a perfectionibus repertis in perfectioribus 
naturis creatis, propriissime nominatur nomine intellectus, quia haec est 
altior natura inter omnes.45
Mens […] dicitur de Deo ratione intellectus essentialiter et causaliter. 
Essentialiter quidem, quia intellectus secundum veram huius nominis 
rationem solius Dei est, quae vera ratio consistit in puritate lucis intellec-
tualis, quae nihil de obumbratione possibilitatis et potentiae materialis 
habet admixtum. […] Causaliter autem dicitur de Deo, inquantum ipse est 
causa mentis perfectae in angelis bonis et mentis participatae in natura 
rationali et mentis daemonum, inquantum est mens, et non inquantum est 
mens rationis depravatae, quia sic magis debet appellari casus a mente.46
According to Ulrich, intellectus is the real first name of the divine being that is 
also considered prima causa omnium and universalis providentia. As Beccarisi 
points out,47 Ulrich of Strassburg is really at the beginning of the formulation of 
the famous Dominican “theory of the intellect” of Cologne, especially because 
he is the first author to consider intellectus as the first of the proper transcen-
dental names of God (“essentia divina […] propriissime nominatur nomine 
intellectus”). Firstly, as Ulrich writes, this doctrine has an ontological and etio-
logical implication: “Mens dicitur de Deo ratione intellectus essentialiter et 
44  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 15, §4, p. 100, l. 89–90; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 120D, p. 98, l. 251–252.
45  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 1, §1, p. 1, l. 5–16. On this topic, see 
A. Beccarisi, “Einleitung”, in Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6, 
p. vii–xxi.
46  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 1, §1–2, p. 8, l. 2–6 and p. 9, l. 32–35.
47  A. Beccarisi, “La scientia divina dei filosofi”, p. 137–63. On this topic, see I. Zavattero, “I 
principi costitutivi delle virtù nel De Summo Bono di Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in A. Beccarisi, 
R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds.), Per perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der 
Mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburstag gewidmet (Hamburg: Meiner, 
2008), p. 111–126.
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causaliter”. The name “intellect” is appropriate to God because intellect alone 
guarantees the stability, the order, and the rationality that characterise the cos-
mos, the causa prima and providentia itself (“Nec enim prima causa potest in 
causando ab alio regi, nec providentia potest esse sine intellectu, quia confert 
convenientiam ad consequendum finem”). To these two ontological and etio-
logical aspects of intellect, according to Ulrich and Berthold, there is added 
also a noetic one. Indeed, providence, which is an expression of God’s essence 
and causality, is also the foundation of our natural knowledge of God: “Nam 
per opera providentiae primam accipimus Dei cognitionem naturalem”.48 A 
man through his natural reason can know the regulative reason of God because 
man’s reason has the same intellectual nature that characterises the essence of 
God. Certainly, Ulrich hastens to affirm, in a passage that is not found in the 
Expositio, that “opera vero creationis et institutionis naturae potius per prophe-
tiam quam per philosophiam cognoscuntur”.49 Ulrich seems to subordinate 
philosophical knowledge to a prophetic and Scriptural one, but this does not 
mean that rational knowledge cannot achieve its ultimate goal, which is the 
supreme Good. Ulrich, like Berthold, strongly believes in the cognitive power 
of natural reason, even if it analyses theological issues. Sometimes Ulrich 
seems almost to reserve more power for rational research than for revelation:
Et ex intellectu assimilativo fit intellectus divinus, scilicet cum in lumine 
intelligentiae recipimus lumen divinum, quia per lumen intelligentiae 
amplius cognoscentes divina et cognitione uniti Deo ab ipso illuminamur, 
et in hoc lumine cognoscimus Deum; nec dicimus hoc de lumine gra-
tiae gratum facientis, sed de lumine, quo Deus “illuminat omnem homi-
nem”, Ioann. 1, et quo Deus illis, id est philosophis, revelavit, ut dicitur 
Ad Rom. 1.50
And also:
In haec autem concordia philosophiae cum fidei veritate ideo sollicite 
laboravimus, ut ipsam fidem rationabilem et acceptabilem faceremus his, 
qui in philosophia nutriti sciunt insolubilibus rationibus esse demonstra-
tum caelum ab aliquo intellectu sibi intrinseco moveri.51
48  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 42–43; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 109, l. 82–83.
49  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, p. 109, l. 43–44.
50  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 7, p. 19, l. 16–22.
51  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. iv, tr. 3, c. 1, §21, p. 13, l. 289–p. 14, l. 292.
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It is now necessary to reflect on the general consideration of philosophy in 
the Expositio and in the De summo bono. These texts reveal the great impor-
tance that Ulrich attaches to philosophical inquiry, even in theological mat-
ters, and this leads us to reconsider the opinion of Berthold expressed in the 
Expositio tituli in reference to Proclus: a great man able to know God as far as 
possible for a mortal and only using the light of his natural intellect. The over-
lap between philosophy and theology typical of the philosophi theologizantes 
or the theologi philosophantes such as Proclus, which Berthold endorses and 
repurposes in his Expositio, seems to follow more closely the example of Ulrich 
than the example of Albert the Great or Dietrich of Freiberg. Indeed, Albert 
considered philosophy as something separate from theology (“Theologica 
autem non conveniunt cum philosophicis in principiis, quia fundantur super 
revelationem et inspirationem et non super rationem”)52 and Dietrich clearly 
divided the scientia divina philosophorum from nostra divina sanctorum scien-
tia.53 Ulrich instead frequently superimposes revealed theology and rational 
theology. He declares in the De summo bono that “the light of truth which is 
announced in the Gospel of John and which illuminates mankind is the light in 
which God revealed himself to philosophers,” not to Moses.54 God reveals him-
self to philosophers through the light of the natural intellect, not only through 
the power of divine grace. Furthermore, when the agreement between phi-
losophy and theology is not possible, it must be achieved by adapting the faith 
to the philosophical doctrine which is based on certain insolubilibus rationi-
bus.55 In Ulrich, philosophy can deal with theological and Scriptural matters 
and it has the same goals. In the De summo bono we find many philosophical 
questions superimposed or interposed on purely theological issues such as the 
Trinity, the Father, the Son, the Holy Spirit, the sacraments, grace, the gifts, 
virtues, beatitude, and so on.56 All these questions, the theological as well as 
the philosophical ones, are pursued by the author using philosophical argu-
ments, Biblical sources, and statements of the Fathers at the same time. This is 
52  Albert the Great, Metaphysica, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1964), lib. xi, tr. 3, 
c. 7, p. 542, l. 25–9.
53  Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto, 3.9, p. 281, l. 100–p. 282, l. 109.
54  Indeed, the revelation to Moses is in caligine, so it is covered by divine darkness (cf. Ulrich 
of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, p. 17, l. 50–p. 18, l. 60).
55  Cf. Beccarisi, “La scientia divina dei filosofi”, p. 137–63.
56  Every book of the De summo bono is focused on deepening of one of these topics: the first 
book focuses on the principles of the “supreme science” named theology; the second on 
the essence of the supreme Good and its properties; the third on the Father, the Son, and 
the Holy Spirit taken in their Unity; the fourth, fifth and sixth books respectively on the 
Father, the Son and his Incarnation, the Holy Spirit and the virtues; the seventh on the 
sacraments; the eighth on beatitude.
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because Ulrich, unlike Dietrich and Albert, does not consider there to be a real 
difference in the object or aims of philosophy and theology.
Like Ulrich, there are several elements in Berthold’s Expositio indicating 
the harmonic continuity between theological and philosophical discourses, 
although the author, unlike Ulrich, rarely uses Scriptural references in his 
work directly. Especially in the Expositio, Berthold advocated for the possibil-
ity of a philosophical investigation into theological issues. First of all, as men-
tioned earlier, there is the methodological attempt to harmonise Proclus with 
Dionysius in the Expositio. The juxtaposition of philosophical authorities with 
theological ones in the two initial lists is an attempt to announce the different 
authorities used by Berthold, who are in cooperation and not in conflict with 
each other. Secondly, the second point concerns Berthold’s reason for choos-
ing to comment on a Neoplatonic text (the Elementatio theologica) instead of 
an Aristotelian one. Berthold indicates that he found in Proclus the intention 
philosophically to analyse certain divine and theological themes lacking in 
Aristotle:
Ex praedictis evidenter apparet scientiam istam in suorum principiorum 
certitudine ratione principii cognitivi, per quod circa divina versatur, 
non solum omnibus particularibus scientiis, sed etiam metaphysicae 
Peripatetici, quae est de ente in eo, quod ens, incomparabiliter eminere.57
Proclus deals with divine themes and goes beyond the limits of Aristotelian 
philosophy.58 Precisely for this reason, he defines the Elementatio as scientia 
divinissima and its author as a philosopher-theologian inspired by God.59 As 
Zavattero shows,60 Proclus is presented by Berthold as a pagan touched by 
divine grace. Proclus is an enlightened man, a philosopher who studies divine 
themes, but also a prophet because he describes the divine in the same terms 
as Dionysius. The questions treated in the Elementatio concern the divine 
properties, the Supreme Good and beatitude:
57  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeambulum C, p. 65, l. 422–425.
58  Cf. S. Gersh, “Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy”, 
in J. Aersten, K. Emery Jr., A. Speer (eds), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und 
Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzen Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und 
Texte (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 493–503; L. Sturlese, “Il dibattito sul Proclo 
latino nel Medioevo fra l’università di Parigi e lo studium di Colonia”, in G. Boss, G. Seel 
(eds), Proclus et son influence. Actes du colloque de Neuchâtel ( juin 1985) (Zürich: Éditions 
du Grand Midi, 1987), p. 261–285.
59  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 62, l. 327–328.
60  Zavattero, “La figura e il pensiero di Proclo in Bertoldo di Moosburg”, p. 51–67.
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Ex praemissis omnibus evidenter apparet, quod non solum per opera-
tionem et scientiam sicut per duo elementa, puta practicam et theori-
cam, sed magis per elementationis theologicae altissimam philosophiam 
ascendendo redit homo ad suam perfectionem finalem, propter quam 
creatus est, scilicet felicitatem, immo, ut apertius dicam, beatitudinem.61
In this sense, Proclus’ Elementatio seeks to bring about the deification of man 
and his salvation through philosophical reflection. This is also stressed in the 
Praeambulum, in which Berthold says that Proclus’ philosophy is a “scientia 
veridica, certissima et ex hoc altissima”.62 The divine science presented by 
Proclus, according to Berthold, is superior to Aristotelian metaphysics because 
it concerns the divine, the entities which participate in goodness and the prin-
ciples that bring man to the absolute One (“ascenditur in prime unius et prime 
boni anitatis”).63 Berthold thinks that Proclus in the Elementatio ascended 
to knowledge of the divine in a philosophical way. So, for these reasons, the 
Elementatio can rightly be defined as “theological” because it truly recognises 
the possibility for philosophy to investigate divine realities.
Like Ulrich, therefore, Berthold strongly believes in the cognitive power of 
philosophy in divine themes. He constantly searches for the harmony between 
philosophers and theologians because he wants to deal with theological issues 
through a philosophical approach, following the example of the philosopher-
theologians. In this way, I think the attitude and the intention of Berthold most 
resembles Ulrich’s, who superimposes philosophical discourse with theologi-
cal discourse and always tries to find a correspondence between philosophy 
and theology. Berthold certainly follows Dietrich of Freiberg on the division of 
natural providence and voluntary providence, but he seems to be very close to 
Ulrich’s De summo bono on a textual, philosophical, and methodological level. 
Berthold and Ulrich consider that the difference between providentia naturalis 
and providentia voluntaria is only a question of method or different “points 
of view”, but it does not really concern disparate objects of research, areas of 
competence, or goals. In fact, unlike Dietrich, Berthold and Ulrich think that 
philosophy and theology have the same purpose: the deification of man and 
the attainment of ultimate bliss.
After this digression on methodological issues, it is necessary to return to 
the principal topic of this article: providence, its intellectual nature, and the 
ontological characteristics of intellect. Natural providence has an intellectual 
essence and it concerns the causal action of God in the world. According to 
61  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Exp. tit. L, p. 51, l. 475–479.
62  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb., p. 53, l. 3.
63  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 68, l. 556.
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Berthold and Ulrich, the divine perfections are communicated to the whole 
universe (communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates)64 and, accordingly, 
creatures participate to the name of God (even if imperfectly):
Et secundum quod hoc nomen ‘Deus’ dicitur a providentia secundum 
perfectionem talis rationis, sic hoc nomen Deo adeo proprium est, quod 
nec communicari potest creaturae, sicut nec communicari ei potest, 
quod non sit a prima causa, quia, si aliquod contineret se vel alia pro-
pria et non dependente virtute, illud non esset ab aliquo causatum. […] 
Inquantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet “per fatum” [Ulrich] / 
“per primordiales causas” [Berthold], sic actus providentiae participantur 
a creaturis, et per consequens nomen Dei.65
This imperfection in the communication of the same name (and of the same 
nature) is due to the causal relationship between God and creatures, which 
is a connection by analogy. Indeed, the analogical cause contains in itself the 
perfections of its effect, not in a formal way (like the univocal cause), but in an 
eminent way or in a more perfect way:
[…] haec divisio non est univoca, quia nomen commune conveniret divi-
dentibus aequaliter, nec etiam est divisio nominis aequivoci, quia tunc 
non esset in diversis nominibus respectus ad unam naturam, sed est divi-
sio analogi, quia nomen Dei proprie et primo convenit ei, cui convenit 
substantialiter, et secundario convenit participantibus divinitatem.66
The particular causal relationship, which connects God to creatures, allows the 
cause to communicate its own essence to the effect, but it also implies that 
the same nature is shared according to different degrees of perfection: in an 
excellent way in God (eminentiori modo) and in an imperfect way in creatures. 
The philosophical doctrine justifying this etiological connection is clearly that 
of essential causality, a central theme for the masters of Cologne. It is cen-
tral in Dietrich,67 who probably gave its best and classical formulation, but 
64  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 256–262; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 43, l. 97–98; 120E, p. 100, l. 298.
65  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §4–5, p. 109–110, l. 52–61; Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 43, l. 85–95.
66  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §5, p. 110, l. 67–71; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 45, l. 150–157.
67  Cf. B. Mojsisch, “Causa essentialis bei Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckhart”, in 
K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 106–
14; T. Tsopurashvili, “Die causa essentialis-Theorie als Grundlage der Sprachtheorie? 
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has a prominent role in Ulrich’s De summo bono68 and, of course, in Berthold’s 
Expositio.69 We can say that with Ulrich this etiological principle, which con-
cerns intellectual causality, is expressed in the Cologne School for the first 
time. Essential causality is introduced here in two different terms. Ulrich uses 
the concept of fatum and Berthold uses the term causa primordialis:
Ulrich: Inquantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet “per fatum” 
sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per consequens 
nomen Dei.70
Berthold: Inquantum tamen providentiam suam Deus explet “per pri-
mordiales causas” sic actus providentiae participantur a creaturis, et per 
consequens nomen Dei.71
What fate is and its close connection to essential causality could be explained 
comparing Berthold’s Propositions 120 and 141 with chapters 16 and 18 of the 
fifth treatise of Book ii of De summo bono. In these passages the problem of 
the subdivision of providence into providentia voluntaria and providentia natu-
ralis is addressed in priority. After the examination of the definitions given by 
Boethius and Dionysius, the quotation of Augustine, also used by Dietrich, is 
reported in both Ulrich and Berthold:
Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum pro-
videntiae. Dicit enim Augustinus viii libro Super Genesim: Gemina 
operatio providentiae reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et 
herbis incrementum, partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et 
hominum.72
Sprachmodelle des Dietrich von Freiberg und Meister Eckharts”, in Bochumer 
Philosophisches Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 18/1(2015), p. 108–129; V. Decaix, 
“Structure et fonction de la causalite essentielle chez Dietrich de Freiberg”, in Khôra. 
Revue d’études anciennes et médiévales 12(2014), p. 171–88.
68  Cf. A. de Libera, Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand (Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 189–206; 
A. de Libera, Introduzione alla mistica renana, p. 79–118.
69  Cf. E. Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 
2013); E. King, “Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg’s Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam Procli”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes, Volume 1. 
Western Scholarly Networks and Debates (Leiden: Brill, 2019), p. 394–437.
70  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §5, p. 110, l. 60–61.
71  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 114B, p. 43, l. 94–95.
72  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145–146, l. 256–262; Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio, 120E, p. 100, l. 300–302.
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This passage is followed by two texts in Berthold and Ulrich, which differ in 
form, but not in their meaning:
Ulrich: Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis cau-
sarum, quem philosophi determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt causae 
universales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae 
particulares. Cum ergo omnis artifex operans per instrumentum dis-
positionem artis instrumentis infundat, necessario dispositio divinae 
providentiae huic conexioni causarum infunditur. Haec ergo dispositio 
providentiae infusa toti isti conexioni causarum fatum vocatur, ut dicit 
Boethius, prout philosophi de fato loquuntur.73
Berthold: Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis cau-
sarum qui in hoc volumine exprimitur, quibus omnibus supereminent 
ipsae primordiales causae, quas auctor vocat deos.74
According to Ulrich, the providence that refers to the ordo naturalis as con-
exio causarum is providentia naturalis and this providence is also called fatum. 
Fate, quod est effectum providentiae voluntariae75 – meaning it depends on the 
free will of God – has an intellectual nature and it is the expression of a ratio-
nal power which orders everything due to a connection of causes and entities 
governed by a First Principle. Therefore, Ulrich considers fatum naturale to 
be synonymous with providentia naturalis and judges that it has a prominent 
role in the order and movements of the heavens. Fatum naturale or providentia 
naturalis is an expression of the necessary order of the universe that appears 
as an unalterable connection of causes:
Dispositio autem fati naturalis primo habet esse in ordine et motu caelo-
rum. Et ideo substantiae caelorum et ordo et motus non cadunt sub fatali 
dispositione, sed cadunt sub providentia, quia ab ipsa sunt causata et ab 
ipsa continentur et gubernantur.76
Berthold in the Expositio generally does not use the expression fatum. He uses 
the concept of “primordial cause” as synonymous with “essential cause.” The 
lemma fatum, employed by Berthold in the same sense as Ulrich, that is, as 
73  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 262–p. 146, l. 266.
74  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120E, p. 100, l. 303–305.
75  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §11, p. 114, l. 186–189.
76  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §14, p. 149, l. 361–364.
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synonymous with providentia naturalis, can be found in the Expositio only 
in Proposition 141, in a long text copied from prose 6 of Book iv of Boethius’ 
Consolatio philosophiae and from Proclus’ De providentia et fato. Why does 
Berthold use the expression “fate” less frequently than Ulrich? Could it be that, 
for some philosophical or theological reason, he normally prefers to use other 
lemmas to refer to providentia naturalis? If so, why? I have not found a defini-
tive answer to these questions. According to Berthold, the causae primordiales 
are the causes of the invisibilia Dei and they are organised in perfect orders, at 
the top of which there is God. They are also called by the Dominican master 
“infinitates, enter entia, vitae, intellectuales hypostases et animae totales et 
partiales et his participantia” and their determination is the responsibility of 
natural providence:
Et hoc de primis invisibilibus praedictis. Sunt praeterea invisibilia effec-
tus primordialium causarum, et hoc sive per se perfecta sive in aliis sub-
sistentiam habentia. Per se perfecta, puta infinitates, enter entia, vitae, 
intellectuales hypostases et animae totales et partiales et his participan-
tia. De quibus (scilicet primordialibus causis et earum effectibus) sic dicit 
Dionysius 11 cap. et est supra allegatum: ‘Et primo ipsorum (scilicet per se 
esse, per se virtutis etc.) bonus dicitur substantificator esse, postea toto-
rum ipsorum (id est ordinum, quos causae primordiales instituunt: isti 
ordines dicuntur tota, quia per se perfecti), postea particularium ipso-
rum (scilicet singularium ipsorum ordinum), postea particulariter ipsis 
participantium (in quibus sunt perfectiones superiorum nec primo nec 
per se, sicut est intellectualitas in nobis hominibus et a nobis particulari-
ter participata).’ Ista sunt invisibilia Dei transitive accepta, de quibus in 
ista elementatione theologica subtilissime pertractatur, quantum perti-
net ad providentiam naturalem.77
Therefore, Ulrich’s fatum and Berthold’s causae primordiales refer to the same 
order of entities, serve the same purpose, and refer to the same etiological 
doctrine. I shall conclude my analysis with the mention of Proposition 144, 
but without going into details because in this proposition Berthold repeats 
the same issues discussed above. In this proposition, the harmony of cre-
ation is underlined once again starting from the Biblical expression, Disponit 
omnia suaviter.78 Indeed, God orders everything in mensura, numero, et 
77  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 5, p. 13, l. 251–266.
78  Wisdom 8:1.
225Berthold of Moosburg, Reader of Ulrich of Strassburg
pondere79 and this disposition is a rational effect of providence. Once again, 
in the cosmological order there is no place for casus; everything is determined 
and this order is established by natural providence, which is the conexio cau-
sarum. Such providence, finally, “est divina ratio in summo omnium principe 
constituta, quae cuncta disponit”.80
 Conclusions
In this paper, I have attempted to show how Berthold uses Ulrich’s text and 
philosophy for the elaboration of the concept of providentia naturalis. Starting 
from the comparison between these two theologians, I have also tried to prove 
how in Ulrich’s De summo bono, before Dietrich, we find a clear distinction 
between providentia naturalis and providentia voluntaria. Providentia naturalis 
is interpreted for the first time by Ulrich as the conexio causarum that orders 
the cosmos in a rational way. Both Ulrich and Berthold deepen the question 
of providential action, using an innovative theory of intellect and especially 
by employing the etiological doctrine of “essential causality”. In Ulrich we see 
the attempt to establish the conditions for the natural knowledge of God and 
of the providential order that rules the world. This attempt is justified by the 
rationality of the universe itself and by the causal relationship between the 
essence of God and everything that has the same intellectual nature, includ-
ing man. The possibility of knowing God depends on the idea that providence 
is the development, in the world, of the same invisibilia Dei. In Ulrich, even 
before Dietrich, providentia naturalis is interpreted as a conexio causarum that 
rules the universe. This connection has its own origin in the First Cause, which 
analogically communicates its essence. This sharing is imperfect, such that 
there is an equality secundum essentia and a diversity secundum esse between 
the cause and its effect:
Tertio modo consideratur secundum relationem ad effectum, et sic est 
regula effectuum omnium et operum proveniens ex applicatione causa-
rum ad effectus particulares. Et haec regula, ut est a prima causa et ut 
consideratur in sua essentia, et ut per esse est in causis vere necessaris, 
79  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 15, §1, p. 97, l. 4; Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio, 144B, p. 75, l. 27.
80  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 15, §4, p. 100, l. 89–90; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 144B, p. 76, l. 54–55.
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est necessaria et immobilis, licet secundum esse, quod habet in proximis 
causis, mutetur.81
Ulrich is the first thinker in the entire Dominican School of Cologne who 
clearly identifies natural providence with the rational order of causes that 
links everything existing in the universe to the First Principle.82 This philo-
sophical and doctrinal approach is also found in Berthold’s Expositio and it 
seems to be very similar to Ulrich’s. In this paper, I have tried to show the tex-
tual and theoretical dependence of the Expositio on the De summo bono: the 
cura de omnibus and the ordo qui cuncta complectitur constitute for Ulrich 
and Berthold the causal order that rules in the cosmos. This ordo holds every-
thing together and it is the effect of the First Cause, which communicates its 
nature to creatures imperfectly, according to the doctrine of essential causal-
ity. Furthermore, for Berthold and Ulrich, natural providence is part of the 
rational investigation of philosophers and has an ontological, etiological, and 
noetic importance. Berthold found in the attitude of Ulrich, who combines 
philosophical and theological issues and uses philosophy for in the investiga-
tion of divine questions, a similar method to that of the philosophi theologi-
zantes sive theologi philosophantes, groups that include Proclus and Berthold 
himself. In my opinion, this method differs both from Albert and Dietrich, 
who clearly divide the spheres of competence of philosophy and theology. All 
these aspects enable us to reconsider a continuity of ideas between Ulrich and 
Berthold, demonstrated by the textual dependence of the Expositio on the De 
summo bono. In my view, Berthold’s careful and faithful use of the De summo 
bono presupposes a deep and shared approach to theoretical and method-
ological questions. Ultimately, through this paper, I have tried to show that the 
impact of Ulrich’s De summo bono for the Expositio was unduly neglected, and 
that it deserves to be rediscovered for a better understanding not just of both 
Berthold’s and Ulrich’s philosophies, but also of the cultural context in which 
they lived and worked. Reconsidering the influence of the De summo bono on 
the subsequent generations of Dominican authors active in the studia beyond 
the Rhine could truly corroborate and enrich the epithet that Grabmann, at 
the beginning of the 20th century, prophetically assigned to Ulrich as a true 
“co-founder” of the Cologne School: a fundamental cornerstone for the entire 
Dominican tradition.
81  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §12, p. 148, l. 333–337.
82  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §14, p. 149, l. 361–364.
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 Appendix
Ulrich of Strassburg
Hoc nomen Deus quantum ad primum 
significatum, quod est ratio, a qua impo-
nitur nomen, significat providentiam, 
quia, sicut dicit Maximus super 12 cap. 
Dionysii De divinis nominibus: “Hoc 
nomen ‘theos’, quod apud nos est Deus, 
duas habet derivationes apud Graecos, 
quia vel derivatur ab hoc verbo ‘theoro’, 
id est ‘video’ sive ‘contemplor’ sive 
‘considero’, quia omnia circumspicit, 
vel ab hoc verbo ‘theo’, quod est ‘curro’, 
quia omnia providentia circuit” eo cir-
cuitu, de quo dicit Boethius in iv libro 
De consolatione: “Ordo”, inquit, “quidam 
cuncta complectitur, ut, quod assignata 
ordinis ratione decesserit, hoc licet in 
alium, tamen ordinem relabatur, ne quid 
in regno providentiae liceat temeritati”. 
Damascenus autem libro i cap. 12 dicit: 
“Post nomen ‘Qui est’, quod idem cum 
nomine boni est et est primum inter 
nomina Dei, hoc nomen Deus est nomen 
secundum, et est nomen operationis. Et 
dicitur hoc ‘theos’, id est Deus, vel ab 
‘ethin’, id est curare vel fovere universa”, 
secundum illud Gen. 14: “Spiritus Dei 
ferebatur super aquas”, id est incubabat 
et fovebat, ut dicit alia translatio. “Vel 
ab ethin, id est ardens”. Ut enim dicit 
Deut. 4 et Hebr. 13: Deus noster ignis 
consumens omnium malitiam est. “Vel 
a ‘theaste’, id est considerando omnia” 
secundum illud Hebr. 4: “Omnia nuda et 
aperta sunt oculis eius” etc.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §1, 
p. 108, l. 1–18).
Berthold of Moosburg
De secundo sciendum, quod hoc nomen 
‘Deus’ quantum ad primum significatum, 
quod est ratio, a qua imponitur nomen, 
significat providentiam, quia, sicut 
Maximus monachus super 12 cap. De divinis 
nominibus Dionysii tractans descriptionem 
deitatis, qua dicitur ibi: “Deitas autem, quae 
omnia videt providentia et bonitate per-
fecta, omnia circumspiciens et continens 
et se ipsa implens et excedens omnia provi-
dentia ipsa utentia”, hanc, inquam, descrip-
tionem deitatis tractans sic dicit: Hoc 
nomen ‘theos’, quod apud nos est ‘Deus’, 
duas habet derivationes apud Graecos, 
quia vel derivatur ab hoc verbo ‘theoro’, 
id est ‘video’ sive ‘contemplor’ sive ‘consi-
dero’, quia omnia circumspicit, vel ab hoc 
verbo ‘theo’, quod est ‘curro’, quia omnia 
providentia sua circuit” (haec Maximus) eo 
circuitu, de quo dicit Boethius in iv libro 
De consolatione prosa 6 circa finem: “Sola 
est enim divina vis, cui quoque mala bona 
sint, cum eis competenter utendo alicuius 
boni elicit effectum. Ordo enim quidam 
est, qui cuncta complectitur, ut, quod ab 
assignata ordinis ratione discesserit, hoc 
licet in alium, tamen ordinem relabatur, 
ne quid in regno providentiae liceat teme-
ritati”. Damascenus autem libro i cap. 12 
dicit: “Sicut autem sanctus Dionysius ait, 
‘bonum’” est principalius nomen eius. “Non 
enim est in Deo dicere primum esse, et ita 
bonum. Secundum vero nomen ‘theos’, id 
est ‘Deus’, quod dicitur vel ab eo, quod est 
‘thetin’, id est currere vel fovere universa, 
vel ab ‘ethim’, id est ardens”. Et infra: “vel
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Ex quibus omnibus colligitur, quod 
hoc nomen quantum ad primum suum 
significatum est nomen providentiae 
Dei secundum quattuor eius opera, quae 
sunt: “prudentia, qua scit, quid unicuique 
congruit, et cura, qua bona conservat, et 
tertio bonitas, qua nocumenta repellit, 
et quarto providentiae circuitus, qua 
non solum bona, sed etiam mala, quae 
permittit, ordinat ad bonum. Et sic hoc 
nomen describit Dionysius 12 cap. De 
divinis nominibus dicens: “Deitas dicitur, 
quae omnia videt” prospectu regiminis, 
sicut frequenter dicitur in Scriptura: 
“Videat Dominus et iudicet”, et Gen. 22: 
“Unde usque hodie dicitur: in monte 
Dominus videbit”. Providentia curae, de 
qua Sap. 12: “Nec enim est alius Deus, 
quam tu, cui cura est de omnibus omnia 
circumspiciens”, scilicet non solum 
bona, sed etiam mala circumspectione 
ordinis, quae, ut dictum est, cuncta com-
plectitur. Et “bonitate perfecta”, qua non 
solum placuit omnia fieri, sed etiam facta 
placent, ut conserventur, Gen. 1: “Vidit 
Deus cuncta, quae fecerat” etc., “omnia 
bona continens” con sumenda mala, ne 
ipsa mala consumant bona. Sic enim 
continentur bona in sua natura, quam 
malum privat et corrumpit, “et se ipsa 
implens omnia” deducendo singula 
secundum suas capacitates in proprios 
fines, in quibus participant proportio-
naliter summum bonum ut finem ulti-
mum, “et execedens omnia providentia
a ‘theaste’, id est a considerando omnia. 
Nulla enim eum latent, immo omnium est 
contemplator”. Haec Damascenus.
(Expositio, 114B, p. 41–42, l. 41–62).
Ex quibus omnibus colligitur, quod hoc 
nomen ‘Deus’ quantum ad primum suum 
significatum est nomen providentiae ipsius 
quantum ad quattuor eius opera, quae 
sunt prudentia, qua scit, quid unicuique 
congruit, et cura, qua bona conservat, et 
tertio bonitas, qua nocumenta repellit, 
et quarto providentiae circuitus, qua non 
solum bona, sed etiam mala, quae permit-
tit, ordinat ad bonum. Et sic hoc nomen 
‘deitas’ describit Dionysius ubi supra 
dicens: “Deitas autem dicitur, quae omnia 
videt” prospectu regiminis; “providentia” 
curae “et bonitate perfecta”, qua non solum 
diffundit se in omnium creatione, sed et 
platicorum conservatione “omnia circum-
spiciens”, non solum bona, sed etiam mala 
circumspectione ordinis, qui, ut dictum est 
ex Boethio, “cuncta complectitur”, omnia 
“continens” consumenda mala, ne consu-
mant bona. Sic enim continentur bona in 
sua natura, quam naturam malum privat et 
corrumpit “et se ipsa implens” omnia dedu-
cendo singula secundum suas capacitates 
in proprios fines, in quibus participant pro-
portionaliter summum bonum et ultimum 
finem “et excedens omnia providentia ipsa 
utentia”, quia regit res ita, quod non com-
miscetur cum eis.
(Expositio, 114B, p. 42, l. 63–77).
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ipsa utentia”, quia regit res ita, quod non 
permiscetur cum eis.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §2, 
p. 108, l. 19–p. 109, l. 36).
Ex his patet bonitas huius definitionis, 
quia non est definitio rei significatae, 
quae simplex est et definiri non potest, 
sed est expositio nominis. Et ideo ponit 
quattuor actus, a quibus nomen hoc 
impositum est. Sed quantum ad id, cui 
impositum est nomen, quod est secun-
dum eius significatum, significat ipsam 
naturam divinam praeomnibus aliis Dei 
nominibus quoad nos. Nam per opera 
providentiae primam accipimus Dei 
cognitionem naturalem. Opera vero 
creationis et institutionis naturae potius 
per prophetiam quam per philosophiam 
cognoscuntur. Unde hoc, quod scribitur 
Gen. 1, vocat Gregorius Super Ezechielem: 
“Prophetiam de praeterito”. Propter quod 
potius argumentum, per quod in libro 
De natura deorum probatur, quod Deus 
sit, sumitur a providentia, a qua nomen 
Dei dicitur. Et sic vere dicit Ambrosius in 
libro De Trinitate, quod Deus nomen est 
naturae.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §3, 
p. 109, l. 37–48).
Quia vero res non conservatur nisi virtute 
suae causae, sola prima et universalis 
omnium causa est universaliter omnium 
conservativa per providentiam propriae 
virtutis. Et secundum quod hoc nomen 
‘Deus’ dicitur a providentia secundum 
perfectionem talis rationis, sic hoc 
nomen Deo adeo proprium est, quod 
nec communicari potest creaturae, sicut
Ex his patet bonitas huius descriptionis, 
cum non sit definitio rei significatae, quae 
est simplex et definiri non potest, sed est 
expositio nominis. Et ideo ponit quattuor 
actus, a quibus hoc nomen ‘Deus’ impo-
situm est. Sed quantum ad id, cui nomen 
impositum est, quod est secundum eius 
significatum, significat ipsam naturam, 
essentiam seu intentionem omnibus emi-
nentissimam, quia per opera providentiae 
in cognitionem naturae prime devenimus. 
Unde et Deus dicitur et est nomen naturae.
(Expositio, 114B, p. 43, l. 78–84).
Quod vero res non conservantur nisi virtute 
suae causae, solum prime bonum, quod est 
prima et universalis causa omnium sim-
pliciter, est ultra omnium conservativa per 
providentiam propriae virtutis. Et secun-
dum quod hoc nomen dicitur a providen-
tia secundum perfectionem talis rationis, 
sic hoc nomen ‘Deus’ prime bono adeo 
proprium est, quod inquantum huiusmodi 
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nec communicari ei potest, quod non sit 
a prima causa, quia, si aliquod contine-
ret se vel alia propria et non dependente 
virtute, illud non esset ab aliquo causa-
tum. Et sic ipse dicit Deut. 32: “Videte, 
quod ego sim solus et non sit alius Deus 
praeter me”. Et probat hoc per opera 
providentiae dicens: “Ego occidam” etc. 
Ideo dicitur Sap. 14: “Incommunicabile 
nomen lapidibus et lignis imposuerunt”. 
Inquantum tamen providentiam suam 
Deus explet per fatum, sic actus provi-
dentiae participantur a creaturis, et per 
consequens nomen Dei.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §4–5, 
p. 109, l. 49–p. 110, l. 61).
Ad horum ergo intellectum considere-
mus primo, quid hoc nomine significetur. 
Deus omnia, quae causat, per providen-
tiam causat eo, quod ipse operatur per 
intellectum et artem. Et quamvis per se 
principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut 
dignitas causalitatis et divinae coope-
rationis non deesset universo, cui com-
municatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates 
naturaliter communicabiles, operatur 
etiam per secundas causas. Et illae sunt 
ordinatae dupliciter secundum dupli-
cem modum providentiae.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, 
p. 145, l. 256–261).
Et patet, quod haec divisio non est uni-
voca, quia nomen commune conveniret 
dividentibus aequaliter, nec etiam est 
divisio nominis aequivoci, quia tunc non 
esset in diversis nominibus respectus 
ad unam naturam, sed est divisio ana-
logi, quia nomen Dei proprie et primo
nec ipsis per se bonitatibus communicari 
potest, sicut nec communicari eis potest, 
quod non sint a prime bono, quia, si aliquid 
contineret se vel alia propria et non depen-
dente virtute, illud non esset ab alio cau-
satum. Inquantum tamen prime bonum 
explet providentiam suam per primordia-
les causas, sic actus providentiae primitus 
est in diis, ut infra videbitur, et per conse-
quens nomen Dei.
(Expositio, 114B, p. 43, l. 85–95).
Ad cuius intellectum considerandum, quod 
prime bonum omnia, quae creat, per provi-
dentiam gubernat. Et quamvis per se prin-
cipaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas 
causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non 
deesset universo, cui communicatae sunt 
omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter sibi 
communicabiles, ita, quod nullus gradus 
bonitatis sibi desit, cum prime boni opus 
sit perfectissimum, operatur etiam per pri-
mordiales causas et secundarias.
(Expositio, 114B, p. 43, l. 95–100).
Ubi tamen sciendum, quod divisio divini 
nominis non est divisio nec univoci, quia 
nomen commune conveniret dividentibus 
aequaliter, nec est divisio nominis aequi-
voci, si proprie loquamur, quia tunc non 
esset universis nominibus respectus ad 
unam naturam, sed est divisio analogi, quia
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convenit ei, cui convenit substantialiter, 
et secundario convenit participantibus 
divinitatem, sicut sunt sancti, ut dicit 
Glossa ibidem.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §5, 
p. 110, l. 67–72).
nomen Dei causaliter et principaliformiter 
convenit ei, cui superessentialiter attribui-
tur et per consequens prime, primo autem 
et per se, quibus convenit essentialiter, et 
deinde participantibus proprietate divina 
secundum prius et posterius, sicut patet de 
nuncupative dictis diis, inferius apparebit.
(Expositio, 114C–D, p. 45, l. 150–157).
Definitur quoque providentia multipli-
citer. Damascenus 29 cap. ii libri ponit 
duas definitiones. Prima est data per 
effectum, cum dicit: “Providentia est ea, 
quae ex Deo ad existentia fit cura”. Haec 
enim cura est fatum, quod est effectum 
providentiae. Secunda datur, secundum 
quod providentia tamquam practica 
scientia in se concipit voluntatem, cum 
dicit: “Providentia est voluntas Dei”, 
id est ratio recta cum voluntate. Unde 
ipse statim subdit: “Necesse est omnia, 
quae providentia fiunt, secundum rec-
tam rationem fieri”, propter quam, scili-
cet voluntatem, omnia, quae sunt, quia 
effectus providentiae est circa entia, 
suscipiunt deductionem in suos fines. 
Boethius autem in iv libro De consola-
tione ponit alias duas definitiones. Prima 
datur de providentia, prout est scientia 
operativa. Unde dicit: “Providentia est 
divina ratio”, id est rationalis modus in 
divina intelligentia existens, quae mul-
tiplicem rebus regendis modum statuit, 
cum ipsa in se simplex sit “in summo 
omnium principe constituta”. Quia prae-
dictus modus non refertur extra mentem 
divinam ad ea, quae movet atque dis-
ponit, tunc non providentia, sed fatum 
appellatur, quae scilicet ratio “cuncta” 
propter universalitatem providentiae 
“disponit” ordinando in finem. Secunda
Secundum vero quid rei definitur multi-
pliciter. Damascenus enim ubi supra ponit 
duas definitiones. Prima est data per effec-
tum, cum dicit: “Providentia est ea, quae ex 
Deo ad existentia fit cura”. Secunda datur, 
secundum quod providentia tamquam 
practica scientia in se concipit voluntatem, 
cum dicit: “Providentia est voluntas Dei, per 
quam omnia, quae sunt, suscipiunt deduc-
tionem” in suos fines. Boethius autem in iv 
libro De consolatione ponit alias duas defi-
nitiones. Quarum prima datur, prout est 
scientia operativa. Unde dicit: “Providentia 
est divina ratio in summo omnium principe 
constituta, quae cuncta disponit”. Secunda 
vero est a causa. Unde dicit: Providentia 
est “simplex et immobilis forma rerum 
gerendarum”.
(Expositio, 120D, p. 98, l. 245–254).
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vero definitio est huius expositio. Dicit 
enim: “Providentia est forma simplex et 
immobilis forma rerum gerendarum”.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §11, 
p. 114, l. 186–203).
Sicut autem creatio instituit naturam, 
sic providentia res institutas dedu-
cit in congruos sibi fines. Et ideo dicit 
Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis nominibus: 
“Sicut providentia uniuscuiusque natu-
rae est salvativa, per se mobilia providet 
ut per se mobilia et tota iuxta proprieta-
tem totius et uniuscuiusque”, scilicet est 
providentia, secundum quod “proviso-
rum natura suscipit provisivas bonitates 
largissime providentiae proportionabili-
ter attributas unicuique”. Et huius exem-
plum in naturalibus ponit Philosophus 
in xi Metaphysicae in patre familias 
magnae domus. Ibi enim regimen patris 
familias perfecte suscipiunt liberi per 
amorem patris nihil agentes licentiose. 
Servi autem suscipiunt illud imperfecte, 
quia ex timore suscipiunt et interdum 
delinquunt. Bestiae vero semper ab eo 
errant, nisi inquantum violentia agun-
tur. Sic enim vult Philosophus, quod 
prima causa omnia ordinat in bonum 
suum, sed necessaria, quae sunt semper 
eodem modo sine exorbitatione, illam 
ordinationem servant ut filii. Ea autem, 
quae sunt frequenter, sunt sicut servi, et 
quia permixtas habent sibi malitias, non 
attingunt bonum universi, nisi inquan-
tum reguntur ab his, quae sunt semper. 
Ea vero, quae raro fiunt, sunt sicut bes-
tiae, et non diriguntur in bonum uni-
versi nisi quodam freno eorum, quae 
sunt semper et quae fiunt frequenter.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 16, §8, 
p. 112, l. 119–135).
Dico autem unicuique, quia, ut dicit 
Dionysius 4 cap. De divinis nominibus circa 
finem, “providentia est uniuscuiusque 
naturae salvativa, per se mobilia providet 
ut per se mobilia et tota et particularia 
iuxta proprietatem totius et uniuscuiusque, 
inquantum provisorum natura suscipit 
totius et largissimae providentiae propor-
tionaliter attributas unicuique provisivas 
bonitates”. Haec Dionysius. Et huius exem-
plum in naturalibus ponit Aristoteles in 
xii Metaphysicae in patre familias magnae 
domus. Ibi enim regimen patris familias 
perfecte suscipiunt liberi propter amorem 
patris nihil agentes licentiose. Servi autem 
suscipiunt illud imperfecte, quia ex timore 
suscipiunt et ideo interdum delinquunt. 
Bestiae vero semper ab eo errant, nisi 
inquantum violentia ab eo aguntur. Sic 
enim vult Aristoteles, quod prima causa 
omnia ordinat in bonum suum, sed neces-
saria, quae sunt semper eodem modo sine 
exorbitatione, illam ordinationem servant, 
ut filii. Ea autem, quae sunt frequenter, 
sicut servi, et permixtas habent sibi mali-
tias et non attingunt bonum universi, nisi 
inquantum reguntur ab his, quae sunt sem-
per. Ea vero, quae raro fiunt, sunt sicut bes-
tiae, et non diriguntur in bonum universi, 
nisi quodam freno eorum, quae sunt sem-
per et quae fiunt frequenter.
(Expositio, 120D, p. 99, l. 277–292).
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Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia 
efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis 
et divinae cooperationis non deesset 
universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes 
divinae bonitates naturaliter commu-
nicabiles, operatur etiam per secundas 
causas. Et illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter 
secundum duplicem modum providen-
tiae. Dicit enim Augustinus viii libro 
Super Genesim: “Gemina operatio pro-
videntiae reperitur: partim naturalis, 
per quam dat lignis et herbis incremen-
tum, partim voluntaria per operationem 
angelorum et hominum”. Secundum 
primum actum providentiae est ordo 
naturalis causarum, quem philosophi 
determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt 
causae universales, scilicet caelestia et 
motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae 
particulares. Cum ergo omnis artifex 
operans per instrumentum dispositio-
nem artis instrumentis infundat, neces-
sario dispositio divinae providentiae 
huic conexioni causarum infunditur. 
Haec ergo dispositio providentiae infusa 
toti isti conexioni causarum fatum voca-
tur, ut dicit Boethius, prout philosophi 
de fato loquuuntur.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, 
p. 145, l. 258–p. 146, l. 266).
Circa tertium sciendum, quod, licet prime 
bonum super omnia superbenedictus Deus 
per se principaliter omnia efficiat et per 
providentiam gubernet, tamen, ut dignitas 
causalitatis et divinae cooperationis, quae 
est divinissimum operum, non deesset uni-
verso, cui communicati sunt omnes gradus 
divinae bonitatis possibiles existere, opera-
tur etiam per secundas causas a se, scilicet 
per primordiales. Et istae sunt ordinatae 
dupliciter secundum duplicem modum 
providentiae, quae distinguit Augustinus 
viii Hexaemeron sui dicens, quod “gemina 
operatio providentiae invenitur, partim 
naturalis, partim voluntaria”. Secundum 
primum actum providentiae est ordo 
naturalis causarum qui in hoc volumine 
exprimitur, quibus omnibus supereminent 
ipsae primordiales causae, quas auctor 
vocat deos.
(Expositio, 120E, p. 100, l. 295–305).
Ad providentiam divinam tria concur-
runt, a quibus Deus nominatur 
ratione providentiae, propter quod 
Dionysius 12 cap. De divinis nominibus 
haec tria nomina coniungit cum hoc 
nomine ‘Deus’. Unum est praesidentia, 
qua ad ipsum pertinet prospicere subiec-
tis propter amorem, qui “superiora 
movet ad providentiam minus haben-
tium”. Et sic est hoc nomen ‘dominus’.
Superius ostensa est deorum providen-
tia. Verum quia ad divinam providentiam 
tria concurrunt, scilicet praesidentia, qua 
ad ipsum pertinet prospicere subiectis 
propter amorem, qui “superiora movet ad 
providentiam minus habentium”, unde 
Dionysius sic dicit 4 cap. De divinis nomi-
nibis: “Ipse omnium causa pulchro et bono 
omnium amore per abundantiam amati-
vae bonitatis extra se ipsum fit ad omnia 
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Secundum est ipse actus regiminis, quo 
Deus cuncta gubernat. Et sic est hoc 
nomen ‘rex’. Tertium est modus regi-
minis, quo summus rex sic regit omnia 
quod non commiscetur cum eis. Tertium 
est modus regiminis, quo summus rex 
sic regit omnia quod non commiscetur 
cum eis. Et ideo nihil inquinatum incur-
rit in eum. Et sic est hoc nomen ‘sanctus’.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 17, §1, 
p. 121, l. 1–10).
existentia providentiis”. Secundum, quod 
concurrit ad providentiam, est actus 
regiminis, qui exit a potentia. Tertium est 
cognitionis eminentia, qua consideret, 
quid unicuique congruat. Et ideo auctor in 
praesenti elemento ostendit, qualis sit deo-
rum essentia, potentia et scientia dicens: 
omne etc.
(Expositio, 121, p. 105, l. 5–13).
Ad horum ergo intellectum considere-
mus primo, quid hoc nomine significetur 
Deus omnia, quae causat, per providen-
tiam causat eo, quod ipse operatur per 
intellectum et artem. Et quamvis per 
se principaliter omnia efficiat, tamen, 
ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae coo-
perationis non deesset universo, cui 
communicatae sunt omnes divinae 
bonitates naturaliter communicabiles, 
operatur etiam per secundas causas. Et 
illae sunt ordinatae dupliciter secun-
dum duplicem modum providentiae. 
Dicit enim Augustinus viii libro Super 
Genesim: “Gemina operatio providentiae 
reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat 
lignis et herbis incrementum, partim 
voluntaria per operationem angelorum 
et hominum”. Secundum primum actum 
providentiae est ordo naturalis causa-
rum, quem philosophi determinant, 
scilicet quod primo sunt causae univer-
sales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, 
et sub illis sunt causae particulares. 
Cum ergo omnis artifex operans per 
instrumentum dispositionem artis ins-
trumentis infundat, necessario disposi-
tio divinae providentiae huic conexioni 
causarum infunditur. Haec ergo
De primo sciendum, sicut aliqualiter dic-
tum est super 120, duplex est providentia, 
naturalis scilicet et voluntaria. Et habetur 
ista distinctio ab Augustino viii Super 
Genesim ad litteram, ubi dicit tractans illud 
verbum “ut operaretur et custodiret”: “Hinc 
iam in ipsum mundum velut in quandam 
magnam arborem rerum oculus cogitatio-
nis attollitur atque in ipso quoque gemina 
operatio providentiae reperitur, partim 
naturalis, partim voluntaria. Naturalis qui-
dem per occultam Dei administrationem, 
quae et lignis et herbis dat incrementum, 
voluntaria vero per angelorum opera et 
hominum. Secundum illam primam cae-
lestia superius ordinari inferiusque ter-
restria, lumina sideraque fulgere” – et 
infra – “et quidquid aliud in rebus interiore 
naturalique motu geritur. In hac autem 
altera signa dari, doceri et discere, agros 
coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri, 
et quaeque alia sive in superna societate 
aguntur sive in hac terrena atque mortali 
ita, ut bonis consolatur”. Et infra: “Deus 
itaque super omnia, qui condidit omnia 
et regit omnia, omnes naturas bonus 
creat, omnes voluntates iustus ordinat”. 
Haec Augustinus. Verum, quia in naturali 
providentia est ordo et conexio causarum
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dispositio providentiae infusa toti isti 
conexioni causarum fatum vocatur, ut 
dicit Boethius, prout philosophi de fato 
loquuuntur.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, 
p. 145, l. 256–p. 146, l. 266).
essentialium et substantialium, ideo sub-
dividitur in conditivam, contentivam et 
provisivam.
(Expositio, 141A, p. 45, l. 11–26).
Dispositionem in Deo esse Scriptura 
testatur, Sap. 8: “Disponit omnia suavi-
ter”. Et quod non solum in Deo sit sicut 
in causa dispositionis rerum, sed sicut 
in disponente per intellectum, probat 
Augustinus in libro Super Genesim trac-
tans illud Sap. 11: “Omnia in mensura, 
numero et pondere disposuisti”, quia 
vel haec sunt in creaturis vel in creatore. 
Non in creaturis, quia sunt facta, et si 
omnia facta disposita sunt in his, ipsa 
etiam disposita sunt in se ipsis, quia, si 
in aliis essent disposita, non omnia Deus 
in his disposuit. Impossibile autem est 
rem disponi in se ipsa. Ergo reliquum 
membrum verum est, scilicet quod haec 
sunt extra creaturas in creatore et quod 
disposuisse “omnia in mensura” etc. et 
omnia disposuisse in se, qui est “mensura 
omni rei modum praefigens et numerus 
omni rei speciem praehabens et pondus 
omnem rem ad quietem trahens”.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 15, §1, 
p. 97, l. 3–12).
Et licet dispositio divina, inquantum est 
practica, implicet divinam voluntatem, 
et inquantum scientia practica Dei est 
causa scitorum, implicet potentiam, 
tamen secundum principalem rationem 
nominis pertinet ad scientiam divinam, 
in qua secundum rationes exemplares 
omnia sunt praeordinata. Et quia hoc
De secundo notandum, quod dispositio 
multa significat. Aliquando enim dicit 
praedefinitionem simpliciter prime Dei, ut 
est in ipso praedefiniente secundum illud: 
“disponit omnia suaviter”. Et quod non 
solum in Deo sit sicut in causa dispositio-
nis rerum, sed sicut in disponente per intel-
lectum, probat Augustinus Super Genesim 
tractans illud: “omnia in mensura, numero 
et pondere disposuisti”, quia vel haec sunt 
in creaturis vel in creatore. Non in creaturis, 
quia sunt facta, et si omnia facta disposita 
sunt in his, ipsa etiam disposita sunt in his 
se ipsis, quia si in aliis essent disposita, non 
omnia Deus in his disposuisset. Impossibile 
autem est rem disponi in se ipsa: ergo reli-
quum membrum verum est, scilicet quod 
haec sunt extra creaturas in creatore et 
quod disposuisse “omnia in mensura” etc. 
est omnia disposuisse in se, qui est “men-
sura omni rei modum praefigens et nume-
rus omni rei speciem praebens et pondus 
omnem rem ad quietem trahens”.
(Expositio, 144B, p. 75, l. 23–p. 76, l. 34).
Et licet talis dispositio divina implicet divi-
nam voluntatem et, inquantum scientia 
practica Dei est causa scitorum, implicet 
potentiam, tamen secundum principalem 
rationem nominis pertinet ad scientiam 
divinam, in qua secundum rationes exem-
plares omnia sunt praeordinata. Et quia 
hoc attributum appropriatur Verbo divino, 
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attributum appropriatur Verbo divino, 
ideo dicit Glossa super principium 
Genesis, quod Deus uno modo operatur 
in Verbo omnia disponendo, “quoniam 
in ipso condita sunt universa”, Col. 1, et 
parum infra: “Omnia per ipsum et in ipso 
creata sunt”, scilicet secundum quod 
conceptus rei res ipsa vocatur.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 15, §3, 
p. 99, l. 75–82).
Ab hac dispositione efficientia ipsius 
vocatur dispositio, secundum quod tria 
distinguuntur opera Dei primo, scili-
cet creationis, dispositionis, ornatus, et 
ulterius ipse effectus huius efficientiae 
vocatur dispositio, Sap. 7, “ut sciam dis-
positionem orbis terrarum”, et tertio 
huius effectus habitualiter inserti in 
natura rerum productio ad actum et per-
fectionem est etiam dispositio, Sap. 8: 
“Disponit omnia suaviter”, et haec dis-
positio proprie est effectus providentiae. 
Unde Boethius in iv libro De consola-
tione: “Providentia est divina ratio in 
summo omnium principe constituta, 
quae cuncta disponit”.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 15, §4, 
p. 100, l. 83–90).
Ut autem id, quod auctoritate constat, 
ratione quoque firmetur, praecognos-
cendum est, quod dicitur per nomen. 
Natandum ergo, quod, sicut dicit 
Damascenus in libro ii cap. 22, ordo 
est inter consilium, iudicium, disposi-
tionem, electionem et operationem, 
quia primo de operandis est “consi-
lium appetitus inquisitivus de his 
rebus, quae in nobis sunt”. Secundo est
ideo dicit Glossa super principium Genesis, 
quod Deus uno modo operatur “in Verbo 
omnia disponendo”, “quoniam in ipso 
condita sunt universa”, immo “omnia per 
ipsum et in ipso creata sunt”, secundum 
quod conceptus rei vocatur res ipsa. Et ista 
est prima significatio dispositionis.
(Expositio, 144B, p. 76, l. 34–42).
Efficientia ipsius prime Dei, qua omnia in 
ipsis primordialibus causis et per eas in 
propriis naturis condidit, dicitur dispositio, 
secundum quod tria distinguuntur opera 
Dei prima, scilicet creationis, dispositionis 
et ornatus. Et sic ulterius quarto ipse effec-
tus huius efficientiae vocatur dispositio 
Sap. 7: “Ut sciam dispositionem orbis ter-
rarum”. Et quinto huius effectus habitudi-
naliter inserti in natura rerum. Productio 
ad actum et perfectionem est etiam dispo-
sitio, Sap. 8: “Disponit omnia suaviter”. Et 
haec disposito proprie est effectus provi-
dentiae secundum illud Boethii iv De con-
solatione: “Providentia est divina ratio in 
summo omnium principe constituta, quae 
cuncta disponit”.
(Expositio, 144B, p. 76, l. 46–55).
Verum, ut istud, quod iam dictum est et 
etiam quod supra de dispositione adduc-
tum est, in primis tribus significationibus 
dispositionis evidentius appareat, con-
siderandum, quod, sicut dicit Damascenus 
ii libro cap. 22, ordo est inter consilium, 
iudicium, dispositionem et electionem et 
operationem, quia primo de operandis est 
consilium, id est appetitus inquisitivus de 
his rebus, quae in nobis sunt, secundo est
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iudicium, quo iudicamus, quid melius. 
Tertio est dispositio, qua quis disponit 
et amat, quod iudicatum est ex consilio, 
et vocatur sententia. Quarto est electio, 
cum duobus propositis hoc alteri praeop-
tamus, deinde fit impetus ad opus. Ex 
hoc patet, quod dispositio in nobis 
est sententia de aliquo faciendo, sicut 
consulte iudicatum est fieri. Cum ergo 
omnia, quae de Deo dicuntur secundum 
suam perfectionem sine imperfectione, 
quam habent in creaturis, sumantur, sic 
etiam est in proposito. Et ideo remoto 
omni eo, quod dicit dubitationem vel 
ignorantiam, dispositio Dei est practica 
praeconceptio in arte divina de rebus 
faciendis et de modo productionis, sci-
licet secundum congruitatem locorum 
et temporum et similium condicionum, 
et de modo cuiuslibet rei productae, 
scilicet ut sit in mensura et numero et 
pondere et in tali perfectione bonitatis, 
quod creatura sit vestigium creatoris. 
Nam secundum Augustinum in iv libro 
Super Genesim haec causaliter dicta sunt 
in solo creatore, sed formaliter dicta et 
inhaerenter sunt tantum in creaturis.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 15, §1, 
p. 97, l. 13–p. 98, l. 31).
Sententia quoque dispositionis, licet in 
nobis dicat conclusionem practicam 
conclusam ex iudicio, quae est cum 
intentione affectus ad prosequendum 
id, quod consiliatum est, quia, ut dicit 
Damascenus, si iudicat et non diligit 
illud, quod iudicatum est, non dicitur 
sententia, tamen in Deo non sic sumitur, 
quia ipse non cognoscit unum ex alio, sed 
dicit in Deo infallibilem et immutabilem
iudicium, quo iudicamus quid melius, ter-
tio est dispositio, quo quis disponit et amat, 
quod iudicatum est ex consilio, et vocatur 
sententia, quarto est electio, cum duobus 
propositis hoc alteri praeoptamus, deinde 
fit impetus ad opus. Ex hoc patet, quod 
dispositio in nobis est sententia de aliquo 
facendo, sicut consulte iudicatum est fieri. 
Cum ergo omnia, quae de diis dicuntur, 
secundum suam perfectionem sine imper-
fectione, quam habent in entibus produc-
tis, sumantur, sic etiam est in proposito. Et 
ideo remoto omni eo, quod dicit dubitatio-
nem vel ignorantiam, dispositio deorum 
est practica praeconceptio in eorum arte 
de rebus facendis et de modo productionis, 
scilicet secundum congruitatem ordinum 
et ordinatorum et similium condicionum, 
et de modo cuiuslibet rei productae, scili-
cet ut sit in mensura et numero et pondere, 
id est in tali perfectione bonitatis, quod 
cuiuslibet dei causatum sit vestigium suae 
causae primordialis.
(Expositio, 144E, p. 79, l. 132–148).
Ex praemissis apparet tertium, quod sen-
tentia dispositionis, licet in nobis dicat 
conclusionem practicam conclusam ex 
iudicio, quae est cum intentione affectus 
ad prosequendum id, quod consiliatum 
est – ut enim dicit Damascenus, si iudi-
cat et non diligit illud, quod iudicatum 
est, non dicitur sententia –, tamen in diis 
non sic sumitur, cum non cognoscant 
unum ex alio, sed dicit in eis infallibilem
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praeordinationem effectus, secundum 
quod per omnia congruit rationi iudicii 
divini. Haec est enim sententia mentalis 
secundum iudicium prudentiae. Unde 
sicut dicunt Avicenna et Isaac in libro 
De definitionibus: Sententia est concep-
tio definitiva et certissima alterius partis 
contradictionis. Alia vero est sententia 
Dei iudicialis secundum iudicium ius-
titiae, quam Deus per ora prophetarum 
promulgavit secundum ordinem causa-
rum inferiorum. Et quia istae mutabiles 
sunt, ideo dicit Gregorius, quod Deus 
non mutat consilium, sed sententiam, ut 
patet Is. 38 et Ezech. 33 et Ion. 3. Electio 
vero, prout hic sumitur, non dicit praeop-
tationem comparationis unius ad aliud 
nec etiam dicit illum specialem modum 
electionis, quo solo salvandi electi sunt 
aeternaliter a Deo, sed dicit proposi-
tum divinae voluntatis de quocumque 
faciendo, sicut dispositum est. Cum ergo 
Deus omnia operetur per artificialem 
intellectum et ab illo nihil possit fieri 
nisi cum dispositione praedicto modo 
sumpta, patet, quod necessaria ratione 
concluditur dispositionem esse in Deo.
(De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 15, §2, 
p. 99, l. 55–63).
et immutabilem praeordinationem effec-
tus, secundum quod per omnia congruit 
rationi iudicii divini. Haec est enim sen-
tentia supermentalis secundum iudicium 
prudentiae. Unde, sicut dicunt Avicenna et 
Isaac in libello De definitionibus, “sententia 
est conceptio definita et certissima” “alte-
rius partis” contradictionis. Cum igitur dii 
omnia operentur per artificiales intellectus 
et ab illis nihil possit fieri nisi cum disposi-
tione praedicto modo sumpta, patet, quod 
necessaria ratione concluditur dispositio-
nes et praeordinationes esse in diis.
(Expositio, 144F, p. 79, l. 150–p. 80, l. 161).
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chapter 7
Sapiens modernus: The Reception of Dietrich of 
Freiberg in Berthold of Moosburg
Evan King
University College Dublin / Newman Centre for the Study of Religions
1 Introduction*
The importance of the Dominican master Dietrich of Freiberg (d. after 1310) for 
Berthold of Moosburg’s Exposition on the Elements of Theology has long been 
noted, though the extent of this influence has been measured only gradually.1 
Dietrich’s influence touches nearly every aspect of the commentary: its doc-
trines of intellect, causality, time and eternity, cosmology, the theory of soul, 
the conception of contemplation and beatitude, ontology, natural philosophy, 
and theology. By my calculation, based on the table below, Berthold cites a text 
from Dietrich, on average, at least once per Proposition and takes, on average, 
at least two passages from him each time. The overall situation was succinctly 
described by Loris Sturlese over 30 years ago: “A catalogue of doctrines inher-
ited by Berthold would equal an index of Dietrich’s corpus. We will see that 
Berthold also cheated, at times. But the agreement with Dietrich goes so far 
and is thus so emphatic in the Exposition that this must be considered as a 
foundation for every interpretation of Berthold’s work”.2 This judgement has 
proven true for almost every study of particular doctrines in the Exposition.3 
My aim here is to bring to light the deeper patterns of this reception.
* This article was completed within the context of the erc Grant NeoplAT (CoG_771640).
1 The connection was first noted briefly by M. Grabmann, “Studien über Ulrich von 
Straßburg”, in Zeitschrift für katholiche Theologie 29(1905), p. 626, and E. Krebs, Meister 
Dietrich (Theodoricus Teutonicus de Vriberg). Sein Leben, seine Werke, seine Wissenschaft 
(Münster: Aschendorff, 1906), p. 50. On Dietrich of Freiberg, see now K. Flasch, Dietrich von 
Freiberg. Philosophie, Theologie, Naturforschung um 1300 (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 
2007); L. Sturlese, “Dietrich von Freiberg”, in A. Brungs, V. Mudroch, P. Schulthess (eds), Die 
Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. 4. 13. Jahrhundert (Basel: Schwabe, 2017), p. 895–911.
2 L. Sturlese, Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart 
und Heinrich Seuse (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), p. 139.
3 See A. de Libera, La mystique rhénane. D’Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart (Paris: Seuil, 1994), 
p. 326–384, with bibliography; T. Iremadze, Konzeptionen des Denkens im Neuplatonismus. 
Zur Rezeption der Proklischen Philosophie im deutschen und georgischen Mittelalter. Dietrich 
244 King
The overall pattern can be construed as a dialogue between ancients 
and moderns in Berthold’s commentary. Dietrich is the exemplary figure of 
the modern master in confrontation with ancient wisdom. The pattern in 
Berthold’s reception of his thought is an act of transposition and sublation. 
Berthold transplanted Dietrich’s metaphysics, whenever possible, back into 
ancient soil; this is his consistent practice with most of his contemporary 
sources, e.g., Thomas of York, Albert the Great, and Ulrich of Strassburg. But 
there is also a striking element of duplicity or “cheating” in his use of Dietrich. 
This was not because Berthold believed his master’s thought was incoherent; 
I intend to show that Berthold proceeded as if Dietrich’s intellectual aims 
could be realized only by going back to an earlier golden age, and this is why 
I call it an act of sublation. In this gesture, Berthold profoundly transformed 
central elements of Dietrich’s philosophical project. For Berthold, Dietrich’s 
insights into the order of separate beings and their necessary interconnection 
were stated inadequately, tarnished by the same forgetting that affected all the 
“moderns” – one might call it the forgetting of what is beyond being.
As Dragos Calma has shown, Dietrich’s copy of the Elements of Theology, 
which he used throughout his career, lacked at least four propositions.4 By 
contrast, Dietrich cited Augustine with great care, often supplying alternate 
systems of enumerating the chapters. But it seems he was not sufficiently 
concerned with the authority of Proclus to emend his copy of the Elements. 
A comparison with Dietrich’s use of the Liber de causis has indicated that he 
preferred it to Proclus.5 As for Berthold, his sympathy and familiarity with 
three rare texts made this attitude inconceivable: Proclus’ Three Works on 
Providence, the Sapientiale of Thomas of York,6 and the 12th-century para-
phrase of Eriugena’s Periphyseon called the Clavis physicae, which Berthold 
attributed to a “Theodorus, Abbot of Constantinople”.7 Each of these estab-
lished the fundamental doxographical alliance of Proclus and Dionysius. The 
von Freiberg – Berthold von Moosburg – Joane Petrizi (Amsterdam: Grüner, 2004); M. Führer, 
S. Gersh, “Dietrich of Freiberg and Berthold of Moosburg”, in S. Gersh (ed.), Interpreting 
Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
p. 299–317; E. King, “Berthold of Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul”, in Dionysius 
36(2018), p. 184–199; P. Hellmeier, “Der Intellekt ist nicht genug. Das proklische unum in nobis 
bei Berthold von Moosburg”, in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 126/2(2019), p. 202–226.
4 D. Calma, Le poids de la citation. Étude sur les sources arabes et grecques dans l’œuvre de 
Dietrich de Freiberg (Fribourg: Academic Press, 2010), p. 277–278.
5 Calma, Le poids de la citation, p. 341–342, 371–375.
6 See the contributions of Fiorella Retucci and Loris Sturlese in this volume.
7 E. Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela 
de Colonia (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013); E. King, “Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg’s 
Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and
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result could not be overlooked. As Loris Sturlese has put it, for Dietrich, Proclus 
was “a diligent investigator” of the essential natural order of the cosmos, but 
for Berthold, he became “a divine man” and, in a sense, “a prophet” of “a phil-
osophical revelation”.8 Thus the very letter of the Elements of Theology, each 
term in each Proposition, carried the weight of a luminous ancient wisdom. It 
was the commentator’s task to adjust weaker modern eyes to that light.9
This paper has three parts: Part 2 presents the quantitative data of Dietrich’s 
presence in the Exposition; Part 3 analyses some case studies of Berthold’s 
critique and transformation of Dietrich’s works; Part 4 develops a hypothesis 
about Berthold’s use of a lost theological text from Dietrich.
2 The Citations of Dietrich of Freiberg in the Exposition:  
Formal Analysis
The table below presents the number of citations of Dietrich’s works found in 
the commentary.10 
the Book of Causes, Volume 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates (Leiden: Brill, 
2019), p. 394–437.
8  Sturlese, Homo divinus, p. 143, 145.
9  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, eds 
M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), Prologus 21, p. 34, l. 974–975: 
Igitur cum Platone et Boethio bonum esse reor humilem theoricum obnixe lucem divinis-
simam votis supplicibus invocare […]. All citations of the Expositio refer to the critical 
edition published in the Corpus philosophorum teutonicorum medii aevi. See Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14–34, 
eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986); Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35–65, 
ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001); Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 2003); Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 108–135, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011); Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159, ed. F. Retucci 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theo-
logicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); 
Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
184–211, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014).
10  The works of Dietrich of Freiberg are cited according to the critical edition (Corpus philos-
ophorum teutonicorum medii aevi). See Dietrich of Freiberg, Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften 
zur Intellekttheorie, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977); Dietrich of Freiberg, Opera 
omnia, vol. 2. Schriften zur Metaphysik und Theologie, eds R. Imbach et al. (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1980); Dietrich of Freiberg, Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und 
Metaphysik, eds J.-D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983); Dietrich of Freiberg, Opera 
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For the sake of simplicity, Berthold’s citations of Dietrich are arranged in 
each column according to the volume of the critical edition of the Exposition, 
which in most cases (volumes 1, 5, 6, 7, and 8) correspond precisely or closely to 
natural divisions in the Elements of Theology. In each row of the table, the num-
ber outside the parentheses refers to the number of subsections in Berthold’s 
commentary (such as: 2A, 2B, 2C, etc.) where a citation of each text is found. The 
number in parentheses represents the total citations. For example, Proposition 
167C has been counted to include six citations for De intellectu et intelligibili, 
which would be represented by 1 (6). The total for that volume indicates that 
Berthold cited De int. in 16 different subsections of his commentary for a total 
of 40 citations. It is worthwhile keeping these two figures distinct, because 
the subsections of the Exposition correspond to Berthold’s explanations of 
separate terms, doctrines, or arguments. These subsections are the most basic 
building blocks of the Exposition. Therefore, the number outside parentheses 
gives a sense of how the influence of each of Dietrich’s treatises permeates the 
fundamental structure of the commentary. The number in parentheses reflects 
the use of a more artificial standard for counting a citation. These numbers are 
significantly lower than those one would reach by simply counting the entries 
in the indices of the critical edition, for two reasons. First, I do not count 
terms or phrases as citations, however characteristic Berthold’s thorough 
appropriation and internalisation of Dietrich’s philosophical terminology 
they may be. Furthermore, it would often be impossible to determine which
omnia, vol. 4. Schriften zur Naturwissenschaft, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese et al. (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1985). Abbreviations: De acc. (De accidentibus, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, vol. 3); 
De anim. (De animatione caeli, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 3); De cog. ent. (De cognitione entium 
separatorum, ed. H. Steffan, vol. 2); De cor. cael. (De corporibus caelestibus quoad naturam 
eorum corporalem, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 2); De dot. (De dotibus corporum gloriosorum, ed. 
L. Sturlese, vol. 2); De elem. (De elementis corporum naturalium, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, 
vol. 4); De ente (De ente et essentia, ed. R. Imbach, vol. 2); De hab. (De habitibus, ed. 
H. Steffan, vol. 2); De int. (De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. B. Mojsisch, vol. 1); De intellig. (De 
intelligentiis et motoribus caelorum, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 2); De ir. (De iride et de radialibus 
impressionibus, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese, vol. 4); De luce (De luce et eius orig-
ine, ed. R. Rehn, vol. 4); De magis (De magis et minus, eds R. Imbach, H. Steffan, vol. 2); De 
mens. (De mensuris, ed. R. Rehn, vol. 3); De misc. (De miscibilibus in mixto, ed. W. Wallace, 
vol. 4); De nat. contin. (De natura et proprietate continuorum, ed. R. Rehn, vol. 3); De nat. 
contr. (De natura contrariorum, ed. R. Imbach, vol. 2); De orig. (De origine rerum praedica-
mentalium, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 3); De pot. (De ratione potentiae, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, 
vol. 3); De quid. (De quiditatibus entium, eds R. Imbach, J.-D. Cavigioli, vol. 3); De subiecto 
(De subiecto theologiae, ed. L. Sturlese, vol. 3); De sub. spir. (De substantiis separatis et cor-
poribus futurae resurrectionis, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, vol. 2); De vis. beat. (De visione 
beatifica, ed. B. Mojsisch, vol. 1); Quaest. utrum in Deo (Quaestio utrum in Deo sit aliqua 
vis cognitiva inferior intellectu, ed. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, vol. 3); Quaest. utrum sub. spir. 
(Quaestio utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita ex materia et forma, ed. B. Mojsisch, 
vol. 3).
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Prol.-13 14–34 35–65 66–107 108–135 136–159 160–183 184–211 Total
1. De int. 3 (4)  9 (22) 2 (4) 8 (9)  4 (10) 1 (2) 16 (40)  5 (11)    48 (102)
2. De vis. beat. 3 (3) 4 (7)  6 (11) 1 (2) 3 (4) 4 (5) 14 (24) 3 (3)    37 (58)
3. De orig. 2 (2)  5 (13) 2 (3)  7 (11) 3 (5) 1 (2) 2 (3) 1 (1)    23 (40)
4. De anim. 1 (2) 4 (8) 2 (2)  5 (11) 2 (5)  7 (10)    21 (38)
5. De cog. ent. 1 (6) 3 (3) 2 (2) 2 (6) 1 (1) 5 (9) 1 (2)    15 (29)
6. Quaest.  
utrum in Deo
1 (2) 1 (2) 5 (7)  4 (16) 1 (3) 1 (1) 1 (7)    14 (38)
7. De sub. spir. 5 (9) 1 (6)  5 (10)  11 (25)
8. De mens.  7 (21) 2 (3)   9 (24)
9. De dot. 1 (1) 1 (2) 1 (1) 5 (7)   8 (11)
10. De pot. 2 (6) 3 (8) 1 (3)   6 (17)
11. De nat.  
contr.
1 (8)  2 (11) 1 (1)   4 (20)
12. Quaest. 
utrum sub. spir.
1 (1) 3 (7) 4 (8)
13. De cor. cael. 2 (4) 2 (3) 4 (7)
14. De nat. 
contin.
4 (6) 4 (6)
15. De misc. 1 (1) 1 (1) 2 (3) 4 (5)
16. De acc. 1 (7) 2 (3)   3 (10)
17. De elem. 2 (6) 2 (6)
18. De intellig. 2 (5) 2 (5)
19. De magis 1 (1) 1 (3) 2 (4)
20. De luce 2 (4) 2 (4)
21. De ente 1 (3) 1 (3)
22. De ir. 1 (1) 1 (1)
23. De quid. 1 (1) 1 (1)
24. De subiecto 1 (1) 1 (1)
Total 15 (32) 31 (72) 38 (67) 47 (102) 15 (32) 9 (12) 41 (91) 32 (56) 228 (464)
of Dietrich’s works they derive from (e.g., ens secundum speciem, intellectus in 
actu per essentiam, ens conceptionale). Secondly, when Berthold copied many 
lines from the same treatise in sequence, as he frequently did, I count separate 
citations only when he omitted two lines of his source or interpolated two lines 
of his own, since these were evidently deliberate editorial acts on Berthold’s 
part. Finally, in compiling this table I have identified eight overlooked citations 
of Dietrich.11
11  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 17E, p. 40, l. 257–259 = Dietrich of Freiberg, De int., ii.5.1, 
p. 149, l. 6–10; Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 42F, p. 63, l. 280–p. 64, l. 288 ≈ Dietrich 
of Freiberg, De vis. beat., 1.3.2 (7), p. 55, l. 56–63 and 1.3.2 (10), p. 56, l. 80–86; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 121D, p. 106, l. 50–63 = Dietrich of Freiberg, De vis. beat., 3.2.9.2 (4), 
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The quantitative data allow us to draw a few conclusions. (a) Works. 
Berthold’s familiarity with Dietrich’s corpus was profound. In the Exposition, 
Berthold used every extant treatise by Dietrich except for De coloribus, De 
corpore Christi mortuo, De habitibus, and the short Quaestiones preserved as 
reportationes – so 24 out of 28 works. Of Dietrich’s eight other works listed in 
the 14th-century Stams catalogue, which are no longer extant, we know that 
Berthold knew at least one, De entium universitate.12 He refers to this treatise in 
his glosses on Macrobius, which date to before 1323.13 It seems safe to conclude 
that, at one time or another, Berthold had all, or almost all, of Dietrich’s known 
corpus available to him, and drew freely from these works as the text of the 
Elements required.
(b) Rank. Berthold made consistent use of De intellectu et intelligibili (102), 
which incidentally contains Dietrich’s praise of Proclus as a “diligent inves-
tigator” (diligens indagator) of the order of nature.14 In a distant second we 
find De visione beatifica (58), followed by De origine rerum praedicamentalium 
(40), and De animatione caeli (38). Next come works that Dietrich explicitly 
structured according to the four fundamental levels of the cosmos described in 
Proposition 20 of the Elements of Theology: De cognitione entium separatorum 
and De substantiis spiritualibus et corporibus futurae resurrectionis. All of the 
treatises in the top eight places, with the exception of De origine rerum prae-
dicamentalium, often proceed by reasoning about the hierarchical structure 
of the universe and/or the modes of cognition appropriate to these levels or 
maneries, which explains why Berthold would favour them when explaining 
the cosmology outlined in the Elements. Only after the works on intellect and 
cosmology do we get Dietrich’s works on theology (De dot.), ontology (De pot., 
p. 88, l. 20–32; Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 158E, p. 186, l. 73–78 = Dietrich of Freiberg, 
De cog. ent., 49.2, p. 214, l. 100–105; Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 171A, p. 110, l. 45–49 = 
Dietrich of Freiberg, De orig., 4.25, p. 175, l. 241–245; Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 171A, 
p. 110, l. 49–50 = Dietrich of Freiberg, De orig., 4.25, p. 175, l. 249–p. 176, l. 251; Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio, 189F, p. 72, l. 138–140 ≈ Dietrich of Freiberg, De orig., 4.6, p. 169, 
l. 33–p. 170, l. 37.
12  On the catalogues of Dietrich’s works, see L. Sturlese, Dokumente und Forschungen zu 
Leben und Werk Dietrichs von Freiberg (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 134–136.
13  ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, f. 20r. The gloss corresponds to Macrobius, 
Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis, i.17.5: qvod qvidem to pan, id est omne, dix-
ervnt. Pan enim non est aliud quam mundus ipse; nota de ratione universitatis ex tractatu 
magistri Theoderici qui intitulatur De entium universitate.
14  Dietrich of Freiberg, De int., i.4.1, p. 138, l. 44–46: Distinguit autem idem Proclus quadru-
plicem rerum maneriem, in quibus singulis diligens indagator, prout fuerit de proposito suo, 
necesse habet quaerere proprias uniuscuiusque eorum operationes.
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De nat. contr., De acc., etc.), and natural philosophy (Quaest. utrum sub. spir., 
De cor. cael., etc.).
(c) Distribution.15 The highest distribution of citations by proposition is 
in 160–183, which primarily concern the intellect, followed by Propositions 
14–34, on the four genera of the cosmos and essential causality. We also notice 
a decrease of citations between Propositions 108–159, which concern the pri-
mordial causes or gods (unitates, bonitates) and their providence. Incidentally 
perhaps, here one observes an increase in citations from Ulrich of Strassburg 
and Thomas of York.
(d) Explicit references. Only two of all the citations of Dietrich are explicit 
references, and both provide the title of Dietrich’s treatise: magister Theodoricus 
prima parte tractatus De animatione caeli (107A); magister Theodoricus trac-
tatu De natura oppositorum cap. 44 (143O). Both attributions are correct. By 
comparison with other contemporary authors used in the Exposition, apart 
from the appearance of their names in two tables of authorities that accom-
pany the commentary, we find only one explicit reference to Albert the Great 
(118A), one to Thomas Aquinas (204A), and zero for Thomas of York and Ulrich 
of Strassburg, which is hardly representative of the degree to which Berthold 
relied on their work. Nevertheless, in these limited cases there appears to be a 
pattern. The explicit mentions of Albert and Thomas occur after Berthold cites 
a lengthy passage that conveys their final determination about a classic topic 
in philosophical theology: how a plurality of ideas is in God (118A) and whether 
the rational soul is created de novo or is transmitted through the seed (204A). 
Berthold’s decisions to cite Dietrich explicitly coincide with passages in which 
he presents an argument from Dietrich that he endorses and when this argu-
ment makes a valuable correction to an older authority, either Avicenna and 
Algazel (107A)16 or Alhazen (143O).
(e) Indirect citations. Most of Berthold’s citations of Dietrich are implicit 
(quidam or alii)17 or tacit. Often the implicit citations occur when Dietrich’s 
argument is compared with a different view from another more contemporary 
15  The averages per proposition by cptma volume, which roughly correspond to the divi-
sion of the larger themes and subject matter of the Elements are: 1–13: 1.15 (2.46); 14–34: 
1.55 (3.60); 35–65: 1.27 (2.30); 66–107: 1.15 (2.49); 108–135: 0.55 (1.19); 136–159: 0.35 (0.48); 
160–183: 1.70 (3.78); 184–211: 1.15 (2.04). The proportion for et 1–13 decreases if we include 
the three prefaces, which contain only three citations.
16  They are unnamed at 107B but are named in the parallel passage at 185B.
17  For example, 3A (De anim.?); 7C (De vis. beat.) 21I (De cog. ent.); 43F (De int.); 74B (De orig.); 
88A (De mens.); 104E (De mens.); 105B (De int.); 106F (De anim.); 111B (De int.); 129A (De 
misc.); 129A (De sub. spir., twice); 133E (De anim.?); 183A (De vis. beat.?); 190A (De int. and 
De vis. beat.).
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author, like Ulrich,18 or where Berthold disagrees with the view advanced by 
Dietrich, because it either conflicts with the Platonists or inadequately cap-
tures a Platonic doctrine, as we see in the case studies that follow.
3 Case Studies
Three instances of Berthold’s reception of Dietrich are particularly illustra-
tive: the doctrine of transcendentals, the theory of time and eternity, and the 
doctrine of causality. The first is foundational for the other two. As is clear to 
contemporary readers of his commentaries on Propositions 1 and 11, Berthold 
used texts from Dietrich when he presented a doctrine of “the transcenden-
tals” that he attributes to Aristotle.19 At other times, Berthold used different 
texts from Dietrich to present both sides of the Plato-Aristotle divide. A salient 
example of this is when he contrasts the “Platonic” notion of a “metaphysi-
cal” genus as a level of reality defined by its natural place in the cosmic hier-
archy (a maneries),20 with the “Aristotelian” sense of a metaphysical genus 
that is described using the De origine rerum praedicamentalium.21 I believe we 
should understand this two-sidedness as Berthold’s redoubling of Dietrich’s 
own characteristic critique against himself. Dietrich had criticized those who 
import imaginative and logical abstractions into metaphysics (the communiter 
loquentes), and Berthold subjected the Aristotelian metaphysics of being to the 
same criticism, which implicated Dietrich. For Berthold, being (ens) is prior 
only from the point of view of logical abstraction, and only the Platonic meta-
physics of the Good is adequate to the reality beyond our abstractions.
The second and third cases focus on the only two passages where Berthold 
discusses the views of his contemporaries (moderni). Both cases illustrate how 
Berthold subordinated Dietrich’s “contemporary” views to ancient Platonism. 
This occurs in two different ways: in the propositions on time and eternity, 
Berthold takes many essential doctrines from Dietrich’s theory of time and 
eternity in De mensuris, but explicitly decides to restrict Dietrich’s theory 
18  For example, Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 59C, p. 166, l. 128–p. 168, l. 175; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 185B, p. 19, l. 171–172.
19  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1A, p. 74, l. 109–112: Et per consequens unum secundum 
[Aristotelem] et multum proprietates entis in eo, quod ens, erunt transcendentia, quarum 
esse etiam non est extra animam, quamquam secundum intellectum sint posteriora ente, 
utpote quorum unum addit super ens indivisionem, aliud vero divisionem sive distinctionem.
20  On this characteristic theme of Dietrich’s thought, see D. Calma, “Maneries”, in I. Atucha 
et al. (eds), Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach (Porto: fidem, 2011), p. 433–444.
21  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 135K–L, p. 227, l. 119–p. 229, l. 289.
251Sapiens modernus
because it does not conform to the Platonic truth. In the third case, on causal-
ity, we observe the reverse: Berthold elaborates Dietrich’s theory of three kinds 
of causes in order to align it with the Platonic theory of the five kinds of causes.
3.1 Case 1: Being and Goodness (Critique)
Berthold attributed to Aristotle a full-fledged doctrine of the transcendentals.22 
The Aristotelian position, as Berthold presents it by tacitly borrowing the 
words of Dietrich of Freiberg, is that being (ens) is the most formal and pri-
mary of all intentions, and unum, verum, and bonum are logically derivative 
of being because they are resolvable into it.23 Berthold goes behind this posi-
tion to address what he takes to be its flawed assumption, namely, that act 
always determines potency.24 According to Berthold, Plato acknowledged the 
validity of this approach relative to physical phenomena, where form always 
determines matter, but realized that their relation was reversed among the 
separate substances and the first principles, where potency is a limitation of 
active causal power.25 Following Aristotle’s reasoning, however, we must main-
tain that diversity or multitude only arise from the most indeterminate and 
potential. Starting out from this, the Aristotelian way then posits that the first 
diversity arises as a form of an opposition in the relationship between priva-
tion and possession (habitus), which is reducible to the relation of potency and 
act, which is finally reducible to the logical opposition of negation and affirma-
tion in a subject.26 On the basis of these assumptions, Berthold then gives a 
lengthy, if tacit, summary of Dietrich of Freiberg’s derivation of the other tran-
scendentals from ens by unfolding their notions from the foundational opposi-
tion of affirmation and negation.
Berthold’s Aristotle, from a historical point of view, is of course a remark-
able invention. In some sense his portrait is compatible with those of earlier 
Neoplatonic commentators who advocate for an ultimate harmony of Plato 
and Aristotle, provided the Aristotelian philosophy is restricted to the sublu-
nary world. With Berthold, however, the emphasis falls on the discord at the 
22  See J. Aertsen, Medieval Philosophy as Transcendental Thought. From Philip the Chancellor 
(ca. 1225) to Francisco Suárez (Leiden: Brill, 2012), p. 545–553.
23  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11A, p. 185, l. 23–p. 186, l. 40.
24  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1A, p. 72, l. 53–54: Secundum Aristotelem autem VII 
Metaphysicae suae actus separat et distinguit […].
25  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1A, p. 73, l. 90–93: Plato vero alia via incedit circa multitu-
dinis originem, qui, licet concedat distinctionem esse formalem causam multitudinis, tamen 
actus secundum eum non ubique, hoc est in tota rerum universitate, distinguit nisi in solis 
materialibus.
26  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1A, p. 72, l. 58–62.
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level of their metaphysics and the need for a total reversal in first principles. It 
is important to reflect on the underlying motivations for this. For him, it seems 
a danger lurks in the metaphysics of being that threatens to occlude human 
nature and its proper relation to the divine. In short, an exclusively physical-
ist view of the origin of diversity ends up producing a strictly intra-mental or 
logical metaphysics: we make an imaginative reduction to the primary substra-
tum, prime matter, and from there have recourse to the first principles of logic, 
the principle of non-contradiction, to account for the principles of diversity 
and multitude. These principles, however, have lost all bearing on the world 
outside the mind. Berthold uses a remark from Averroes as verification that the 
Aristotelians are willing to admit that these transcendental determinations do 
not have any being outside the soul.27 Such an outlook must be subject to the 
verdict of Dionysius: the unlearned are sealed off among beings and believe 
there is nothing that is supersubstantial beyond.28 Perhaps Berthold believes 
that these tendencies were coming to fruition among some of his contempo-
raries in the late 1310s in Oxford. In any event, he shares the view of Proclus, 
Dionysius, and Boethius that individuals tend to disperse themselves in the 
physical world, and that what is beyond being is therefore hidden from our 
everyday awareness.29 Platonic theology resists this imaginative impulse and 
prepares its practitioner to know and be united with the divine realities them-
selves, which are measured in terms of a causal influence that is independent 
of the activity of our minds.30 Platonism, therefore, is the corrective of both a 
27  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1D, p. 77, l. 218–219; Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11A, 
p. 186, l. 43–47.
28  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 71D, p. 35, l. 123–127, directed against the Liber de causis, 
proposition IV.
29  Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 17, p. 27, l. 724–726: Donec autem circa ea, quae 
deorsum, volvimur, increduliter habemus circa haec. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
Prol. 15, p. 23, l. 583–587: […] quae sunt corpus, anima, intellectus et unum sive unitas. De 
quorum ultimo, quia prima tria manifesta sunt, sic dicit Proclus […]: “Et enim nobis (scilicet 
hominibus) iniacet aliquod secretum unius vestigium, quod et eo, qui intellectus, est divin-
ius”. Cui concordat Dionysius […].
30  Another important source for Berthold was the Byzantine commentator Eustratius, 
and his arguments against Aristotle’s criticism of the Good in the Nicomachean Ethics, 
insofar as Eustratius distinguished between logical universals, produced by the mind, 
and universals of separation, which Berthold also calls “theological universals”, that are 
beyond the mind. See F. Retucci, “Tommaso di York, Eustrazio e la dottrina delle idee di 
Platone”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), Per perscrutationem philosophicam. 
Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewid-
met (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 79–111. See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1A, p. 74, 
l. 98–102; Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11A, p. 186, l. 56–59.
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contemplative failure and a baleful lack of rational self-criticism at the heart of 
the metaphysics of being.
Anyone familiar with Dietrich of Freiberg will feel that Berthold is somehow 
dealing unfairly with his source here. Perhaps no philosopher of his time was 
more critical of reified, imagistic thinking in metaphysics than Dietrich, as Kurt 
Flasch in particular has emphasized by pointing precisely to Dietrich’s exege-
sis of Aristotle himself, and especially the Stagirite’s doctrines of substance 
and intellect.31 Dietrich recognized perfectly well that the move from phys-
ics to metaphysics entailed a shift in perspective characterized by the aban-
donment of extrinsic efficient and final causal explanations. Furthermore, his 
dynamic view of intellectual substance was founded firmly on the De anima 
and Metaphysics xii. Berthold of course was fully aware of this. As we see 
in his extension of Dietrich’s critiques of the communiter loquentes, below, 
he intended, if anything, to go further in this direction. But it was perhaps 
Dietrich’s own endorsement of the metaphysics of being and his characteristic 
doctrine of the possible intellect, which “effects the universality in things”,32 
that made it necessary for Dietrich’s own works to be played off against one 
another.33
In other words, Berthold judged Dietrich’s metaphysics to be on the cusp 
of the truth: it was fundamentally correct in its aspirations but flawed in its 
expression. Only one further step was needed, which was to restore it to the 
ancient philosophical soil that would rearticulate those ambitions, and thus 
give them a form in which they could be realized. He fundamentally endorsed 
the principle Dietrich took from Aristotle, “each thing exists for the sake of 
31  Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 119: “Dietrichs origo-Analyse beansprucht, zugleich 
Theorie der Wissenschaften zu sein. Sie bestimmt nicht nur die Aufgabe der Metaphysik 
neu; sie faßt auch das Gebiet der Physik strenger und zieht die Grenze zwischen Logik 
und Metaphysik schärfer. […] Wenn Dietrich ein Revolutionär war, dann ein konser-
vativer Revolutionär, denn er wollte nur herausstellen, was er in der Philosophie der 
Peripatetiker enthalten fand und es gegen waltende Banalisierungen verteidigen.” And 
p. 200: “Diese Intellekte sind anders als Dinge. Sie zu begreifen, erfordert eine Reform des 
dingorientierten Denkens.” Also, p. 226: “Befreien wir unseren Selbstbegriff von verdingli-
chenden Vorstellungen und erneuern wir unser Verständnis des christlichen Glaubens.”
32  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11A, p. 186, l. 41–42: Ens autem sic acceptum est commu-
nissimum in se communitate abstractionis, quam facit intellectus, qui efficit universalitatem 
in rebus. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De orig., 3.8, 4.1, 5.33; Dietrich of Freiberg, De ente, i.1.2; 
Dietrich of Freiberg, De quid., 1.3.
33  See, for example, 16D and 177H. Both passages appeal to Dietrich’s distinction of abstrac-
tion, which is the work of reason, and separation, which is the work of nature. In 16D, 
Berthold uses De origine on intellect to describe abstraction, and De animation caeli to 
describe the condition of separate substances. In 177H, he uses De intellectu on logical 
universals, followed by De cognitione on separate universals.
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its own operation”.34 For Berthold, however, this could be best justified if one 
acknowledged the priority of the Good. In this view, bonum and unum are the 
most formal of all intentions if we consider what makes a reality an organized 
totality, be it a singular thing, an entire series, or the whole cosmos, by ordering 
it relative to all other things and/or within itself. In other words, placing bonum 
before ens compels the mind to seek first the concrete, dynamic, and essential 
order of the totality. Statements like the following from Dietrich anticipate this 
point of view:
An isolated essence by itself does not possess the characteristic of the 
good, nor does it pertain to the real order of the universe insofar as it is 
a single whole, complete in species and in parts. It is a characteristic of 
this order of the universe that one thing flows into another by means of 
some active power.35
The best way to make sense of this duplicity is to say that Berthold was in fact 
thoroughly shaped by Dietrich’s way of thinking, but his reading of Proclus, 
Dionysius, and Eustratius had made him aware of the instability in the meta-
physics of being that inherently would indulge the human soul’s propensity 
to turn itself away from the realities above it and insulate itself from the good 
they bestow. Therefore, he recast the divide between the material and immate-
rial orders along Platonic and Aristotelian lines.
This critical move inevitably led to distortions of Dietrich’s thought, espe-
cially relative to his noetics. Burkhard Mojsisch has pointed to an important 
passage in 168B–D, where Berthold downgrades the constitutive power of the 
possible intellect. When tacitly citing Dietrich on the way the intellect con-
stitutes its object “conceptionally” (conceptionaliter), Berthold explains that 
this means “conceptually” (conceptive) or “intentionally”, such that what is 
thus constituted has being only in the mind.36 Similarly, Mojsisch observed, 
nowhere in Berthold do we find Dietrich’s strong affirmation that the agent 
34  Aristotle, De caelo ii.3, 286a8–9.
35  Dietrich of Freiberg, De int., i.10.3, p. 143, l. 22–25: Absoluta enim essentia secundum se non 
habet rationem boni nec est de reali ordine universi, inquantum est unum totum perfectum 
specie et partibus, de cuius ordinis ratione est, ut una res fluat in aliam aliqua virtute activa. 
Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 6B, 44A, and 131D.
36  B. Mojsisch, “Die Theorie des Intellekts bei Berthold von Moosburg: zur Proklosrezeption 
im Mittelalter”, in Th. Kobusch, B. Mojsisch, O. Summerell (eds), Selbst – Singularität – 
Subjektivität. Vom Neuplatonismus zum Deutschen Idealismus (Amsterdam: Grüner, 2002), 
p. 175–184.
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intellect knows the first principle in the manner of the principle itself.37 But 
we should recognize that both changes follow from a coherent standpoint. 
For Berthold, it is only the unum animae, which places us outside ourselves 
and beyond the limits of our knowing, that could know in the manner of the 
principle, and it is only through that principle that the human is placed in any 
constitutive or providential relation to the world.
3.2 Case 2: The Measures of Time and Eternity (Restriction)
The next case studies show the two opposed ways Berthold reconciled the 
rational insights of the modern master with the authority of the Platonists. 
The first comes from the propositions on time and eternity. Here, Berthold 
extensively uses Dietrich’s De mensuris, which contains a complex account 
of the different measures of temporal and eternal activity. In total, Dietrich 
posits five kinds of measurement corresponding to five cosmic maneries: God 
(superaeternitas); the intelligences, “if such beings exist” (aeternitas); angels 
(aevum); celestial bodies (aeviternitas); sublunary beings (tempus).38 There are 
additionally two kinds of measures relating to things whose essence is subject 
to change and succession: motion, which applies to material things, and “time 
consisting from indivisibles” (tempus constans ex indivisibilibus), which relates 
to changes in spiritual substances.39 These distinctions arise when entities 
are ranked according to four intrinsic criteria: (1) the mode and property of a 
thing’s substantial perfection; (2) whether there is variation of its substance, 
and what this is; (3) whether it has a beginning and an end, and what these 
are; (4) the presentness (praesentialitas) or mode of presentness belonging 
to its existence.40 After citing passages from De mensuris 21 times between 
Propositions 49 and 54, and presenting these principles and conclusions as 
those of the more subtle contemporary sages (moderni sapientes et subtiliores), 
Berthold concludes with the following:
Although what has just been said seems to have been said reasonably 
[rationabiliter dicta], notwithstanding this, in truth, according to the 
Platonists, there are in fact only two measures.41
37  Dietrich of Freiberg, De vis. beat., 1.2.1.3 (2), p. 44, l. 9–p. 45, l. 20; Dietrich of Freiberg, De 
int., ii.40.3, p. 177, l. 72–77.
38  Dietrich of Freiberg, De mens., 2.7–32, p. 218, l. 106–p. 222, l. 246.
39  Dietrich of Freiberg, De mens., 2.33–48, p. 222, l. 247–p. 225, l. 339.
40  Dietrich of Freiberg, De mens., 2.6, p. 218, l. 98–105.
41  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 54G, p. 131, l. 95 and 54H, p. 133, l. 162–164: De primo 
notandum, quod moderni sapientes et subtiliores advertentes ea quattuor, quae ad assignan-
dum rebus proprias mensuras requiruntur, […] soliti sunt septem mensurarum differentias 
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Berthold’s procedure here understandably has frustrated some of his mod-
ern commentators.42 Nevertheless, it is important to appreciate the tensions 
navigated by Berthold as he proceeds in accordance with the principles of his 
project.
Berthold finds himself in a difficult position. His sympathy with Dietrich’s 
arguments is clear throughout Propositions 49–54. He even embellishes his 
summaries of De mensuris with concepts characteristic of Dietrich’s thought. 
For example, he contrasts the use of the four intrinsic criteria, mentioned 
above, with the approach of the communiter loquentes, who reason about the 
measures of time only according to extrinsic considerations arising in the 
domain of voluntary providence.43 The textual basis for interpolating these 
notions is clear, although he combines two groups mentioned by Dietrich into 
one. Dietrich had mentioned the communiter agentes who assume that the 
mode of a measure must equal the measure of duration. Thus, they consider 
only whether a thing’s duration has a beginning and/or an end: God, who has 
no beginning or end, is measured by eternity; created, incorruptible creatures, 
who have a beginning but no end, are measured by the aevum; generable and 
corruptible creatures are measured by time. There are others, Dietrich added, 
who adopt only a comparative approach, in which beings are compared either 
to the whole universe, to God, or to one another. This yields four measures: 
eternity is the measure of God’s duration, because he precedes the existence 
of the universe; the universe is measured by sempiternity, through a compari-
son with eternity; particular beings are measured by perpetuity, because they 
receive their being at a certain time and last as long as the sempiternal universe; 
finally, things that come before and after one another are said to be in the past 
or in the future relative to one another, and these are measured by temporal-
ity. For Dietrich, both ways of assigning these measures are extrinsic to the 
properties of the substance of things (extra proprietatem substantiae rerum) 
and are received, as it were, from the outside (quasi extrinsecus acceptus).44 
From the perspective of voluntary providence, which Berthold invokes here, 
assignare. […] Circa secundum advertendum, quod licet ea, quae iam dicta sunt, rationabili-
ter dicta videantur, tamen salva gratia eorum, in veritate secundum Platonicos secundum 
rem non sunt nisi duae mensurae, aeternitas videlicet et tempus.
42  C. Steel, “The Neoplatonic Doctrine of Time and Eternity and its Influence on Medieval 
Philosophy”, in P. Porro (ed.), The Medieval Concept of Time. Studies on the Scholastic 
Debate and its Reception in Early Modern Philosophy (Leiden: Brill, 2001), p. 3–32, at p. 29.
43  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 52C, p. 121, l. 165–p. 122, l. 181. Berthold’s remarks about 
the communiter loquentes and voluntary providence summarise Dietrich of Freiberg, De 
mens., 2.1–3.
44  Dietrich of Freiberg, De mens., 2.3, p. 217, l. 73–78.
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the consideration of the nature of a thing is secondary to extrinsic factors; for 
example, angels act in the world to serve God’s voluntary providence that cer-
tain individuals will be saved.45 What a nature is in itself, essentially and uni-
versally, is assumed by voluntary providence, but does not strictly belong to its 
purview.46 Problems arise when the extrinsic scruples of voluntary providence 
encroach upon the intrinsic reasoning about natures. So, for instance, both 
models here either assume the creation of the world in time or move directly 
from God to the angels. Accordingly, the entities that populate either picture 
do not include the separate intelligences – “if they exist”, as Dietrich cautions. 
As far as theoretical reason is concerned, what must come first is the intrinsic, 
per-se consideration of the realities themselves, their essence and their order, 
which proceeds according to rational patterns of symmetry and proportion. 
For Dietrich, Proclus’ excellence in this reasoning is what made him the dili-
gent investigator (diligens indagator) into the order of nature. It is important 
to note that Berthold praises the reasoning of the moderni sapientes as being 
“more subtle” (subtiliores), which suggests that this intrinsic consideration of 
natural providence is in fact more difficult to attain; indeed, our reason easily 
descends back into the imagination that specializes in viewing things extrin-
sically.47 Thus we see why Berthold was so sympathetic to these arguments, 
but also why scruples of another kind forced him to curtail their validity. For 
Berthold, these subtle arguments agree with the approach followed by the 
Platonists and yet they must ultimately yield to the dogmatic authority of the 
best of the ancient philosophers Plato and Proclus.
3.3 Case 3: The Three Levels of Causes (Elaboration)
Berthold takes the opposite approach to Dietrich’s doctrine of the three levels 
of causes, namely, essential, substantial, and accidental causes.48 Whereas the 
previous example demanded a truncation of Dietrich’s theory, this required 
elaboration. Berthold borrowed this doctrine of causes repeatedly, though 
the most sustained discussion appears in Proposition 7.49 He identifies this 
45  Dietrich of Freiberg, De anim., 20.6, p. 31, l. 109–113.
46  Dietrich of Freiberg, De sub. spir., p. 319, l. 26–p. 320, l. 29; Dietrich of Freiberg, De vis. beat., 
4.3.2 (4), p. 114, l. 16–21.
47  One of the two explicit mentions of Dietrich in the Expositio praises him with the same 
terms for an argument about mediation that is faithful to the patterns of symmetrical 
reasoning. See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 107A, p. 247, l. 60–62: Ubi considerandum, 
quod dictis magister subtilissime, realissime concludit caelum esse animatum, sed non dat 
medium continuativum inter intellectuales hypostases et corpora caelestia, quod hic quaeri-
tur, sicut patet, quae sunt extrema.
48  Dietrich of Freiberg, De vis. beat., 3.2.9.4, p. 90, l. 2–p. 93, l. 104.
49  See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 25C, 34C, 51A, 72C, 75A, and 104D.
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Proposition as one of the two foundations of the entire project. This is because 
it is the first devoted principally to the Good. Having defended the primacy of 
the Good with arguments from the Timaeus, Dionysius, and Augustine in 7A, 
Berthold outlines the various kinds of productive causes. In 7B, he gives a five-
fold division: the superbonum (God), the superessential goods, the essential 
causes, substantial causes, and accidental causes. After just over 100 lines of 
explanation, he then adds in 7C:
However, it should be considered that certain moderns [quidam moderni] 
only distinguish three kinds of productive [principles] according to the 
three kinds of agent cause, namely, essential, substantial and accidental.50
He then gives a succinct summary of this “contemporary” position using two 
texts from Dietrich, De cognitione entium separatorum 75.1–76.6 and De anima-
tione caeli 7.1–5, which yields this threefold division. Essential causes act spon-
taneously in virtue of their essence, and therefore their effect is an essence in 
turn. Each cause is a being existing as a species (ens secundum speciem) that is 
immutable, and so is its effect. For Dietrich, the separate intelligences operate 
like this. Substantial causes, which act from their own substance, bring their 
effect into being out of the potency of material principles. Dietrich would 
identify these with the heavenly souls and the celestial bodies, whose effects 
are the substances of the sublunary world. Finally, accidental causes act by 
way of accidental features, like fire that acts by heat. The effect, in turn, is an 
accidental change, for example, being heated.
If we look back to the fivefold division proposed by Berthold in 7B, there 
appears to be no significant difference between Berthold’s highest three 
levels and Dietrich’s essential cause. All of them act spontaneously and pre-
suppose nothing before bestowing their effect. The difference seems to be 
one of vocabulary and precision: “essential, substantial, and accidental pro-
ductive principles are less properly called [productive] and truly are less 
productive than superessential productive principles”, while “superessential 
productive principles are called [productive] and are productive by analogy to 
the first productive principle as such”.51 Therefore, the advantage of Berthold’s 
50  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7C, p. 148, l. 365–368: Et licet haec sufficiant de propo-
sito, tamen considerandum est, quod quidam moderni solum distinguunt triplex genus 
productivorum secundum triplex genus causae agentis, essentialis videlicet, substantialis et 
accidentalis.
51  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7C, p. 147, l. 336–p. 148, l. 338 and p. 148, l. 351–353: inter 
iam enumerata productiva tam essentialia quam etiam substantialia et accidentalia minus 
proprie et vere sunt ut dicuntur productiva superessentialibus productivis. […] Sola igitur 
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more elaborate scheme is simply that it arranges causes according to modali-
ties of goodness, and thus separates the unbounded creative causality of the 
Good, which calls all things into being, from the more determinate, qualified 
productive causality of the gods, and the more restricted causality of the many 
principles beneath the gods.52
Comparing his borrowings from Dietrich in 7C to the original texts, it 
becomes clear that Berthold modifies his source in order to make it seem like 
this more complex structure was latent in the “contemporary” doctrine of 
essential causes.53 Berthold thus gives the impression that the moderns come 
so far, but their intentions can be fully realized only by returning to the meta-
physics of the Good articulated by the best of the ancient Platonists.54
Berthold thus interpolates Proclean structures into Dietrich’s doctrine of 
creation and determination because it is consistent with that metaphysics of 
the Good and, again, because the authority of the Platonists must prevail. For 
the same reason, in his citation of De animatione caeli, Berthold omits a very 
significant caveat from Dietrich’s text. After describing God’s creative causality, 
Dietrich had gone on to add:
superessentialia et superbonum productiva stant in vera et propria ratione productivorum, 
licet ipsa superessentialia dicantur et sint productiva in analogia ad simpliciter primum 
productivum.
52  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7B, p. 146, l. 270–p. 147, l. 316.
53  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 7C, p. 150, l. 427–p. 151, l. 445, with the modifications of 
Dietrich of Freiberg, De anim., 7.1–5 in bold: Ex praemissis colligitur secundum eos, quod 
sola causa essentialis dicitur et est causa productiva, a qua entia per suas essentias emanant 
modo simplici, quia non per motum vel quamcumque transmutationem, sed per simplicem 
defluxum totalis essentiae rei sic procedentis et hoc vel totaliter vel secundum determi-
natum modum, ut ex dictis apparet. In talis autem entis constitutione in esse attenditur 
simplicitas modi productionis non solum ex parte principii productivi – quod est ens ut 
simpliciter et ex hoc proprium modum principiandi effective habet simplicem et propter 
hoc sine motu et transmutatione –, verum etiam ex parte causati seu producti huic modo 
producendi active correspondet passive quidam proprius modus simplicitatis, quia tale 
productum vel non producitur ex aliquo subiecto – quale est omnis effectus, ut est solum 
prime productivi simpliciter, cuiusmodi est prime bonum –, vel, si producitur ex aliquo 
subiecto, hoc tamen subiectum quasi recipiens et intentio ipsum determinans ramanet ut 
res una, et sic secundum totalitatem sui in esse constituitur, licet non totaliter, cum solum 
prime productivum, cui etiam summus modus producendi competit, quia agit non solum 
non praesupponendo aliquod subiectum, ex quo vel in quoḏ agat, sed etiam non praesup-
ponendo actionem cuiuscumque prioris vel altioris virtutis, qua sua actio figatur et fundatur 
in producendo […].
54  For a similar case, this time an extension of Dietrich’s notion of “proceeding as an image” 
(procedere ut imago) to what is above intellect, see Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 29B, 
58A, 70C, 83B, 109A, 125D, 131D, 145B, and 185E.
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But if there are other substances, which the curiosity of the philosophers 
asserts and which they call intelligences […] these, I say, according to 
these philosophers, would be the principles of beings without presup-
posing a prior subject from elsewhere, but would presuppose the action 
and power of the first and higher principle.55
Dietrich was not the first to use these caveats when referring to the separate 
intellects; a passage from Siger of Brabant may be interpreted along these lines.56 
But with Dietrich they became a matter of habit: there are over 40 such expres-
sions in his work.57 It seems extremely important that Dietrich was always 
careful to make these cautionary remarks and that Berthold always omitted 
them and never spoke in these hypothetical terms himself.58 This reflects his 
fundamentally different view of pagan philosophical authority. In what follows 
I will argue that this difference extends down to the very roots of Berthold’s 
conception of theology itself which, I believe, he derived from Dietrich and, 
following his consistent practice, developed in a new direction: Berthold uni-
fies the orders of natural and voluntary providence, which Dietrich had used to 
separate philosophical and revealed theology, in Platonism as such.
55  Dietrich of Freiberg, De anim., 7.5, p. 18, l. 67–p. 19, l. 75: Si autem essent aliae substantiae, 
quas curiositas philosophorum asserit et intelligentias vocant, quarum quaelibet secundum 
eos est intellectus in actu per essentiam, huiusmodi, inquam, essent secundum dictos phi-
losophos principia entium non supposito aliunde aliquo subiecto, supposita tamen actione 
et virtute prioris et altioris principii, in cuius virtute et actione fundarentur et figerentur 
earum propriae actiones; et ideo non essent creatrices, quamvis entia secundum totas suas 
essentias ab ipsis procederent, modo tamen inferiore, quam sit ille, quo procedunt a primo 
omnium principio.
56  Siger of Brabant, Quaestiones in Metaphysicam, ed. A. Maurer (Louvain-la-Neuve: Éditions 
de l’Institut supérieur de philosophie, 1983), lib. iii, q. 5, p. 83, l. 15–17: Nulla autem istarum 
viarum potest probari quod substantiae separate, si plures sint, habeant causam aliquam, 
nec etiam quod non habeant ex hoc quod aeternae sunt.
57  Dietrich of Freiberg, De cog. ent., 1.3–4, 2.3, 3.1, 5.2–3, 14.1, 27.2–3, 36.2, 37.1, 37.8, 39.2, 39.4, 
44.9, 86.6; Dietrich of Freiberg, De sub. spir., 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 2.2, 6.2, 9.1, 16.1, 18.2, 19.3, 23.4, 
28.4; Dietrich of Freiberg, De vis. beat., 3.2.9.2.4, 3.2.9.8.1, 4.2.1.14; Dietrich of Freiberg, De 
orig., 1.14, 3.37; Dietrich of Freiberg, De int., ii.34.1, iii.25.1, iii.30.2; Dietrich of Freiberg, De 
anim., 7.5, 9.1, 11.4, 15.1; Dietrich of Freiberg, Quaest. utrum in Deo, 1.1.4, 1.3.4; Dietrich of 
Freiberg, De mens., 2.11, 2.43, 8.3; Dietrich of Freiberg, De dot., 24.5; Dietrich of Freiberg, De 
acc., 8.2.
58  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 44E, p. 77, l. 154–161, citing Dietrich of Freiberg, De acc., 
8.2, p. 63, l. 97–p. 64, l. 104; Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 69B, p. 21, l. 33–36, citing 
Dietrich of Freiberg, De sub. spir., 28.4, p. 327, l. 25–28; Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
83B, p. 124, l. 38–43, citing Dietrich of Freiberg, Quaest. utrum in Deo, 1.1 (4), p. 294, l. 32.
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4 Theology and Philosophy: Traces of a Lost Text?
The Preamble to the Exposition seeks to account for the two principles that, 
according to Berthold, Proclus assumes as the foundations of his philosophy: 
Proposition 1 (Omnis multitudo etc.) assumes “that there is multitude” (multi-
tudinem esse) and moves from the many to the One, while Proposition 7 (Omne 
productivum etc.) presupposes that “the productive exists” (productivum esse) 
and establishes the existence of the Good.
Since Proclus seems to assume these principles, Berthold was compelled, 
somewhat surprisingly, to address some doubts as to whether the science of 
the Elements of Theology is a true science at all:
These two principles, upon which all of this philosophy is built as upon 
its own foundations, the author assumes are grasped by the reception 
of the senses and are in no way intellected, known, or apprehended by 
another scientific habit, but are only believed, just as the theology that 
concerns the divine Good according to the order of voluntary providence 
is founded on believed principles, which are the articles of the Christian 
faith. For this reason, it is often doubted by many, concerning both sapi-
ential and divinising theology, whether it is a science in the true sense of 
the term.59
The argument of the Preamble is then that a science founded on principles 
that are only believed (credita) can still be a science in the genuine sense of 
the word.
But who are the many (a plerisque) who denied the scientific character 
of Proclus’ philosophy? Some, like Albert the Great and Thomas Aquinas, in 
an Aristotelian spirit, at times criticised the Platonists for using metaphors 
instead of precise terminology. But there is no precedent for any such critique 
directed against Proclus in the Latin world. The criticism seems to presuppose 
an elaborate debate about the Aristotelian character of a science, the modes of 
cognition by which the principles of a science are apprehended, as well as an 
argument that connects the reception of principles through sense-perception 
59  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeambulum A, p. 53, l. 15–22: Ista duo principia, qui-
bus totius istius philosophiae structura sicut propriis fundamentis innititur, auctor supponit 
sicut per sensus acceptionem nota et nullo modo vel intellecta vel scita vel aliquo alio habitu 
scientiali apprehensa, sed solum credita, sicut et theologia, quae est de bono divino secun-
dum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, fundatur in principiis creditis, quae sunt articuli 
fidei Christianae. Propter quod a plerisque dubitari solet de utraque theologia et sapientiali 
et divinali, an sit scientia secundum veram scientiae rationem.
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with belief. In other words, some have challenged the notion that a science 
based on believed principles could be a science at all. This argument seems 
naturally suited to debates about the scientific status of revealed theology, but 
the application of this to the Elements is hardly a straightforward one, even 
within the parallel framework of the two orders of providence, and obliges us 
to seek out the background debate presupposed by the text.
This task is now much easier now that Berthold’s extensive reliance on 
Thomas of York has been demonstrated. Large portions of the Preamble 
come directly from Thomas.60 But this is not the case for the core passages of 
the Preamble, namely, its verdict on the status of a science that begins from 
believed principles. I will suggest that these come from a lost work of Dietrich, 
whose title we know from the 14th-century Stams catalogue: De theologia, quod 
sit scientia secundum perfectam rationem scientiae. Loris Sturlese was the first 
to note that the final phrase of the opening passage of the Preamble, translated 
above, echoes the title of this lost treatise, and he intuited that a good deal of 
what follows in the Preamble must depend on Dietrich’s lost text, but did not 
pursue the hypothesis any further.61 If we now look past Berthold’s borrow-
ings from Thomas to the central arguments of the Preamble, sections B and C, 
we begin to see many theoretical and terminological parallels with Dietrich’s 
known works. Indeed, if we transpose these arguments into Dietrich’s idiom 
and context, a picture emerges that is consistent with what we already know 
about his intellectual project. It equally reflects Berthold’s adaptations and 
adjustments of it that were discussed in the case studies. Furthermore, this 
hypothesis sheds light on their decisively different approaches to the funda-
mental question of the relationship between philosophy and theology, and 
how these disciplines map on to the methodological and ontological sepa-
ration of the two orders of providence. And so while the reconstruction of 
the argument of a lost treatise is always a delicate one, especially when one 
is relying on traces and tacit citations, I believe the result corroborates what 
60  See Fiorella Retucci’s contribution in this volume.
61  L. Sturlese, “Il De animatione caeli di Teodorico di Freiberg”, in R. Creytens, P. Künzle 
(eds), Xenia Medii Aevi historiam illustrantia, oblata Thomae Kaeppeli O.P., vol. 1 (Roma: 
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1978), p. 175–247, at p. 194, n. 84: “che Bertoldo dipenda 
da tale quaestio, o comunque da posizioni teodoriciane, è mia netta impressione: ma non 
posso per ora dimostrario”. See also L. Sturlese, “Introduction”, Berthold de Moosburg, 
Commentaire des Éléments de théologie de Proclus, Préambule du livre, in R. Imbach, 
M.-H. Méléard (eds), Philosophes médiévaux. Anthologie de textes philosophiques (XIIIe–
XIV e siècles) (Paris: Union générale d’éditions, 1986), p. 335–346, at p. 342–343: “[…] sur-
tout on peut envisager l’éventualité que derrière le texte du Préambule se camoufle un 
extrait de la Question perdue de Thierry de Freiberg Quaestio utrum theologia sit scientia 
secundum perfectam rationem scientiae”.
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has already been established on solid ground and also opens up new paths for 
understanding the projects of these two Dominicans within their respective 
contexts.
While Dietrich was in Paris as a bachelor in theology and lecturing on the 
Sentences sometime between 1282–1292,62 debates concerning the scientific 
status of theology reached “a fever pitch”.63 Followers of Aquinas invoked the 
deductive model of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics and argued that theology is 
a science in the strong sense, in that our theology is subalternated to the higher 
science possessed by God and the blessed. To give an analogy from the human 
sciences, an expert geometer knows demonstratively what the practitioner of 
optics assumes: the geometer knows the reason why (propter quid), while the 
optician knows the fact that (quia).64 Among the most innovative and polar-
ised reactions to this position were Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. 
Both went to the Posterior Analytics to criticise the subalternation theory on its 
own grounds. For Henry of Ghent, we must look beyond Aristotle to Christian 
authorities in order to ground the subalternation theory. Henry proposed his 
famous doctrine of the middle light (lumen medium), which the theologian 
possesses between the obscure light of faith, which every believer has, and the 
clear light of glory of God and the blessed. Godfrey of Fontaines also returned 
to Aristotle but opposed both Henry and the Thomists. Godfrey argued that 
we simply must give up calling theology a science in the strict sense. In his 
fourth and eighth Quodlibets from 1287 and 1292,65 which probably overlapped 
with Dietrich’s baccalaureate,66 he argued against the subalternation theory, 
62  Sturlese, Dokumente und Forschungen, p. 4; Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 30.
63  S. Brown, “Duo Candelabra Parisiensia. Prosper of Reggio in Emilia’s Portrait of the 
Enduring Presence of Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines regarding the Nature 
of Theological Study”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), Nach der Verurteilung 
von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. 
Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 320–356, at p. 323.
64  Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, i.1.2. On this doctrine and its legacy, see J.-P. Torrell, 
“Le savoir théologique chez les premiers thomistes”, in Revue thomiste 97(1997), p. 9–30, 
at p. 16–19, 26–29.
65  For the chronology, see J. Wippel, The Metaphysical Thought of Godfrey of Fontaines. A 
Study in Late Thirteenth-Century Philosophy (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University 
of America Press, 1981), p. xxvii–xxviii. On Godfrey and his criticisms of Henry of Ghent, 
see C. König-Pralong, Le bon usage des savoirs. Scolastique, philosophie et politique cul-
turelle (Paris: Vrin, 2011), p. 111–123.
66  Dietrich’s De origine seems to use Godfrey’s Quodlibet ii (1286) and Henry’s Quodlibet 
xiv (1290/1291). See L. Sturlese, Storia della filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo. Il secolo XIII 
(Firenze: Olschki, 1996), p. 185–188; Flasch, Dietrich von Freiberg, p. 162–165; P. Porro, “Res 
praedicamenti e ratio praedicamenti. Una nota su Teodorico di Freiberg e Enrico di Gand”, 
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contending that any science that receives its principles from a higher science 
through mere belief cannot be a science in the strict sense of the term:
Therefore, to say that the principles of theology or the knowledge of 
anything in theology itself [are merely believed], or that in the one who 
is said to be knowledgeable in theology [these principles] are merely 
believed and are not known or intellected [sunt solum credita et non 
scita vel intellecta], and thus merely possess the certitude of adhesion, 
and nevertheless produce the certitude of knowledge in the conclusions 
reached from them, is to say that the conclusions would be better known 
than the principles, and so have a twofold certitude, while the principles 
would have but one [kind of certitude]. This is to say contradictory things 
and greatly to dishonour sacred theology and its teachers, by propagating 
such lies about theology to those drawn to it.67
Godfrey based his argument on a distinction between the certitude of evi-
dence, which belongs to scientia, and the certitude of adhesion, which belongs 
to faith. The latter comes from adhesion to authority and is weak and imper-
fect compared to the certitude of scientific evidence.68 One cannot deduce 
stronger conclusions from weaker principles.69 Therefore, because theology 
relies on principles that are only believed, which are grounded only on certi-
tude of adhesion to authority, Godfrey concluded in 1293/1294, after Dietrich 
had left Paris, that “theology is less properly a science than natural science”.70
in J. Biard, D. Calma, R. Imbach (eds), Recherches sur Dietrich de Freiberg (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 2009), p. 131–143, at p. 142–143.
67  Godfrey of Fontaines, Les quatres premiers Quodlibets de Godefroid de Fontaines, eds 
M. de Wulf, A. Pelzer (Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1904), 
Quodlibet iv, q. 10, p. 262: Dicere ergo quod principia theologiae […] sive apud illum qui 
dicitur esse sciens theologiam sunt solum credita et non scita vel intellecta et sic solum cer-
titudinem adhaesionis habentia, et tamen efficiunt certitudinem scientiae in conclusionibus 
ex ipsis elicitis, est dicere quod conclusiones sint notiores principiis, scilicet duplicem certi-
tudinem habentes, cum principia non habeant nisi unam. Et hoc est dicere contradictoria 
et multum derogare sacrae theologiae et doctoribus ipsius, tales fictiones de ipsa theologia 
attractantibus ipsam propalare.
68  Godfrey of Fontaines, Le huitième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans 
(Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1924), Quodlibet viii, q. 7, 
p. 73: notitia debilis vel imperfecta ad evidentiam, sed firma quantum ad adhaesionem, quia 
innititur auctoritati solum et non rei in se vel ostensae per rationem evidentem.
69  Godfrey of Fontaines, Quodlibet iv, q. 10, p. 262.
70  Godfrey of Fontaines, Le neuvième Quodlibet de Godefroid de Fontaines, ed. J. Hoffmans 
(Louvain: Institut supérieur de philosophie de l’Université, 1928), Quodlibet ix, q. 20, 
p. 292: Ergo videtur quod theologia sit minus proprie scientia quam naturalis non tantum 
propter hoc, quia scilicet habet evidentiam quae requiritur ad scientiam, sed minorem quam 
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The ensuing debate lasted well into the 14th century, with prominent 
responses to Godfrey coming from Duns Scotus, James of Metz, Hervaeus 
Natalis, and Bernard of Auvergne. What concerns us are not these details but 
simply the fact that after Godfrey no one held that theology is a science in the 
strictest demonstrative sense. Those who continued to regard it as such had to 
admit some flexibility into their notions of what constituted a demonstrative 
science.71 As we shall see, the Preamble, whether or not it relies on Dietrich’s 
own response to his position, is no exception to this pattern.
By comparing some passages of the Preamble with Dietrich’s extant works, I 
will argue that, if these passages are read as traces of Dietrich’s lost treatise on 
the scientific status of theology, we can surmise that Dietrich largely accepted 
the way in which Godfrey had framed his own position in terms of the certi-
tude of evidence and the certitude of adhesion. But his original manoeuvre 
in this context would have been to focus on the role that belief plays in every 
particular science that begins from without (quasi ab extrinseco), includ-
ing metaphysics and theology, and in fact every science except the purely 
mathematical disciplines. In a sense, this argument amounts to an intensi-
fication of Godfrey’s focus on subjective certitude, but in so doing redefines 
what constitutes a true science insofar as the stability of first principles is to 
be found within the cognitive process by which the subject grasps universal 
propositions.72
naturalis, – immo etiam quia nec habet evidentiam quae requiritur ad illam scientiam quae 
debet dici proprie scientia. Propter quod dicendum esset illis, qui dicunt modo supradicto 
theologiam esse scientiam proprie dictam, dicentes hoc se credere, quia infinitae auctori-
tates sanctorum quibus in hoc credendum est videntur hoc dicere, quod non est ita. Immo 
nec una sola auctoritas viri magnae auctoritatis invenitur per quam possit hoc evidenter 
persuaderi.
71  J.-P. Torrell, Recherches thomasiennes. Études revues et augmentées (Paris: Vrin, 2000), 
p. 173, n. 4. For the subsequent debate, see J. Leclercq, “La théologie comme science dans 
la littérature quodlibétique”, in Recherches de théologie ancienne et médiévale 11(1939), 
p. 351–374; S. Brown, “Late Thirteenth Century Theology. Scientia Pushed to its Limits”, 
in R. Berndt, M. Lutz-Bachmann, R.M.W. Stammberger (eds), “Scientia” und “Disciplina”. 
Wissenstheorie und Wissenschaftspraxis im 12. und 13. Jahrhundert (Berlin: Akademie 
Verlag, 2002), p. 79–90; P. Porro, “Tra l’oscurità della fede e il chiarore della visione. Il 
dibattito sullo statuto scientifico della teologia agli inizi del XIV secolo”, in L. Bianchi, 
C. Crisciani (eds), Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV secolo. Studi in ricordo di Maria 
Elena Reina (Firenze: sismel – Edizioni del Galluzzo, 2014), p. 195–256.
72  C. König-Pralong, “Expérience et sciences de la nature chez Dietrich de Freiberg et Berthold 
de Moosburg”, in L. Bianchi, C. Crisciani (eds), Forme e oggetti della conoscenza nel XIV sec-
olo, p. 107–133, compares the Praeamble with Dietrich of Freiberg’s extant treatises, offers 
some valuable insights on the status of experimental sciences in Dietrich’s extant works, 
and compares him with Roger Bacon. She also rightly underscores an important inno-
vation in the scientific epistemology of the Preamble, which autonomises speculative-
analytical sciences (the purely mathematical) and the experimental-inductive sciences 
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Berthold divides the Preamble into three sections: (A) on scientific prin-
ciples in general; (B) on the three kinds of scientific principles, as well as the 
properties and character peculiar to each kind of principle; (C) on the true 
and properly scientific procedure of Proclus’ theology. All of section A of the 
Preamble (70 lines) comes from Thomas of York’s Sapientiale iii.23 (or v.23 
in the Florence manuscript), from which Berthold produces a terminological 
dossier of the different kinds of principles used in the sciences, such as axioms, 
hypotheses, and postulates.73 For the sake of brevity, I pass over the details of 
this inventory because they do not directly influence Berthold’s response to 
the doubt about the scientific status of the Elements.
The aim of the Preamble is not only to respond to this doubt, but to show 
that Platonic philosophy in fact both meets and exceeds the Aristotelian crite-
ria for demonstrative scientific procedure. Section B contains the crucial mate-
rial that Berthold will then use to elevate Platonic above Aristotelian science in 
section C. I will focus first on section B which, I believe, comes from or is heav-
ily inspired by Dietrich.74 I will then consider the ramifications of this reading 
by pointing to the divergent purposes to which this argument could have been 
put by Dietrich and by Berthold in section C.
Section B begins with an outline of the three properties, or more specifically, 
the proper modes that the three kinds of principles presented in section A 
can assume. Berthold arranges these modes in terms of the various degrees of 
commonality that principles possess: some principles descend into every sci-
ence, others only into some sciences, and those in the third group are proper 
only to one science. After these modes of commonality are explained, this 
which, for the first time, are distinguished not according to their objects but according 
to the mode of apprehending the truth of the propositions comprising these sciences 
(p. 125, 128–129). However, the differences König-Pralong notes between the Preamble and 
Dietrich are not substantive and can be reduced to differences of emphasis: the division 
between analytical and experimental sciences is presented austerely in the Preamble, but 
this does not exclude the possibility of the mixed methods that we see in Dietrich’s De 
iride, prol. (5). Moreover, it obscures the purpose of the Preamble to say that for Berthold 
Platonic science has the same certitude as mathematics (p. 129, p. 132–133). The argument 
of the Preamble becomes clearer when it is read as a theological text, and when its sources 
and interlocutors are sought in that domain.
73  See the list of citations compiled by Fiorella Retucci in this volume. For a study and edi-
tion of this section of the Sapientiale, see F. Retucci, “Nuovi percorsi del platonismo medi-
evale. I commentari bizantini all’Etica Nicomachea nel Sapientiale di Tommaso di York”, in 
Documenti e studi sulla tradizione filosofica medievale 24(2013), p. 85–120.
74  Only one passage in section B undoubtedly comes from Thomas of York: p. 57, l. 141–157 
(≈ Sap. iii.23), which explains what Aristotle means by intellectus in Nicomachean Ethics 
vi and Posterior Analytics using the commentary of Eustratius.
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classification is used to discuss the different modes of certitude proper to each 
kind of principle.
The most-common principles (communissima) descend into every science. 
For example, all sciences use the principle of non-contradiction.75 The mode 
or condition of such principles is that they are the most secure of all and can-
not deceive; they are true universally, and thus are present by nature and not by 
instruction. We read that these principles concern “being as being”, since being 
(ens) is “the most universal of all formal intentions” – however, he continues, 
“according to Plato it is otherwise”. This contrast is incomplete as it stands, and 
one cannot rule out that Berthold is embellishing another text.76
The second group of principles are common (communia). These are taken 
up “proportionately”, or in their own way, only by some sciences. Examples are 
taken from Euclid’s “common conceptions of the mind”: “the whole is greater 
than the part” or “if equals are subtracted from equals, then the remainders 
are equal”.77
In the third group are principles proper to particular sciences that have no 
proportional or analogical commonality across diverse sciences: their mean-
ing is entirely fixed relative to the particular science in question. Examples are 
the principle in geometry that “all right angles are equal”, in optics the prin-
ciple that “light and colour move sight”, or in physics that there is movement 
in nature.
Then we come to the various modes of certitude and truth apprehended 
in these three kinds of principles. The text argues that “most-common” and 
“common” principles are known through intellect (intellectus), and it is here 
that Berthold uses Thomas of York to explain how intellect differs from the 
other habits presented by Aristotle in Book vi of the Ethics. But the most 
75  For Dietrich’s use of descendere to describe the passage from the universal to the particu-
lar, see Dietrich of Freiberg, De vis. beat., 3.2.9.6 (4–6); De quid., 4.4; De int., ii.14.1; De luce, 
17.1–2.
76  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 56, l. 116–119: ens, quod est universalissima 
omnium intentionum formalium secundum Aristotelem, licet aliter sit secundum Platonem. 
Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De orig., 1.25, p. 144, l. 239–241: intentio enim entis prima et for-
malissima est omnium intentionum; 3.8, p. 159, l. 40–p. 160, l. 48: ratio entis […] est prima et 
formalissima omnium intentionum; 5.36, p. 191, l. 351–358: ens, quae est prima et formalis-
sima omnium intentionum; Dietrich of Freiberg, De int., ii.15.1, p. 156, l. 9–10: quantum ad 
primam et simplicissimam et universalissimam intentionem, scilicet esse.
77  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 56, l. 123–126: quas communes animi con-
ceptiones vocant et ponuntur in principio Euclidis, puta, ‘si ab aequalibus aequalia demas’, 
etc., et ‘omne totum est maius sua parte’. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De ir., i.4.8, p. 128, l. 58–59: 
per communem animi conceptionem, scilicet ‘si aequalia ab aequalibus demas’ etc.; i.4.10, 
p. 128, l. 80–81; ii.24.8, p. 186, l. 93–94.
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important point concerns the principles unique to particular sciences. Only 
in some sciences, the purely mathematical, are the principles apprehended by 
intellect. All the others, as we shall see, have a different mode of certitude and 
truth. The notion of a true science must have sufficient latitude to account for 
these, which comprise the majority, by far, of the disciplines normally regarded 
as sciences.
Therefore, each science must be considered separately to determine, first, 
whether it is purely mathematical and, second, how it relates to the physical 
world. Purely mathematical sciences like geometry and arithmetic have the 
same certitude as the most-common and common principles because their 
principles are known through intellect and not sense-experience. In such cases, 
exemplified by Euclid, the order of nature and the order of our knowledge are 
parallel: “we apprehend the proper principles of such sciences by intellect in 
the first steps in the progress in these sciences”.78
Sciences relating to the physical world apprehend truth in another way and 
have a different degree of certitude. Such sciences include physics and ethics, 
where what is prior by nature is later in the order of knowing because they 
begin in sense-perception. Here the text cites Aristotle: “every art and intel-
lective discipline begins from a prior sense-perception”.79 The principles in 
these sciences are universals derived from sense, memory, and experience. For 
example, in physics sense-perception establishes “that there is motion”, and 
in medicine experience establishes “that scammony purges bile”. In optics 
and astronomy an instrument is used to capture an experimentum. In these 
particular sciences, there is no necessary relation between experience and 
the universal proposition or principle derived from it.80 Therefore, whereas 
intellect apprehends the principles of purely mathematical sciences as well 
as most-common and common principles, which have an intrinsic mode of 
certitude and truth, the principles of every other particular science, as we 
shall see, “have their cause and reason as it were from the outside” (quasi ab 
extrinseco).81 It is relative to this domain of exteriority that the text makes the 
critical manoeuvre that extends the true notion of a science to those founded 
on believed principles. It is within this category that the text mentions “the 
principles of metaphysical or divine sciences”.82
78  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 58, l. 177–178.
79  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 59, l. 204–209.
80  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 62, l. 331–334.
81  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 241.
82  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 271–274: alia est cognitio principio-
rum communissimorum, communium et propriorum in scientiis pure mathematicis, quia 
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Any proposition or principle derived from sense-experience in such sciences 
is “only believed and in no way known or intellected”, since it lacks the neces-
sity of intellect.83 These principles, as believed, are “apprehended under the 
certitude of the ‘true’, [which] cannot possibly be otherwise”. This apprehen-
sion has three components: (1) the “apprehended” is what reason objectively 
deals with in thinking, such as “this, which is moved, exists”;84 (2) it is “true” 
by the equality of the thing apprehended and intellect, which occurs through 
“a combination or composition of speech”;85 finally, (3) “certitude” is “the firm 
and unshakeable assent of reason” concerning the thing apprehended as true.
Within this framework, the text compares mathematical and physical sci-
ences. What is known demonstratively (scitum) by intellect is also “appre-
hended by reason under the certitude of truth”, but the principle that is 
believed (creditum) differs from it in two respects: (1) by its mode of certitude 
and (2) in the order of apprehension. (1) Scientia takes its certitude from the 
intrinsic evidence of the thing, that is, from the intention and rational rela-
tions which the terms have to one another in a complex proposition, whether 
immediately in the case of first principles, or mediately, when a conclusion is 
deduced from prior principles. By contrast, the certitude of faith derives not 
from intrinsic evidence, but has its cause and reason from without (quasi ab 
intellectus, alia vero metaphysicorum seu divinorum, physicorum et ad physica relatorum, 
quia acceptio secundum sensum.
83  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 59, l. 217–229: Sic igitur procedente indaga-
tione per viam sensus et experientiae in praemissis scientiis sumptum est unum universale 
pro ipsarum scientiarum principio, quod principium in quacumque huiusmodi scientia 
solum creditum est et nullo modo scitum nec intellectum, quia nec ex propria ratione termi-
norum cognitum est, quod esset intelligere, nec ex aliquibus principiis aliis seu causis conclu-
sum et ita nullo modo scitum, sed, ut dictum est, solum est creditum, et sic apprehensum sub 
certitudine veri, quod impossibile est aliter se habere. Dico autem [1] ‘apprehensum’ id, circa 
quod obiective negotiatur ratio per cognitionem, ut hoc, quod est motum, esse; [2] ‘verum’ 
autem hic intelligo ipsam aequalitatem sive consonantiam rei apprehensae et intellectus, 
quae quantum ad rationem et modum attenditur circa complexionem sive compositionem 
locutionis; [3] ‘certitudo’ autem de ipsa veritate rei apprehensae est firmus et indeclinabilis 
assensus rationis in rem sic apprehensam.
84  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 249–250 clarifies that these are first 
intentions. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De orig., 5.47, p. 194, l. 463–468: Circa quaedam enim 
entia sic negotiatur intellectus […]; 5.54, p. 197, l. 566–568: Unde huiusmodi entia proprie 
dicuntur res rationis, non autem ea, quae sunt primae intentionis, quae important aliquam 
rem naturae et circa quae negotiatur intellectus tamquam circa res naturae.
85  Presumably this occurs through affirmation and negation, and second intentions. This 
rare expression, complexio locutionis, appears also in Dietrich of Freiberg, De orig., 5.54, 
p. 197, l. 559–562: Possunt enim non entia, sicut et entia, in complexionem locutionis et in 
praedicationem affirmativam vel negativam venire […]; Dietrich of Freiberg, De nat. contr., 
13.1, p. 93, l. 44–55.
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extrinseco), such as “from the clear authority of an expert, from whose truth 
the intellect cannot reasonably dissent”.86 At this stage, one should note that 
scientia and fides align closely with what Godfrey called the certitude of evi-
dence, where knowledge begins with per se principles that lead to clear conclu-
sions, and the certitude of adhesion, which begins from authority.
(2) The second difference between scientia and fides concerns the order of 
apprehension. In scientia, the evidence of the thing arises from the intention 
and rational relation of the terms which are, so to speak, “the intrinsic prin-
ciple of cognition found in the thing”.87 The thing itself is by nature appre-
hended first, prior to truth or falsehood, which both arise from the combining 
activity of intellect. By contrast, in belief, the authority of an expert comes 
first, “in whose truth reason declares our trust must absolutely be placed and 
the will inclines to it”.88 In belief, the order of apprehension begins with truth 
as such and not with the intrinsic evidence of the thing. Any necessity lacking 
in the evidence of the terms is supplied by the authority of an expert, which 
provides the secure foundation of truth.
What remains to be determined is whether there can be a true science 
(vera scientia) which begins from belief. Section C of the Preamble is based 
on establishing an analogy between theology and natural science. Godfrey did 
not accept this analogy. But the argument in the Preamble will make room for 
it insofar as it has found a role for belief in the physical sciences. In a moment 
we shall pause to consider the implications of the possibility that, if Berthold 
is indeed using Dietrich’s De theologia, substantial modifications follow from 
his repurposing of its argument: he would have placed Platonic philosophy 
where Dietrich would have put revealed theology, for section C argues that 
Platonic wisdom (divinalis sapientia) has the same scientific structure, propor-
tionately speaking (proportionaliter loquendo), as the other genuine sciences, 
86  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 241–242: puta ex evidenti auctoritate 
alicuius experti, a cuius veritate intellectus rationabiliter dissentire non potest.
87  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 248–250: quae sunt quasi intrinse-
cum cognitionis principium repertum apud rem ipsam, prout est ens et res primae inten-
tionis. Cf. Dietrich of Freiberg, De acc., 8.4, p. 64, l. 110–113: universitas entium, quae sunt 
res primae intentionis et vere res naturae, in duplicem maneriem rerum distinguitur secun-
dum duas differentias entis in eo, quod ens, quae est prima et simplicissima omnium forma-
lium intentionum repertarum in rebus; Dietrich of Freiberg, De vis. beat., 3.2.9.1 (3), p. 86, 
l. 26–33.
88  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 60, l. 254–56: Quia enim causam et ratio-
nem suae certitudinis non habet a re ipsa, sed ab auctoritate alicuius experti, cuius veritati 
omnino standum esse dicit ratio et inclinat voluntas […].
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except the purely mathematical.89 That is, it uses most-common principles 
(e.g., non-contradiction) and common principles (e.g., “the whole is greater 
than the part”), which are apprehended by intellect. As for the two principles 
unique to this science, “there is multitude” and “there is producer and pro-
duced”, Berthold states that Proclus assumes them and “proceeds perfectly fol-
lowing the scientific mode”. In this most divine science (divinissima scientia), 
these two principles are known in a way analogous (proportionaliter) to the 
sciences concerning things conjoined to motion or change. While Berthold 
does not explicitly say so, this requires that we understand both the elements 
of similarity and difference in the analogy.
In terms of similarity, this theology resembles those sciences in which 
there is no necessary connection between sense-experience and the universal 
proposition: their principles must be believed. The text explains this with an 
important account of the cognitive structure of belief which, however, is sub-
tly different from the grounding of authority in section B:
Therefore, in taking this universal principle from sense-experiences there 
is nothing but a conjectural inference under the aspect of the true and 
not under the aspect of being, as has been said. Accordingly, it is received 
as believed, not as intellected or known [ut creditum, non ut intellectum 
vel scitum]. As has been said, it is taken by a certain conjecture, but still 
with the firm and unwavering assent of reason. This firmness and unwav-
ering assent arises from a certain natural instinct founded in the power 
that at once distinguishes, collects, and gathers, which we call the cogita-
tive. In and through this power the simple and pure intentions of things, 
separated from their images, to use the phrase of Averroes, are appre-
hended, distinguished, collected, and gathered.90
89  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 61, l. 307–309: omnino eodem modo pro-
portionaliter loquendo secundum proprium modum scientiae procedit haec divinalis sapi-
entia sicut praedictae scientiae solis pure mathematicis exclusis.
90  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 62, l. 340–349: Igitur in sumptione talis 
universalis principii ex sensibilibus experimentis non est nisi quaedam coniecturalis illatio 
sub ratione veri et non sub ratione talis entis secundum praemissa, et ideo solum accipitur 
ut creditum, non ut intellectum vel scitum, et, ut dictum est, sumitur secundum quandam 
coniecturam, cum firmo tamen et indeclinabili assensu rationis. Quae firmitas et indeclina-
bilis assensus surgit ex naturali quodam instinctu fundato in virtute distinctiva et collectiva 
simul et collativa, quam cogitativam dicimus, in qua seu per quam apprehenduntur, dis-
tinguuntur, colliguntur, conferuntur simplices et purae rerum intentiones separatae a suis 
idolis, ut verbo Averrois utar.
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The universal principle is thus a conjectural inference that is believed with 
the assent of reason, all of which occurs in the cogitative power; the “true” as 
such, rather than the thing itself, is still primary. However, its solidity comes not 
from authority but from the cogitative power itself, which separates the inten-
tions stored in memory and acquired by sense-perception. Its activity is ratio-
nal and automatic. There are passages from Dietrich of Freiberg that closely 
resemble this description of the cogitative power and its close association with 
the estimative faculty,91 its phrasing,92 and its terminology of conjecture.93 An 
argument like this would serve as a strong reply to Godfrey of Fontaines, in 
that it has effectively extended the certitude of adhesion beyond the domain 
of revealed theology to all physical sciences; there is an act of belief in all such 
scientific habits.
The fundamental assumption here requires that we accept the analogy 
between what we might call, importing Godfrey’s language, the certitude of 
adhesion to authority and the certitude of adhesion to a conjectural infer-
ence. The text emphasizes how, in the order of apprehension, both in some 
sense come from without (quasi ab extrinseco), and both are grasped primar-
ily as true with enough firmness to serve as a basis for scientific knowledge. 
Nevertheless, we should recall that there must also be an element of difference 
in the analogy between theology and natural philosophy or, in other words, 
between authority and inference: one, for example, proceeds automatically 
(the conjecture) and one is voluntary (assenting to authority). This difference 
in the analogy is, however, not resolved or even acknowledged in the Preamble.
91  Dietrich of Freiberg, De int., iii.27.2, p. 200, l. 26–32: Ratio particularis, quam etiam aes-
timativam seu cogitativam vocant, est vis distinctiva, quae componit et dividit et versatur 
circa intentiones rerum, etiamsi sint res universales, universales, inquam, secundum consi-
derationem, inquantum videlicet considerat rem aliquam absque principiis secundum 
considerationem individuantibus seu particulantibus eam. Et hoc est, quod ille commenta-
tor Averroes dicit, scilicet quod denudate rem a suo idolo, id est ab accidentibus, sub quibus 
imaginativa rem considerat. See also Dietrich of Freiberg, De orig., 5.26, p. 187, l. 224–p. 188, 
l. 228; Dietrich of Freiberg, De int., iii.7.5, p. 182, l. 112–p. 183, l. 120; iii.17.1, p. 190, l. 3–9; 
iii.33.1–2, p. 204, l. 28–53; Dietrich of Freiberg, Quaestio utrum in Deo, 1.4.2.2 (11), p. 302, 
l. 78–88; Dietrich of Freiberg, De vis. beat., 3.2.9.7 (4), p. 98, l. 21–33; 4.3.2 (9), p. 115, l. 40–54; 
Dietrich of Freiberg, De sub. spir., 4.6, p. 306, l. 96–101.
92  Dietrich of Freiberg, De vis. beat., Prooemium (4), p. 14, l. 40 and 1.2.2.1 (8), p. 47, l. 51: ut 
verbo eius [Augustini] utar; 3.2.4 (10), p. 75, l. 48: ut verbis eius [Aristotelis] utar; Dietrich of 
Freiberg, De int., iii.2.1, p. 179, l. 21; Dietrich of Freiberg, De magis, 11.4, p. 55, l. 68; Dietrich 
of Freiberg, De anim., 10.4, p. 22, l. 96–97 and Dietrich of Freiberg, De ir., iv.23.5, p. 265, 
l. 112: ut verbis Philosophi utar; Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellig., 5.10, p. 360, l. 94–95: ut 
verbis philosophorum utar; Dietrich of Freiberg, De anim., 9.1, p. 20, l. 48–49: ut philos-
ophorum verbis utar.
93  Dietrich of Freiberg, De int., ii.37.1, p. 175, l. 2: coniciendum; Dietrich of Freiberg, De nat. 
contr., 56.2, p. 123, l. 35: conicimus. See also note 98, below.
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But if we entertain the hypothesis about the De theologia and the origin of 
this argument in Dietrich, we find in his works the resources to resolve this 
tension. Of the greatest importance here is the De subiecto theologiae, which is 
transmitted in Berthold’s own hand (MS Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31, 
f. 69v).94 In this fragment, we find a similar approach to that of the Preamble: 
Dietrich reasons about the subject of theology by analogy with natural philos-
ophy, relying mainly on Aristotle and Averroes.95 This fragment also, of course, 
contains the programmatic distinction of natural and voluntary providence 
used by Berthold in the Exposition of the Title that precedes the Preamble. It 
is this distinction that could address the tension between authority and con-
jecture, insofar as the natural, automatic assent of the cogitative power would 
pertain to what the fragment calls “the divine science of the philosophers”, 
while the free assent to the authority of Scripture would relate to what Dietrich 
variously calls our science (nostra scientia), theology as such (theologia simplic-
iter), and our divine science of the saints (nostra divina sanctorum scientia).96 
Dietrich frames the difference between the two theologies eschatologically: 
the divine science of the saints looks beyond the limits of this world and will 
outlast those limits, when the mundane wisdom of the philosophers will be 
destroyed. The arguments about authority and conjectural inference in the 
Preamble could be used toward a similar end. That is, while metaphysics or 
the divine science of the philosophers begins from believed principles, and 
94  See Loris Sturlese’s introduction to the critical edition of the text in Dietrich von Freiberg, 
Opera omnia, vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik, p. 277.
95  Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto, 2.2, p. 279, l. 10–20 and 3.2–3, p. 280, l. 35–58. Presumably 
the De subiecto would have followed the De theologia; we ask about the subject of theol-
ogy after determining whether it is a science.
96  Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto, 3.8–10, p. 281, l. 92–p. 282, l. 112: Quamvis autem quantum 
ad considerationem primi philosophi talis etiam, quae dicta est, attributio entium ad pri-
mum principium attendatur, et propter hoc etiam potius dicitur apud philosophos scientia 
divina seu theologia, quam dicatur metaphysica – considerat enim primo et principaliter de 
ente divino, quod est divinum per essentiam, consequenter autem de aliis, unde in XII talia 
ostendit ordinari in ipsum tamquam in universitatis principem – nihilominus tamen nostra 
scientia, quam vere et simpliciter theologiam dicimus, distinguitur a scientia divina philos-
ophorum. Scientia enim divina philosophorum considerat universitatem entium secundum 
ordinem providentiae naturalis, quo videlicet res stant in sui natura et secundum suos modos 
et proprietates naturales gubernantur per principem universitatis, nec ultra hunc naturae 
ordinem aliquem ulteriorem finem attendit. Nostra autem divina sanctorum scientia atten-
ditur in entibus, secundum quod stant et disponuntur sub ordine voluntariae providentiae, 
in quo attenditur ratio meriti et praemii et ea, quae attenduntur circa bonam et sanctam 
vitam et adeptionem aeternae beatitudinis et perventionem ad finem ulteriorem sive in bono 
sive in malo etiam post terminum huius mundi, quando scientia divina sapientium huius 
mundi destruetur, I Cor., 13. Secundum praedicta igitur convenienter accipitur subiectum 
huius nostrae scientiae divinae, videlicet ut dicatur ens divinum secundum ordinem volun-
tariae providentiae.
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nevertheless is a legitimate science, the free assent to the infinite authority of 
Scripture surpasses it in its certitude. For metaphysics begins with principles 
deriving from sense, memory, and experience, and as Dietrich writes else-
where, even though the cogitative power gives spontaneous, firm assent, it is 
not infallible.97
Assumptions like these help us understand why Dietrich habitually quali-
fied his assent to the positions of the philosophers regarding the existence 
of separate intelligences. As was noted above, he uses caveats like these at 
least 40 times. And yet, at the same time, Dietrich maintains that the phi-
losophers’ arguments are the most rationally compelling option and upholds 
them against those who haphazardly mingle revealed and natural principles. 
He sums it up in a phrase: “we rationally conjecture” (rationabiliter conicimus) 
about such things as the order of the universe, the movers of the heavens, the 
separate intelligences, the nature of spiritual places and their inhabitants, and 
the character of the beatific vision.98 Our theoretical knowledge of these reali-
ties remains tentative; only in ethics and the order of voluntary providence do 
we reach the things themselves.
But we must return to Berthold, whose Preamble importantly does not 
resolve the tensions between conjecture and authority, between natural and 
voluntary providence, between the divine science of Proclus and Christian 
theology. Berthold leaves all of these questions open. Where Dietrich under-
scores the disproportion between revealed theology and the divine science 
of the philosophers, Berthold instead spends the remainder of the Preamble 
underscoring the supremacy of Platonic supersapientia over Aristotelian sapi-
entia. From this point until the end of the Preamble we are on surer footing 
97  Dietrich of Freiberg, De hab., 9.1–2, p. 14, l. 62–72: veniemus ad aliquid magis intimum, et 
hoc eo intimius, ut ita loquamur, quo spiritualius, et est phantasticum nostrum exspolia-
tum idolis et corporalibus rerum similitudinibus retinens apud se rei intentionem. Et istud 
vocamus cogitativum nostrum. Et hic oritur aestimativa et per consequens ratio particularis. 
Et operatio boni vel mali hinc surgit; consequenter autem ratio et proprietas virtutis opera-
tivae. Sine hac vi spirituali daemon numquam fuisset lapsus. Ruina enim sua fuit eo, quod 
inclinavit se in aestimatum bonum, quod non fuit verum. Intellectus autem semper verorum 
est.
98  Dietrich of Freiberg, De anim., 5.3, p. 16, l. 20: rationabiliter conicimus; 20.1, p. 30, l. 78: 
rationi, qua conicimus; Dietrich of Freiberg, De cog. ent., 44.9, p. 210, l. 101: rationabiliter 
conicitur; 81.4, p. 243, l. 97: rationabiliter conicitur; Dietrich of Freiberg, De dot., 13.3, p. 279, 
l. 30: rationabiliter conicitur; Dietrich of Freiberg, De magis, 14.3, p. 58, l. 75: rationabiliter 
conicitur; Dietrich of Freiberg, De sub. spir., 11.1, p. 311, l. 76–77: possumus et de eis conicere 
tamquam a simili ex tertia manerie entium conceptionalium; 14.1, p. 313, l. 13–14: aliqualiter 
conicere possumus de locis dictorum entium realium; Dietrich of Freiberg, De vis. beat., 4.1 
(6), p. 106, l. 33–34: tamen circa hoc probabiliter ex ratione conicere.
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about his sources: Berthold uses his characteristic synthesis of Dionysius and 
Proclus concerning what is beyond intellect, and returns to Thomas of York 
for materials relating to Aristotle. This coincides with a shift in terminology. 
In the passage reminiscent of Dietrich, translated above, it was “we” who 
call the cogitative the virtus distinctiva et collectiva simul et collativa. Now, as 
Berthold turns to Proclus, it is “they” who call the ratio particularis the cogi-
tativa (rationem particularem, quam quidam cogitativam vocant).99 But much 
more tellingly, whereas Dietrich in the De subiecto theologiae was careful to 
distinguish between “our theology of the saints” and “the divine science of the 
philosophers”, with Berthold the mark of ownership passes to the speculative 
habit of the Platonists: habitus nostrae divinalis supersapientiae and nostra 
supersapientialis et divinalis sapientia.100 Berthold can make this transposition 
because of what he understands the fundamental achievement of Platonism 
to be and what the consequences are of realizing that the best of the pagans 
had achieved a divine cognition beyond intellect. Proclus in the Elements of 
Theology followed the oblique motion of the soul, ascending to God by rea-
soning, and he must have begun with the certainty of conjectural inference. 
Eventually, through intellectual practice and virtue, silencing all motions 
external and internal, he was elevated to the direct and ecstatic knowledge 
through ignorance that is the unum animae or divine madness. For Berthold, 
what Dionysius says about the cognition beyond the mind describes the habit 
of Platonic theology:
According to this [unity], therefore, it is necessary to think divine things, 
not according to ourselves, but ourselves wholly placed wholly outside 
ourselves and wholly deified. For it is better to be God’s and not our own.101
For Thomas Aquinas, in his commentary on the same text, Dionysius is refer-
ring to the gift of faith.102 But the undeniable parallels between Dionysius and 
99  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 63, l. 378–379.
100 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 65, l. 454–p. 66, l. 455 and p. 67, l. 514.
101 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 64, l. 410–415: Secundum hanc igitur div-
ina oportet intelligere, non secundum nos, sed totos nos ipsos extra totos nos ipsos statutos 
et totos deifactos. Melius est enim esse Dei et non nostri ipsorum. Cf. Dionysius, De divinis 
nominibus 7.1, 865C–868A.
102 Thomas Aquinas, In librum beati Dionysii De divinis nominibus Expositio, ed. C. Pera 
(Torino: Marietti, 1950), lib. vii, lect. 1, n. 705, p. 262: secundo vero, habet quamdam uni-
tionem ad res divinas per gratiam, quae excedit naturam mentis nostrae, per quam uni-
tionem, coniunguntur homines per fidem aut quamcumque cognitionem, ad ea quae sunt 
super naturalem mentis virtutem. Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Super Boetium De Trinitate, ed. 
P.-M.J. Gils (Roma / Paris: Commissio Leonina / Cerf, 1992), q. 2, a. 2, p. 95, l. 65–77: Et 
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the Tria opuscula have changed the parameters. Berthold would be well-aware 
of the similar formulations in Dionysius, where faith is described as the locat-
ing of the soul in the highest truth,103 and in Proclus, for whom the unum ani-
mae locates the soul in the divine, whence it lives by the divine life.104 If he 
has indeed made use of Dietrich’s De theologia in the Preamble, then we see 
that the only words Berthold could find to express the supremacy of Platonism 
over Aristotelian metaphysics were those that his most esteemed modern 
master had used to elevate Christian theology over the divine science of the 
philosophers.
In the first words of the commentary, we read that St. Paul was aware of the 
hidden things of God because he was taken up into the third heaven in rapture. 
Berthold’s emphasis on this putative detail from his biography suggests that, 
from the commentator’s point of view, this rapturous knowledge was the basis 
for Paul’s recognition that the philosophers, by reasoning from the creatures 
of the world, knew the invisible things of God, including the Trinity, and the 
ideas, primordial causes, or gods in the divine Word.105 As Augustine says, the 
vision of these ideas makes the soul blessed.106 Paul’s transitory rapture there-
fore has the same content as the revelation granted to Proclus, Plato, and the 
pre-Platonic theologians. So, we are left to ask, what is the difference between 
the habit of faith and the habit of supersapientia? The end appears to be the 
same: to live by the divine life and to be moved by the providential Good in 
the silence beyond the mind. The best of the pagan Platonists saw the home-
land and they reached it. Whatever differences remain, then, must concern the 
means to that end. Perhaps faith and the sacraments are a more immediate 
secundum hoc de divinis duplex scientia habetur: una secundum modum nostrum, qui sensi-
bilium principia accipit ad notificandum divina, et sic de divinis philosophi scientiam tradi-
derunt, philosophiam primam scientiam divinam dicentes; alia secundum modum ipsorum 
divinorum, ut ipsa divina secundum se ipsa capiantur, quae quidem perfecte in statu viae 
nobis est impossibilis, sed fit nobis in statu viae quaedam illius cognitionis participatio et 
assimilatio ad cognitionem divinam, in quantum per fidem nobis infusam inheremus ipsi 
primae veritati propter se ipsam.
103 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus 7.4, 872C (Dionysiaca, vol. 1, p. 409–410): divina fides est, 
quae est manens credentium collocatio, quae istos collocat in veritate.
104 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 16, p. 25, l. 650–652: per unum, quod est intellectu 
divinius, ‘in quod consummans anima et locans se ad ipsam divina est et vivit divina vita, 
secundum quod huic est licitum’. Cf. Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, 
10.64, p. 106, l. 11–12.
105 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 1, p. 31, l. 5–8: Summus divinalis sapientiae theolo-
gus Paulus secretorum Dei conscius utpote in tertium caelum raptus loquens de mundanae 
philosophiae sapientibus, postquam dixerat: ‘Quod notum est Dei, manifestum est illis: Deus 
enim illis revelavit’ [Rom. 1:19], subiungit: ‘Invisibilia Dei’ [Rom. 1:20] etc.
106 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 20, p. 33, l. 935: […] quarum visione fit beatissima.
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and broadly accessible perfection of the mind and soul than that attained 
through the intellectual labours of philosophical science. Berthold, however, 
was more interested in recalling his contemporaries to the ultimate origin and 
goal that was in danger of being forgotten than underlining any differences in 
the means.
5 Conclusions
Reading the Exposition with an eye to its tacit sources, it seems that, for 
Berthold, Dietrich of Freiberg was the exemplary contemporary master or 
sage. Berthold’s first gesture towards Dietrich in the commentary is to turn 
the master’s criticism of imaginative metaphysics against himself. In so doing, 
he separates the Aristotelians, who reason “according to ourselves”, from the 
Platonists, who reason according to what is beyond ourselves. This critique 
provides the philosophical foundation for the dogmatic authority of Proclus 
and Dionysius. In relation to this authority, Dietrich’s metaphysics must either 
be simplified (case 2) or elaborated (case 3). Moreover, since the measure of 
truth was historically actual in the consensus of the greatest sages of antiq-
uity, Berthold could not accommodate Dietrich’s hypothetical attitude toward 
the cosmology of the divine science of the philosophers. The critical sapiens 
modernus gave way to authoritative ancient wisdom. In Part 4, I suggested that 
this corresponded to a profoundly different understanding of philosophy and 
revelation in our two authors, which emerged once we situated the core argu-
ment of the Preamble in the context of late 13th-century Paris.
If we accept this hypothesis, then it becomes clear that all three prefaces 
to Berthold’s commentary follow the same intertextual pattern: to express the 
ancient accord of Dionysius and Proclus that confronts him, Berthold took 
arguments that his contemporaries used to describe the nobility of revealed 
theology. For Dietrich, the difference of natural and voluntary providence 
corresponded to that of pagan and Christian theologies; the divide between 
theoretical and practical reason would only be overcome in the end times, and 
until then the natural arguments of the philosophers, used self-critically, are 
usually the best tool we have to understand the order of reality. For Berthold, 
the paths of natural and voluntary providence, theoretical and practical rea-
son, knowledge and action, are only methodologically separate; in the disci-
pline of Platonic science, the realisation of the unum animae, and active union 
with the divine providence, they must be one. Thus, for Berthold of Moosburg, 
the difference of pagan and Christian philosophical theology is overcome in 
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chapter 8
Berthold of Moosburg, the unum animae,  
and Deification
Loris Sturlese
Accademia Nazionale dei Lincei, Rome
1 Introduction. Berthold of Moosburg’s Commentary on Proclus
In the first chapter of the Ecclesiastical Hierarchy, Dionysius defines deification 
as follows: “Deification is assimilation and union with God, as far as possible”.1 
In the Middle Ages, the theme of deification provoked orthodoxy to issue 
numerous condemnations of doctrines that were believed not to safeguard 
the transcendence of God. In the 14th century, which is the period on which 
we will focus, the debate concerning the heresy of the so-called “free spirit” 
was particularly lively in the Flemish Rhineland religious and cultural envi-
ronment, and took place both in Latin and in the vernacular. An authoritative 
participant in this debate was the Dominican Berthold of Moosburg. We know 
little about his biography, but enough to recognise him as a pivotal figure in 
this discussion: he was active in the intellectual leadership of the Dominican 
order in this period, he succeeded Eckhart at the Dominican studium generale 
of Cologne, he had the task of “collecting the pieces”, so to speak, after the 
condemnation of Eckhart, he was involved in the spiritual direction of the 
Beguines of Cologne, and he was well-known in the mystical circles of Bavaria.2
He has written only one work, a gigantic Exposition of the Elements of 
Theology of Proclus.3 The Elements of Theology is a metaphysical work par 
1 Dionysius, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, ed. G. Heil (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1991), 1.3, 
p. 66, l. 12–13; Lat. trans. in Dionysiaca, recueil donnant l’ensemble des traductions latines des 
ouvrages attribués au Denys de l’Aréopage, ed. Ph. Chevallier (Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 
1937), p. 1090.
2 For a biographical account of Berthold, see L. Sturlese, Homo divinus. Philosophische Projekte 
in Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Heinrich Seuse (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007), 
p. 137–138; E. King, Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem theologi-
cam Procli of Berthold von Moosburg, PhD diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016), p. 5–14.
3 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus. 
Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984); Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 14–34, 
eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986); Berthold of 
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excellence, and Berthold’s mission is to detect the immutable structures that 
found the world of experience. The discovery, piece by piece, of this transem-
pirical and foundational metaphysical complex has the same effect, in the end, 
of being able to contemplate, behind the curtain of a theatre, the enormous 
quantity of interconnected mechanisms and artifices that with their immu-
table presence make possible the story that from time to time takes place in 
the manifold appearances of becoming. The aspect of immutability prevails 
in this fundamental and foundational presence – the immutability of an order 
that begins with the One, which by its causal transcendence establishes a 
One-Good, from which derives a more determined Unity and so on as far as 
the institution of a finite series of henads (seven), which constitute the pri-
mordial causes from which further series of unparticipated and participated 
principles derive. The look behind the scenes of the universe allows Berthold 
to identify, between the transcendent One and Matter, a numerical detail of 
something like 126 metaphysical principles dependent on each other and 
made up of orders (monarchies) dependent on the primordial causes (unity, 
infinity, entity, vitality, intellectuality, animality, and physicality). But beyond 
these complicated details – for which we can well refer to Ezequiel Ludueña’s 
dissertation4 – it is important to note, as I said, the aspect of immutability, 
because even as we descend from eternity to time and from motionlessness to 
movement (soul), we have yet to consider the eternal and immutable motion 
of the celestial spheres.
What, then, does this discovery mean, what is the sense of the contempla-
tion of these dusty and complicated mechanisms of the intelligible universe? 
Is it one of the many contributions – to use the words of E.R. Dodds5 – “to 
that most extensive of all sciences, the Wissenschaft des Nichtwissenswerthen”? 
Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 35–65, ed. 
A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001); Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam Procli. Propositiones 66–107, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135, ed. 
F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011); Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007); Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183, 
eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003); Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184–211, ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 
2014).
4 See E. Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertholdo de Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la 
Escuela de Colonia, (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013), p. 122–224.
5 E.R. Dodds, “Introduction” to Proclus, The Elements of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
19632), p. ix.
287Berthold of Moosburg, the unum animae, and Deification
What is its relevance to understanding man, to understanding the human 
condition?
The question seems legitimate, if we think that in the historical moment 
in which Berthold lives, the way of understanding the human being and his 
relationship to God is changing. The “free spirit” proposes a path of individual 
deification; the Council of Vienne condemns the thesis that “Any intellectual 
creature in itself is blessed by nature, and the soul does not need a light of glory 
to raise it to see God”.6 Dietrich of Freiberg wonders if there is a personal prin-
ciple with which we unite ourselves to God in the beatific vision and answers 
that it is the individual agent intellect, which contemplates God by nature;7 
Eckhart proposes to overcome the false autonomy of individuality by recognis-
ing the absolute relational dependence of man on God.8
In his Exposition, Berthold speaks of deification, theosis, according to a 
broad spectrum of understanding: as a possibility of the subject in the two-
fold aspect of union with God in the present and in the future life, and this 
under the twofold perspective of the subject’s belonging to the pagan and to 
the Christian tradition, that is to say to the state of (corrupted) nature and to 
the state of (reintegrated) grace. He deals with all these themes of contempla-
tion in this life and in the afterlife, he reflects on important mystical passages 
from Dionysius and Richard of Saint Victor, he quotes Bernard’s metaphor of 
mixed liquids, he knows Eriugena’s doctrine of deification: in short, the whole 
mystical tradition is known to him.
2 The Doctrine of Dionysius the Areopagite on the Three Movements
Berthold’s intention may be better clarified by considering his doctrine of 
the “three movements” of the soul. The doctrine was sketched by Dionysius 
and was interpreted by his commentators in different ways. Dionysius’ rele-
vant text is reported in three different places of the Exposition: the first in the 
Expositio tituli, the second in Proposition 131, the third in Proposition 185 (lit-
eral quotation).9 The text quoted in the Expositio tituli is the following:
6 Enchiridion Symbolorum. Definitionum et declarationum de rebus fidei et morum, eds 
H. Denzinger, A. Schönmetzer, 36th ed. (Barcelona / Freiburg im Breisgau / Roma: Herder, 
1976), p. 282, §895.
7 King, Supersapientia, p. 21, 37–42.
8 King, Supersapientia, p. 21, 140.
9 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 131A, p. 190, l. 10–p. 191, l. 39; Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 
185K, p. 26, l. 393–408; for the Expositio tituli, see the following note.
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Sunt autem istorum motuum, inquantum sunt animae, definitiones 
tales, secundum quod pertractat Dionysius ubi supra: “Circularis quidem 
est animae ad se ipsam introitus ab exterioribus et intellectualium ipsius 
virtutum uniformis convolutio sicut in quodam circulo non errare ipsi 
largiens, in multis exterioribus ipsam etiam congregans primum ad se 
ipsam, deinde sicut informem factam uniens unitive unitis virtutibus et 
ita ad pulchrum et bonum manuducens, quod est super omnia existentia 
et unum et idem et sine principio et interminabile. Oblique autem anima 
movetur, inquantum secundum proprietatem suam divinis illuminatur 
cognitionibus, non intellectualiter et singulariter, sed rationabiliter et 
diffuse et sicut commixtis et transitoriis operationibus et ab exterioribus 
sicut a quibusdam signis variatis et multiplicatis ad simplices et unitas sur-
sum agitur contemplationes. In directum autem, quando non ad se ipsam 
ingressa et singulari intellectualitate mota – hoc est enim, sicut dixi, 
secundum circulum –, sed ad ea, quae sunt circa ipsam, progreditur”.10
According to Dionysius De divinis nominibus c. 4, angels and human souls have 
a threefold mental movement:11 the movement of human souls is what inter-
ests Berthold particularly, because souls are part of the order of nature (natural 
providence) and angels are not.
The first movement, the circular one, is a concentration on interiority (ani-
mae ad se ipsam introitus) that leads to the contemplation of the Good that 
transcends the whole of being (super omnia existentia).
The second movement, the oblique or helical one, is the speculative move-
ment of rational and deductive reflection (non intellectualiter et singulariter, 
sed rationabiliter et diffuse), which – Berthold points out – by the signs offered 
by the external world is enlightened and raised to simple and unitive contem-
plations (ad […] unitas sursum agitur contemplationes).
The third direct movement takes place “when it progresses to the things 
that are around it” (In directum autem, quando […] ad ea, quae sunt circa ipsam, 
progreditur [sic!]).
As we have already said, Berthold literally quotes the text of Dionysius twice. 
The first quotation occurs in the Expositio tituli (the text reported above), and 
refers to Proclus himself, who would have experienced the three movements 
in person (his writings being proof of this); the second occurrence refers more 
generally to the possibilities of the soul according to the state of the present 
10  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expositio tituli A, p. 38, l. 35–48.
11  Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, ed. B.R. Suchla (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1990), 
4.8–9, p. 153, l. 4–p. 154, l. 6; Dionysiaca, p. 189–190.
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life (de anima secundum statum praesentis vitae). The long quotation (134 
words) appears to be taken directly from the Corpus Dionysiacum (translation 
by John Saracen), but the comparison with the original reveals a significant 
discrepancy: the phrase “et ab exterioribus sicut a quibusdam signis variatis 
et multiplicatis ad simplices et unitas sursum agitur contemplationes”, which 
in the original text of Dionysius refers to the straight movement, is placed in 
Berthold’s text at the conclusion of the oblique movement (italics in the text 
reported above). The fact seems to me to be very important. In this way the 
direct mystical intuition (characteristic of the straight movement) is attrib-
uted as a prerogative of the oblique movement, which is that of philosophical 
reason.
It is difficult to think that this is a random coincidence. Berthold certainly 
had a complete text “in order”: this is demonstrated by the fact that in a simi-
lar place12 he clearly states that the rectilinear movement is proper to direct 
mystical intuition. Therefore we must conclude that the displacement is 
intentional – and this displacement changes the cards on the table with respect 
to Dionysius! Evidently Berthold is keen to communicate that the movement 
of philosophical reason can land (or rather: in fact lands) at the mystical vision. 
So far, so good. For now we can continue to deepen the doctrine of the three 
movements and its application to the historical Proclus.
3 The Three Movements of the Soul According to Thomas of York
Those who are familiar with Dionysius and the tradition of his commenta-
tors might be amazed to find me writing that the straight movement leads 
to the mystical vision of God. I confirm, for Berthold it is just like that. It is 
an interpretation that finds no confirmation either in the Commentaries of 
Albert the Great or of Thomas Aquinas, but that Berthold derives from the 
Sapientiale of Thomas of York, which has recently been discovered to be one 
of his most important doctrinal sources. At the time when the first volumes 
of the Expositio edition were produced, the influence of Thomas of York on 
Berthold was not yet known. The research of Retucci, Porreca, and King has 
highlighted the many places where the Sapientiale is used, and this is also the 
case regarding the three movements of the soul.13
12  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 131A, p. 191, l. 35–44.
13  See F. Retucci, “Magister Thomas Anglicus minor”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio 
super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 136–159, p. xxiii–xxxix; D. Porreca, 
“Hermes Trismegistus in Thomas of York. A 13th-Century Witness to the Prominence 
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Thomas of York addresses the question of the threefold movement in 
chapter 6 of the first book of the Sapientiale.14 His aim is to show the breadth 
of the natural knowledge of God achieved by the philosophers of antiquity 
(divinitatis agnitionem) and his argument is based on the perception of non-
self-sufficiency that the subject feels both by practicing introspection (circu-
lar) and reflection upon the world of the senses: the oblique with the effort 
of discursive rational procedure, the straight with an ascent that leads to 
direct vision. In all three cases, the subject feels a failure that is the engine of a 
search that leads to the recognition of the existence of the first principle, God. 
Thomas’ passages have been carefully examined by Evan King,15 to whom I can 
refer hoping that his beautiful dissertation will soon be published. I will limit 
myself to pointing out a couple of elements characteristic of Thomas of York’s 
interpretation. The three movements refer to the knowledge of the existence 
(anitas) of God, and have been practiced by the philosophers of antiquity to a 
large extent, particularly the first (introspection) and the second (philosophi-
cal reason). The straight movement, on the other hand, in the case of those 
who did not have the faith, was granted only to a few, and in its excellence, only 
to very few, by special grace, that is, as a consequence of the completeness and 
perfection of the oblique movement. Note that Dionysius, in De divinis nomi-
nibus, makes no mention of the philosophers of antiquity. It is true indeed 
that Dionysius had been, before conversion, a pagan philosopher. But the func-
tionalisation of this doctrine to formulate the notion of a sort of philosophical 
revelation of pagan wisdom is the original work of Thomas of York and does 
not seem to me to be reflected in the exegesis of the Corpus Dionysiacum at all. 
At the center of Thomas’ reflection is the universal consensus of the people on 
the anitas of God, and that this “ascent in the knowledge of divinity” can lead 
to a mystical vision is a theme present, but not developed in the Sapientiale. 
Thomas is especially interested, I think, in the oblique movement.
4 The Three Movements of the Soul and the Testimony of Proclus
Berthold was fascinated by Thomas’ reading of Dionysius. But it was the study 
of Proclus’ Opuscula (as we know, the manuscript he owned and glossed is 
still preserved in the library at Basel)16 that opened his eyes, so to speak. In 
of an Ancient Sage”, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 72(2005), 
p. 147–275; King, Supersapientia, p. 28–43.
14  See Thomas of York, Sapientiale, ed. F. Retucci, lib. i, c. 6 (Firenze, in press).
15  King, Supersapientia, p. 31–34.
16  ms Basel, Universitätsbibliothek, F.iv.31. See King, Supersapientia, p. 3–9.
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De fato et providentia in particular, Berthold thought he had found the key to 
understanding the doctrine of Dionysius, in particular to further develop the 
interpretation of the straight movement sketched by Thomas.
In the Expositio tituli, Berthold carefully relates the three movements of 
the soul with what Proclus wrote, highlighting the similarities with the text 
of Dionysius. In the case of the circular movement, Berthold emphasises the 
almost literal correspondence between De fato and De divinis nominibus:
Quod autem Proclus per primum motum, scilicet circularem, […] ascen-
derit, patet in libro suo De fato et providentia 6 cap., […] dicens: […] 
conversa est ad se ipsam, […] ad ipsam iam summam recurrens ipsius 
intelligentiam, […] videt autem supra omnes animas intellectuales sub-
stantias et ordines […] videt autem rursum et ante haec eas, quae supra 
intellectum, deorum ipsorum monades.17 
This is the movement of intellect that leads to the contemplation of the pri-
mordial causes of Eriugena. The oblique movement is formulated in the exact 
terms of Thomas’ philosophical reasoning, and is identified par excellence 
with the theorems of the Elements of Theology:
per motum obliquum, qui proprius erat philosophorum et erat per labo-
riosam investigationem primi omnium existentium principii dividendo, 
definiendo, communibus principiis utendo, a notis ad ignota per ratioci-
nationem progrediendo, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia ascendendo et inter 
intelligibilia ab uno in aliud tendendo, quousque ad simpliciter ultimum 
perveniatur.18
This arrival to the extreme limit leads to a mystical vision. The rectilinear 
movement is interpreted as a mystical vision and as the exercise of an indi-
vidual transintellectual principle:19
Sed quod per directum motum ascenderit in Dei cognitionem […] non 
digressive, sed unitive, hoc est […] directa ipsius visione, apparet libro quo 
supra cap. 8, ubi […] prosequitur de cognitione, quae est supra intellec-
tum, quam theologi etiam ante Platonem divulgant vocantes eam ut veri 
17  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. B, p. 38, l. 49–p. 39, l. 67 (italics added for 
emphasis), citing Proclus, De providentia, ed. H. Boese, Tria opuscula (De providentia, lib-
ertate, fato) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960), c. 6, §18, p. 124, l. 2–p. 126, l. 8, and c. 6, §19, p. 126, 
l. 8–9.
18  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. D, p. 40, l. 110–115.
19  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. C, p. 39, l. 73–p. 40, 108.
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divinam maniam: “Ipsam enim aiunt unum animae, non adhuc intellec-
tuale excitantem”, sed coaptantem ipsum unum uni summo, cui “adiacens 
le unum quietem amat, clausa cognitionibus, muta facta et silens intrinseco 
silentio”.20 His concordat Dionysius 7 cap. De divinis nominibus B et 4 N.21
As we can see, according to Berthold, Proclus experienced the direct vision of 
God (directa ipsius visione).
A very significant shift here should be noted: Dionysius spoke of the mysti-
cal experiences of himself and his friends, Timothy, Dorotheus, Gaius. Thomas 
of York applied this in a generic way to the philosophers of antiquity. Berthold 
focuses it on Proclus, and does so on the basis of a philological textual compar-
ison. The description of Dionysius fits perfectly with Proclus, who becomes the 
prototype of the “divine man”, homo divinus (of which Dionysius speaks). At 
least on a couple of occasions Berthold points out that in Proclus’ texts there 
is the key to fully understand Dionysius’ position: “Sed auctor expressius hoc 
deducit […].22 Istam intentionem clarius ponit Proclus”.23
This shift has the appreciable advantage of allowing Berthold to bring some 
clarity to the group of ancient authors (Seneca, Cicero, Apuleius, Macrobius, 
etc.), which Thomas of York offers in a way that is as inclusive as it is undiffer-
entiated. The reading of Proclus (one should recall that he was still unknown 
to Thomas) offers Berthold the possibility of resolving the question of ancient 
wisdom and the Platonic tradition in a selective way, with a surgical operation 
that identifies and isolates the three movements in the historical instantiation 
of the Platonic Proclus Diadochus. Thomas of York attributed the vision of God 
to “a few”, or better to “a very few” pagans, and above all put the accent on the 
consensus philosophorum. In Berthold, this consensus is transformed into the 
historical-factual proof of the personal deification carried out by a pagan phi-
losopher, and by a long and ancient pre-Platonic and Platonic tradition.
To ask how Proclus managed to do what (as Tauler will say) many Christians 
are unable to do (and which, according to Tauler again, should be a shame for 
them),24 is tantamount to asking – beyond the obvious need for the grace of 
God – the metaphysical reasons and the psychological foundations of deifica-
tion. This is what we will try to deepen by studying the third, direct movement. 
20  Proclus, De prov., c. 8, §31, p. 139, l. 1–p. 140, l. 12.
21  Dionysius, De div. nom., 7.1, p. 194, Dionysiaca, p. 385–386; De div. nom., 4.11, p. 156–157, 
Dionysiaca, p. 206.
22  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 20H, p. 71, l. 245–p. 72, 246.
23  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 178, l. 167.
24  See Sturlese, Homo divinus, p. 169–197.
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We can anticipate that, according to Berthold, Proclus so to speak “activated” 
and exercised a cognitive principle that is inherent to every human being, the 
exercise of which was already known to the ancient pre-Platonic philosophers 
and to Plato, and which the subsequent victory of the Aristotelian vision of 
the world has condemned to oblivion: this principle is the unum. The unum 
is the foundation of both the straight and the oblique movement. We under-
stand now the reason why Berthold unites the two moments under a single 
denominator of the “beatific vision”, intentionally modifying Dionysius’ text, 
as we have seen.
It is therefore certainly true that, as Stephen Gersh pointed out,25 Berthold 
reads Proclus through Dionysius, but from these considerations it appears 
equally true that at least in this case he reads Dionysius through Proclus.
5 The Straight Movement and the unum animae
We have seen that, in the text of Dionysius used by Berthold, the straight move-
ment is formulated in an obscure and even mutilated way, and that its interpre-
tation is also open to debate; but it is nevertheless beyond doubt that Berthold 
understands this movement as that of a unitive (unitive) and direct vision 
(directa ipsius [Dei] visione). In fact, he tells us that the straight movement is 
rooted in a particular cognitive principle, of which Dionysius speaks in De divi-
nis nominibus c. 7, and which is called “unity” transcending the nature of the 
mind (unitas superexaltata, a Proclean term). This is a “unity” that abandons 
intellectual knowledge (intellectuales virtutes sunt superfluae) and is capable of 
bringing multiplicity back to the one (multorum ad unum convolutio), becom-
ing deiform and launching itself into the inaccessible light (deiformis facta […] 
luci se immittit)26 – note that, according the commentators, this idea is rather 
the characteristic of the circular movement. On the basis of his reading of 
25  S. Gersh, “Berthold von Moosburg and the Content and Method of Platonic Philosophy”, 
in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, Jr., A. Speer (eds), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und 
Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts (Berlin / New 
York: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 493–503, at p. 502.
26  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 20H, p. 71, l. 238–245: Corpus autem, animam et intel-
lectum esse in homine non est, qui ambigat. Sed quod sit ibi unum, testatur Dionysius 7 cap. 
De divinis nominibus B vocans ipsum «unitionem excedentem mentis naturam (vel «unita-
tem superexaltatam», ut dicit alia translatio), per quam mens coniungitur ad ea, quae sunt 
supra ipsam»; et hoc «multorum ad unum convolutione», ut dicit infra C; unde et intellec-
tuales virtutes sunt superfluae, «quando anima deiformis facta per unitionem ignote inac-
cessibili lucis lumini se immittit», ut dicit 4 cap. N. For the Dionysian source see above, note 
21.
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Proclus’ Opuscula,27 Berthold adds that this is the same cognitive principle of 
which Proclus treats in chapter 8 of De fato, namely a movement of the mind 
that abandons and transcends intellectual knowledge (non adhuc intellectuale 
excitantem) and joins the One (coaptantem uni) in stillness and inner silence, 
thus becoming God as far as possible and living by divine life (deus factus, ut 
animae possibile). The closeness to the text of Dionysius is indeed impres-
sive. Berthold notes that this cognitive principle bears the same name in both 
authors: Dionysius speaks of a “unity”, Proclus of an unum in the soul, evok-
ing the name that the tradition of pre-Platonic theologians and Plato himself 
gave it.
Proclus also converges with Dionysius in pointing out that the “one of the 
soul” is hidden from common sense, and indicates the reason why: people 
live only within the horizon of the (Aristotelian) world of being (Dionysius: in 
existentibus sunt firmati)28 here below (Proclus: circa ea, quae deorsum, volvun-
tur), and therefore are incredulous (Proclus: increduliter habemus nos)29 and 
ignorant (Dionysius: indoctos). Nevertheless, Berthold states, Proclus offers a 
clearer formulation (expressius) than that of Dionysius. In what sense?
It is enough to reread the refined analysis of the unum animae offered by 
Werner Beierwaltes30 in his fundamental contribution of 1961 to understand 
what Berthold might think of. The German scholar based his interpretation 
on texts by Proclus that were not all known in the Middle Ages. But if we want 
to limit ourselves to the Opuscula, and in particular to De fato, we note that 
chapters 6–8, cited in full in the Proposition 185 of the Expositio,31 outline a 
27  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 20H, p. 71, l. 245–p. 72, l. 250: Sed auctor expressius hoc 
deducit 10 quaest. De providentia in haec verba: «Et enim in nobis iniacet aliquod secretum 
unius vestigium, quod et eo, qui in nobis est intellectus, est divinius, in quem et consummans 
anima et locans se ad ipsum divina est et vivit divina vita». Idem habetur De fato et provi-
dentia cap. 8, ubi loquitur de mania divina, quam aiunt theologi «unum animae». For the 
Proclean source see above, note 20.
28  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 71D, p. 35, l. 123–127: Quem quidam firmati in existentibus 
et non opinantibus aliquid esse super entia dicunt fore esse, sicut dicit auctor De causis: 
‘Prima rerum creatarum est esse’. Esse autem est actus entis. Sed tales vocat Dionysius indoc-
tos, in 1 cap. De mystica theologia, ubi dicit sic: ‘Istos autem dico (subaudi: indoctos), qui in 
existentibus sunt firmati nihil super existentia supersubstantialiter esse opinantes’.
29  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 121M, p. 111, l. 212–215: […] deus factus, ut animae possi-
bile, cognoscet solummodo, qualiter dii omnia indicibiliter cognoscunt singuli secundum li 
unum, quod sui ipsorum. Donec autem circa ea, quae deorsum volvimur, increduliter habe-
mus nos circa haec, scilicet omnia divino cognoscente.
30  W. Beierwaltes, “Der Begriff des unum in nobis bei Proklos”, in P. Wilpert (ed.), Die 
Metaphysik im Mittelalter. Ihr Ursprung und ihre Bedeutung (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 
1963), p. 255–266.
31  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 185L, p. 26, l. 410–p. 28, l. 455.
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rigorous philosophical itinerary of the rational soul’s self-reflection which, on 
the basis of the principle that “what is united presupposes a cause of union, 
and what has an intellectual nature presupposes an intellectual power, and 
everything that is a participant presupposes a non-participable hypostasis”,32 
ascends from sensitive to discursive knowledge and from that to intellectual 
noesis, to reach the ground, the foundation, the One: “become therefore one, to 
see the one, or rather not to see the one: in fact, he who sees will see something 
of intellectual nature and not above the intellect, and will include a certain 
one and not the absolute One”.33 The one of the soul is therefore revealed to 
be a condition of the very possibility of sensitive and rational experience, and 
as the point of arrival of a process of self-reflection that also represents a pro-
found diagnosis of the human condition.
This is also the conclusion reached by the oblique movement expressed 
in the Exposition on the Elements of Theology: in fact, from the metaphysical 
point of view, the one in us is a “shining” instituted by the self-determination 
of the First Principle (the One-Good) in the series of primordial causes and in 
particular in the Primary Soul, which institutes the Soul for itself and a double 
series of souls, a finite series and a series of “shinings” in human souls.34
In sum, according to Berthold, the one of the soul (Proclus), the unity 
transcending the nature of the mind (Dionysius) is inherent to the nature of 
man. The human condition is no less and no more than that of living in the 
unawareness of bearing within oneself a secret vestige of the One. The task of 
philosophical theology is to bring the One to awareness. This does not mean 
“seeing it” or even “thinking about it”, because the One is the condition of the 
possibility of “seeing” and “thinking”, and awareness of this is nothing more 
than identity with the One in stillness and silence. At this point I will be careful 
not to violate the threshold of the unsayable and of silence, but I think it is at 
least appropriate to make an explanatory observation. This concerns the provi-
dential dimension of the unum animae as a “shining” of the One itself, and it 
appears important to clarify the trans-Aristotelian sense of the Proclean doc-
trine also in relation to the discussions of Berthold’s German contemporaries.
We have seen that the most striking character of the presentation of unum 
animae is its logical-ontological primacy with respect to the Aristotelian 
32  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 185L, p. 27, l. 444–446: Oportet enim supra unita locari 
unificas causas et supra intellectuales factas intellectualificas, et supra omnia simpliciter 
participantia imparticipabiles hypostases.
33  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 197G, p. 137, l. 170–172: Fiat igitur unum, ut videat le unum, 
magis autem, ut non videat le unum: videns enim intellectuale videbit et non supra intellec-
tum, et quoddam unum intelliget et non le antounum.
34  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 64F, p. 197, l. 155–p. 198, l. 183.
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intellect. On this point, which appears to be very characteristic if we consider 
the role that Dietrich and Eckhart assign to the intellect, it should be noted 
that Berthold distinguishes, on the basis of Proclus, an “intellectual” cogni-
tion from a “providential” cognition. The first is proper to the intellect, and 
Berthold here fully accepts the doctrine of Dietrich’s so-called “paradoxes of 
consciousness” (Paradoxien des Bewußtseins):35 1) the intellect always consti-
tutes itself in thinking itself in act; 2) in this intellection the intellect thinks 
itself by essence; 3) the intellect is an actual image of the totality; 4) and the 
intellect by thinking itself thinks the totality by a simple intellection.
The “providential” cognition is “the knowledge of providence that tran-
scends the intellect and is proper to the One only, according to which each god 
is and is said to provide for things, and that places itself in an operation prior 
to the intellect”.36 It is always a matter of the knowledge of totality, like that of 
the intellect, but not in terms of just knowing, but in terms of providere (to pro-
vide), which is “the act or operation of Good” (providere est actus sive operatio 
boni),37 “an operation of Good that gives each entity what is appropriate to it” 
(providentia […] ‘operatio boni unicuique congrua largientis’).38 The providence 
of the unum animae is therefore an imitation and participation in the divine 
power that establishes and preserves totality as goodness and order, and this 
is deification.39
35  See K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Dietrich of Freiberg, Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur 
Intellekttheorie, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), p. xiii. See Dietrich of Freiberg, 
De visione beatifica, ed. B. Mojsisch, in Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie, 
1.1.1.3.6, p. 22, l. 100–120.
36  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 134D, p. 216, l. 70–73: providentiae cognitio super intel-
lectum existens et uno solo, secundum quod et est unusquisque deus et providere omnium 
dicitur in ea, quae ante intelligere operatione sistens se ipsum. Hoc itaque uno, secundum 
quod et consistit, cognoscit omnia. Cf. Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, 
ed. H. Boese, q. 1, §4, p. 6, l. 1–5.
37  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120F, p. 101, l. 348–349.
38  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120D, p. 98, l. 259–260.
39  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 188E, p. 65, l. 203–215: anima […] non solum vivit anime-
aliter, sed etiam intellectualiter, et per consequens habet in se principium sui motus, scilicet 
«unum ipsius animae», quod quidam vocant «deiformem unitatem», alii vero «abditum 
mentis» sive «faciem», quidam autem «intellectum agentem», hoc, inquam, principium 
manens in se stabile et invariabile et existens intrinsecum substantiae animae, utpote portio 
eius intranea et eminentior principiat omnem motum vitalem ipsius animae, sive sit intel-
lectualis sive sensualis sive germinalis. […] Ista enim intraneitas, cum importet mutuum 
respectum eorum, quorum unum est in alio, non est nisi identitas substantialis.
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6 Berthold and the Mystics
With the doctrine of the unum animae, Berthold offered an original solution 
to the question raised by Dietrich at the end of the 13th century: what is the 
individual principle through which we unite ourselves to God in the beatific 
vision? Is the human being naturally “capable of God”? Dietrich’s answer is 
well known: Aristotle (the agent intellect), Augustine (the abditum mentis), 
and Scripture (the image of God) converge in establishing the principle of 
the beatific vision as an individual and natural one. In the beatific vision, 
the individual agent intellect becomes the form of the possible intellect; this 
condition is, however, denied to the subject during “this life”, because “in this 
life […] it unites itself to the subject only through the intelligible species that 
are its action”.40 In other words, Dietrich says, the human being lives in a con-
dition of alienation from his intellectual and vital principle, which can only be 
healed in the afterlife when the order of nature is absorbed by that of grace or, 
in other words, when natural providence is absorbed by voluntary providence. 
By choosing to keep to the natural order, Dietrich is indeed dealing with the 
foundation of a possible mystical experience, but he places mysticism outside 
the horizon of his problematic. And in fact, although he was certainly aware 
of transitory “mystical” phenomena in his time, he does not mention them, 
except for a nod to the experience of Saint Benedict, who was reported to have 
seen the universe at a glance (in ictu oculi).41 Dietrich probably considered 
mystical experiences to be outside the horizon of philosophical theology, that 
is, belonging to the order of so-called voluntary providence, of ethics and of 
the intervention of God in the world. Not very different was the position of 
Eckhart, his great contemporary, who agreed with him in considering the prob-
lem of mystical experience to be a marginal one.
Berthold raises with greater force the question of the relationship between 
the unum, intellect and mystical experience. This can be seen from his inter-
pretation of Dionysius, who teaches how the threefold movement of the soul 
leads to a direct contemplation of God that happens ( fit), “through a strong 
contrition, through the abandonment of the senses and intellectual opera-
tions, of all the sensible and intelligible, and of all being and non-being, in such 
a way that the divine man rises in a hidden way, according to his possibility, 
40  Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 4.3.3, p. 122, l. 80–84: nobis quoque, qui degi-
mus in hac vita, non unitur ut forma, secundum quod actio eius est essentia eius, ut dicit 
Commentator Super iii De anima, sed solum unitur nobis per intellecta in actu seu species 
intelligibiles, quae sunt actio eius, secundum quod actio eius differt ab essentia eius.
41  Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, 1.1.4 (5), p. 29, l. 27–32.
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to the union with the one who transcends all substance and knowledge”, and 
“for this the going-out from himself and from everything is necessary”.42 Here 
Dionysius is speaking in the first person of himself and his friends, and there-
fore of an experience in the present life. In this way, Dietrich’s problem regard-
ing the “principle by which we unite ourselves to God in the beatific vision”43 in 
the future life moves to the “principle of union in the present life”. The problem 
is made even more acute because, according to Berthold, a philological reading 
of Dionysius shows that the term unitio (union as an abstract deverbal noun, 
Ein-ung, the action of uniting) used by John Saracen is, in the older transla-
tion of Eriugena, unitas (unity as an abstract deadjectival name, Ein-heit) that 
transcends the intellect. The lectio of Eriugena corresponds exactly to that of 
Proclus (unum animae). And this unum, as we know from Dietrich’s analysis, 
is a principle and essential cause of the intellect of the soul; it cannot be an 
accident, but it is a substance.44
42  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202A, p. 181, l. 27–p. 182, l. 35: Istam condicionem tangit 
ipse Dionysius in Mystica theologia I cap. in principio post orationem dicens: ‘Tu autem, 
amice Thimotee, circa mysticas visiones’ (alia translatio: ‘circa mysticos intellectus’) ‘forti 
contritione’ (sive: ‘corroborato itinere’, secundum aliam translationem) ‘et sensus derelinque 
et intellectuales operationes, et omnia sensibilia et intelligibilia et omnia existentia et non 
existentia, et sicut est possibile, ignote consurge ad eius unitionem, qui est super omnem 
substantiam et cognitionem. Et enim excessu tui ipsius et omnium irretentibili absolute, et 
munde ad supersubstantialem divinarum tenebrarum radium, cuncta auferens et a cunctis 
absolutus sursum’ agens. See Dionysius, De mystica theologia, ed. A.M. Ritter (Berlin / New 
York: De Gruyter, 1991), 1.1, p. 142, l. 5–11; Dionysiaca, p. 567–569.
43  Dietrich of Freiberg, De tribus difficilibus quaestionibus, ed. L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, 
vol. 3. Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik, eds J.-D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1983), p. 9, l. 16–18: de principio ex parte nostri, quo immediate uniuntur beati Deo 
in illa gloriosa et beatifica visione, utrum videlicet hoc sit intellectus possibilis vel intellectus 
agens.
44  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 21C, p. 83, l. 263–273, with emphasis added: Unitas vero 
agens et patiens est duplex, quia vel subsistit se ipsa formaliter per essentiam, licet efficienter 
sit a primo dicta unitate producta, vel subsistit in alio non potens subsistere per se ipsam. 
Primo hic dicto modo unitas dicitur de omnibus primordialibus causis, quarum quaelibet est 
unitas per se perfecta. Secundo modo adhuc dicitur dupliciter, quia vel est principium cau-
sale formale eius, in quo subsistit, sicut se habet omnis unitas sive in virtutibus sive in entibus 
sive in vitis sive in intellectualibus hypostasibus sive in animabus – quaelibet enim istarum 
unitatum, licet sit quodammodo patiens, ut procedit a sua prime causa, tamen est agens, 
inquantum est causa totius residuae subsistentiae rei, cuius est principale principium 
intrinsecum formale et causale sub ordine principalis agentis; Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio, 64B, p. 193, l. 34–p. 194, l. 36: Si [unitas] est res extra animam, tunc habet ratio-
nem principii omnia sua principiata in se virtualiter continentis ita, quod est potentia omnia 
sua principiata, actu vero et operatione nullum.
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Berthold therefore believes, on the basis of Proclus, that the principle of 
individual deification is a substance whose very action is its substance, and in 
this sense he interprets Dionysius.
There are many declarations in this sense, in which Dionysius and Proclus 
are both quoted, even if Berthold underlines the transience and the difficulty 
of this mystical experience.
In the prologue he declares,45 in the words of Hermes Trismegistus (through 
Albert), that the human being (homo) “is” conjoined (subnexus, id est coniunc-
tus, copulatus) with God. There is a certain paradox in this statement, since this 
conjunction is presented as a factuality but immediately afterward it is said 
that this conjunction “happens” ( fit), according to Dionysius,46 “through the 
abandonment of the senses and intellectual operations, of all the sensible and 
intelligible, and of all being and non-being, and in such a way that the divine 
man rises in a hidden way, according to his possibility”, “to the union with him 
who transcends all substance and knowledge”. But shortly afterwards Berthold 
returns to factuality:47 “thus man is united with God, the true and ineffable 
One, through his one, that is, through the divine likeness – in fact through his 
one, which is the image of God by which man is capable of God himself and is 
united with God […] it is the likeness of God and is God through participation”, 
which is deification.
A similar metaphysical objectivity characterises the commentary to 
Proposition 129, if I understand the text correctly, in which the notion of deifica-
tion is explicitly analysed:48 “All divine bodies are such through the mediation 
of a divinised soul, all divine souls through a divine intelligence, and all divine 
intelligences by participation in a divine henad: the henad is immediate deity, 
45  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prologus 18, p. 27, l. 729–732: Sic ergo homo subnexus 
Deo vero et indicibili uni per suum unum, hoc est per divinam similitudinem – uno enim suo, 
quod est imago Dei, qua homo est capax ipsius Dei et conexus Deo, habet similitudinem Dei, 
immo est similitudo Dei et deus participatione.
46  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 17, p. 26, l. 677–682: Quod secundum Dionysium in 
principio Mysticae theologiae forti contritione fit per sensuum derelictionem et intelligibi-
lium operationum et omnium sensibilium et intelligibilium et omnium existentium et non 
existentium et ut divinus homo ignote consurgat, sicut est possibile, ‘ad eius unitionem, qui 
est super omnem substantiam et cognitionem’. Et subiungit ad hoc necessarium esse exces-
sum sui et omnium. See Dionysius, De mystica theologia, text quoted in note 42.
47  See note 46.
48  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129, p. 174, l. 2–7: Omne corpus divinum per animam est 
divinum exdeatam, omnis autem anima divina propter divinum intellectum, omnis autem 
intellectus divinus secundum participationem divinae unitatis. et si quidem unum anto-
theon, id est ex se deus, intellectus autem divinissimus, anima autem divina, corpus autem 
deiforme.
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the intelligence most divine, the soul divine, the body deisimilar”. Here Proclus 
is dealing with the vertical series, in which the distinctive property of each 
henad is reflected at different levels of reality (taxeis), and illustrates the rela-
tionships of dependence and participation at the metaphysical level. Berthold, 
applying a principle of symmetry already formulated by Dietrich,49 finds these 
levels in the microcosm that is the deified man:50 “in Proposition 129 […] it has 
been demonstrated that in the deified man there are four [levels], that is, the 
divine body, the divine soul, the most divine intellect and the one or the unity 
that transcends the nature of the mind [Dionysius]”; “let us take the deified 
man as an example: […] the absolute One, that is, God himself, participated in 
a separable way, is present in the intellect through an inseparable power, that 
is, the one, and in this way makes the intellect itself divine; and furthermore is 
present to the rational soul through the one and the intellect, deifying it [i.e. 
the rational soul] through the divine intellect itself”.
The perspective is decidedly metaphysical. For Proclus the structure of 
the taxeis is objective, and the description of the deified man also appears to 
be objective. Deification is the result of the presence of the One in the soul 
through the determinations of power, being, life and intellect, and is a gift 
(datio) that “is the fundamental substratum” and therefore is constitutive of 
human nature. Should we therefore conclude that man is deified by the pres-
ence of God, and is not aware of this?
With regard to this awareness, Berthold affirms that it is the result of a 
greater or lesser separation from corporeal things (prout minus vel plus se ab 
his corporalibus separaverit),51 and that it is possible in this life, even if in a 
transitory way, “sometimes” (aliquando): “contemplating the gods [or rather 
the primordial causes] it is sometimes possible for the human soul, indeed for 
49  See L. Sturlese, “Dietrich von Freiberg”, in A. Brungs, V. Mudroch, P. Schulthess (eds), Die 
Philosophie des Mittelalters, vol. IV. 13. Jahrhundert (Basel: Schwabe, 2017), p. 895–911, at 
p. 910.
50  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 181D, p. 223, l. 83–88: […] per 129, ubi etiam ostensum 
est, quod in homine deificato sunt quattuor, scilicet corpus divinum, anima divina, intel-
lectus divinissimus et unum sive unitas, quae etiam ‘excedit mentis naturam’; Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 178, l. 155–181: ponamus hominem deificatum pro exemplo 
[…]. Et sic prime unum, scilicet ex se Deus, separabiliter participatus adest intellectui per 
inseparabilem potentiam, scilicet per tale unum, et sic facit ipsum intellectum divinissimum; 
et item adest animae rationali mediante et uno et intellectu, deificans eam per ipsum intel-
lectum divinum.
51  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 197I, p. 139, l. 220–221: In statu enim generationis potest 
enumeratas quinque cognitionum species exercere, prout minus vel plus se ab his corporali-
bus separaverit.
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us through this”;52 “it sometimes contemplates the gods, which is nevertheless 
granted to a few souls”;53 “as Dionysius affirms when speaking of himself and 
other men of exemplary holiness” and “of the holy minds of human souls” (de 
mentibus sanctis humanarum animarum) in this life (de contemplatione viae).54 
Nevertheless, “those who study divine things become gods” (divina tractantes 
efficiuntur di et cognoscunt divina)55 and exercise perfect wisdom: “The perfect 
wisdom of the soul is to recognize where it was born and from what source 
it comes”.56
All of these statements show, in my opinion, a certain difficulty in reconcil-
ing the metaphysical perspective with an eschatological perspective, that is, 
the different perspectives of natural providence and voluntary providence. On 
the one side there is the ordered, eternal cosmic theatre of the world described 
by Proclus, on the other there is the single actor of creation, the homo nexus 
Dei et mundi, who by the instrument of his own reason moves towards the 
discovery of his true being, transcends his rationality, and ascends to the One 
by acquiring divine intellect, and at the same time acts virtuously and acquires 
merits of eschatological relevance. In the unum animae the orders of the two 
providences are unified, and it is therefore no wonder that Proclus, a pagan 
philosopher, reached unitive deification as it was understood Dionysius and 
Berthold: “deification is unitas with God, simplicity that rejects any diversity 
of multiplicity”.57
52  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 185I, p. 25, l. 376–379: necessarium est animas, quae sem-
per sunt statutae extra se ipsas et supra se ipsas et sic totae deifactae, incessanter unitate 
supermentali contemplari ipsos deos, cum hoc sit animae partiali, prout est in generatione, 
immo nobis per eam possibile aliquando.
53  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 185M, p. 28, l. 457–471: […] ideo non semper contemplatur 
deos, licet aliquando. Quod tamen paucis conceditur animabus […].
54  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 202C, p. 185, l. 138–144: […] de contemplatione viae subi-
ungit […]; 185G, p. 24, l. 329–331: Et licet praedicta verba Dionysii sint dicta de mentibus 
sanctis humanarum animarum, tamen proportionaliter eminentiori modo applicari pos-
sunt ad animas semper intelligentes.
55  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeambulum C, p. 65, l. 419–420.
56  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 206F, p. 223, l. 237–238: animae enim, dum corpore utitur, 
haec est perfecta sapientia, ut, unde orta sit, de quo fonte venerit, recognoscat.
57  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 129B, p. 177, l. 133–137: ‘Deificatio autem’ secundum 
Dionysium 1 cap. Ecclesiasticae hierarchiae ‘est ad Deum, sicut est possibile, et assimilatio 
et unitio’ (alia translatio: ‘et similitudo et unitas’). ‘Similitudo vero est rerum differentium 
eadem qualitas’ vel proprietas. Unitas autem est simplicitas omnem diversitatem multitudi-
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1. When Albert the Great sets out to define “freedom” in the first book of his 
commentary on the De causis, he fishes in murky water by engaging with philo-
sophical traditions that are only partly transparent to him.
“Freedom”, the first concept in the series libertas – voluntas – omnipotentia 
discussed here, is assigned to the first principle in five steps. First, Albert dis-
cusses Aristotle’s explanation of “what is free” as a causa sui in the Metaphysics 
(A1–4 in the appendix). Second, he claims that, since freedom is said in four 
modes – namely, as negating necessity by obligation, coaction, inevitability, 
and position – the first principle is free according to all of these modes (A5–12). 
Third, he relates the opposed view, which denies freedom to the first principle, 
in order to safeguard it from imperfection (A13–17). Fourth, while answering to 
these objections, Albert shows that the first principle acts freely, not by neces-
sity (A18–22). Finally, he interprets the freedom of the first principle according 
to the “richness” with which the Platonic tradition invests it (A23–24).
Surely, Albert was not only aware of, but also familiar with, the philosophi-
cal traditions that are mobilized by the opposed view. But it is no less certain 
that Albert could not fully appreciate or see through the complex process of 
transmission that connects Aristotle’s definition of freedom in the Metaphysics 
with the Liber de causis, which Albert regards as the complement to Aristotle’s 
philosophical theology.
In fact, Aristotle’s definition of “the free” as causa sui was the model for 
Plotinus’ Enneads vi.8, which describes the freedom of the absolute as “what 
wills its own being”. Proclus, however, who objected that Aristotle’s definition 
of “the free” as causa sui applies primarily to nous, denied it to the absolute 
One-Good. The concept of freedom is absent in the Elements of Theology, with 
the concepts of the self-sufficient (autarkes) and especially the self-constituted 
(authupostaton) coming as close to freedom as it gets. If, therefore, the author 
of the Liber de causis reproduces the notion of a causa sui ipsius, he seems to 
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remain loyal to the Aristotelian tradition at the point at which he, in fact, devi-
ates from his direct source, the Elements of Theology.1
This constellation is of interest when we compare Albert’s discussion of the 
freedom of the first principle in his De causis-commentary to its literal recep-
tion, mediated by the De summo bono of Ulrich of Strassburg, in the commen-
tary on the Elements of Theology by Berthold of Moosburg.
In these three authors, two opposite hermeneutical strategies clash: Albert’s 
synthesis of the Aristotelian and the Neoplatonic traditions, in continuity with 
the Porphyrian tradition of “the harmony of Plato and Aristotle”, on the one 
hand, and, on the other hand, Berthold’s antithesis of these traditions, which 
follows the path first opened by Aquinas and his exposure of the pseudo-
Aristotelian Liber de causis as, in fact, adapting and abridging the Elements of 
Theology.
Several questions of a heuristic nature arise here. How does Berthold 
compensate for Albert’s reliance on Aristotle, in the light of his antithetical 
approach? And how does he account for the freedom of the first principle at 
all in his commentary, given the absence of the concept in the Elements of 
Theology?
2. Before engaging with the texts in a more direct way, I would first like to 
emphasise Albert’s contribution to an articulation of a Platonic concept of 
absolute freedom – for that is what he does here, malgré soi – by invoking 
Albert’s simultaneous endorsement of the Aristotelian conception of free-
dom as “freedom of choice”. (Clearly, the use of historiographical categories 
like “Platonic” and “Aristotelian” reaches its true limits when we oppose the 
“freedom of choice” in the Nicomachean Ethics to the conception of freedom 
in Aristotle’s Metaphysics, which we would label “Platonic”. Perhaps it is more 
appropriate, therefore, to speak of metaphysical and ethical freedom instead. 
What is important is the difference between the two.)
Metaphysical freedom, the freedom of the Absolute, can be distinguished 
from ethical freedom, the freedom of choice associated with human agency. 
In fact, the freedom of the Absolute dialectically sublates the very necessity that 
1 See W. Beierwaltes, “Pronoia und Freiheit in der Philosophie des Proklos”, in Freiburger 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 24(1977), p. 88–111; W. Beierwaltes, “Proklos’ 
Theorie des Authypostaton und seine Kritik an Plotins Konzept einer causa sui”, in Das 
wahre Selbst (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2001), p. 160–181; Th. Kobusch, “Bedingte 
Selbstverursachung. Zu einem Grundmotiv der neuplatonischen Tradition”, in Th. Kobusch, 
B. Mojsisch, O.F. Summerell (eds), Selbst – Singularität – Subjektivität. Vom Neuplatonismus 
zum Deutschen Idealismus (Amsterdam / Philadelphia: Grüner, 2002), p. 155–173.
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is excluded by the notion of freedom of choice as indifference. Their opposition 
shapes the history of philosophy, where the Neoplatonic affirmation of the 
absolute freedom of the Good is metaphysical at the expense of any ethics 
conceived as an independent discipline based on practical reason, and where, 
inversely, Aristotle is understood as an advocate of an ethical conception of 
freedom and the human good, at the expense of a metaphysical conception of 
the Good, which, if it existed, would be irrelevant for human agency.2
This opposition, which can only be sketched here, must be addressed 
in order to appreciate Albert’s strategy in defending the freedom of the first 
principle.3 For when Albert takes issue with the position that declares the first 
principle to act by necessity, his discourse actually enacts the dialectical medi-
ation between freedom and necessity, which we have just mentioned.
Indeed, Albert concedes that the freedom that is opposed to necessity is an 
imperfection from which the first principle must be preserved, while insisting 
that this is not the only conceivable kind of freedom. What results is a concep-
tion of absolute freedom that is no longer opposed to necessity and that is 
acknowledged to be incompatible with the conception of ethical freedom that 
Albert endorses elsewhere in his works, but is denied here, due to its imper-
fection, to the first principle. The real issue, it seems, then, is the unity of the 
concept of freedom in Albert.
3. Turning to the text of Albert, I postpone for now the discussion of the four 
modes according to which freedom is applied to the first principle. Albert 
introduces Aristotle’s explanation of “the free” as causa sui in the Metaphysics, 
in order to prove the general claim that the first principle is in every way free to 
2 See W. Goris, “Metaphysik der Freiheit”, in J. Müller, Ch. Rode (eds), Freiheit und Geschichte. 
Festschrift für Theo Kobusch zum 70. Geburtstag (Münster: Aschendorff, 2018), p. 229–250; 
W. Goris, “Die Freiheit und das Gute”, in C. Böhr (ed.), Metaphysik. Von einem unabweislichen 
Bedürfnis der menschlichen Vernunft. Rémi Brague zu Ehren (Wiesbaden: Springer VS, 2020), 
p. 373-390; J. Halfwassen, “Freiheit als Transzendenz. Zur Freiheit des Absoluten bei Schelling 
und Plotin”, in J.-M. Narbonne, A. Reckermann (eds), Pensées de l’Un dans l’histoire de la phi-
losophie. Études en hommage au Professeur Werner Beierwaltes (Paris: Vrin, 2004), p. 459–481. 
For the later tradition, see the excellent essay by Ch. Krijnen, “Die Wirklichkeit der Freiheit 
begreifen. Hegels Begriff von Sittlichkeit als Voraussetzung der Sittlichkeitskonzeption 
Kants”, in Folia Philosophica 39(2018), p. 37–144.
3 For prior publications on the concept of freedom in Albert the Great, I refer the reader to 
H. Anzulewicz, “Das Phänomen des Schicksals und die Freiheit des Menschen nach Albertus 
Magnus”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery Jr., A. Speer (eds), Nach der Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie 
und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und 
Texte (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2001), p. 507–534; E. Miteva, “I Want to Break Free. Albert the Great’s 
Naturalistic Account of Freedom of Choice and its Limitations”, in Bochumer Philosophisches 
Jahrbuch für Antike und Mittelalter 21(2018), p. 11–28.
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act. Before assessing the different modes according to which the first principle 
is free to act, this freedom itself first needs to be established.
The first principle is in every way free to act. For Aristotle says in the first 
book of the Metaphysics that “we call ‘free’ the one who acts on his own 
behalf” [causa sui: cause of itself]. Since, therefore, the first principle is 
in the highest sense on its own behalf (causa sui) in acting, it is the most 
free in action, and not just free, but even placed above freedom. For it has 
its “own power” (dominium) in its action. For the first is lord of all its acts. 
If now man is lord of his acts, since the cause of his acts is in him, all the 
more so the first of all is lord, who is for himself cause in every action. 
(A1–4)
The meaning of the text is clear from a comparison with Albert’s commentary 
on the Metaphysics.4 Our point of reference is not the commentary on the first 
book of the Metaphysics, from which the quotation of Aristotle is taken, and 
in which Albert discusses freedom in relation to science and the liberal arts.5 
Rather, in the commentary on Metaphysics Lambda, where Albert comments 
on the notion of prote ousia as pure act, he reproduces the whole discussion on 
the first principle as necesse esse that acts by its own essence, without thereby 
losing its freedom, since it is free in the sense of what is causa sui. The connec-
tion with the De causis-commentary is manifest in the digression that Albert 
adds to explain that the first substance is “above every name” (super omne 
nomen).
We may notice, moreover, that Albert introduces a slight twist in his expla-
nation of Aristotle’s conception of freedom. The first principle is “the freest” 
and not just free, but “placed above freedom”, which designates the transcen-
dence proper to the first principle. The conclusion of the text discusses free-
dom as the largitas of magnificence, as the expression of self-sufficiency or 
autarky (see Liber de causis, prop. XIX[XX]).
4. Referring to previous deliberations, Albert introduces the position that con-
tradicts his conclusion that the first principle is “the freest” both in itself and 
in its actions since it does not depend on any other cause and thus is free from 
all necessity.
4 Albert the Great, Metaphysica, ed. B. Geyer, Editio Coloniensis 16/1–2 (Münster i.W.: 
Aschendorff, 1960–1964), lib. xi, tr. 2, c. 2, p. 484, l. 48–p. 485, l. 31.
5 Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. i, tr. 2, c. 7, p. 24, l. 13–92.
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In the five arguments contra, it is argued that it is proper to the first prin-
ciple to act by necessity, and not freely. The first two arguments rely on the 
concept of the necesse esse, which acts per essentiam, both of which seem to 
exclude freedom. The first argument is as follows:
Against this, however, some try to 
counter by what was said before. It 
was said, namely, that the first is nec-
essary being totally and in every way. 
And what is necessary in every way, 
in no way seems to be free. (A13)
To these objections, however, and 
others like it one can easily respond, 
namely, that the first is in every way 
necessary being. But for this reason 
freedom is not removed from it. For 
necessity, which is by dependence on 
another cause, is removed from the 
first. But for that reason freedom is not 
removed, such that in it is the cause of 
its action. (A18)
The reference to “what was said before” indicates chapters 9–11 of the first trea-
tise in this first book, where the first principle is established as necesse esse; 
the Cologne edition has shown in detail how this passage in Albert’s text is 
elaborated upon the abridgement of Avicennian doctrine in the Metaphysica 
Algazelis. The arguments contesting the freedom of the first principle here are 
based, therefore, on Avicenna.6
In his answer, Albert concedes that the first principle is necesse esse, but 
denies that such necessity annuls freedom. It is perfectly reasonable, he affirms 
here with the entire Platonic tradition, to deny necessity to the first principle, 
so as to remove any dependence upon other causes, while affirming its free-
dom in the sense of what necessitates itself.
The last three arguments (A15–16) articulate a conception of freedom as the 
disposition “to act or not to act”, which, if posited in the first principle, would 
introduce change into what is immutable, withhold the perfection of everlast-
ing action from it, and falsely attribute something to the higher realm which 
implies an imperfection in the lower realms.7 The key to solving these objec-
tions is provided by the answer to the third argument:
6 See Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, ed. W. Fauser, Editio 
Coloniensis 17/2 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), lib. i, tr. 1, c. 9, p. 17, l. 33–p. 18, l. 40.
7 In the Summa theologiae, Albert attributes this conception of freedom to Avicenna: in potes-
tate suae libertatis habet agere et non agere et agere hoc et contrarium huius. See Albert the 
Great, Summa theologiae sive de mirabili scientia Dei. Libri I, pars I. Quaestiones 1–50A, ed. 
D. Siedler, Editio Coloniensis 34/1 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1978), pars i, tr. 2, q. 3, c. 2, p. 30, 
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Furthermore, what is free is that in 
which there is “to act and not to act”. 
If it is said, however, that in the first 
there is “to act and not to act”, one 
must concede that the first is subject 
to variation. This, however, is impos-
sible, since it is totally unchangeable, 
as was proved before. Therefore, 
there is not “to act and not to act” in 
it. It is necessary, therefore, that it 
acts. And thus it is subject to neces-
sity and not to freedom. (A15)
Furthermore, by that which is said, 
that there is not “to act and not to act” 
in it, nothing is proved. For this is said 
in a twofold way. The absence of “to act 
and not to act” in something can be the 
result of compulsion to the one and the 
impossibility of the other. In the other 
way, it can be the result of freedom to 
the one and the other. But because it 
is better to be the one than the other, 
therefore it does not turn from the one 
to the other – just as in the chaste there 
is acting chastely and not chastely, 
and in the generous to give and not 
to give. But because it is better to act 
chastely and to give generously than to 
act unchastely and to hold back greed-
ily, therefore the chaste and the gen-
erous does not turn to the opposite of 
its action. And thus “to act and not to 
act” is in the first indeed, but it cannot 
not act, since it is better to send out 
goodness than to hold it back, and “it is 
impossible to attribute anything in the 
least unbecoming to it”.8 (A20)
The freedom “to act and not to act” is denied incorrectly to the first principle by 
the objection, if its denial is taken in the sense of being forced to do something 
because it is impossible to do the opposite. Clearly, the first principle is free in 
this sense, for the contrary would conflict with its omnipotence. But necessity 
can also be taken in the sense of having the ability “to act and not to act”, while 
preferring the one over the other because of its perceived goodness. In this 
sense, Albert says, the first principle is free not to act, while acting necessarily 
in conformity to its own goodness.
More urgent at present than a consideration of Albert’s replies to the fourth 
and fifth objections, which also follow this strategy, is the clarification of the 
l. 11–15. One notes the differentiation here between executio actus (agere et non agere) and 
specificatio actus (agere hoc et contrarium huius).
8 The quotation is from Anselm, Cur Deus homo, lib. i, c. 10.
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type of necessity that the freedom of the first principle negates (see A4–12). 
The necessity to act that is attributed to the first principle is not the neces-
sity which determines nature to one action; this type of necessity, in the form 
of an obligatio ad unum, is clearly opposed to the freedom of the first prin-
ciple. But the necessity attributed to the first principle differs less evidently 
from the fourth type of necessity, that of position (in the sense of “presupposi-
tion”), which corresponds to the final cause.9 Albert refers to a passage in the 
Nicomachean Ethics on the unity of the virtues, where Aristotle (cf. ne vi.13, 
1145a4–6) explains that choice requires both virtue and practical wisdom, 
which can be distinguished in terms of what determines the end and what 
makes us do the things that lead to the end:
For a goal being posited, if one has to attain this goal, it is necessary to 
attend to what is necessary to attain the goal. As Aristotle says, “in order 
to have moral virtue it is necessary to have prudence, because prudence 
inquires and chooses that which leads to the moral goal of virtue, since 
moral virtue tends only as nature to the goal, without considering that 
which leads to the execution of its goal”. (A10)
It seems to me that this relation is very akin to the necessity to act, if acting is 
perceived as to do what is good, which is granted to the first principle in the 
response to the third objection.
My point, however, is not to challenge the consistency of Albert’s remarks, 
but to check the definition of freedom as what can both act and not act. 
Freedom is defined here exclusively in relation to the executio actus, and not to 
the specificatio actus. That the first principle is free not to act, yet is bound to 
act by its goodness, might be interpreted as an evasive strategy. But is not the 
9 See Albert the Great, Summa theologiae, lib. i, tr. 7, q. 30, c. 3, p. 237, l. 33–42, where Albert 
negates the first three types of necessity to God, while accepting the fourth: Dicitur quarto 
modo necessitas secundum causam finalem, quam Boethius vocat necessitatem suppositio-
nis, secundum quam dicimus: si femina honesta esse debeat, necesse est castam esse […]. Et 
hoc modo dicimus, quod pater necessitate genuit filium, quia si summum bonum esse debeat, 
necesse est, quod summa et perfecta diffusione seipsum diffundat et communicet. See also the 
questions on liberum arbitrium: Albert the Great, In II Sententiarum, ed. A. Borgnet, vol. 
27 (Paris: Vivès, 1894), d. 3, A, a. 7, p. 72b; Albert the Great, De homine, eds H. Anzulewicz, 
J. Söder, Editio Coloniensis 27/2 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 2008), a. 3.4.1, p. 519–p. 521. In the 
latter text, Albert follows Anselm in distinguishing freedom from the flexibilitas in bonum et 
malum, which is based here on an objection from Aristotle: Praeterea, in primo Metaphysicae 
habetur quod dicimus hominem liberum, quia causa sui est tantum; ergo videtur quod libertas 
sic deberet determinari secundum rationem illam, scilicet quod libertas arbitrii in hoc est quod 
ipsum causa sui est in actibus (p. 520).
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real problem the question that Albert dodges successfully, that is, whether the 
first principle is free to do something or its very opposite?
5. We may conclude that Albert introduces necessity into the concept of free-
dom that he attributes to the first principle, and thus subscribes to the Platonic 
tradition of absolute freedom that originates in Enneads vi.8. Albert subse-
quently builds on this tradition when he derives from the freedom of the first 
principle that it has will and is omnipotent, since its freedom requires neither 
deliberation, as we have seen, nor an explicit appetite for things absent.10
Against this, however, some object subtly by saying that everything that 
has in itself the principle of its action and that is totally free, is willing. 
But the first has in the highest sense in itself the principle of its action 
and is totally free. Therefore, the first is willing in the highest sense.11
The association of these quidam with the position of Plato, as well as the 
identification of the will as a free cause of its actions with Boethius sequens 
Platonem,12 makes clear that Albert has identified a Platonic conception of 
absolute freedom. This freedom is compatible with the freedom of choice that 
he relates to Aristotle only on the condition of removing the imperfection that 
is inherent to the freedom of choice.
6. Albert’s careful, and perhaps even cautious, discussion on the freedom of 
the first principle is rearranged by his pupil Ulrich of Strassburg in De summo 
bono iv.1.4, which reproduces the same series of attributes: De primi princi-
pii libertate, voluntate et omnipotentia. Ulrich interprets Albert’s approach as 
attributing three different concepts of freedom to the first principle. In his 
reconstruction, Ulrich imposes a hierarchy among these concepts.
The first concept is the freedom of dependency from a cause, which is 
proved by literal quotations from the second section in Albert’s discussion. 
Ulrich recognizes the complexity in Albert, and even smooths out the text, 
when he characterizes the freedom of the first principle.
10  Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis, lib. i, tr. 3, c. 2, p. 37, l. 50–55.
11  Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis, lib. i, tr. 3, c. 2, p. 37, l. 26–30: Contra 
hoc autem quidam subtilissime obiciunt dicentes, quod omne quod in seipso habet suae 
actionis principium et omnino liberum est, volens est. Primum autem maxime in seipso 
habet suae actionis principium et omnino liberum est. Ergo primum maxime volens est.
12  Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis, lib. i, tr. 3, c. 2, p. 37, l. 69–70.
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And this first principle is free both in itself and in its action. (B1)
That the first principle is free in itself follows from the compatibility of this 
freedom with the necessity of immutability, which Ulrich had already affirmed 
of the first principle. Hence, what was dialectically mediated in Albert, is in 
Ulrich transformed into a straightforward assertion.
The freedom of the first principle (haec libertas) is compatible with the 
necessity proper to it alone (haec necessitas), since it is causa sui. This free-
dom is compatible with the necessity of immutability, but not with the neces-
sity of dependence on another cause, which is ruled out by the necessity of 
immutability.
Since Ulrich proceeds to show that there exists no genus of cause accord-
ing to which the first principle is dependent and necessitated in its action, we 
can register two interesting deviations from Albert’s text: Ulrich extends the 
discussion of “freedom from inevitability” with a reflection on the essences of 
things, and he omits the dimension of ethical freedom which fueled Albert’s 
analysis of “the necessity of position” (B8 and 10).
A second type of freedom can be discerned in the freedom to act and not to 
act, which was the core of Albert’s answer to objections 3–5 and which Ulrich 
associates, silently quoting the Liber de causis, with the magnificence and self-
sufficient generosity ascribed to the first principle by the Peripatetics (B24).
From this freedom Ulrich distinguishes a third type, which is the freedom 
of what is causa sui, and which he ascribes explicitly to Aristotle, to which a 
short summary of Albert’s explanation is added (B25–26). Only the ascription 
of liberum and liberissimum remains; the libertati superpositum is removed.
We may conclude, therefore, that Ulrich does more than simply rearrange 
Albert’s argument about the freedom of the first principle. Albert’s argument is 
transformed into a hierarchy of three concepts of freedom. In this way, Ulrich 
stresses the compatibility of freedom and necessity. He also emphasizes their 
compatibility with the freedom to act and not to act. Finally, the Aristotelian 
concept of freedom, which was at the basis of Albert’s approach and which still 
tacitly informs Ulrich’s description of the first type of freedom, is reduced to a 
mere afterthought.
The conception of freedom that slowly starts to emerge in Ulrich, becomes 
fully manifest in Berthold of Moosburg’s commentary on the Elements of 
Theology.
7. Berthold employs Ulrich’s discussion of the freedom of the first principle in 
the commentary on Proposition 23 of the Elements of Theology:
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All that is unparticipated produces out of itself the participated; and all 
participated substances are linked by upward tension to existences not 
participated.13
It is interesting to observe which passage Berthold selected to insert the dis-
cussion on freedom in his commentary. In Proposition 23, Proclus introduces 
the notion of the unparticipated as part of the triad ἀμέθεκτον – μετεχόμενον – 
μετέχον (imparticipatum, participatum, participans) – a central triad in Proclus’ 
philosophy. In establishing the hierarchy of the unparticipated, the partici-
pated, and the participating, Proclus first differentiates between the unpartici-
pated and the participated, before projecting the hierarchy of the participated 
(superior) and the participating (inferior) upon the unparticipated (superior) 
and the participated (inferior) in Proposition 24. The differentiation between 
the unparticipated and the participated in Proclus responds to Plato’s self-
criticism regarding the doctrine of participation in the Parmenides. Its media-
tion of immanence and transcendence is codified in Proposition 23. Since it 
would be derogatory to the perfection of the unparticipated if it were to remain 
ungenerative, the unparticipated must give something of itself; but since it is 
both common to all that can participate and identical for all, it must be prior 
to all and must be unparticipated.
Proclus here elaborates a structure that applies to the entire hierarchy that 
links the One, Intellect, Soul, and Nature. Following this reasoning, Berthold 
infers that “the unparticipated” applies to the One-Good as well. In his com-
mentary, Berthold first identifies the possible referents of the term “the unpar-
ticipated” before specifying the meaning of the term in the proposition. It is at 
this stage that he deals with the very modes of freedom which Albert and Ulrich 
ascribed to the first principle. Berthold distinguishes three modes according 
to which imparticipatum is said: communiter, proprie, and magis proprie. The 
commonly accepted meaning applies to every intellectual nature, the proper 
meaning to every first and principal being of an order, and the most proper 
meaning to the One-Good alone, which has neither superiors nor inferiors to 
which it would be related by participation.
Proposition 23, Berthold observes, is concerned with imparticipatum taken 
in the second sense (proprie):
13  Proclus, Elementatio theologica, prop. 23: Πᾶν τὸ ἀμέθεκτον ὑφίστησιν ἀφ’ ἑαυτοῦ τὰ 
μετεχόμενα, καὶ πᾶσαι αἱ μετεχόμεναι ὑποστάσεις εἰς ἀμεθέκτους ὑπάρξεις ἀνατείνονται. In its 
Latin translation: Omne imparticipatum instituit a se ipso participata, et omnes participa-
tae hypostases ad imparticipatas essentias eriguntur.
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In the other way, namely in a proper sense, “unparticipated” refers to 
everything that is first and principally a being according to each order, 
total or partial, viz. that either is simply and absolutely first (the good and 
the one) or with respect to some determinate and partial order only (for 
example, the first virtue, the first being, and so on). What is such, is not 
partially taken [i.e., participatum as quasi partialiter captum, wg] from 
inferiors, since it is the most absolute and superperfect in its kind, which 
as such is “by itself” (sui gratia) and thus “being by itself” (sui ipsius ens), 
and this free from every mode of contraction, by which its kind is lim-
ited, as will be said immediately below. And thus it is before everything 
whatsoever that is contracted in its intention, as the truly separate and 
exempt, for the absolute is always prior and more eminent than the con-
tracted; and thus it is called “unparticipated”, that is not partially taken, 
either from the whole of its order simultaneously or from something of 
its order, since it is common to all and before all of which it is exempt. 
In this sense “unparticipated” is understood in the present proposition.14
The “unparticipated” applies to every maneries entium, and denotes the most 
absolute and perfect mode of being within each order, which is sui gratia and 
sui ipsius ens – that is, the unparticipated is free from all contraction and is 
transcendent, although it does not necessarily refer only the One-Good itself, 
which is unparticipated in the sense that “it has its own essence only from 
itself, since it does not depend from anything else” (“propriam essentiam non 
habeat nisi ex se, cum non pendeat ex alio”).
8. Having established the referent of the term imparticipatum, Berthold pro-
ceeds to detail its meaning and defines the unparticipated in the following way:
14  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
14–34, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 23A, 
p. 112, l. 24–p. 113, l. 37: Alio modo, scilicet proprie, dicitur imparticipatum omne, quod est 
prime et principaliter ens secundum unumquemque ordinem, et hoc sive totalem sive par-
tialem, hoc est sive sit simpliciter et absolute prime, puta bonum et unum, sive respectu 
alicuius determinati et partialis ordinis solum, puta prime virtus, prime ens et huiusmodi. 
Omne enim tale non est partialiter captum ab inferioribus, cum sit absolutissimum et super-
perfectissimum in sua manerie, quod inquantum huiusmodi est sui gratia et sic sui ipsius 
ens, et hoc liberum ab omni modo contractionis, quibus habet sua maneries limitari, ut 
statim infra dicetur. Et sic est ante omnia qualitercumque in sua intentione contracta sicut 
vere separatum et exemptum, cum semper absolutum prius et eminentius sit contracto; et sic 
dicitur imparticipatum, id est non partialiter captum, et hoc sive a toto suo ordine simul sive 
ab aliquo ipsius ordinis, cum sit commune omnium et ante omnia, a quibus est exemptum. 
Et sic accipitur in proposito elemento.
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Indeed, the unparticipated, such as it is taken here, according to its essen-
tial description, is (i.) a thing, (ii.) existing by itself, (iii.) having from itself 
and in itself a superplenitude of its own goodness or (iv.) of an intention 
by itself in whatsoever way originally instituted.15
Before we focus on the second condition, “existing by itself”, I want to make 
two remarks on the other aspects of this description, which aims to give a real 
definition (secundum quid rei) instead of a merely nominal one (secundum 
quid nominis).
First, Berthold comments on the concept of res with the remark:
In this description, “thing” is taken generically, not insofar as it derives 
grammatically from “I think, you think”, but from “solidity”, since the 
unparticipated is something solid in nature.16
Although this distinction between res a reor, reris and res a ratitudine is related 
in a privileged way to the first Quodlibet (1276) of Henry of Ghent, it is also 
found in Bonaventure and Aquinas.17 If I highlight this term, it is because it is 
indicative of the central place accorded to the idea of an essential order, both 
here and in the Avicennian tradition leading up to Scotus.
Secondly, the further elements – which entail a subdivision between the 
simpliciter imparticipabile, which is the first One and Good, and the impar-
ticipabile in a determinate intention18 – refer back, as Berthold notes (sicut 
expositum est super 9), to the exposition on Proposition 9, about what is self-
sufficient (autarkes) according to substance or operation – I will come back to 
this shortly.
As for the second condition of the imparticipatum mentioned already (sui 
ipsius existens), Berthold interprets this in terms of what is free both in itself 
and in its action, as he explains in agreement with Ulrich:
15  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 23B, p. 113, l. 59–61: Sane imparticipatum, prout hic sumi-
tur, secundum quid rei est res sui ipsius existens habens a se ipsa et in se ipsa superplenitudi-
nem propriae bonitatis seu intentionis a se qualitercumque originaliter institutae.
16  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 23B, p. 113, l. 62–64: In ista descriptione res accipitur pro 
genere, non prout grammatice descendit a reor, reris, sed a ratitudine, cum imparticipatum 
sit quid ratum in natura.
17  See P. Porro, “Res a reor, reris / res a ratitudine. Autour d’Henri de Gand”, in I. Atucha, 
D. Calma, C. König-Pralong, I. Zavattero (eds), Mots médiévaux offerts à Ruedi Imbach 
(Porto / Turnhout: Fédération Internationale des Instituts d’Études Médiévales, 2011), 
p. 617–628.
18  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
160–183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 163A, p. 24, l. 12–22.
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Ulrich Berthold
And this first principle is free both in 
itself and in its action. (B1)
I say, however, “existent by itself”, in 
order that it is understood to be free 
both in itself and in its action. (C1)
What is free in itself is described by Berthold in accordance with Ulrich along 
the four modes of freedom, in which the necessary dependence from other 
causes is excluded (C6–11).
But whereas Ulrich related freedom in action to Albert’s discussion of agere 
et non agere (B20), Berthold insists on the notion of what acts per esse (C12) 
which was part of the formal or essential characteristic of freedom in Ulrich 
and Berthold alike.
Ulrich Berthold
And this freedom is according to the 
simplicity by which something has a 
form, not as a part of itself – rather 
it is its essence and is its freedom 
and is whatever it has. For, indeed, it 
acts whatever it acts by its essence, 
and yet it acts freely, for its essence 
is its freedom and free will, and this 
freedom is in the first principle. And 
therefore the case of what acts by its 
essence, and the case of what acts 
naturally by the essence of its form, 
like fire necessarily burns and the 
like, are not the same (B9)
Just like every unparticipated has free-
dom in itself, insofar as it is “being by 
itself” and “for its own sake”, in the 
same way it has freedom in action, 
since it acts by its being, and thus the 
action that remains in it is one with 
their essence. (C12)
And this is rooted in simplicity, either 
in all ways and absolutely or respec-
tively. For thus each simple principle is 
its freedom, by which it is completely 
what it is, and completely acts what 
it acts, and yet it acts freely, since its 
essence is its freedom. (C9)
I take this to be the essence of what I call here a Platonic concept of freedom.
9. Now what about Aristotle? What happened to the Aristotelian definition 
of freedom, which was central for Albert and became a sort of appendix for 
Ulrich? It is eliminated by Berthold. And not only the reference to Aristotle 
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has disappeared, the vocabulary itself is replaced: where Ulrich has causa sui, 
Berthold has gratia sui or sui ipsius existens. This is no mere coincidence. In 
fact, Berthold considers the concept of a causa sui to be self-refuting, as is clear 
from assertions like “illud esset causa sui ipsius, quod est impossibile” and the 
recurring reference in the Expositio to the eighth proposition of Nicholas of 
Amiens’ De arte fidei, which asserts that nihil est causa sui. Here, we return 
to the commentary on Proposition 9 of Proclus, where Berthold explains the 
“sufficiens bonum as quod habet a se ipso et in se ipso plenitudinem propriae 
bonitatis”. Berthold argues that a se ipso must be understood in respect to for-
mal causality and not efficient causality:
But I say “by itself” formally, not efficiently, since by way of an efficient 
cause nothing begets itself in order to exist, according to Augustine. 
The author of De arte fidei alludes to this in prop. 3: “Nothing composed 
itself or brought itself into being,” and prop. 8: “Nothing is cause of itself,” 
although formally it both proceeds from itself and converts to itself.19
For Berthold, from the perspective of efficient causality, the notion of causa sui 
is self-contradictory. It can, however, be given an acceptable interpretation in 
terms of formal and essential causality: freedom is essential self-constitution.
 Appendix
A = Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, ed. W. Fauser, 
Editio Coloniensis 17/2 (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), lib. i, tr. 3, c. 1, p. 35, l. 10–p. 36, 
l. 60.
B = Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 1–2,7, ed. S. Pieperhoff 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1987), lib. iv, tr. 1, c. 4, p. 23, l. 2–p. 24, l. 39.
19  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, 
Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), 9B, 
p. 170, l. 108–112: Dico autem a se ipso formaliter, non efficienter, quia causaliter effective 
nihil gignit se ipsum, ut sit, secundum Augustinum De Trinitate I cap. 1, cui alludit auctor De 
articulis fidei libro I prop. 3: “Nihil se ipsum composuit aut ad esse perduxit” et 8: “Nihil est 
causa sui”, licet formaliter et procedat a se ipso et convertatur ad se ipsum. For further objec-
tions to the expression causa sui see Expositio, 7E, p. 152, l. 502–508; Expositio, 18D, p. 53, 
l. 335–341; Expositio, 21B, p. 82, l. 212–219; Expositio, 35B, p. 4, l. 50–59; 38A, p. 27, l. 16–22; 
Expositio 150D, p. 121, l. 76–78. Significantly, at Expositio super Elementationem theologi-
cam Procli. Propositiones 35–65, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001), 52A, p. 119, l. 80, 
where Berthold for once uses the expression non-critically, it is in the midst of a quotation 
from Albert the Great.
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C = Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propo- 
sitiones 14–34, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 
1986), 23B, p. 113, l. 65–p. 115, l. 107.
A B C
1 Primum etiam princip-
ium ad agendum omni 
modo liberum est. 
Liberum etiam est hic 
primum principium tam 
in se quam in actione.
Dico autem sui ipsius 
existens, ut intelligatur esse 
liberum tam in se quam in 
actione sua. 
2 In se quidem liberum 
est, quia haec libertas 
non tollit necessitatem 
immutabilitatis, quali-
ter primum principium 
solum esse necessarium 
supra probavimus, cum 
haec necessitas maxime 
faciat ipsum esse sui 
causa in causando eo, 
quod non convenit nisi 
primae causae,
In se quidem omne impar-
ticipatum liberum est, quia 
haec libertas non tollit 
necessitatem immutabili-
tatis, qualiter omnis per se 
perfecta vel superperfecta 
monas est immutabilis, cum 
haec necessitas maxime 
faciat ipsum esse sui gra-
tia eo, quod non conveniat 
nisi prime et principaliter 
enti, et hoc vel quod tale est 
simpliciter et absolute vel in 
respectu determinati ordinis 
per praemissam. 
3 Dicit enim Aristoteles 
in i Philosophiae Pri-
mae quod ‘liberum 
dicimus, qui causa sui 
est’. 
4 Cum ergo primum 
principium maxime 
sui causa sit in agendo, 
liberrimum in actione 
est nec tantum libe-
rum, sed etiam lib-
ertati superpositum. 
Dominium enim 




Dominus enim est pri-
mus omnium suorum 
actuum. Si enim homo 
dominus est suorum 
actuum, cum causa 
suorum actuum in 
ipso est, multo magis 
primus omnium domi-
nus est, qui sibi ipsi in 
omni actione causa 
est.
5 Adhuc autem, cum lib-
ertas quattuor modis 
dicatur, scilicet ab obli-
gatione, a coactione, 
ab inevitabilitate et a 
necessitate positionis, 
primum principium 
omni modo liberum 
est. 
sed tollit necessitatem 
dependentiae ad ali-
quam causam, quae 
quattuor modis dicitur 
secundum quattuor 
genera causarum.
Tollit autem haec libertas 
necessitatem dependentiae 
ad aliquam causam, quae 
necessitas quattuor modis 
dicitur secundum quattuor 
genera causarum.
6 Libertas enim ab 
obligatione est ad 
effectum causae mate-
rialis. Obligatio enim 
per materiam est. 
Sicut homo obliga-
tur ad necessitatem 
comedendi, bibendi, 
dormiendi. A quibus 
omnibus esset liber, si 
immaterialis esset. 
Est enim libertas ab 
obligatione, quae obli-
gatio est per materiam, 
sicut homo obligatur 
per hoc, quod materia-
lis est, ad necessitatem 
comedendi, dormiendi 
et huiusmodi. Libertas 
ergo haec est per 
immaterialitatem.
Est enim necessitas obli-
gationis, quae est vel per 
materiam proprie dictam, 
sicut generatum obligatur 
per materiam ad corruptio-
nem, vel per materiam com-
muniter dictam, qualis est 
corpus subiectum in caelo, 
ad quod obligatur anima 
totalis, cum inter ea secun-
dum quosdam sit mutua 
dependentia ita, quod, si 
unum eorum non esset, nec 
reliquum, vel communis-
sime dictam quasi extenso 




subiecta intentionum in 
aliis existentium, ad quae 
obligantur in existentia 
propter essentialem eorum 
ad invicem dependentiam, 
qua unum sine alio sub-
sistere non valeret. Et sic 
solum illud, quod in se ipso 
est sine dependentia ad 
quodcumque materiale, 
liberum est quoad iam dic-
tam libertatem, quae est 
immunitas ab obligatione. 
Et sic est quadruplex liber-
tas ab obligatione, scilicet 
per immaterialitatem et 
independentiam ad cor-
pus subiectum et in se ipso 
esse et non in alio secun-
dum intentionem differ-
ente et sic esse illimitatum.
7 Necessitas autem 
coactionis per causam 
efficientem est. Sicut 
necessitatem habet 
homo, quod combura-
tur, si in igne ponatur; 
vel ut non moveatur, si 
vinculetur. 
Alia est libertas a coac-
tione, quae coactio est 
per causam efficientem, 
sicut vinculatus necesse 
habet non ire, et liber-
tas haec est per virtu-
tis perfectionem, quae 
nihil extrinsecum potest 
recipere.
Est secundo libertas a coac-
tione, quae est per causam 
efficientem seu producen-
tem. Et hoc vel per causam 
simpliciter omnium pro-
ductivam, quae est prime 
bonum, vel per eam, quae 
efficit aliquam multitu-
dinem determinatam, ut 
sunt unitates, non ut sunt 
intra ordinem unialem 
conclusae – sic enim cadunt 
a dicta libertate –, sed ut 






tatis a causa formali 
est. Sicut necesse habet 
homo non volare, quia 
pennas naturaliter 
non habet insitas; et 
necesse habet homi-
nem esse et humana 
facere propter formam 
humanitatis. 
Tertia libertas est ab 
inevitabilitate, quae 
inevitabilitas est per 
formalem causam, sicut 
homo necessario facit 
humana propter for-
mam humanitatis, 
Est et tertio libertas ab inevi-
tabilitate, quae est per cau-
sam formalem. 
9 et haec libertas est per 
simplicitatem, qua 
aliquid formam non 
habet partem sui, sed 
est ipsa sua quiditas et 
est ipsa libertas et est, 
quidquid habet. Illud 
enim operatur quidem 
per essentiam suam, 
quidquid agit, et tamen 
agit libere, quia sua 
essentia est sua libertas 
et libera voluntas, et hoc 
est in primo principio. 
Et ideo non est simile 
de hoc agente per essen-
tiam et de naturalibus 
agentibus per essentiam 
suae formae, sicut ignis 
necessario comburit et 
similia.
Et haec radicatur in simplic-
itate, et hoc vel omnimoda 
et absoluta vel in respectiva. 
Sic enim quodlibet sim-
plicium est sua libertas, qua 
se toto est, quod est, et se 
toto agit, quod agit, et tamen 
agit libere, quia essentia sua 
est sua libertas.
10 Necessitas autem 
positionis secundum 
causam finalem est. 
Sicut necesse habet 
quis lucrari, si velit 
ditari; vel secari, si velit
Quarta libertas est a 
necessitate positionis, 
quae necessitas est per 
causam finalem, sicut 
necesse est hunc secari, 
si debet curari.
Est quarto libertas a neces-
sitate positionis, quae est 
per causam finalem, et quia 
imparticipata, sicut nec
habent principium inquan-




sanari. Posito enim 
fine aliquo si debeat 
aliquis consequi finem, 
necesse est studere ad 
ea quae sunt ad finem 
consequendum. Sicut 
Aristoteles dicit, quod 
‘ad habendum virtu-
tem moralem necesse 
est habere pruden-
tiam eo quod pruden-
tia inquirit et eligit ea 
quae faciunt ad finem 
moralem virtutis, cum 
ipsa moralis virtus non 
sint principia, sic etiam non 
habent finem, cum quodli-
bet sit finis, et hoc iterum 
vel simpliciter et absolute 
vel respectu determinatae 
maneriei.
nisi ut natura tendat 
in finem nihil eorum 
considerans quae 
faciunt ad sui finis 
consecutionem’. 
11 Cum igitur primus 
ad nullam penitus 
causam habeat depen-
dentiam, constat, quod 
ab omni necessitate 
liber est. 
Cum ergo primum 
principium ad nullam 
causam habeat depen-
dentiam, patet, quod 
ipsum in se omnino 
liberum est.
12 Liberrimus ergo est 
primus tam in se quam 
in actione.
Sicut autem omne imparti-
cipatum habet libertatem 
in se, prout est sui ipsius ens 
et sui gratia, ita consimiliter 
habet libertatem in actione, 
cum agat per esse, et sic 





13 (1) Contra hoc tamen 
quidam nituntur oppo-
nere per ea quae ante-
habita sunt. Habitum 
est enim, quod pri-
mum necesse est esse 
omnino et omnimode. 
Et quod est omnimode 
necesse, nullo modo 
videtur esse liberum.
14 (2) Adhuc autem, habii-
tum est quod primum 
non nisi per essen-
tiam agit, quia aliter 
non esset primum, si 
ageret vel per accidens 
vel per aliquid essen-
tiae additum vel etiam 
per aliud. Quod autem 
per essentiam agit, de 
necessitate agit, sicut
lux lucet per necessita-
tem essentiae.
15 (3) Adhuc autem, 
liberum est, in qua est 
agere et non agere. Si 
autem dicatur in primo 
esse agere et non agere, 
necesse est, ut conce-
datur primum aliter 
et aliter se habere. Hoc 
autem impossibile est, 
cum omnino sit imper-
mutabile, ut in ante-
habitis probatum est. 




agere et non agere. 
Necesse est ergo ipsum 
agere. Et sic necessi-
tati subiacet et non 
libertati.
16 (4) Adhuc, nobilius 
est semper agere 
quam aliquando agere 
et aliquando non 
agere. Primo autem 
convenit semper agere, 
quia omne nobilius 
convenit ei. Cui autem 
convenit semper agere, 
de necessitate agit. 
Necessitati ergo subia-
cet et non libertati, ut 
videtur.
17 (5) Adhuc, in secundis 
quaecumque semper 
agunt et necessita-
tem habent in agendo, 
meliora sunt quam ea 
quae quandoque agunt 
et quandoque non 
agunt. Sicut caelestia 
meliora dicimus quam 
naturalia generabilia et 
corruptibilia et natura-
lia meliora fortuitis eo 
quod caelestia semper 
et de necessitate agunt, 
naturalia frequenter, 
fortuita autem raro. 
Videtur ergo, quod 
primi sit de necessi-





18 (1) Ad haec autem et 
similia facile respon-
deri potest, scilicet 
quod primum omni 
modo necesse est esse. 
Sed non propter hoc 
tollitur ab eo libertas. 
Necessitas enim, quae 
est per dependen-
tiam ad aliquam cau-
sam, tollitur a primo. 
Sed propter hoc non 
aufertur libertas, quin 
in ipso sit causa suae 
actionis.
19 (2) Similiter, per hoc 
quod dicitur, quod 
per essentiam agit, 
non potest probari, 
quod per necessitatem 
agat, nisi illa essen-
tia subiaceat neces-
sitati. Et similiter per 
sequens, quamvis sit 
simplicissimum, non 
concluditur, quod 
aliquam in agendo 
patiatur necessitatem.
Simplicissimum enim 
liberrimum est inter 
omnia eo quod ipsum 





20 (3) Adhuc autem, per 
hoc quod dicitur, quod 
non sit in ipso agere et 
non agere, nihil proba-
tur. Hoc enim dupli-
citer dicitur. Non esse 
enim in aliquo agere et 
non agere potest esse 
per obligationem ad 
unum et impossibili-
tatem ad alterum. Alio 
modo potest esse per 
libertatem ad unum et 
ad alterum. Sed quia 
melius est esse unum 
quam alterum, prop-
ter hoc non transponi-
tur de uno in alterum. 
Sicut in casto est caste 
agere et non caste, et 
in liberali dare et non 
dare. Sed quia melius 
est caste agere et libe-
raliter dare quam non 
caste agere et avare 
retinere, ideo non 
transponitur castus et 
liberalis in oppositum 
suae actionis. Et sic 
agere et non agere qui-
dem est in primo, sed 
non potest non agere, 
quia melius est emit-
tere bonitates quam 
retinere, et minimum 
inconveniens in primo 
impossibile est. 
Est etiam liberum 
ad agendum et non 
agendum ita, quod ad 
neutrum habet obliga-
tionem nec impossibili-
tatem ad alterum, sed 
habens libertatem ad 
utrumque non transpo-
nitur de uno in alterum, 
quia melius est esse 
unum quam alterum, 
sicut “homo sanctus in 
sapientia manet sicut 
sol”, Eccli. 27. Cum 
tamen liber sit ad hoc et 
ad oppositum, sic enim 
in primo est agere et non 
agere, sed non potest 
non agere, quia melius 





21 (4) Ex hoc etiam patet 
responsio ad sequens: 
Tali enim modo semper 
agere nobilissimum 
est et multo nobi-
lius quam aliquando 
agere et aliquando 
non agere. Sicut dicit 
Messahalla, quod 
motus caeli motus 
sapientis est eo quod 
sapientis uno modo 
est agere et semper et 
non per inconstantiam 
aliquando agere et ali-
quando non agere vel 
sic et aliter agere. Tali 
enim modo agit, quod 
per diversa disponitur. 
Quod non convenit 
primo.
22 (5) Hoc etiam modo 
quaecumque secundo-
rum semper agunt, ad 
intelligentiae actionem 
referuntur, quae uno et 
eodem se habet modo 
et uno et eodem modo 
desideratur a mobili. 
Et propter hoc illa 
nobiliora sunt quam 
ea quae frequenter vel 
raro agunt et a diversis 
ad diversa disponun-
tur. Non tamen propter 





23 Ex omnibus his col-
ligitur, quod primum 
liberrimum est in 
omnibus suis tam 
in agendo quam in 
aliis eo quod ad nihil 
penitus habet depen-
dentiam et sibi ipsi 
sufficiens causa est ad 
omnia et in omnibus.
24 Propter quod etiam 
meliores Peripatetico-
rum primum dixerunt 
esse largissimum 
secundum illam lar-
gitatis speciem, quae 
magnificentia vocatur. 
Hoc enim est, quando 
aliquis fluit optimis 
et non deficit propter 
hoc quod in optimis 
in seipso sufficientiam 
habet, per quam sibi et 
omnibus aliis sufficit 
abundanter.
propter quod etiam 
Avicenna et alii meliores 
Peripateticorum dicunt 
primum esse largissi-
mum secundum illam 
speciem largitatis, quae 
est magnificentia, quia 
semper fluit optimis et 
non deficit eo, quod sibi 
sufficit et omnibus aliis.
Dico autem ipsum impar-
ticipatum habere a se 
ipso, scilicet formaliter, 
et in se ipso essentialiter 
superplenitudinem.
25 Primum ergo in hoc 
agere liberrimum est tam 
propter libertatem iam 
dictam quam etiam 
propter hoc, quod, ut 
dicit Philosophus in i 
Metaphysicae, liberum 





26 Cum ergo primum 
principium maxime 
sui causa sit in agendo, 
liberrimum est in 
actione et per conse-
quens dominium habet 
in actione sua, quia qui-
libet est dominus suo-
rum actuum, cum causa 
ipsorum in ipso est.
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chapter 10
Doppelte Providenz. Die Rezeption einer 




In seiner Schrift Zum ewigen Frieden (1795) unterscheidet I. Kant zwischen 
der „gründenden Vorsehung“ (providentia conditrix) des Welturhebers, „sofern 
sie in den Anfang der Welt gelegt wird“, und der „waltenden Vorsehung“ (pro-
videntia gubernatrix), die diesen Anfang nach „allgemeinen Gesetzen der 
Zweckmäßigkeit“ erhalten soll.
Diese Unterscheidung einer doppelten Providenz hat eine lange Geschichte, 
der hier im Sinne einer Genealogie nachgegangen werden soll. In ihr spielt das 
Mittelalter eine herausragende Rolle, auf der Seite der Franziskaner – wie hier 
nur erwähnt werden kann – vor allem Alexander von Hales und die Summa 
Halensis, auf der Dominikanerseite vor allem Berthold von Moosburg und 
seine philosophischen Mitstreiter. Die folgenden Ausführungen haben zum 
Ziel, den mittelalterlichen Diskurs über das Thema der doppelten Providenz 
unserem Verständnis näher zu bringen und den neuplatonischen Ursprung 
dieser Idee offenzulegen.
1 Natürliche und willensmäßige Providenz
1.1 Berthold von Moosburg
Berthold von Moosburg hat seinen monumentalen Kommentar zur Elementatio 
theologica des Proklos von vorneherein unter die Differenz der doppelten 
Providenz, d.h. der providentia naturalis und der providentia voluntaria gestellt. 
Die natürliche und die willensmäßige Providenz sind zwei Gesichtspunkte, 
unter denen das göttliche Gute je verschieden betrachtet wird. Nach der 
Sichtweise der natürlichen Providenz werden so die „theologischen Elemente“, 
d.h. vor allem die metaphysischen Prinzipien und primordialen Ursachen 
sichtbar. Deswegen ist die Koordinierung dieser „Elemente“ der eigentlich 
thematische Stoff dieses proklischen Werkes, so daß sich auch der Name des 
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Werkes von selbst ergibt.1 Genauer gesagt handelt es sich bei den „theologi-
schen Elementen“ um die Sätze über Gott.2 Diejenige Disziplin, die diese theo-
logischen Sätze zum Gegenstand hat, heißt traditionell „Metaphysik“. Berthold 
lehnt diese aristotelische Bezeichnung (wie auch die „Erste Philosophie“) 
aufgrund ihrer engen naturphilosophischen Implikationen ab für das theo-
logische Prinzipienwissen und damit auch für das Wissen von der natürli-
chen Providenz, von dem bei Proklos die Rede ist. Er zieht dafür die Begriffe 
des „supersapientialen Wissens“ oder der „divinalen Philosophie“ im Sinne 
Platons vor, die beide das „unvergleichbare Überragen“ über die aristotelische 
Metaphysik ausdrücken, die nur das Ens inquantum ens zum Gegenstand hat.3
Demgegenüber umfaßt die „Ordnung der willentlichen Providenz“ nicht 
das Wesen- und Naturhafte, sondern – mit den Worten Alberts des Großen – 
das Gnadenhafte bzw. das, was die göttlichen Gnadengaben partizipiert, das 
Hierarchische, Engel und Menschen, das mit freiem Willen Ausgestattete, 
Lohn und Strafe. Deswegen wird Dionysius der „Theologe“ der willensmäßigen 
Providenz genannt.4 Es ist das Reich des Willens, um das es hier geht, daher 
der Name der Ordnung. Auch es ist ein ordo divinus, auch hier geht es um 
das göttliche Gute, nämlich in partizipierter Form.5 Berthold kann deswegen 
beide Formen der Providenz auch als zwei Arten des „Hervorgangs“ (proces-
sus) begreifen, die natürliche als einen wesenhaften, die willentliche als einen 
partizipativen.6 Das Wissen von dieser Ordnung der willentlichen Providenz 
ist und heißt bei Berthold genau wie das Wissen um die natürliche Providenz: 
„Theologie“, aber jetzt ist die Offenbarungstheologie gemeint. Beide Theologien, 
die philosophische Theologie Platons und die Offenbarungstheologie – deren 
Wissenschaftscharakter Berthold im Praeambulum seines Kommentars 
darzustellen sich bemüht – haben eine ganz ähnliche Struktur: Wie die 
1 Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 1–13, hg.v. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), Expositio tituli i, S.45, L.278–283: Ex praedictis apparet, quod bonum 
divinum secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis est subiectum huius libri, quod exprimitur 
per li: ELEMENTATIO THEOLOGICA. […] Materialis quidem subiectiva, quia in ipso tracta-
tur per elementorum coordinationem de bono divino secundum ordinem providentiae natura-
lis; unde dicitur elementatio non qualiscumque, sed theologica, ad differentiam elementationis 
physicae, quam etiam iste auctor dicitur edidisse.
2 Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio tituli K, S.47, L.365–366: Auctor tamen vocat eas elementa 
theologica, id est propositiones, in quibus est sermo de divinis sive de Deo.
3 Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, Praeambulum C, S.65, L.422ff.; L, S.48, L.401ff.
4 Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 5B, S.116, L.104.
5 Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 10A, S.179, L.88–180, L.112.
6 Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
136–159, hg.v. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 146B, S.90, L.19.
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philosophische Theologie auf allgemeinsten Prinzipien beruht, die nicht 
bewiesen und nicht gewußt sind, sondern nur „glaubend“ hingenommen 
werden können – Berthold zählt zu ihnen neben dem Widerspruchsprinzip 
auch die Prinzipien der Vielheit und des Produktiven, die für die Stabilisierung 
der Existenz des Einen und des Guten notwendig sind –, so ist auch die 
Offenbarungstheologie auf nur geglaubte Prinzipien gegründet, eben auf die 
articuli fidei Christianae.7
Wie sich die beiden Theologien zueinander verhalten, ist nicht ganz ein-
fach zu sagen, weil Berthold ihre Funktion nicht direkt gegenüber stellt. Wenn 
wir aber wissen könnten, wie sich die natürliche Providenz und die willens-
mäßige Providenz zueinander verhalten, dann würde auch das Verhältnis der 
beiden Theologien klar werden. Nun hat Berthold, wie weiter unten ausgeführt 
werden wird, die willensmäßige Providenz als eine „Ergänzung“, also als eine 
Vervollständigung eines Ganzen bezeichnet (s.u. S.340-342). Er hat damit einen 
Begriff ins Spiel gebracht, der als terminus technicus in den Erkenntnislehren 
seiner Zeit, besonders aber bei Heinrich von Gent und Dietrich von Freiberg, 
eine überragende Rolle spielt. Wird seine Bedeutung nicht erkannt, dann kann 
man dem Anspruch dieser Erkenntnislehren nicht gerecht werden. Das gilt 
nun auch hier: Wenn die willensmäßige Providenz eine „Ergänzung“ der natür-
lichen ist und wenn jener die Offenbarungstheologie, dieser aber die philoso-
phische Theologie zugeordnet sein soll, dann muß die Offenbarungstheologie 
nach Berthold, aber auch nach Dietrich als eine „Ergänzung“ der philosophi-
schen Theologie und damit der natürlichen Vernunft angesehen werden.8
7 Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, Praeambulum, S.53, L.13–20: Circa stabilitionem anitatis 
seu existentiae unius utitur quodam principio complexo, isto videlicet, multitudinem esse, sicut 
et stabiliendo anitatem boni utitur alio principio, scilicet productivum esse. Ista duo principia, 
quibus totius istius philosophiae structura sicut propriis fundamentis innititur, auctor suppo-
nit […] nullo modo vel intellecta vel scita […] sed solum credita, sicut et theologia, quae est de 
bono divino secundum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, fundatur in principiis creditis, quae 
sunt articuli fidei Christianae. Den Begriff der anitas, d.h. der „Obheit“, also der Existenz, den 
Berthold auch der quiditas, also der Essenz gegenüberstellt (Praeambulum C, S.68, L.556), 
dürfte Berthold von Avicenna oder Meister Eckhart kennengelernt haben.
8 Man kann F. Retucci nur zustimmen, wenn sie Bertholds Verdienste um die Stärkung der 
natürlichen Vernunft gegenüber Thomas und der übrigen Scholastik herausstellt. Allerdings 
darf das nicht zu der falschen Meinung führen, als komme die Offenbarungstheologie im 
Werk Bertholds gar nicht vor oder habe gar keine Funktion. Cf. „Magister Thomas Anglicus 
Minor. Eine neue Quelle der Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli Bertholds von 
Moosburg – das ungedruckte Sapientiale des Franziskaners Thomas von York“, in Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio – Prop. 136–159, s.xxiii–xxxix. Ähnliches gilt auch im Hinblick 
auf Dietrichs Werk, wie schon De subiecto theologiae zeigt. Wenn L. Sturlese in Homo divi-
nus (S.152) sagt, daß an keiner Stelle des Bertholdschen Werkes „von Sakramenten, Kirche, 
Offenbarung, guten Werken und Glaube die Rede“ sei, so ist man auf den ersten Blick geneigt, 
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Und um es ganz klar auszudrücken: „Complementum“ und alle Ableitungen 
dieses Wortstammes bezeichnen nicht etwa, wie die in meinen beiden 
genannten Aufsätzen angeführten Belege zeigen (s.u. Anm.33), ein gegensei-
tiges Ergänzen, sondern eindeutig ein einseitiges: Die Offenbarungstheologie 
ist nach Dietrich und Berthold die Ergänzung der natürlichen Vernunft, nicht 
umgekehrt. Das bedeutet, daß die Offenbarungstheologie eine Hilfestellung 
innehat, nicht den Primat, aber auch nicht gleichrangig ist mit der supersa-
pientalen Metaphysik, sondern ihr untergeordnet. Bei allem Respekt vor 
den Intellekttheorien der beiden Denker (Dietrich und Berthold) ist diese 
Umkehrung des Ancilla-Verhältnisses, diese intellektuelle Revolution, die 
eigentliche Errungenschaft ihrer Philosophie, das einmalig Große inner-
halb der mittelalterlichen Philosophie. Die heutige Theologie, besonders die 
katholische kirchlich verfaßte, die im Sinne der providentia specialis sich auf 
partikuläre Prinzipien stützt, täte gut daran, sich (im Sinne Dietrichs und 
Bertholds) ihrer dienenden Funktion gegenüber der natürlichen, allgemei-
nen Vernunft, die auf universalen Prinzipien beruht, zu besinnen und auf den 
Primatsanspruch in Leben und Wissenschaft zu verzichten.
Beide Ordnungen, die der natürlichen und der willensmäßigen Providenz, 
sind göttliche Ordnungen, sie sind auch beide kausale Ordnungen,9 wenn-
gleich die willensmäßige nur im übertragenen Sinne. Beide Ordnungen unter-
scheiden sich dadurch, daß – wie schon Albert der Große gesagt hatte – erstere 
eine Wesensordnung ist, die zweite aber eine durch Partizipation an den gött-
lichen Gnadengaben begründete. Die natürliche Providenz ist das Reich des 
Autarken, die willensmäßige dagegen das Reich des Hierarchischen.10
  ihm unumwunden zuzustimmen, auf den zweiten nur noch zögerlich: Von „Offenbarung“ 
ist tatsächlich nicht die Rede, wohl aber von articuli fidei, von „guten Werken“ auch nicht, 
wohl aber von Lohn und Strafe (bes. im Zusammenhang mit der providentia voluntaria), 
vom Glauben auch nicht, aber immerhin weiß Berthold, von der „Wissenschaft“ (scientia) 
den „Glauben“ ( fides) abzuheben und zeigt darüber hinaus, daß er mit allen Wassern der 
zeitgenössischen Terminologie um „Gewißheit“ und „Evidenz“ gewaschen ist (cf. Berthold 
von Moosburg, Expositio, Praeambulum B, S.60, L.247–264). Zur Unterscheidung von phi-
losophischer Theologie und Offenbarungstheologie bei Berthold s. W. Goris, „Das Gute 
als Ersterkanntes bei Berthold von Moosburg“, in W. Goris (Hg.), Die Metaphysik und 
das Gute. Aufsätze zu ihrem Verhältnis in Antike und Mittelalter. Jan A. Aertsen zu Ehren 
(Leuven: Peeters, 1999), S.143–145.
9  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
14–34, hg.v. L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 21A, 
S.77, L.47–49: Ordo etiam causalis, qui est secundum originem extra manantem, est duplex, 
quia aut secundum providentiam naturalem aut voluntariam secundum distinctionem 
Augustini VIII Super Genesim ad litteram.
10  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 10A, S.179, L.88–180, L.112, bes. S. 179, L.99–102: Ex pra-
edictis apparet differentia inter antarkiam et hierarchiam, quia antarkia est ordo divinus 
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Beide Ordnungen stellen auch Ganzheiten dar, die eine je verschiedene 
Formbestimmtheit haben. Die Ordnung der natürlichen Providenz ist ein 
Ganzes durch eine „wesensmäßige Verknüpfung oder Verbindung (…), der 
notwendig eine Formbestimmtheit durch den wesentlichen Einfluß eines auf 
ein anderes folgt“.11 Es liegt in der natürlichen Providenz als einer Ordnung 
und Verbindung von wesentlichen Ursachen begründet, daß sie in eine dreifa-
che Kraft oder Macht unterteilt wird: In die schöpferische, die später bei Kant 
als providentia conditrix wieder auftaucht, in die zusammenhaltende und in 
die (um das Heil) sorgende bzw. bewahrende. Berthold beruft sich für diese 
Unterteilung auf Johannes Damascenus.12 Auch Alexander von Hales hat sie in 
dieser Weise aufgenommen.13
Auch die Ordnung der willensmäßigen Providenz ist ein Ganzes, aller-
dings gemäß der Partizipation an einem höheren Licht. In dieser Ordnung 
gibt es die Weitergabe des Lichtes von Höherstehenden an die Niedrigeren, 
denn hier gibt es keine causa essentialis. Und mögen hier auch intellektuelle 
secundum condiciones supra positas in descriptione emanans a Deo iuxta dispositionem 
providentiae naturalis; hierarchia vero est ordo divinus emanans a Deo iuxta dispositionem 
providentiae voluntariae.
11  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 145B, S.83, L.47.
12  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 141A, S.45, L.25–27: Verum, quia in naturali providentia 
est ordo et connexio causarum essentialium et substantialium, ideo subdividitur in condi-
tivam, contentivam et provisivam. Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 141A, S.46, L.35–37: 
Etenim generatio nostra conditricis eius virtutis est, et permanentia contentivae eius est vir-
tutis, et gubernatio et salus provisae eius est virtutis. Cf. Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio 
super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–135, hg.v. F. Retucci (Hamburg, 
Meiner, 2011) 121H, S.108, L.110–112: Verum, quia omne, quod est ratio producendi, qua aliquid 
potest se ipsum exserere sua causalitate et fecunditate secundum triplicem providentiam, 
scilicet conditivam, contentivam et conservativam, est et dicitur virtus sive potentia, qua 
ipsum providens praehabet, praecomprehendit et praeobtinet omnia, quibus providet, neces-
sarium est in omni divino per essentiam esse potentiam sive virtutem […]. Die Dreiteilung 
scheint schon bei Proklos vorweggenommen zu sein. Cf. Proclus, Théologie platonicienne, 
hg.v. H.-D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1968) i, S.123: τὰ μὲν πρὸς τὴν 
πατρικὴν ἀφομοιοῦται καὶ ἔστι ποιητικὰ <καὶ> φρουρητικὰ καὶ συνεκτικὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα γένη τῶν 
θεῶν καὶ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν καὶ τὸ συνέχειν καὶ τὸ φρουρεῖν τῇ τοῦ πέρατος αἰτίᾳ προσήκει. Cf. auch 
Proclus, Sur le Premier Alcibiade de Platon, i, hg.v. A.-Ph. Segonds (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 
2003), S.45–46: oὐχ ὅτι προνοητικός ἐστιν ὁ τοιοῦτος ἔρως καὶ σωστικὸς τῶν ἐρωμένων καὶ 
τελειωτικὸς αὐτῶν καὶ συνεκτικός.
13  Alexander von Hales, Summa universis theologiae, ed. Quaracchi (Roma: Coll. 
S. Bonaventurae, 1924–1948), i, p. 1, inq. 1, tr. 5, s. 2, q. 3, tit. 1, c. 7, a. 1, n. 208, S.301: 
Providentia aliquando accipitur communiter, et sic pertinet ad virtutem conditivam et con-
tentivam et provisivam: secundum hoc res ab ipsa sunt, permanent et gubernantur; et sic 
accipitur a Boethio, in libro Consolationis, cum determinat de providentia per comparatio-
nem ad fatum.
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Substanzen ihren Platz haben, so ist „dennoch keine von ihnen ein intellectus 
per essentiam“.14
Gegenstand der natürlichen Providenz Gottes ist die natürliche Ordnung der 
Ursachen, d.h. – im Sinne Eriugenas ausgedrückt – der primordialen Ursachen, 
also derer, die die Sorge Gottes „unmittelbar“ erfahren, während in der willens-
mäßigen Providenz die Sorge Gottes „auf eigene Weise“ sich vollzieht, nämlich 
durch Partizipation an der Güte Gottes.15 Die providentielle göttliche Sorge 
gilt also zuerst den „Göttern“, d.i. den übersubstantiellen Engeln. Berthold 
beruft sich in diesem Zusammenhang auf die Etymologie, sowohl auf die grie-
chische wie die lateinische: Denn pronoia ist das vor dem Nous, und providen-
tia meint die Tätigkeit des Provisors.16 Was die Etymologie des griechischen 
Ausdrucks angeht, so übernimmt er offenbar eine weitverbreitete neuplatoni-
sche Ansicht.17 Sie gibt der neuplatonischen Überzeugung Ausdruck, daß die 
Providenz die Sache Gottes ist, nicht des Geistes.18
14  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 145B, S.83, L.47–58: […] cum quidam sit totalis per 
essentialem colligationem seu connexionem, ordinationem ratione providentiae naturalis, 
quam necessario sequitur formalitas per essentialem influentiam unius in aliud […] Est 
et alius ordo totalis in providentia voluntaria secundum participationem altioris luminis, 
[…] quam etiam exsequuntur taliter ordinata, inquantum superiora inferioribus communi-
cant indita sibi lumina copiose. […] cum nullum eorum sit causa essentialis. Licet enim sint 
intellectuales substantiae, nulla tamen earum est intellectus per essentiam […].
15  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 120E, S.100, L.303–305: Secundum primum actum pro-
videntiae est ordo naturalis causarum, qui in hoc volumine exprimitur, quibus omnibus 
supereminent ipsae primordiales causae, quas auctor vocat deos. Berthold von Moosburg, 
Expositio, 120E, S.100, L.321–323: Sicut ergo in providentia naturali Deus providet omnibus 
primordialibus causis immediate et per eas et in eis omnibus simpliciter, sic etiam in provi-
dentia voluntaria est suo modo.
16  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 120 -prob., S.104, L.438–440: Igitur in diis est provi-
dentia prime. Ubi enim est pronoy, id est intellectus provisoris nisi in supersubstantialibus? 
Providentia vero est operatio provisoris, ut nomen insinuat.
17  Proclus, The Elements of Theology, hg.v. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 19632), 120, 
S.106, L.6–7: ἡ δὲ πρόνοια, ὡς τοὔνομα ἐμφαίνει, ἐνέργειά ἐστι πρὸ νοῦ. s.134: ᾗ οὖν προνοεῖ, 
θεός, ἐν τῇ πρὸ νοῦ ἐνεργείᾳ τῆς προνοίας ἱσταμένης. Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum commen-
taria, hg.v. E. Diehl (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903, repr. Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1965), i, S.415: καὶ 
δεῖ μεμνῆσθαι καὶ ὧν ὁ Χαιρωνεὺς εἶπε περὶ τοῦ τῆς προνοίας ὀνόματος, ὡς Πλάτωνος οὕτως 
τὴν θείαν αἰτίαν καλέσαντος. εἰ δὲ καὶ νοῦς ἐστιν ὁ δημιουργὸς καὶ πρόνοια, καθόσον ἔχει τι 
καὶ τοῦ νοῦ κρεῖττον, εἰκότως καὶ τοῦτο ἔσχε τὸ ὄνομα διὰ τὴν ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἐνέργειαν. Johannes 
Philoponos, In Aristotelis De anima libros, hg.v. M. Hayduck (Berlin: Reimer, 1897), S.527: 
ὁ γὰρ θεὸς καὶ ὑπὲρ νοῦν ἐστιν, ὅθεν καὶ πρόνοια ὠνόμασται, ὡς πρὸ τοῦ νοῦ ὤν). Olympiodor, 
In Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria, hg.v. L.G. Westerink (Amsterdam: North-Holland, 
1976), 13,2,15, S.167.
18  Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem Commentaria, hg.v. C. Steel (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), ii, S.173 [967,16–20]: οὕτω δὲ καὶ ἐν Νόμοις (αὐτοῖς) αὐτὸς οὐκ ἄλλως εἶπε τὰς 
ὅλας ψυχὰς προνοεῖν ἢ δοὺς αὐταῖς νοῦν θεῖον, ὡς τῷ θεῷ τῆς προνοίας προσηκούσης, ἀλλ’ οὐχὶ 
νῷ· νοῦ γὰρ καὶ ἄλλοις μέτεστι, θείου δὲ νοῦ ταῖς θείαις ψυχαῖς.
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Mit Berufung auf Boethius versucht Berthold darüber hinaus den 
Unterschied beider Providenzarten auch als den zwischen der Providenz und 
dem Fatum deutlich zu machen. Die Providenz ist nach dem alles überragen-
den und bestimmenden neuplatonischen Schema jene Ordnung, die alles in 
eingefalteter Form enthält, was das Fatum als der Zeit unterworfene Ordnung 
entfaltet.19 Ob das Fatum durch gewisse göttliche dienende Geister oder die 
menschliche Seele oder die ganze Natur oder die Bewegung der Gestirne aus-
geführt und die „fatale Reihe“ des Geschehens gewebt wird, das will Berthold 
offenlassen, fest steht nur: Die Providenz ist die Ordnung des Einfachen, des 
Unbeweglichen, die Disposition des singulär und stabil zu Machenden, das 
Fatum dagegen die zeitliche und vielfältige Verwaltung desselben, die Ordnung 
des Beweglichen und des Raumzeitlichen. Deswegen kann man sagen: „Die 
Ordnung des Fatums geht aus der Einfachheit der Providenz hervor“,20 d.h. 
das Fatum steht in den Diensten der göttlichen Providenz. Es bedeutet frei-
lich auch: Alles, was dem Fatum unterworfen ist, ist auch der Providenz unter-
worfen, während der Kausalzusammenhang der wesentlichen Ursachen dem 
Fatum entzogen ist.
Ähnlichkeit und Differenz zwischen den beiden Providenzarten werden 
hier sichtbar: Die Providenz, gemeint ist die providentia naturalis, ist Gott „an 
sich“ (per se), das Fatum aber, das „Abbild“ von jener, ist nicht Gott, sondern nur 
„eine göttliche Sache“.21 Wir könnten das uns so übersetzen: Die „natürliche 
Providenz“ ist das unmittelbare Handeln Gottes, das Fatum aber, die „willentli-
che Providenz“, ist das vermittelte göttliche Handeln. Die göttliche Providenz 
ist „gewissermaßen“ ein „praktisches Wissen“, weil es der Wille Gottes ist, der 
sich auf alles erstreckt.22 Berthold hat in diesem Sinne das intellektuelle und 
das providentielle Erkennen als zwei Tätigkeiten eines substantiellen Intellekts 
unterschieden und so, wie das Mittelalter überhaupt, es vermieden, den göttli-
chen Intellekt „praktisch“ zu nennen.23
19  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 141B, S.46, L.52-56: Providentia namque cuncta pari-
ter, quamvis diversa, quamvis infinita complectitur, fatum vero singula dirigit in motu locis, 
formis ac temporibus distributa, ut haec temporalis ordinis explicatio in divinae mentis 
adunata prospectum providentia sit, eadem vero adunatio digesta atque explicata tempo-
ribus fatum vocetur. Zum complicatio-explicatio-Prinzip vgl. Th. Kobusch, „Complicatio 
und explicatio. Das ontologische Modell des Neuplatonismus“, in hg.v. G. Kapriev, The 
Dionysian Traditions, Turnhout, Brepols, 2021.
20  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 141B, S.46, L.56–S.47, L.76.
21  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 141B, S.48, L.103.
22  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 120D, S.98, L.247: providentia tamquam practica 
scientia.
23  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 134D–E, S.215, L.61–S.217, L.103 wird die Unterscheidung 
zwischen der Erkenntnis des Intellekts und der „Erkenntnis der Providenz“ erwähnt. – 
Daß der göttliche Intellekt „schlechthin spekulativ“ und nur per accidens praktisch ist, 
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1.2 Dietrich von Freiberg
Neben Augustinus ist Dietrich von Freiberg der wichtigste Gewährsmann für 
die Lehre von der doppelten Providenz. Er hat sie zum Thema des Kapitels 20 
seiner Schrift De animatione caeli gemacht. Dort kritisiert er die Position des 
Thomas von Aquin, der nicht genügend unterschieden habe die Ordungen 
der geistigen Substanzen einerseits und der himmlischen Körper, d.h. der 
Gestirne andererseits. Nach Dietrich haben sie aber von ihrer Natur gar keine 
Beziehung zueinander außer derjenigen, durch die sie beide aus dem ersten 
Prinzip, Gott, hervorgegangen sind, aber in je verschiedener Weise. Die geisti-
gen Substanzen nämlich gehen in der Ordnung der willentlichen Providenz 
aus Gott hervor und sind hierarchisch und stufenmäßig unterschieden, und 
zwar nicht nur in ihrer Natur, sondern auch ihrem Willen und ihren hierar-
chischen Akten nach. Ihre Providenz gelangt bis zu uns. Die himmlischen 
Körper dagegen gehen in der Ordnung der natürlichen Providenz aus Gott 
hervor je unterschieden nach ihrer natürlichen Disposition und ihren natür-
lichen Eigentümlichkeiten und Bewegungen. Da aber beide Ordnungen, die 
der natürlichen Providenz und der willentlichen Providenz, „völlig disparat“ 
sind und das Eine mit dem Anderen nichts zu tun hat, können auch nicht die 
geistigen Substanzen, die zur Ordnung der willentlichen Providenz gehören, 
als Prinzipien der Himmelsbewegung, die selbst zur Ordnung der natürlichen 
Providenz gehört, gedacht werden.24
Doch nicht nur dieser Gedanke von der aus der willentlichen Providenz her-
vorgehenden hierarchischen Ordnung der geistigen Substanzen ist das histo-
rische Vorbild für Berthold. Was bei Berthold außerdem eindeutig auf Dietrich 
von Freiberg zurückzuführen ist, ist die Zuteilung der beiden Ordnungen zu 
den je verschiedenen Gegenstandsbereichen der philosophischen Theologie 
und der Offenbarungstheologie. Ihrer beider gemeinsamer Gegenstand ist 
zwar das „göttliche Seiende“ (ens divinum), aber ihre Betrachtungsweise ist 
je verschieden. Denn die philosophische Theologie, d.i. die Metaphysik oder 
Erste Philosophie betrachtet das, was wesenhaft göttlich ist und alles andere, 
hat Heinrich von Gent in zwei Quaestionen ausführlich begründet: Heinrich von Gent, 
Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae), hg.v. G.A. Wilson, art. xxxvi, qq. 4–5 (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 1994), S.105–130.
24  Dietrich von Freiberg, De animatione caeli, hg.v. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), 
20, S.30, L.82-93: Huiusmodi autem substantiae spirituales omnino disparatae sunt in suis 
naturis et essentiis a substantiis corporum caelestium et nullum respectum et habitudinem 
secundum naturam habent ad ipsa nisi eam, qua ambo ista entium genera procedunt ab 
uno principio, Deo, sed tamen ordine diverso. Unum enim istorum, id est spirituum, […] 
procedit in ordine voluntariae providentiae […]. Aliud enim genus entium, scilicet corpora 
caelestia, procedunt a Deo in ordine naturalis providentiae […].
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insofern es auf dieses erste Prinzip hingeordnet ist. Die Metaphysik (scientia 
divina) betrachtet die Gesamtheit des Seienden, insofern sie aus Gott hervor-
gegangen ist, d.h. gemäß der Ordnung der natürlichen Providenz, in der die 
Dinge in ihrer Natur stehen und vom Ersten des Weltalls gemäß ihrer Modi 
und natürlichen Eigentümlichkeiten gelenkt werden, und über diese Ordnung 
der Natur hinaus achtet sie auf kein weiteres Ziel.25
„Unsere göttliche Wissenschaft der Heiligen aber“, d.h. die Offenbarungs-
theologie, betrachtet das „göttliche Seiende“ nach der Ordnung der willentli-
chen Providenz, d.h. die Dinge, insofern sie in die Ordnung der willentlichen 
Providenz gehören, wo es um Verdienst und Lohn und Strafe für ein gutes oder 
schlechtes Leben geht und die Möglichkeit, die ewige Glückseligkeit zu erlan-
gen und überhaupt zu einem ferneren Ziel zu gelangen nach dem Ende die-
ser Welt – wenn die „göttliche Wissenschaft der Weisen dieser Welt vernichtet 
werden wird“.26
Vielleicht wurde Dietrich zu dieser Zuordnung der beiden Providenzarten 
zu den beiden Arten der Theologie von Heinrich von Gent angeregt, von dem 
er auch sonst beeinflußt ist. Dietrich hat ja in den siebziger Jahren in Paris 
studiert, und es ist sehr wahrscheinlich, daß er auch Heinrich von Gent gehört 
und kennen gelernt hat. Jedenfalls erinnert sich Dietrich rund zwanzig Jahre 
später, nämlich im 2. Buch von De intellectu et intelligibili, einer Disputation 
25  Dietrich von Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae, 3 (5), hg.v. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 
1983), S.281, L.69-75: Quia igitur in hac scientia tractatur de tota universitate entium – et 
secundum processum eorum a Deo […] et haec sive secundum ordinem naturalis providen-
tiae seu secundum ordinem voluntariae providentiae, secundum distinctionem Augustini 
VIII Super (69 vb) Genesim – necesse est omnia convenire in una ratione subiecti, quod 
vocetur, sicut et vere est, ens divinum […]. Dietrich of Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae 3 
(8)-(9), S.281, L. 92 – S.282, L.104: Quamvis autem quantum ad considerationem primi phi-
losophi talis etiam, quae dicta est, attributio entium ad primum principium attendatur, et 
propter hoc etiam potius dicitur apud philosophos scientia divina seu theologia, quam dica-
tur metaphysica – considerat enim primo et principaliter de ente divino, quod est divinum 
per essentiam […] – nihilominus tamen nostra scientia, quam vere et simpliciter theologiam 
dicimus, distinguitur a scientia divina philosophorum. Scientia enim divina philosophorum 
considerat universitatem entium secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, quo res stant 
in sui natura et secundum suos modos et proprietates naturales gubernantur per principem 
universitatis, nec ultra hunc naturae ordinem aliquem ulteriorem finem attendit.
26  Dietrich von Freiberg, De subiecto theologiae 3 (9)–(10), S.282, L.104-112: Nostra autem 
divina sanctorum scientia attenditur in entibus, secundum quod stant et disponuntur sub 
ordine voluntariae providentiae, in quo attenditur ratio meriti et praemii et ea, quae attend-
untur circa bonam et sanctam vitam et adeptionem aeternae beatitudinis et perventionem 
ad finem ulteriorem sive in bono sive in malo etiam post terminum huius mundi, quando sci-
entia divina sapientium huius mundi destruetur, I Cor. 13. Secundum praedicta igitur conve-
nienter accipitur subiectum huius nostrae scientiae divinae, videlicet ut dicatur ens divinum 
secundum ordinem voluntariae providentiae.
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eines solemnis magister, und es spricht einiges dafür, daß Heinrich von Gent 
gemeint ist.27 Auf diese Weise zeigt sich ein weiteres Mal, daß Heinrich 
von Gent, dessen Einfluß in der Dietrich- und Eckhart-Forschung notorisch 
unterschätzt wird,28 die zentrale Figur in der zweiten Hälfte des 13. Jh. ist, die 
das Denken der Dominikaner wie auch und besonders der Franziskaner 
bestimmt hat.29
Was das hier verhandelte Problem angeht, so unterscheidet Heinrich im 
Anschluß an Augustinus die „allgemeine Providenz“ im Sinne der natürli-
chen und die „besondere Providenz“ im Sinne der willentlichen. Die allge-
meine Providenz bewegt zu jenen Erkenntnissen, die im Licht der natürlichen 
Vernunft gemacht werden können oder auch zu Handlungen, die aufgrund 
natürlicher Vernunft vollzogen werden. Die „spezielle“ Providenz dagegen 
bewegt zu solchen Erkenntnissen, die die Fähigkeit der natürlichen theore-
tischen Vernunft übersteigen und nur durch ein „übernatürlich“ eingeflöß-
tes Licht möglich werden bzw. zu durch die göttliche Gnade ermöglichten 
Handlungen.30
27  Vgl. M. Führer, „Dietrich of Freiberg“, in E.N. Zalta (Hg.), The Stanford Encyclopedia of 
Philosophy (Fall 2020 Edition), url = https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2020/ente-
ries/dietrich-freiberg/ (29.11.2020).
28  In den sich als programmatisch gebenden „Einleitungen“ zu den kritischen Editionen 
Dietrichs und Bertholds von K. Flasch wird nicht einmal der Name Heinrichs einer 
Erwähnung für würdig gehalten. K. Flasch, „Einleitung“, in Dietrich von Freiberg, Opera 
omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur Intellekttheorie, S.ix–xxvi. K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of 
Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, Propositiones 1–13, 
S. xi–xxxviii.
29  Vgl. Th. Kobusch, Die Philosophie des Hoch- und Spätmittelalters (München: Beck, 2011), 
S.308–321.
30  Heinrich von Gent, Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae), hg.v. G.A. Wilson (Leuven: Leuven 
University Press, 2005), art. iii, q. 5, S.263–264: Nunc autem sicut Deus agit et movet ut 
primus motor in movendo creaturas corporales motu corporali, sic agit et movet ut pri-
mus motor in movendo creaturas spirituales motu spirituali, et ideo sicut dupliciter 
movet, ut dictum est, creaturas corporales, una scilicet providentia generali et naturali, 
et altera providentia speciali et voluntaria, similiter congruit ut dupliciter moveat crea-
turam spiritualem. Motus autem eius est in intelligendo et volendo, et hoc scilicet pro-
videntia generali movendo eam lumine naturaliter sibi indito ad cognoscendum ea quae 
subsunt cognitioni naturali, et similiter ad ea agendum quae sibi ex naturalibus agere 
competit; providentia autem speciali movendo eam lumine supernaturaliter infuso ad 
cognoscendum quae sunt super facultatem rationis naturalis, et similiter voluntarie 
ad agendum quae sibi per gratiam agere competit, ut sic homo ordinetur, tam ex parte 
intellectus quam affectus […]. Auch Thomas bestimmt die providentia specialis ganz 
im Sinne der providentia voluntaria als die besondere Sorge um die vernunftbegabten 
Wesen, cf. Summa contra Gentiles, iii.111, hg.v. P. Marc, C. Pera, P. Caramello (Torino / 
Roma: Marietti, 1961); Summa Theologiae, i, 22,2, hg. Leonina (Roma: Ex Typ. Polyglotta 
S.C. de Propaganda Fide, 1888–1889).
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Zuletzt ist dies bemerkenswert, daß Dietrich die Willensordnung, also die 
Ordnung der Willensprovidenz, als die „Vervollständigung“ oder „Ergänzung“ 
der natürlichen Providenz versteht31. Berthold hat diese These Dietrichs 
zitiert.32 Sie ist insofern bemerkenswert, als dadurch ein Prinzip des 
Dietrichschen Denkens bestätigt wird. Dieses Prinzip besagt, daß die Tätigkeit 
des Intellekts, und das gilt sowohl für den theoretischen Intellekt bei der 
Konstituierung der ersten Intentionen wie auch für den praktischen Intellekt 
bei der Konstituierung z.B. des „Geldes“ oder des „Preises“ oder der positiven 
Gesetze, als eine „Ergänzung“ der Tätigkeit der Naturdinge anzusehen ist.33 
Berthold hat dementsprechend auch die ersten und zweiten Intentionen unter-
schieden: Die ersten Intentionen sind das, was der Intellekt von der Sache als 
das washeitliche Sein aufgrund der formalen, d.h. in der Sache selbst liegenden 
Prinzipien konstituiert. Die ersten Intentionen heißen also so, weil sie zuerst 
von dem extramentalen Naturding angeregt und als solche vom Intellekt auf-
genommen und quiditativ konstituiert werden. Die zweiten Intentionen dage-
gen, also so etwas wie Subjekt, Prädikat, Maior, Minor, Gattung, Species und 
andere Prädikabilien haben ihre Entität alleine durch den Intellekt.34 Berthold 
hat aber auch Dietrichs Lehre von der parallelen Struktur und Funktion des 
spekulativen und praktischen Intellekts aufgenommen, nach der z.B. der 
31  Dietrich von Freiberg, De visione beatifica, hg.v. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), 
4.3.2.(4), S.114, L.16-21: Et dico rationabile esse hoc et non dico necessarium esse, quia hui-
usmodi non fit ex necessitate ordinis, qui attenditur in providentia naturali, sed contingit ex 
sola Dei gratia et bonis meritis, quod pertinet ad ordinem voluntariae providentiae, qui est 
complementum et consummatio ordinis providentiae naturalis, quem duplicem ordinem in 
universo distinguit Augustinus viii Super Genesim.
32  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 129, S.182, L.299ff.
33  Cf. Th. Kobusch, „Begriff und Sache. Die Funktion des menschlichen Intellekts in der mit-
telalterlichen Philosophie“, in Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie 13/2(2004), 140–
157; Th. Kobusch, „Die Vernunftordnung als Vollendung der Naturordnung. Zur Funktion 
der menschlichen Vernunft in der mittelalterlichen Philosophie“, in T. Iremadze (mit 
H. Schneider, K.J. Schmidt) (Hgg.), Philosophy in Global Change: Jubilee volume dedicated 
to the 65th anniversary of Burkhard Mojsisch, Tbilisi: Nekeri, 2011, S.140–154.
34  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 
160–183, hg.v. U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 177G, S.181, L.270–280: Prima 
enim intentio est id, quod capit suam entitatem opere intellectus possibilis facti actu consti-
tuentis ipsum in esse quiditativo ex principiis formalibus, quae sunt partes definitionis; et 
dicitur res primae intentionis, quia est primo intentum a natura et sic respectum ab intel-
lectu. Res vero secundae intentionis non sic capit suam entitatem, ut secundum se et primo 
sit aliquid extra intellectum, quo secundum se et primo sit respectum ab intellectu, sicut res 
primae intentionis, sed est forma quaedam habens se ex parte intellectus vel rationis, sub 
qua fit res rationabilis; et ideo quasi per accidens respicit ipsum intellectum, inquantum 
sub eo et per ipsum ratiocinatur de rebus, quas per se respicit. Est autem secunda intentio 
subiectum, praedicatum, maior vel minor extremitas, genus species et alia praedicabilia.
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„Preis“ als eine solche vom praktischen Intellekt dem Geld verliehene „kom-
plementäre“ Bestimmtheit anzusehen ist.35
Das Letztere zusammengefaßt: Wie der spekulative und praktische Intellekt 
durch seine jeweilige Tätigkeit die Tätigkeit des Naturdings „komplementär“ 
unterstützt und vollendet, so ist nach Dietrich und Berthold auch die „willent-
liche Providenz“ eine komplementäre Ergänzung der „natürlichen Providenz“.
1.3 Augustinus
Für die Unterscheidung der natürlichen und der willensmäßigen Providenz 
beruft sich Berthold sehr oft auf Augustinus, nämlich die klassische Stelle 
in De Genesi ad litteram, wo Augustinus die natürliche Providenz Gottes als 
die unvermittelte Erschaffung und verborgene Verwaltung der Naturwelt 
beschreibt, durch die er den Bäumen und Gräsern das Wachstum verleiht, 
aber auch das kosmische Geschehen regelt, die Elemente ins rechte Verhältnis 
zueinander bringt, und Geburt, Wachsen, Altern und Sterben der Lebewesen 
lenkt. Die willentliche Providenz Gottes aber ist die durch Menschen und 
Engel vermittelte Sorge um den Bestand der Zivilisation und Kultur. Sie ist 
daran zu erkennen, daß‚ gelehrt und gelernt‘ wird (doceri et disci), daß Felder 
bestellt, Staaten verwaltet, Künste geübt werden, und manch anderes, sei es 
in der himmlischen oder in der irdischen Gesellschaft getan wird und zwar so 
sehr, daß sogar die Schlechten, ohne daß sie es wüßten, zum Guten beitragen 
können.36 Die bedeutsame anthropologische Aussage Augustins an dieser 
35  Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 32B, S.207, L.44–57. Im Hintergrund steht Heinrich 
von Gent, Summa (Quaestiones ordinariae) art. XLVII–LII, hg.v. M. Führer (Leuven: 
Leuven University Press, 2008), art. li, q. 3, S.240. Vgl. Kobusch, „Die Vernunftordnung 
als Vollendung“. Auch Nikolaus von Straßburg, Summa, liber ii, tract. 8–14, hg.v. 
T. Suarez-Nani (Hamburg: Meiner, 1990), tr. 9, q. 5, S.35–55 hat sich mit der Dietrichschen 
Lehre von den res primae intentionis und ihrer Verursachung durch den spekulativen und 
praktischen Intellekt kritisch auseinander gesetzt sowie auch mit Hervaeus Natalis’ Kritik 
an Dietrich. Im Verlauf dieser Auseinandersetzung wird auch der Begriff des completum 
bzw. des complementum diskutiert (cf. Nikolaus von Straßburg, Summa, liber ii, tr. 9, q. 5, 
S. 46, L.239–47, L.254).
36  Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram, hg.v. J. Zycha (Prag / Leipzig / Wien: Tempsky / Freytag, 
1894), VIII 9,17: atque in ipso quoque gemina operatio prouidentiae reperitur, partim 
naturalis, partim uoluntaria et naturalis quidem per occultam dei administrationem, qua 
etiam lignis et herbis dat incrementum, uoluntaria uero per angelorum opera et hominum; 
secundum illam primam caelestia superius ordinari inferius que terrestria, luminaria sidera 
que fulgere, diei noctis que uices agitari, aquis terram fundatam interlui atque circumlui, 
aerem altius superfundi, arbusta et animalia concipi et nasci, crescere, senescere, occidere 
et quidquid aliud in rebus interiore naturali que motu geritur; in hac autem altera signa 
dari, doceri et disci, agros coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri et quaeque alia siue 
in superna societate aguntur siue in hac terrena atque mortali, ita ut bonis consulatur et 
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Stelle aber ist, daß diese doppelte Macht der Providenz – die Augustinus auch 
schon in früheren Schriften andeutet37 – auch im Menschen vorhanden ist, 
fast ganz parallel und bezogen sowohl auf den Leib als auch auf die Seele: 
die natürliche, d.h. dem Leib von innen gegebene Sorge äußert sich in den 
Bewegungen, durch die er entsteht, wächst und altert, die willentliche aber, 
indem er für den Lebensunterhalt, Kleidung und Pflege sorgen kann.
Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Natürlichen und Willentlichen im Sinne 
einer Disjunktion ist eine Neuerung der christlichen Philosophie, eingeleitet 
durch Origenes und seine Anhänger. Diese Unterscheidung ist von eminenter 
Wichtigkeit für die weitere Geschichte der Philosophie.38 Denn sie bringt zu 
Bewußtsein, daß es hier um zwei irreduzible Welten geht, die jeweils eigene 
Gesetze haben: Die Welt der Natur mit ihren Naturgesetzen und die Welt 
des Moralischen, die den moralischen Gesetzen gehorcht. Später werden in 
diesem Sinne auch Natur und Freiheit unterschieden. Wenn Augustinus nun 
diese Unterscheidung auf die menschliche Form der Providenz, d.h. der Sorge 
anwendet, dann will er auf ein zweifaches Vermögen in unserer körperlichen 
und geistigen Existenz aufmerksam machen: Das natürliche Vermögen in der 
körperlichen Existenz ist die Bewegung des Entstehens, Wachsens und Alterns. 
Das moralische, d.h. in unsere Verantwortung gegebene, also unsere Freiheit 
betreffende dagegen ist die Ernährung, Kleidung und Körperpflege. Was die 
geistige Existenz angeht, so besteht das natürliche Element darin, daß die Seele 
als Lebensprinzip „lebt“ und Wahrnehmungen bzw. Empfindungen haben 
kann, während das „moralische“, von unserer Freiheit abhängige, im Lernen 
bzw. Erkennen und in der „Zustimmung“ besteht. Obwohl die Konzeption der 
doppelten göttlichen und der doppelten menschlichen Providenz ganz par-
allel strukturiert zu sein scheint, gibt es einen wichtigen Unterschied, den 
Augustinus wenig später auch ausdrücklich benennt: Die natürliche Providenz 
per nescientes malos; in que ipso homine eandem geminam prouidentiae uigere potentiam: 
primo erga corpus naturalem, scilicet eo motu, quo fit, quo crescit, quo senescit; uolunta-
riam uero, quo illa ad uictum, tegumentum curationem que consulitur. similiter erga ani-
mam naturaliter agitur, ut uiuat, ut sentiat, uoluntarie uero, ut discat, ut consentiat. Cf. 
z.B. Berthold von Moosburg, Expositio, 141A, S.45, L.11ff.
37  Cf. Augustinus, De vera religione hg.v. J. Clémence, J. Pegon (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 
1951), 22: […] conditricem vero ac moderatricem temporum divinam providentiam […].
38  S. Th. Kobusch, „Der Begriff des Willens in der christlichen Philosophie vor Augustinus“, 
in J. Müller, R. Hofmeister Pich (Hgg.), Wille und Handlung in der Philosophie der Kaiserzeit 
und Spätantike. Will and Action in Late Antique Philosophy (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 
2010), S.277–300.
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geschaffener Wesen kann keine Schöpfungsprovidenz im strengen Sinne der 
Schöpfung aus Nichts sein39.
Durch den Begriff der Zustimmung ist Augustinus zutiefst mit der sto-
ischen Philosophie verbunden, in der die Zustimmung der eigentliche Hort 
der Freiheit darstellt, da sie im eigentlichen Sinne in unserer Macht steht 
(eph‘ hemin)40. Auch für Augustinus steht die Zustimmung im Zentrum der 
Freiheitslehre. Das ist schon daraus zu erkennen, daß nach Augustins durch-
gehender Lehre die Sündhaftigkeit der Sünde in der Zustimmung zum Bösen 
besteht41. Sie ist Sache des Willens42. Deswegen ist sie in De Genesi ad litteram 
viii 9,17 der willentlichen Providenz zugeordnet.
Augustinus kommt in derselben Schrift – manchmal auch in anderen 
Schriften – noch mehrere Male auf die Lehre von der doppelten Providenz 
zurück und damit auch auf die Zweiteilung der gesamten Schöpfung in natür-
liche und willentliche Bewegungen. Daraus geht hervor, daß die göttliche 
Providenz eine zweifache Funktion hat: eine natürliche, durch die „Naturen“, 
d.h. die Wesenheiten zur Existenz gebracht werden, und eine „willentliche“, d.h. 
eine lenkende, durch die die verschiedenen Willen auf den richtigen morali-
schen Weg gelenkt und entsprechend ihrem Leben auch belohnt oder bestraft 
werden43. Damit sind wir bei der Vorstellung von der göttlichen Schöpfungs- 
39  Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram ix 15, S.288: quapropter cum deus uniuersam creaturam 
suam bipertito quodam modo opere prouidentiae, de quo in superiore libro locuti sumus, 
et in naturalibus et in uoluntariis motibus administret, creare naturam tam nullus angelus 
potest quam nec se ipsum.
40  Cf. Th. Kobusch, „Zustimmung I. Antike; Mittelalter“, in J. Ritter, K. Gründer, G. Gabriel 
(Hgg.), Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie (Basel / Stuttgart: Schwabe ag, 2005), 
S.1457–1465.
41  Cf. die berühmte Lehre von der Dreistufung der Sünde: suggestio, delectatio, consensio in 
De sermone Domini in monte i c.34.
42  Augustinus, De catechizandis rudibus, hg.v. I.B. Bauer (Turnhout: Brepols, 1969), 18: pro-
pria uoluntate consensit. Augustinus, Contra Secundinum, §14, hg.v. R. Jolivet, M. Jourjon 
(Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1961): dicis enim tunc animam uoluntate sua peccare, dum con-
sentit malo. Augustinus, Epistulae, hg.v. K.D. Daur (Turnhout: Brepols, 2009), cviii,7, S.71: 
Qui tetigerit pollutum, pollutus est, sed consensione uoluntatis.
43  Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram viii 12,25: neque enim tale aliquid est homo, ut factus 
deserente eo, qui fecit, possit aliquid agere bene tamquam ex se ipso; sed tota eius actio bona 
est ad eum conuerti, a quo factus est, et ab eo iustus, pius, sapiens beatus que semper fieri, 
non fieri et recedere, sicut a corporis medico sanari et abire, quia medicus corporis operarius 
fuit extrinsecus seruiens naturae intrinsecus operanti sub deo, qui operatur omnem salu-
tem gemino illo opere prouidentiae, de quo supra locuti sumus. Augustinus, De Genesi ad 
litteram viii 19,38: locus itaque magnus neque praetereundus proponitur, ut intueamur, 
quantum possumus, quantum ipse adiuuare et donare dignatur, opus diuinae prouidentiae 
bipertitum, quod superius, cum de agricultura loqueremur, transitoria quadam occasione 
perstrinximus, ut inde iam inciperet legentis animus hoc adsuescere contueri, quod adiuuat 
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und Vergeltungsprovidenz angekommen, deren Ursprung in der Philosophie 
des Neuplatonismus liegt – wie Augustinus selbst zu wissen scheint (De civi-
tate Dei, x 17).
2 Neuplatonismus: Schöpfungs- und Vergeltungsprovidenz
2.1 Porphyrios und Jamblich
Doch mögen Berthold und Dietrich und auch Augustinus noch so sehr der 
Lehre von der doppelten Providenz das Mäntelchen des Christlichen, d.h. der 
„christlichen Philosophie“ umgehängt haben, indem sie die Konzeption des 
Willens damit verbunden haben, so ist der neuplatonische Ursprung dieser 
Lehre doch nicht zu übersehen.
Die göttliche Providenz war ein überragend wichtiges Thema für die antike, 
besonders auch die spätantike Philosophie und zwar sowohl für die pagane wie 
auch die christliche Philosophie. Das bezeugen allein schon die zahlreichen Titel 
Peri pronoias, die wir kennen, so etwa von Chrysipp, Claudius Aelian, Philo von 
Alexandrien, Antiphon, Alexander von Aphrodisias, Clemens Alexandrinus, 
Johannes Chrysostomos, Theodoret, Proklos, Synesios, Hierokles, daneben 
plurimum, ne quid indignum de ipsa dei substantia sentiamus. Augustinus, De Genesi ad 
litteram vii 23,44: ergo dei prouidentia regens atque administrans uniuersam creaturam, 
et naturas et uoluntates, naturas, ut sint, uoluntates autem, ut nec infructuosae bonae nec 
inpunitae malae sint […]. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram viii 24,45: et ideo deus biper-
tito prouidentiae suae opere praeest uniuersae creaturae suae, naturis, ut fiant, uoluntati-
bus autem, ut sine suo iussu uel permissu nihil faciant. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram 
viii 26,48: sed in opere diuinae prouidentiae ista cognoscere non in illo opere, quo naturas 
creat, sed in illo, quo intrinsecus creatas etiam extrinsecus administrat […]. Augustinus, 
De Genesi ad litteram ix 14,24: uomodo haec adduxerit deus ad adam, ne carnaliter sapia-
mus, adiuuare nos debet, quod de bipertito opere diuinae prouidentiae in libro superiore 
tractauimus. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram ix 15,28: quapropter cum deus uniuersam 
creaturam suam bipertito quodam modo opere prouidentiae, de quo in superiore libro locuti 
sumus, et in naturalibus et in uoluntariis motibus administret, creare naturam tam nullus 
angelus potest quam nec se ipsum. Augustinus, De Genesi ad litteram ix 18,33: habet ergo 
deus in se ipso absconditas quorundam factorum causas, quas rebus conditis non inseruit, 
eas que inplet non illo opere prouidentiae, quo naturas substituit, ut sint, sed illo, quo eas 
administrat, ut uoluerit, quas, ut uoluit, condidit. Cf. Augustinus, Enarrationes in Psalmos, 
hg.v. E. Deckers, I. Fraipont (Turnhout: Brepols, 1956), 145, 13: ad prouidentiam uniuer-
sitatis, qua creauit omnia et mundum regit: homines et iumenta saluos facies, domine. 
Augustinus, De opere monachorum, hg.v. J. Zycha (Wien: Tempsky, 1900), 26,34, S.583: cum 
eius sapientissima prouidentia usque ad ista creanda et gubernanda perueniat. Augustinus, 
De civitate Dei, hg.v. B. Dombart, A. Kalb, G. Bardy, G. Combès (Paris: Institut d’études 
augustiniennes, 2014), I, 36: et quod Deus uerus mundum condiderit et de prouidentia eius, 
qua uniuersum quod condidit regit.
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wichtige Kapitel mit diesem Titel in Schriften wie z.B. in Epiktet i 6, Nemesius 
De natura hominis c.42, das Carmen Peri pronoias von Gregor von Nazianz oder 
Kap. 17 in De deis et mundo von Sallust oder schließlich das entsprechende 
Kapitel in der Expositio fidei des Johannes Damascenus. Dem entsprechen 
ebensoviele Titel auf der lateinischen Seite von Philo von Alexandrien, Seneca, 
Augustins q. 27 von De div. quaest., sein Sermo De providentia Dei u.a.m.
Die Lehre von der doppelten göttlichen Providenz, d.h der Schöpfungs- und 
der Vergeltungsprovidenz, hat im Rahmen dieses allgemeinen Interesses an 
der Providenzthematik einen besonderen Stellenwert. Ihre eigentliche Heimat 
ist der Neuplatonismus. Doch von welchem Autor könnte sie stammen? Bei 
Plotin z.B., von dem wir ja zwei Providenzschriften haben, finden wir sie nicht, 
wohl aber bei fast allen späteren Neuplatonikern. W. Theiler hat in einem groß-
artigen Aufsatz erstmals das Bewußtsein der modernen Forschung für dieses 
Thema geweckt44. Mit der Aufdeckung dieses spezifisch neuplatonischen 
Grundsatzes hat Theiler jedoch eine These verbunden, die gewagt zu sein 
scheint. Die These besagt, daß aus der auffälligen Übereinstimmung zwischen 
dem Christen Origenes und dem Neuplatoniker Hierokles das „System des 
Ammonios Sakkas“ ablesbar sei. Die These ist gewagt, weil sie in der Hauptsache 
nicht greift – wie Theiler auch selbst weiß (p. 30). Denn nach Origenes ist die 
geschaffene geistige Welt ontologisch differenz- und grenzenlos – erst der 
geschaffene Wille macht die Wesensgrenzen –, nach Hierokles aber gibt es 
„demiurgische“, d.h. von Gott gesetzte ontologische Grenzen45. Doch auch 
wenn man so gegenüber diesem Versuch der Konstruktion des ammoni-
schen Systems skeptisch sein muß, bleibt das unvergeßliche Verdienst dieses 
Aufsatzes, in der Forschung wegweisend auf die Bedeutung der neuplatoni-
schen Lehre von der Schöpfungs- und Vergeltungsprovidenz hingewiesen 
zu haben.
Wir können diese Lehre erstmals deutlich bei Porphyrios finden. Der 
Christengegner ist in manchem der christlichen Lehre verblüffend nah. Das 
gilt nicht nur etwa für die Lehre von der Schöpfung, sondern auch für die 
hier ins Auge gefaßte Providenzlehre. In seiner christentumsnahen Schrift Ad 
Marcellam ist der Providenzglaube von entscheidender Bedeutung. Die einen, 
so sagt Porphyrios, haben sich „durch Erkenntnis und festen Glauben“ die 
Überzeugung erworben, daß Gott ist und alles verwaltet, d.h. daß er die Welt 
erschaffen hat und alles providentiell regelt, indem mit Hilfe göttlicher Engel 
44  W. Theiler, „Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes“, in Id., Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1966), S.1–45. Zur Schöpfungs- und Vergeltungsprovidenz: S.9. 13. 15f. 
42. 44.
45  S. Th. Kobusch, „Origenes und Pico. Picos Oratio im Licht der spätantiken Philosophie“, in 
A. Fürst, Chr. Hengstermann (Hgg.), Origenes Humanista. Pico della Mirandolas Traktat 
De salute Origenis disputatio (Münster: Aschendorff, 2015), S.141–159.
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bzw. guter Dämonen, denen nichts entgeht, die Handlungen der Menschen 
beobachtet werden. Auf diese Weise lernen solche Gottgläubigen einerseits 
durch ihr sittliches Leben die Götter kennen, andererseits werden sie auch 
durch die erkannten Götter erkannt46. Die anderen dagegen – sagt Porphyrios –, 
die weder an Gottes Existenz glauben noch an die providentielle Verwaltung 
des Universums durch Gott, haben die „Strafe des Rechts“ erhalten, indem 
sie weder sich selbst noch anderen darin vertrauten, daß Götter existieren 
und daß das Universum nicht durch irrationalen Zufall verwaltet wird. Diese 
Ungläubigen haben sich selbst in die größte Gefahr begeben und sich ihrer-
seits einem irrationalen Impuls ergeben und alles getan, was nicht recht ist, 
indem sie versuchten, den Glauben an die Götter zu zerstören. Im Gegensatz 
zu den ersteren haben sie ein schlechtes Leben gewählt, wissen nichts von 
den Göttern, werden aber von den Göttern und dem göttlichen Recht erkannt. 
Selbst wenn sie glauben sollten, die Götter zu verehren und von der Existenz 
der Götter überzeugt zu sein, dabei aber das Moralische vernachlässigen, dann 
handelt es sich in Wirklichkeit um eine Leugnung der Götter47. Denn weder 
ein irrationaler Glaube noch eine blinde Verehrung würden ohne ein sittli-
ches Leben eine Annäherung an Gott sein. Mit dem „irrationalen Glauben“ 
zielt Porphyrios kritisch auf eine fideistische Gruppe der frühen Christen48. 
Da die Ausgangspunkte für alle so unterschiedlich sind, ist es am gerechtesten 
anzunehmen, daß für Gott die Reinheit der Gesinnung zählt, da diese jeder 
aufgrund seines freien Willens erreichen kann49.
Auch sonst spielt die Doppelung von Gottes Existenz und Providenz, 
die später als natürliche und willensmäßige Providenz üblich wird, bei 
Porphyrios eine wichtige Rolle. Ihre Leugnung nennt er die „erste“ und „zweite 
Gottlosigkeit“50. Bei Jamblich stehen die Schöpfung und Providenz der Götter 
46  Porphyrios, Ad Marcellam, 21/22: εὐγνώμονα δὲ βίον κτησάμενοι μανθάνουσι θεοὺς γινώσκο-
νταί τε γινωσκομένοις θεοῖς.
47  Porphyrios, Ad Marcellam, hg.v. A. Nauck und übers. von W. Pötscher (Leiden: Brill, 1969), 
23: βίον δὲ κακοδαίμονα καὶ πλανήτην ἑλόμενοι ἀγνοοῦντες θεοὺς γινώσκονται θεοῖς καὶ τῇ δίκῃ 
τῇ παρὰ θεῶν. κἂν θεοὺς τιμᾶν οἴωνται καὶ πεπεῖσθαι εἶναι θεούς, ἀρετῆς δὲ ἀμελῶσι καὶ σοφίας, 
ἤρνηνται θεοὺς καὶ ἀτιμάζουσιν. οὔτε γὰρ ἄλογοπίστις δίχα τοῦ ὀρθῶς ζῆν ἐπιτυχὴς θεοῦ, οὔτε 
μὴν τὸ τιμᾶν θεοσεβὲς ἄνευ τοῦ μεμαθηκέναι ὅτῳ τρόπῳ χαίρει τὸ θεῖον τιμώμενον.
48  Cf. Th. Kobusch, Christliche Philosophie. Die Entdeckung der Subjektivität (Darmstadt: 
Wissenschaft Buchgesellschaft 2006), S.98.
49  Porphyrios, Ad Marcellam 23: εἰ δὲ τούτων οὐδὲν ἧττον, μόνῳ δὲ ἥδεται τῷ καθαρεύειν τὴν 
διάνοιαν, ὃ δὴ δυνατὸν ἐκ προαιρέσεως παντί τῳ προσεῖναι, πῶς οὐκ ἂν εἴη δίκαιον.
50  Porphyrios, In Platonis Timaeum Commentariorum Fragmenta, hg.v. A.R. Sodano (Neapel: 
Istituto della Stampa, 1964), ii fr.28: ὡς οὔτε οἱ τὴν πρώτην ἀθεότητα νοσήσαντες (…), οἵ γε 
μηδὲ εἶναι λέγοντες θεούς, οὔτε οἱ τὴν δευτέραν, ὅσοι τὴν πρόνοιαν ἄρδην ἀνατρέπουσι θεοὺς 
εἶναι διδόντες, οὔθ’ οἱ καὶ εἶναι καὶ προνοεῖν αὐτοὺς συγχωροῦντες, ἅπαντα δὲ ἀπ‘ αὐτῶν ἐξ ἀνά-
γκης γίνεσθαι·
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ganz nah beieinander51. Die Atheisten verraten eine einfache Denkweise: 
Weil sie die Art und Weise der Schöpfung und providentiellen Sorge Gottes 
nicht durchschauen, leugnen sie beides strikt ab52. Die Providenz wird dabei 
als Vergeltungsprovidenz verstanden. In diesem Sinne ist auch das Schlechte 
providenzgemäß53.
2.2 Die späteren Neuplatoniker
Die Lehre von der doppelten Providenz wird im Neuplatonismus auf vielfa-
che Art und Weise zum Ausdruck gebracht. Proklos hat das Verhältnis der 
Schöpfungsprovidenz und der Vergeltungsprovidenz, (d.h. in bezug auf das 
Letztere: was bei Berthold von Moosburg „Fatum“ genannt wird), in klassischer 
Weise bestimmt: Die Heimarmene und damit das Recht hängt von der gött-
lichen Schöpfungsprovidenz ab und folgt den Bestimmungen des Schöpfers, 
indem es das göttliche Gesetz durchsetzt54. Götter, Dämonen und Seelen 
helfen bei diesem Werk der Gerechtigkeit55. Wie Philoponos und Johannes 
Damascenus übereinstimmend überliefern, ist es das Verdienst der prokli-
schen Providenzschrift, gezeigt zu haben, daß die schöpferische und providen-
tielle Macht Gottes bis zu den äußersten und feinsten Enden der Schöpfung 
reicht56.
Proklos hat diese Zweiheit auch als zwei kosmische Umdrehungen beschrie-
ben, die an die oben erwähnte augustinische Zweiteilung der Providenz erin-
nert: Die eine ist rein intellektuell und hat eine für die Seelen anagogische 
51  Jamblich, De mysteriis, iii 16: Ἥκει δὴ οὖν εἰς ταὐτὸ τῷ τῆς δημιουργίας καὶ προνοίας τῶν θεῶν 
λόγῳ καὶ ὁ περὶ τῆς μαντικῆς ἀπολογισμός.
52  Jamblich, De mysteriis, iii 19: μὴ δυνάμενοι γὰρ μαθεῖν ὅστις ὁ τρόπος αὐτῶν, τάς τε ἀνθρώπων 
φροντίδας καὶ τοὺς λογισμοὺς ἐπὶ τῶν θεῶν ἀποκρίνοντες, καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἀναιροῦσιν ἐπ’ αὐτῶν τὴν 
πρόνοιάν τε καὶ δημιουργίαν.
53  Jamblich, Theologumena arithmeticae, hg.v. V. de Falco (Leipzig: Teubner, 1922), S.45: τὰ 
κακὰ ἄρα τοῖς ἀνθρώποις κατὰ πρόνοιαν γίνεται.
54  Proclus, In Platonis Rempublicam Commentaria, hg.v. W. Kroll (Leipzig: Teubner, 1901, repr. 
Amsterdam: Hakkert, 1965), i S.98: καὶ γὰρ ἡ τῆς εἱμαρμένης ποίησις τῆς δημιουργικῆς ἐξέ-
χεται προνοίας, καὶ ἡ τῆς δίκης σειρὰ περὶ ἐκείνην ὑφέστηκεν καὶ ἕπεται τοῖς ἐκείνου ὅροις, τοῦ 
θείου νόμου τιμωρὸς οὖσα, φησὶν ὁ Ἀθηναῖος ξένος. Cf. auch Olympiodor, In Platonis Gorgiam, 
hg.v. L.G. Westerink (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970), 39,1, S.198: καὶ γὰρ ἡ εἱμαρμένη ἐκ τῆς προνοίας 
ἤρτηται.
55  Proclus, In Platonis Rempublicam Commentaria, ii S.135.
56  Johannes Philoponos, De aeternitate mundi contra Proclum, hg.v. H. Rabe (Leipzig: Teubner, 
1899, repr. 1963), S.91: καὶ ἐν τῷ δευτέρῳ δὲ λόγῳ αὐτοῦ τοῦ Πρόκλου χρήσεις παρεθέμεθα ἐκ 
τοῦ λόγου τοῦ περὶ τῶν δέκα πρὸς τὴν πρόνοιαν ἀπορημάτων, ἐν αἷς σαφῶς τὴν δημιουργικήν τε 
καὶ προνοητικὴν. τοῦ θεοῦ δύναμιν μέχρι καὶ τῶν ἐσχάτων καὶ λεπτοτάτων διήκειν ὁ Πρόκλος 
ἀποφαίνεται. Cf. Johannes Damascenus, Expositio fidei, ed P.B. Kotter (Berlin / New York: 
De Gruyter, 1973), S.42.
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Funktion, die andere führt im Gegensatz dazu in die Welt der Natur hinein, 
die eine ist unsichtbar und durch die göttliche Providenz gelenkt, die andere 
ist sichtbar und stellt die Entfaltung der natürlichen Providenz in der Ordnung 
der Heimarmene dar57.
Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem Sichtbaren und dem Unsichtbaren gilt 
auch im Hinblick auf den Menschen selbst: Die physischen Eigenschaften 
wie Schönheit oder Größe der Gestalt sind Geschenke der Heimarmene oder 
der Natur, die das Seelenheil und eine höhere Lebensart bewirkenden Kräfte 
dagegen sind die Keimkräfte der göttlichen Providenz58. So ergibt sich ganz 
allgemein: Die Heimarmene ist die für die Welt des sinnlich Wahrnehmbaren 
zuständige Providenz, die von der unsichtbaren der Götter abhängig ist59. 
Die Heimarmene ist dabei auch der Inbegriff für die in der göttlichen 
Schöpfungsprovidenz präexistierenden notwendigen Gesetze der Natur und 
des Sittlichen, die als Naturgesetze und Sittengesetze den einzelnen Seelen 
apriori eingepflanzt werden60.
Wiederum anders und sehr aufschlußreich auch im Hinblick auf die 
Lehre vom Einen ist die Bemerkung Proklos‘, daß die eine Providenz des 
Göttlichen ganz transzendent gegenüber dem von ihr Umsorgten ist, wäh-
rend die andere den Charakter des „Koordinierten“ hat61. Diese Lehre hat 
ihre Entsprechung, oder sollten wir sagen: ihren Grund in der Ontologie: Im 
Parmenideskommentar hat Proklos in Auseinandersetzung mit der Theorie 
des historischen Parmenides das absolute Eine als das „Transzendente“ 
(exhairemenon), d.h als das Zusammenhanglose definiert, dem das „Hen on“ 
57  Proclus, Théologie platonicienne, hg.v. H.D. Saffrey, L.G. Westerink (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 
1987), v, S.92: Διττὰς τοίνυν ὁ Ἐλεάτης ξένος τῷ παντὶ τούτῳ κόσμῳ διδοὺς ἀνακυκλήσεις, ὡς 
καὶ πρότερον ἐλέγομεν, τὴν μὲν νοερὰν καὶ τῶν ψυχῶν ἀναγωγόν, τὴν δὲ εἰς φύσιν πορευομένην 
καὶ τἀναντία τῇ πρόσθεν ἀποδιδοῦσαν, καὶ τὴν μὲν ἀφανῆ καὶ προνοίᾳ θείᾳ κυβερνωμένην, τὴν 
δὲ ἐμφανῆ καὶ κατὰ τὴν τῆς εἱμαρμένης τάξιν ἀνελισσομένην.
58  Proclus, Sur le Premier Alcibiade, 134,1–14, i, S.111.
59  Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum, iii, S.274: ὁ Πλάτων […] μονονουχὶ διαρρήδην λέγων, ὅτι ταύτην 
εἱμαρμένην <ἐ>νόμιζε, τὴν προσεχῶς κινοῦσαν τὸ αἰσθητόν, ἐξηρτημένην τῆς ἀφανοῦs προνοίας 
τῶν θεῶν· Cf. Olympiodor, In Platonis Gorgiam, c.39,1.
60  Proclus, In Platonis Timaeum, iii S.274–275: εἰ οὖν κατὰ νόμους εἱμαρμένους ἄγουσι τὰς 
ψυχάς, εἰσὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ψυχαῖς οἱ εἱμαρμένοι νόμοι, προϋπάρχοντες μὲν ἐν τῷ δημιουργῷ νοερῶς 
(παρ’ αὐτῷ γὰρ ὁ θεῖος ἵδρυται νόμος), ὑπάρχοντες δὲ καὶ ἐν ταῖς θείαις ψυχαῖς (κατὰ γὰρ τού-
τους ποδηγετοῦσι τὸ πᾶν), μετεχόμενοι δὲ καὶ ὑπὸ τῶν μερικῶν ψυχῶν.
61  Proclus, Elementatio theologica, Prop. 141: Πᾶσα πρόνοια θείων ἡ μὲν ἐξῃρημένη τῶν προ-
νοουμένων ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ συντεταγμένη. Proclus, Théologie platonicienneos, hg.v. H.D. Saffrey, 
L.G. Westerink (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1997), vi, S.77: Διττὴν γὰρ κἀν τοῖς θεοῖς αὐτοῖς ὁρῶ-
μεν τὴν ἐνέργειαν, τὴν μὲν συντεταγμένην τοῖς προνοουμένοις, τὴν δὲ ἐξῃρημένην καὶ χωριστήν.
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als das „Koordinierte“, d.h. als das mit dem Vielen irgendwie Verbundene 
gegenübersteht62.
Nach Hermias, dem Zeitgenossen des Proklos, sind die Schöpfungsprovidenz 
und die Vergeltungsprovidenz zwei unterschiedliche Aspekte desselben: Die 
Schöpfungsprovidenz hat den Charakter des Existenzstiftenden (hyposta-
tike), die Vergeltungsprovidenz dagegen stiftet das „Heil“ (sostike). Mit dem 
Letzteren knüpft Hermias an Porphyrios‘ Vorstellung vom universalen Weg 
zum Heil der Seele an63.
Am deutlichsten hat Hierokles von Alexandrien die These von der doppel-
ten Providenz Gottes vertreten. In seiner Schrift Über die Providenz, von der 
wir Teile bei Photius überliefert haben, knüpft er an Platons Lehre von Gott 
als dem Schöpfer und Vater aller Dinge an. Seine Königsherrschaft besteht 
in seiner Providenz, die jeder Gattung das ihr Zukommende zuteilt. Das die-
ser Verfügung aber folgende Recht wird Heimarmene genannt. Sie ist die 
Providenz im Sinne der Vergeltung, die auf die freien und selbstmächtigen 
Handlungen der Menschen reagiert, d.h. sie korrigiert64. Die Vergeltung aber 
wird göttlicherseits in die Hände ätherischer Wesen, also der Engel gelegt, 
die von Gott als Richter eingesetzt werden und die Sorge um uns naturgemäß 
übernehmen65. Da, wie Hierokles bemerkenswerterweise sagt, die providen-
tielle Beurteilung, die mit Recht und Gesetz die menschlichen Dinge ordnet, 
unserer Freiheit bedarf, die Heimarmene aber die Antwort auf unsere freien 
Handlungen ist, muß die Heimarmene, d.h. das rechtsprechende Verhältnis 
zu den menschlichen Seelen als ein Teil der göttlichen Providenz angesehen 
werden66.
62  Proclus, In Platonis Parmenidem, 714,5 [711,21].
63  Hermias, In Platonis Phaedrum Scholia, hg.v. C.M. Lucarini, C. Moreschini (Berlin: De 
Gruyter, 2012), 2, S.146: Καὶ ἡ πρόνοια μὲν γὰρ αὐτοῦ δημιουργεῖ καὶ ἡ δημιουργία προνοεῖ· 
ἀλλὰ ταῖς ἐπιβολαῖς διενήνοχεν· ἡ μὲν γάρ ἐστιν ὑποστατικὴ τῶν πραγμάτων, ἡ δὲ σωστική. Cf. 
auch S.238: διττὴ οὖν ἡ πρόνοια· ἢ αὐτὴ ἡ ἰδικῶς ἡ τῶν θεῶν, ἢ ἡ διὰ τῶν κρειττόνων γενῶν καὶ 
δαιμόνων καὶ ἐντοπίων θεῶν. Cf. Augustinus, De civitate Dei, x 32.
64  Hierokles, Peri Pronoias (bei Photius, Bibliotheka, hg.v. R. Henry (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 
1959–1991), cod. 251, 461b): πάντων δὲ βασιλεύειν τὸν ποιητὴν αὐτῶν θεὸν καὶ πατέρα, καὶ 
ταύτην τὴν πατρονομικὴν βασιλείαν αὐτοῦ πρόνοιαν εἶναι τὴν ἑκάστῳ γένει τὰ προσήκοντα 
νομοθετοῦσαν, τὴν δὲ ταύτῃ ἑπομένην δίκην εἱμαρμένην καλεῖσθαι· […] οἴονταί τινες, ἀλλὰ τὴν 
τῶν ἐκβαινόντων κατὰ τὸν τῆς προνοίας θεσμὸν δικαστικὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐνέργειαν, τάξει καὶ εἱρμῷ 
πρὸς τὰς προαιρετικὰς ὑποθέσεις τῶν αὐτεξουσίων ἔργων ἐπανορθουμένην τὰ καθ’ ἡμᾶς.
65  Hierokles, Peri Pronoias (bei Photius, Bibliotheka, cod. 251, 462b): Ἀναγκαῖον δὴ τὸ 
λειπόμενον, τὰς μὲν προαιρέσεις ἐφ’ ἡμῖν εἶναι, τὰς δ’ ἐπὶ ταῖς προαιρέσεσι δικαίας ἀμοιβὰς ἐπὶ 
τοῖς αἰθερίοις κεῖσθαι ὡς ὑπὸ θεοῦ τεταγμένοις δικασταῖς καὶ πεφυκόσιν ἡμῶν ἐπιμελεῖσθαι.
66  Hierokles, Peri Pronoias (bei Photius, Bibliotheka, cod. 251, 462b): καὶ ἡ προνοητικὴ κρίσις, 
δίκῃ καὶ νόμῳ τὰ ἀνθρώπινα τάττουσα, τῆς αὐτεξουσίου ἡμῶν καὶ προαιρετικῆς ἀρχῆς δεῖται. 
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Was – wenn man so sagen kann – den Zuständigkeitsbereich der göttli-
chen Providenz angeht, so ergibt sich ein auffälliger Unterschied zur Lehre 
des Proklos, mit dem Hierokles sonst Vieles gemeinsam hat: „Die Tiere und 
Pflanzen sind der göttlichen Vorsehung entzogen“, hier herrscht der Zufall (hos 
tyche), sagt Hierokles67, während nach Proklos die Kompetenz der göttlichen 
Providenz bis zu den äußersten Enden des Universums und das bedeutet: bis 
zur Pflanzenwelt und toten Körperwelt reicht68.
Die göttliche Providenz im Sinne der providentia gubernatrix ist ihrem 
weitesten Begriff nach die Lenkung des Universums. Sie ist in diesem Sinne 
Gegenstand der Ersten Philosophie, d.h. der Metaphysik69. Es ist der „Theologe“, 
d.h. der Metaphysiker, der die Frage erörtert, ob alles aus Notwendigkeit 
geschieht oder auch aus Zufall, und wenn alles notwendigerweise geschieht, 
ob dann die Gründe für unsere Fehler in der Heimarmene, d.h. der provi-
dentia gubernatrix liegen oder, wenn doch Einiges in unserer Macht liegt im 
Sinne des eph‘ hemin, ob wir dann nicht als autonome Wesen Sorge zu tragen 
haben für unsere Ausbildung und Moralität70. Nur unter dieser Voraussetzung 
der Freiheit des Menschen kann die lenkende Providenz auch als Straf- oder 
Vergeltungsprovidenz gedacht werden, die die Taten der Menschen nach ihrer 
Ὥστε μέρος ἐστὶ της ὅλης προνοίας ἡ εἱμαρμένη τὸ πρὸς τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχὰς δικαστικῶς 
ἁρμοζόμενον.
67  W. Theiler, „Ammonios der Lehrer des Origenes“, 11f. Cf. Hierokles, In Aureum 
Pythagoreorum Carmen Commentarius, hg.v. F.W. Koehler (Stuttgart: Teubner, 1974), xi 28, 
S.51. Cf. Hierokles, Peri Pronoias (bei Photius, Bibliotheka, cod. 251, 466 a).
68  Proclus, De decem dubitationibus circa providentiam, hg.v. H. Boese (Berlin: De Gruyter, 
1960), 45: πάντως δήπου καὶ ὁ τῆς προνοίας λόγος ἔσται ἐν τούτοις ὅμοιος καὶ κοινὸς ὥσπερ καὶ 
ἐπὶ τῶν φυτῶν […]. cf. auch Anm. 42! Tatsächlich heißt es in Proclus, Théologie platonici-
enne, v 102: δύναμιν καὶ πρόνοιαν, ἄνωθεν ἄχρι τῶν ἐσχάτων τοῦ παντὸς διήκουσαν· Cf. Proclus, 
Sur le Premier Alcibiade, i 53,21, S.44.
69  Cf. Ammonios, In Aristotelis librum De interpretatione commentarius, hg.v. A. Busse 
(Berlin: Reimer, 1897), S.131: ζητήσει γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεολόγος κατὰ τίνα τρόπον ὑπὸ τῆς προνοίας 
διακυβερνᾶται τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πράγματα.
70  Ammonios, In Aristotelis De interpretatione, S.130–131: ζητήσει γὰρ καὶ ὁ θεολόγος κατὰ τίνα 
τρόπον ὑπὸ τῆς προνοίας διακυβερνᾶται τὰ ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ πράγματα, καὶ εἴτε πάντα ὡρισμέ-
νως καὶ ἐξ ἀνάγκης γίνεται τὰ γινόμενα, καθάπερ τὰ ἐπὶ τῶν ἀιδίων ὑπάρχοντα, ἢ ἔστι τινὰ καὶ 
ἐνδεχομένως ἐκβαίνοντα, ὧν τὴν γένεσιν ἐπὶ μερικὰς δηλονότι καὶ ἄλλοτε ἄλλως ἐχούσας αἰτίας 
ἀνάγειν ἀνάγκη. καὶ οὐδὲ τοὺς πάνυ ἰδιωτικῶς διακειμένους τῶν ἀνθρώπων εὑρήσεις ἀμελοῦ-
ντας τῆς περὶ τούτου τοῦ θεωρήματος ἐννοίας, ἀλλὰ τοὺς μὲν ὡς πάντων ἐξ ἀνάγκης γινομένων 
τὰς αἰτίας ὧν ἁμαρτάνουσιν ἐπὶ τὴν εἱμαρμένην ἢ τὴν πρόνοιαν τήν τε θείαν καὶ τὴν δαιμονίαν 
ἀναφέρειν πειρωμένους, καθάπερ ὁ ἀπαιδεύτως παρ’ Ὁμήρῳ λέγων ἐγὼ δ’οὐκ αἴτιός εἰμι, ἀλλὰ 
Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐριννύς, ἀλλὰ Ζεὺς καὶ Μοῖρα καὶ ἠεροφοῖτις Ἐριννύς, τοὺς δὲ 
ὡς ὄντων τινῶν καὶ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν ἀπομαχομένους μὲν τοῖς πάντα ἀναγκάζουσιν ἀξιοῦντας δὲ ἡμᾶς ὡς 
αὐτοκινήτους παιδείας τε καὶ ἀρετῆς ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι.
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Würdigkeit vergilt71. Von dieser Vergeltungsprovidenz scheint der gesamte spä-
tere Neuplatonismus zu sprechen72.
Nach Philoponos kümmert sich die göttliche Providenz nicht nur um unser 
Sein, d.h. um unsere Existenz im Sinne der providentia conditrix oder natura-
lis, sondern auch um unser Gutsein im Sinne der providentia voluntaria, die 
auch die ins Widernatürliche abgeglittene Seele nicht vernachlässigt, son-
dern ihrer Sorge teilhaftig werden läßt, indem sie ihr die Gelegenheit zur 
Selbstreinigung gibt73.
Die Schöpfungsprovidenz (demiurgike pronoia) definiert Simplikios in 
diesem Zusammenhang als die mit der göttlichen Güte koexistierende schöp-
ferische Tätigkeit, durch die der Demiurg dem Universum die Ordnung ver-
schafft hat74.
Wie Simplikios berichtet, ist der Gedanke einer lenkenden Providenz auf die 
alten Mythenerzähler zurückzuführen, nach denen das Meer ein Symbol der 
Entstehung der Seelen war. Das Schiff, das die Seelen zur Entstehung brachte, 
steht dabei für das zugeteilte Los (Moira) oder das unentrinnbare Schicksal 
(Heimarmene) oder wie man es sonst nennen soll. Der Lenker des Schiffes 
aber ist Gott, der das All lenkt und durch seine Providenz die Entstehung der 
Seelen und die entsprechende Vergeltung regelt75.
71  Cf. Ammonios, In Aristotelis Categorias commentarius, hg.v. A. Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 
1895), S.78: ἴσμεν ὅτι ἔστι πρόνοια ἀπονέμουσα ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ἀμοιβὴν τῶν πράξεων.
72  Cf. Ammonios, In Aristotelis Categorias, S.78: ἐπειδὴ δὲ κατὰ τὸ ἀληθὲς ἅπαντες ἴσμεν ὅτι 
ἔστι πρόνοια ἀπονέμουσα ἑκάστῃ ψυχῇ ἀμοιβὴν τῶν πράξεων […]. Cf. Johannes Philoponos, 
In Aristotelis Categorias commentarius, hg.v. A. Busse (Berlin: Reimer, 1898), S.127: καὶ 
εἰ οὐδεὶς τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἀπολήψεται, οὐκ ἔσται πρόνοια. Johannes Philoponos, In Aristotelis 
Analytica priora commentaria, hg.v. M. Wallies (Berlin: Reimer, 1905), S.38: εἰ δὲ οὐ τυγχάνει 
τοῦ κατ’ ἀξίαν, ἀνῄρηται πρόνοια. Cf. Hierokles, Peri Pronoias (bei Photius, Bibliotheka, cod. 
251, 465b): ἣν ἡ εἰμαρμένη ἐπιτελεῖν λέγεται, κρίσις θεία οὖσα ἐν τοῖς οὐκ ἐφ’ ἡμῖν, πρὸς τὴν 
ἀξίαν ἀμοιβὴν τῶν ἐφ’ ἡμῖν. Olympiodor, In Platonis Phaedonem Commentaria 2,7: ἑτέρου δὲ 
τοῦ εἶναι πρόνοιαν τὰ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἀπονέμουσαν ἑκάστῳ, Cf. später auch z.B. Albert der Große, 
In IV Sententiarum, hg.v. A. Borgnet (Paris: Vivès, 1894), d. 43, a.1, S.498: Primum est de 
justitia et providentia, quae ordinat quamlibet naturam secundum gradum suae dignitatis.
73  Johannes Philoponos, In Aristotelis libros de anima, S.17: οὐ γὰρ μόνον τοῦ εἶναι ἡμῶν φροντί-
ζει ἡ πρόνοια, ἀλλὰ καὶ τοῦ εὖ εἶναι. διὸ οὐκ ἀμελεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ εἰς τὸ παρὰ φύσιν ἐξολισθήσασα, 
ἀλλὰ τυγχάνει τῆς προσηκούσης ἐπιμελείας, καὶ ἐπειδὴ τὸ ἁμαρτάνειν αὐτῇ διὰ γλυκυθυμίαν 
ἐγένετο, ἐξ ἀνάγκης καὶ τὸ καθαρθῆναι δι’ἀλγύνσεως αὐτῇ γενήσεται·
74  Simplikios, In Aristotelis Physicorum libros commentaria, hg.v. H. Diels (Berlin: Reimer, 
1882), S.704: εἰ γὰρ διὰ τὴν ἀγαθότητα δημιουργεῖ, ἡ δὲ ἀγαθότης αὐτοῦ ἀεὶ τελεία καὶ ἐνεργός 
ἐστι καὶ τῷ εἶναι πάντα ἀγαθύνει, δῆλον ὅτι τῇ τοῦ θεοῦ ἀγαθότητι συνυφέστηκεν ἡ δημιουργικὴ 
πρόνοια. ἐνδείκνυται δὲ τὸ λεγόμενον, ὅτι κόσμου καὶ τάξεως ὁ δημιουργὸς αἴτιός ἐστι τῷ παντί.
75  Simplikios, Commentarius in Epicteti enchiridion, hg.v. I. Hadot (Leiden / New York: 
Brill, 1996), S.13: Τὴν μὲν γὰρ θάλασσαν διὰ τὸ ἐμβριθὲς καὶ κλυδαινόμενον καὶ παντοίως 
μεταβαλλόμενον καὶ πνίγον τοὺς καταδύνοντας εἰς αὐτήν, ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως ἀνα{λογίας} καὶ οἱ 
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Wie Johannes von Damaskus später sicher ganz in neuplatonischem Sinne 
sagt, ist die Providenz im allgemeinen Sinne nichts Anderes als die Sorge 
Gottes um das Seiende76. Doch gerade bei diesem Begriff der Sorge kann der 
Unterschied zwischen der christlichen und nichtchristlichen Konzeption der 
göttlichen Providenz deutlich werden. Bei Simplikios nämlich treffen beide 
Konzeptionen aufeinander.
Auch wenn die Providenz als Sorge Gottes um den Menschen bezeichnet 
wird, darf man sie nach dem letzten Vertreter der platonischen Akademie 
nicht so vorstellen, als wendete sich Gott den Menschen zu, wie er sich auch 
nicht abwendet. Das geht aus einer Auseinandersetzung des Simplikios mit 
der christlichen Verzeihenslehre hervor, die an anderer Stelle entfaltet ist77. 
Für den Providenzbegriff ergibt sich aus dieser Auseinandersetzung, daß 
die göttliche Sorge-Providenz nicht eine Annäherung an die menschlichen 
Dinge beinhaltet. Wenn der Mensch sittliche Verfehlungen begeht, „ziehen 
wir uns selbst von dort weg“, ohne doch der alles durchdringenden göttlichen 
Providenz entrinnen zu können. Vielmehr verschaffen wir uns, wenn wir an 
der Krankheit der Schlechtigkeit leiden, am ehesten Zugang zur Heilung, die 
im Recht besteht, wenn wir uns der göttlichen Providenz und Sorge würdig 
machen, und genau das meint Platons berühmte Rede von der Homoiosis 
Theo. Wer dagegen diese unsere Hinwendung zu Gott als seine Hinwendung 
zu uns versteht – wie die Christen es tun – dem ergeht es so wie gewissen 
Schiffbrüchigen, die ein Seil um einen Felsen werfen, um sich und das Boot 
dem Felsen zu nähern und dabei der irrigen Meinung verfallen, daß nicht sie 
sich dem Felsen näherten, sondern der Felsen zu ihnen käme. In diesem Bild 
entsprechen die Reue, das Gebet und das Bittflehen dem Seil, denn durch 
sie vollzieht sich die „Hinwendung“78. Hinwendung im Sinne der epistrophé 
παλαιοὶ μυθοπλάσται τῆς γενέσεωςἔλεγον σύμβολον. Τὸ δὲ πλοῖον εἴη ἂν τὸ διακομίζον εἰς τὴν 
γένεσιν τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ εἴτε μοῖραν, εἴτε εἱμαρμένην, εἴτε ἄλλο τι τοιοῦτον αὐτὸ καλεῖν χρή. Ὁ δὲ 
κυβερνήτης τοῦ πλοίου εἴη ἂν ὁ θεός, ὁ καὶ τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὴν εἰς γένεσιν κάθοδον τῶν ψυχῶν ταῖς 
ἑαυτοῦ προνοίαις πρὸς τὸ δέον καὶ τὸ κατ’ ἀξίαν ἀπευθύνων τε καὶ κυβερνῶν.
76  Johannes Damascenus, Expositio fidei, S.43: Πρόνοια τοίνυν ἐστὶν ἐκ θεοῦ εἰς τὰ ὄντα 
γινομένη ἐπιμέλεια.
77  Cf. Th. Kobusch, Selbstwerdung und Personalität. Spätantike Philosophie und ihr Einfluß 
auf die Moderne (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2018), Kap. xvii.
78  Simplikios, Commentarius in Epicteti enchiridion, 360,683–392,703. Das schöne Bild ist 
aufgenommen worden von Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi, Von den göttlichen Dingen, hg.v. 
W. Jaeschke (Hamburg: Meiner, 2000), 41,28–42,02: „So macht Simplicius, in seiner 
Auslegung des Epictet, wider gewisse Leute, die sich über die Zukehrung des Menschen 
zu Gott so ausdrückten, als wenn Gott, vom Menschen abgewendet, sich erst zu ihm wen-
den müßte, die Anmerkung: ‚es ginge ihnen hiebey wie denen, die ein Schiffseil um einen 
Felsen am Ufer würfen, und da sie sich und ihr Boot an demselben Ufer hinan zögen, 
354 Kobusch
ist so – nach Simplikios – die Sache allein des Menschen bzw. des „Geistes“. 
Die göttliche Straf- oder Vergeltungsprovidenz ist nach dem nichtchristlichen 
Neuplatonismus keine Hinwendung zu den Menschen. Vielmehr ist für den 
paganen Philosophen der Gedanke einer Hinwendung Gottes zum Niedrigen 
skandalös. Die göttliche Hinwendung zum Menschen ist für den christli-
chen Philosophen ein Zeichen der Vollkommenheit Gottes, für den paganen 
Neuplatoniker ein Zeichen der Unvollkommenheit. Vor fast sechzig Jahren 
schrieb schon P. Aubin in diesem Sinne: „On sent très bien que la pensée phi-
losophique de cette époque répugne à répudier systématiquement toute ‚con-
version‘ ad inferiora (…) mais nous n’avons pas trouvé d’auteur paien qui ose 
parler explicitement d’E- [i.e. ἐπιστροφή] de Dieu vers l’homme. (…) Tout E- 
[i.e. ἐπιστροφή] vers l’inférieur marque finalement une imperfection“79.
3 Konklusion
Die Lehre von der doppelten göttlichen Providenz, der providentia natura-
lis und der providentia voluntaria, die bei Berthold von Moosburg unter der 
Voraussetzung der Differenz von Philosophie und Theologie entwickelt wird, 
ist auf Dietrich von Freiberg zurückführbar. Die Unterscheidung zwischen dem 
Natürlichen und dem Willensmäßigen, die in den lateinischen Ausdrücken mit 
enthalten ist, stammt von Augustinus. Was bei diesen christlichen Denkern als 
Gründungsprovidenz und Erhaltungs- oder Rettungsprovidenz erscheint, das 
war im Neuplatonismus als demiurgische Providenz und Vergeltungsprovidenz 
(Dike, Heimarmene) vorgebildet worden.
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chapter 11
Regna duo duorum. Berthold of Moosburg’s Theory 
of Providence and Fate
Alessandro Palazzo
Università di Trento
Berthold’s reflections on providence were part of a lively debate which took 
place in Germany between the mid-13th century and the third quarter of 
the 14th century, involving the chief German theologians of the Dominican 
Order: Albert the Great, Ulrich of Strassburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, and Meister 
Eckhart.
The centrality of natural providence in the philosophy of Berthold of 
Moosburg is unquestionable. In a well-known and oft-cited locus of the 
Expositio tituli, Berthold states that the subject of the Elementatio theologica is 
the universe (universitas) of divine things considered in their procession from, 
and their return to, the Highest Good within the order of natural providence. 
The ratio subiecti of this theological science is the Divine Good, which belongs 
in a simple, causal, and primary way to the First Principle of all things, whereas 
it resides relatively (in attributione ad ipsum) in divine things per essentiam 
and per participationem. Therefore, it can be affirmed that the subject of the 
Elementatio theologica is the Divine Good according to natural providence.1 
1 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam. Prologus. Propo- 
sitiones 1–13, eds. M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), Expositio tituli 
i, p. 46, l. 319–p. 47, l. 342: Et quia totus iste liber tractat de rerum divinarum universitate secun-
dum processum eius a summo bono et regressum in ipsum, et hoc secundum dispositionem et 
proprios modos earum inditos ipsis rebus divinis ab eo, quod est divinum principaliformiter sive 
secundum causam, et hoc secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis, non iam proprie volun-
tariae, iuxta distinctionem Augustini VIII Super Genesim ad litteram, necesse est omnia con-
venire, de quibus hic tractatur, in una ratione subiecti, propter quam etiam ista philosophia est 
una scientia. Quod subiectum vocetur, sicut et vere est, bonum divinum, quod simpliciter et abso-
lute causaliter seu principaliformiter convenit omnium primo principio, reliquis autem bonis, 
puta divinis per essentiam et per participationem, in attributione ad ipsum, et hoc quantum 
ad modos attributionis, quos distinguit Averroes super principium IV Metaphysicae, scilicet ut 
ad efficiens primum et finem ultimum nec non ut accidentia ad subiectum. […] Ex praedictis 
apparet, quod bonum divinum secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis est subiectum huius 
libri, quod exprimitur per li: ELEMENTATIO THEOLOGICA. See also Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio, Exp. tit. i, p. 45, l. 280–281: Materialis quidem subiectiva, quia in ipso tractatur per 
elementorum coordinationem de bono divino secundum ordinem providentiae naturalis. The 
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Elsewhere, Berthold maintains more straightforwardly that the act of natural 
providence is the subject of this book.2 By contrast, voluntary providence is 
said to be the subject of dogmatic theology3 and is usually exemplified by the 
Dionysian hierarchy, the angels, and their hierarchical mutual operations.4
Unsurprisingly, therefore, when it comes to providence, modern scholars 
have mainly devoted their attention to the concept of twofold providence 
(gemina providentia), first theorized by Augustine in Book VIII of De Genesi ad 
litteram,5 and originally reformulated by Ulrich of Strassburg (De summo bono 
source of the longer quotation is a locus of Dietrich’s De subiecto theologiae, the only differ-
ence being the fact that, unlike Berthold, Dietrich is concerned with defining the subject of 
theology, not philosophy: see De subiecto theologiae, ed. L. Sturlese, in Opera omnia, vol. 3. 
Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik, eds J.-D. Cavigioli et al. (Hamburg: Meiner, 
1983), 3.9, p. 281, l. 100–p. 282, l. 109. On the locus of the De subiecto theologiae and Dietrich’s 
notion of twofold providence, see L. Sturlese, “Introduzione” to Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 184–211. De animabus, ed. L. Sturlese 
(Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1974), p. xv–xcii, at p. xxvi–xxxiv; L. Sturlese, “Il De 
animatione caeli di Teodorico di Freiberg”, in R. Creytens, P. Künzle (eds), Xenia Medii Aevi his-
toriam illustrantia oblata Thomae Kaeppeli O. P., 2 vols (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 
1978), vol. 1, p. 175–247, at p. 183–201; A. de Libera, Introduzione alla mistica renana (Milano: 
Jaca Book, 1998), ch. 7, p. 244–246; L. Sturlese, Storia delle filosofia tedesca nel Medioevo. Il 
secolo XIII (Firenze: Olschki, 1996), p. 204–213.
2 See below, n. 31.
3 Berthold, Expositio, Praeambulum, p. 53, l. 19–20: theologia, quae est de bono divino secun-
dum ordinem providentiae voluntariae, fundatur in principiis creditis, quae sunt articuli fidei 
Christianae.
4 Interestingly, Berthold inverts the usual scheme when he first refers to twofold providence, 
for he quotes a passage from Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus to illustrate the invisibilia Dei 
transitive accepta according to natural providence – these are the primordial causes and their 
effects, which are both the subject of the Elementatio theologiae – whereas he cites a text 
from Proclus’ De malorum subsistentia to clarify the invisibilia Dei belonging to voluntary 
providence: see Expositio, Prologus 5–6, p. 13, l. 251–278. The latter text is also used to illustrate 
voluntary providence elsewhere: see Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem 
theologicam. Propositiones 136–159, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 161C, p. 12, 
l. 46–53.
5 Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram libri duodecim, ed. J. Zycha (Praha / Wien / Leipzig: Tempsky, 
1894), viii.9, p. 243, l. 25–p. 244, l. 18: hinc iam in ipsum mundum uelut in quandam mag-
nam arborem rerum oculus cogitationis adtollitur atque in ipso quoque gemina operatio proui-
dentiae reperitur, partim naturalis, partim uoluntaria. Et naturalis quidem per occultam dei 
administrationem, qua etiam lignis et herbis dat incrementum, uoluntaria uero per angelorum 
opera et hominum; secundum illam primam caelestia superius ordinari inferius que terrestria, 
luminaria sidera que fulgere, diei noctis que uices agitari, aquis terram fundatam interlui atque 
circumlui, aerem altius superfundi, arbusta et animalia concipi et nasci, crescere, senescere, 
occidere et quidquid aliud in rebus interiore naturali que motu geritur; in hac autem altera 
signa dari, doceri et disci, agros coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri et quaeque alia siue 
in superna societate aguntur siue in hac terrena atque mortali, ita ut bonis consulatur et per 
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ii.5.18) and Dietrich of Freiberg (in several works). It has therefore been argued 
that Berthold aligned himself with his Dominican predecessors who made 
recourse to twofold providence as an epistemological tool aimed at separating 
the fields of philosophy and theology.6 This line of interpretation is defective, 
however, because it ends up neglecting other important aspects of Berthold’s 
theory of providence.
Furthermore, by exclusively focusing its attention on twofold providence, 
modern scholarship is inclined to read Berthold’s conceptions through the 
filter of the views of his predecessors, who attached fundamental impor-
tance to Augustine’s distinction between natural and voluntary providence. 
Even though it cannot be denied that Berthold was indebted to both Ulrich 
and Dietrich,7 it must nevertheless be pointed out that his analysis advances 
nescientes malos; in que ipso homine eandem geminam prouidentiae uigere potentiam: primo 
erga corpus naturalem, scilicet eo motu, quo fit, quo crescit, quo senescit; uoluntariam uero, quo 
illa ad uictum, tegumentum curationem que consulitur.
6 Sturlese, “Il De animatione caeli”, p. 193–196; K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, 
Expositio super Elementationem theologica. Prologus. Propositiones 1–13, p. xi–xxxvii, at 
p. xxxi–xxxii; G.L. Potestà, “Per laboriosam investigationem ascendendo. L’edizione di Bertoldo 
di Moosburg”, in Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica 76(1984), p. 637–643, at p. 642; R. Imbach, 
“Au-delà de la métaphysique. Notule sur l’importance du Commentaire de Berthold de 
Moosburg op sur les Éléments de théologie”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book 
of Causes. Volume 1. Western Scholarly Networks and Debates (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2019), 
p. 376–393, at p. 380–381; A. Beccarisi, “Einleitung”, in Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. 
Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6, ed. A. Beccarisi (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), p. vii–xx, at p. xix–xx. By 
contrast, W. Eckert, “Berthold von Moosburg O.P. Ein Vertreter der Einheitsmetaphysik im 
Spätmittelalter”, in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 65(1957), p. 120–133, at p. 133, argues that the 
distinction between the two providences is aimed at using theological principles to explain 
Proclean thought, since philosophy and theology – which are identified by the two provi-
dential orders – deal with the same subject, the Highest One considered from two different 
points of view. According to de Libera, Introduzione alla mistica renana, p. 246–247, n. 24, 
even though twofold providence serves to provide the distinction between philosophy and 
theology with a systematic foundation, Proclus is both a philosopher and a theologian and 
brings together the methods of both disciplines.
7 I draw attention to a hitherto overlooked passage from Albert’s Summa theologiae: Albert 
the Great, Summa theologiae. Pars prima, ed. A. Borgnet, Opera omnia, vol. 31 (Paris: Vivès, 
1894), Ia, tr. 17, q. 68, m. 3, p. 703b–704a: Sunt alia per duos ordines causarum a providentia 
descendentia, scilicet per ordinem causarum naturalium […]. Est iterum ordo causarum in his 
quae descendunt a providentia per liberum arbitrium. See also Albert the Great, Summa theo-
logiae, Ia, tr. 17, q. 68, m. 1, p. 695a. Even though a textual dependence seems improbable, it 
cannot be excluded that the text was known by and influenced Berthold. As is well known, 
the Summa theologiae was one of the most prominent sources in Berthold’s Exposition on the 
Elements of Theology. See L. Sturlese, “Rec. a Alberti Magni Summa theologiae sive de mira-
bili scientia Dei, Libri I pars 1, Quaestiones 1–50A, ed. D. Siedler, Münster i.W., Aschendorff, 
1978”, in Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore di Pisa 10(1980), p. 1691–1698, at p. 1693–1697. 
The complex ways in which the Summa theologiae was used by Berthold have been carefully 
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original concepts, deals with hitherto unexplored issues, and put forward inno-
vative solutions. In a word, Berthold faced the intellectual challenge posed by 
Proclus’ Opuscula, from which he derived key elements, such as the threefold 
One or Good (secundum causam, per essentiam, secundum participationem), 
the theory of the two regna (providence and fate), providential knowledge 
(cognitio providentionalis), etc. The Elements of Theology also offers a complex 
and articulate theory of providence, giving Berthold the opportunity to discuss 
crucial questions, such as how providence differently resides in the One-Good 
and in the rest of reality and how it transcends the things for which it provides. 
Even though he was familiar with Proclus’ masterpiece, Dietrich of Freiberg 
did not deal with these topics.
…
In what follows, I intend to explore some of the issues which Berthold dis-
cusses with regard to providence. In particular, I will devote my attention to 
the dialectical relationship between the domains of providence and fate. As 
we will see, the delineation of the two realms is made possible by the adop-
tion of two different approaches to providence, one top-down and the other 
bottom-up. It is within this specific doctrinal context that I will also refer to the 
concept of twofold providence.
My analysis will focus on Berthold’s commentary on a few particularly rel-
evant Propositions (141, 120, 122, and 34) in an attempt to reconstruct the main 
steps in Berthold’s reflections on providence. Attention will be given to several 
sources (Proclus’ Opuscula, Boethius’ De consolatione philosophiae, Ulrich’s De 
summo bono, Cicero’s De natura deorum) that Berthold quotes from, in addi-
tion to the Elements of Theology.
1 The Complexity of Providence: The Tabula contentorum
The starting point of my analysis is the Tabula contentorum at the end of the 
Expositio, a document usually neglected by Berthold scholars. The Tabula is 
a list of the main topics discussed by Berthold and includes references to the 
studied by M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, “À propos du néoplatonisme d’Albert le Grand. Aventures 
et mésaventures de quelques textes d’Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus de Berthold de 
Moosburg”, in Archives de Philosophie 43(1980), p. 635–654; E. King, “Eriugenism in Berthold 
of Moosburg’s Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli”, in D. Calma (ed.), Reading 
Proclus. Vol. 1, p. 395–437, at p. 401–410.
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numbers of the propositions where these topics are discussed. Whether com-
piled by Berthold himself or by someone else, at his request, this is a valu-
able hermeneutical tool, as it provides specific access to the text ad mentem 
auctoris.8
PROVIDENTIA, PROVIDERE
Quod quidam negaverunt providentiam esse 120 (D). Ostenditur mul-
tipliciter providentiam esse. Quod omnis deus in sua existentia habet 
totum providere (F). Quod providentia primitus est in diis (I). Quid sit 
providentia (D). Quod providentia est duplex, scilicet naturalis et volun-
taria (L). Quid sit ratio providendi (G). Quomodo providere conveniat 
pluribus (H).
De duplici providentia 121 (L).
Quod est prime providens 122 (A). Quod omne divinum est primum 
providens in sua universitate. Quod est inpausabiliter providens et uni-
versaliter. Que sit condicio provisorum.
Quod omne divinum providet essentialiter, universaliter et inpausa-
biliter seu incessabiliter. Provisorum diversificatio (D). Actus providendi 
difformis participatio (E). Actus providendi ad omnia eternalis extensio 
(F). Actus providendi primitus providentium condicio (G). Quod perve-
nit ad omnia intentioni providentis subiecta (H). Quod prime providens 
est exemptum a providentibus (I). Quid sit inmiscibilitas et inhabitudina-
litas divinorum (K). Quod providentia et unialis excellentia conpatiuntur 
se (L). Quod excellentia non submittitur nec providentia exterminatur 
(M). Cognitionis intellectualis et providentionalis differentia 134 (D). 
Item distinctio intelligendi et providendi (E). Quod omnis intellectus 
divinus providet ut deus (F). 
Distinctio providentie in naturalem et voluntariam secundum 
Augustinum 141 (A). Providentie et fati distinctio (B). Omnis providentie 
causa et ratio et eius bipartita divisio (D). Providentie exempte modus et 
condicio (E). Providentie coordinate propria intentio (F). Quod in ordine 
providentie naturalis est duplex processus 146 B.9
The section entitled Providentia, providere is one of the longest in the Tabula, 
taking up almost a page and a half. The reader is struck by the number of 
8 L. Sturlese, “Presentazione”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Tabula contentorum in Expositione 
super Elementationem theologicam Procli, ed. A. Beccarisi (Pisa: Scuola Normale Superiore, 
2000), p. vii–xi, at p. x: “accesso puntuale al testo, per così dire, ad mentem auctoris”.
9 Berthold of Moosburg, Tabula contentorum, p. 132–133.
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topics related to providence: the existence of providence (“Quod quidam 
negaverunt providentiam esse”) and its definition (“Quid sit providen-
tia”); how providence resides in the divine (e.g. “Omnis deus in sua existen-
tia habet totum providere”, “Quod providentia primitus est in diis”, “Quod 
omne divinum est primum providens in sua universitate”, etc.); how infe-
rior beings are subject to providence (“Que sit condicio provisorum”); the 
difference between knowledge according to providence and intellectual 
knowledge (“Cognitionis intellectualis et providentionalis differentia”; “Item 
distinctio intelligendi et providendi”); the transcendence and universality 
of providence (“Actus providendi ad omnia eternalis extensio”; “Quod per-
venit ad omnia intentioni providentis subiecta”; “Quod prime providens est 
exemptum a providentibus”; etc.), and so on. Considered within this large 
cluster of theologico-metaphysical themes, the concept of a twofold provi-
dence, which is referred to three times, it is only one important issue among 
several others.10
Moreover, the distinction Berthold draws between providence and fate 
(“Providentie et fati distinctio”, 141B) reveals a link to topics related to both 
the realm of celestial causality – evoked by such headings as “Peryodus, 
Peryodicum, Annus: De magno anno“ (198 [F]) and Astra11 – and the world of 
nature – referred to as Natura.12 In other words, the providence-fate distinc-
tion allows us to identify a bottom-up perspective on providence and also con-
duct the analysis at the level of the philosophy of nature.
2 The Realm of Providence and the Realm of Fate
Proposition 141 (“Omnis providentia deorum haec quidem est exempta ab his, 
quibus providetur, haec autem coordinata”) is one of the most cited under the 
heading Providentia, providere in the Tabula contentorum. In the commentary 
on this proposition, Berthold addresses some of the most salient motifs in his 
theory of providence.
10  See Berthold of Moosburg, Tabula contentorum, p. 133, l. 584–585: Quod providentia est 
duplex, scilicet naturalis et voluntaria (L) [the correct reference would be to 120E]; l. 587: 
De duplici providentia 121 (L) [however, the reference is not to twofold providence, but to 
cognitio providentiae]; l. 603: Distinctio providentiae in naturalem et voluntariam secun-
dum Augustinum 141 (A).
11  See Berthold of Moosburg, Tabula contentorum, p. 119, l. 246–256; p. 17, l. 378–379; p. 22, 
l. 502–504.
12  See Berthold of Moosburg, Tabula contentorum, p. 98, l. 26–p. 99, l. 58. One should note 
that Berthold lists Naturalis providentia as the first item after Natura: p. 99, l. 59–61.
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In the suppositum, he deals with the issue of twofold providence. It must 
be noted that in this case, in contrast with comments he makes elsewhere, 
Berthold does not evoke this concept for methodological reasons, that is, with 
a view to distinguishing divinissima philosophia, subject of the Elementatio 
theologiae, from Christian philosophy.
De primo sciendum, sicut aliqualiter dictum est super 120, duplex est 
providentia, naturalis scilicet et voluntaria. Et habetur ista distinctio ab 
Augustino viii Super Genesim ad litteram, ubi dicit tractans illud verbum 
“ut operaretur et custodiret”: “Hinc iam in ipsum mundum velut in quan-
dam magnam arborem rerum oculus cogitationis attollitur atque in ipso 
quoque gemina operatio providentiae reperitur, partim naturalis, partim 
voluntaria. Naturalis quidem per occultam Dei administrationem, quae 
et lignis et herbis dat incrementum, voluntaria vero per angelorum opera 
et hominum. Secundum illam primam caelestia superius ordinari inferii-
usque terrestria, lumina sideraque fulgere” – et infra – “et quidquid aliud 
in rebus interiore naturalique motu geritur. In hac autem altera signa 
dari, doceri et discere, agros coli, societates administrari, artes exerceri, et 
quaeque alia sive in superna societate aguntur sive in hac terrena atque 
mortali ita, ut bonis consolatur”. Et infra: “Deus itaque super omnia, qui 
condidit omnia et regit omnia, omnes naturas bonus creat, omnes volun-
tates iustus ordinat”. Haec Augustinus.13
Among the mentions of twofold providence scattered throughout Berthold’s 
Expositio, this passage has two peculiarities. First, Berthold directly and explic-
itly quotes from the Book viii of the De Genesi ad litteram – a rare occurrence 
in the Expositio. Secondly, this is the only time Augustine’s text is cited exten-
sively. As the consequence, natural providence is exemplified as the growing of 
trees and herbs, the order of celestial and terrestrial phenomena, the shining 
of lights and lightning, and whatever else takes place in things due to their 
intrinsic and natural movements. From all these examples, the physical char-
acter of natural providence clearly emerges. Whereas in the Expositio tituli, for 
instance, the order of natural providence coincides with the all-encompassing 
metaphysical movement of the procession from, and return to, the One, here 
natural providence is interpreted as the orderly structure of physical phenom-
ena and in fact is the same as the realm of fate described in the passage from 
13  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 141A, p. 45, l. 11–24. As for the quotation of Augustine, see 
above, n. 5.
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Proclus’ On Providence and Fate (De providentia et fato) cited only a few pages 
later. This physical understanding of natural providence is made easier by a 
seemingly minimal, but in fact highly significant, divergence from De Genesi ad 
litteram; whereas Augustine refers to the twofold operation of a single provi-
dence (gemina operatio providentiae), Berthold mentions a twofold providence 
(duplex est providentia), thus paving the way for the identification of natural 
providence with what he would later define as “the realm of fate”.
In all likelihood, Ulrich of Strassburg’s De summo bono is the origin for the 
interpretation of natural providence as fate.
Dicit enim Augustinus viii libro Super Genesim: “Gemina operatio pro-
videntiae reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et herbis incre-
mentum, partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et hominum”. 
Secundum primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, 
quem philosophi determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt causae univer-
sales, scilicet caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae particu-
lares. Cum ergo omnis artifex operans per instrumentum dispositionem 
artis instrumentis infundat, necessario dispositio divinae providentiae 
huic conexioni causarum infunditur. Haec ergo dispositio providentiae 
infusa toti isti conexioni causarum fatum vocatur, ut dicit Boethius, prout 
philosophi de fato loquuuntur.14
In this text, Ulrich transforms what was originally an operation of providence 
into a natural order of causes which descend from the universal (i.e., the celes-
tial bodies and their motions) to the particular. Even though this does not 
reach the explicit idea of a realm of fate, it comes a step closer by suggesting 
the existence of a structure that underpins the natural universe.
Ulrich’s mention of Boethius’ conception of fate is telling. Unsurprisingly, 
Berthold takes this clue and develops it further. In the suppositum, when it 
comes to clarifying the relationship between providence and fate, he quotes the 
classical locus from On the Consolation of Philosophy, Book iv, prose 6 dealing 
14  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 263–p. 146, l. 272. 
The fact that Berthold quotes a larger part of the Augustinian source than Ulrich does 
confirms that he had direct access to Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram. On Ulrich’s con-
ception of fate, see A. Beccarisi, “La scientia divina dei filosofi nel De summo bono di 
Ulrico di Strasburgo”, in Rivista di Storia della filosofia 61(2006), p. 137–163, at p. 147–152; 
A. Palazzo, “Ulrich of Strasbourg’s Philosophical Theology. Textual and Doctrinal Remarks 
on De summo bono” in A. Speer, Th. Jeschke (eds), Schüler und Meister (Berlin / Boston: 
De Gruyter, 2016), p. 205–242, at p. 219–241. Twofold providence is discussed at pages 
p. 222–228.
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with providence and fate.15 There, Boethius considers fate to be the chain of 
causes by which the simple and eternal decree of divine providence unfolds 
in space and time. This is the core concept from which Boethius draws several 
important consequences, such as the conclusion that everything subject to 
fate is also subordinate to providence, but not vice versa; that fate is a disposi-
tion inhering in mutable things; that the beings close to the First Divinity are 
beyond the mutable order of fate, etc. This text allows Berthold to conceptu-
alize the crucial issue of the temporalization of the disposition of the divine 
mind. As already seen in Ulrich, providence and fate are clearly distinguished: 
one coincides with the intuition of all reality in the divine mind, the other 
with the temporal series or connection of causes. Yet, they are interrelated: the 
latter is the unfolding of the former. Nowhere, however, does Boethius refer to 
two realms.
It is on the basis of a long passage quoted from Proclus’ On Providence and 
Fate that Berthold explicitly theorizes the existence of two hierarchically 
ordained realms: that of providence and that of fate. On Providence and Fate 
is one of Proclus’ Tria opuscula which deal with providence, fate, freedom and 
evil. Translated from Greek into Latin by William of Moerbeke in 1280, they 
did not enjoy wide circulation.16 Berthold, however, made extensive recourse 
to these treatises with specific regard to the theory of unum animae.17 They are 
also crucial sources for Berthold’s theory of providence, as is clear from this 
and other passages throughout his Expositio, some of which we will discuss 
below.18
15  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 141B, p. 46, l. 42–p. 47, l. 66. See Boethius, De consolatione 
philosophiae, ed. C. Moreschini (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2000), lib. iv, prosa 6, §7–17, 
p. 122, l. 20–p. 124, l. 77.
16  C. Steel, “William of Moerbeke, Translator of Proclus”, in S. Gersh (ed.), Interpreting 
Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 
p. 247–263, at p. 251–253.
17  L. Sturlese, Eckhart, Tauler, Suso. Filosofi e mistici nella Germania medievale (Firenze: Le 
Lettere, 2010), ch. vii (“Tauler e Bertoldo di Moosburg. I presupposti filosofici della dot-
trina del ‘fondo dell’anima’”), p. 157–194, at p. 184–191; ch. ix (“Homo divinus. Il commento 
a Proclo di Bertoldo di Moosburg”), p. 237–257, at p. 244–246 (the texts are translated with 
few changes from the originals in L. Sturlese, Homo divinus. Philosophische Projeckte in 
Deutschland zwischen Meister Eckhart und Henrich Seuse [Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 2007]); 
ch. xii (“Tauler im Kontext. Die philosophischen Voraussetzungen des ‘Seelengrundes’ 
in der Lehre des deutschen Neuplatonikers Berthold von Moosburg”), p. 169–197; ch. x 
(“Der Prokloskommentar Bertholds von Moosburg und die philosophischen Probleme 
der nacheckhartschen Zeit”), p. 137–154.
18  For the theory of providence in On Ten Doubts Concerning Providence, see for example the 
commentary and the doctrinal analysis in F. Brunner, W. Spoerri, “De decem dubitationi-
bus circa providentiam, q. 3, 11–14. Commentaire philosophique par F. Brunner. Kritische 
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Ex praemissis colligitur differentia providentiae et fati: tum quia [A] “pro-
videntia praeexistit fato et omnia quidem, quaecumque fiunt secundum 
fatum, multo prius a providentia fiunt” secundum auctorem De fato et pro-
videntia cap. 2. [B] Tum quia providentia est simpliciter omnium, fatum 
vere quorundam: “multa enim diffugiunt fatum, providentiam vero nihil” 
secundum auctorem ibidem. [C] Tum quia “providentia est fatum desu-
per gubernans, quod ipsa produxit et separavit ipsius epystasiam, id est 
superstationem, usque ad altero mobilia aut sortita in altero mobilibus 
subsistentiam”, idem ubi supra. [D] Tum etiam quia proxima deo sunt 
exempta a fato, distantia vero subsunt. [E] Unde auctor ibidem 5 cap.: 
“Providentiam itaque non est tibi difficile videre, quam dicimus. Si enim 
fontem bonorum primum divinam ipsam causam determinans recte 
dicens, unde enim aliunde bona quam divinitus? Ita ut bonorum quidem, 
ait Plato, nullum alium causandum quam Deum. [F] Deinde omnibus 
superstantem intelligentialibusque et sensibilibus superiorem esse fato, 
et quae quidem sub fato entia et sub providentia perseverare, le conecti 
quidem a fato habentia, bonificari autem a providentia, ut conexio finem 
habeat bonum et providentia sic reductiva fati in se ipsam, quae autem 
rursum sub providentia non adhuc omnia indigere et fato, sed intelligen-
tialia ab hoc (scilicet fato) exempta esse”. Et bene infra: “Et propter haec 
omne quidem intellectualiter ens sub providentia perseverari solum, 
omne autem, quod corporaliter, sub necessitate. [G] Duo itaque regna rei 
intelligantur: haec quidem intellectualia, haec autem sensibilia, et regna 
duo duorum, providentiae quidem sursum intellectualiumque et sensibi-
lium, fati autem deorsum sensibilium. [H] Et providentia differat a fato, 
qua differt Deus a divino quidem, sed participatione divino et non prime, 
quoniam et in aliis, ut vides, aliud quod prime, aliud quod secundum 
participationem velut lumen solis et quod in aere lumen, sed hic qui-
dem prime, hoc autem propter illum (scilicet solem) lumen; et vita prime 
quidem in anima, secundario autem in corpore propter illam. Sic igitur 
providentia quidem Deus per se, fatum autem divina aliqua res et non 
Deus: dependet enim a providentia et velut imago est illius. Sicut enim 
providentia ad intellectualia entium, sic fatum ad sensibilia. [I] Regnat 
quidem haec (scilicet providentia) super intellectualia, hoc autem super 
sensibilia, et permutatim aiunt geometrae, et ut providentia ad fatum, sic 
Exegetische-Bemerkungen von W. Spoerri”, in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie 
und Theologie 24(1977), p. 112–164; for an overview of Proclus’ theory of providence, 
see W. Beierwaltes, “Pronoia und Freiheit in der Philosophie des Proklos”, in Freiburger 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 24(1977), p. 88–111.
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intellectualia ad sensibilia. Intellectualia autem prime sunt entia et ab 
his altera: et providentia ergo prime est, quod est, et ab hac dependet et 
fati ordo”. Haec auctor.19
This text, which is quoted immediately after the citation from On the 
Consolation of Philosophy, Book iv, prose 6, provides Berthold with the con-
ceptual tools he needs to rethink the relationship between providence and 
fate in more elaborate terms. Whereas Boethius considers fate to be the chain 
of causes by which the simple and eternal providence unfolds in space and 
time, this text sheds light on the existence of the two distinct, but interrelated, 
realms of providence and fate, analyzing their main characteristics.20
Berthold first points out that On Providence and Fate is in agreement 
with Boethius on several points: e.g., (A) providence preexists fate but 
(B) whereas nothing escapes providence, many things are not subject to fate. 
(C) Accordingly, “providence governs from above over fate” and “entrusts to it 
the authority as far as the bodies that are externally moved (or those things 
that first come to be in externally moved things)”. (D) Finally, things close to 
God are exempt from fate. All of this confirms the preeminence that provi-
dence enjoys over fate, a point which was already clear in On the Consolation 
of Philosophy. Proclus’ distinctive influence on Berthold’s conception must be 
looked for in the rest of the quotation from On Providence and Fate.
19  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 141B, p. 47, l. 78–p. 48, l. 109. The capital letters between 
square brackets have been introduced into the text to simplify references to the sections 
examined. For the texts in Proclus, see Proclus, De providentia et fato et eo quod in nobis 
ad Theodorum Mechanicum, in Tria opuscula (De providentia, libertate, malo), ed. H. Boese 
(Berlin: De Gruyter, 1960), c. 2, §3, p. 110, l. 6–p. 111, l. 8; c. 2, §4, p. 111, l. 4–7; c. 5, §13, p. 118, 
l. 1–p. 120, l. 11 and l. 29–30; c. 5, §14, p. 120, l. 31–p. 122, l. 16. For literal quotations of On 
Providence, I have relied on Proclus, On Providence, trans. C. Steel (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2007).
20  In spite of the undeniable analogies between lib. iv, prosa 6 of On the Consolation of 
Philosophy and Proclus’ On Providence and Fate, the regna duo thesis constitutes a major 
difference between the two texts, which is peculiar to the Proclean treatise. On Boethius’ 
relationship with Proclus and other Neoplatonists on the topic of fate, see H.R. Patch, 
“Fate in Boethius and the Neoplatonists”, in Speculum 4(1929), p. 62–72; P. Courcelle, Les 
lettres grecques en Occident. De Macrobe à Cassiodore (Paris: De Boccard, 1948), p. 287–289, 
and J.C. Magee, “The Boethian Wheels of Fortune and Fate”, in Mediaeval Studies 49(1987), 
p. 524–533. Courcelle and Magee offer criticisms of Patch’s arguments. See also S. Gersh, 
Middle Platonism and Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition, 2 vols (Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1986), vol. 2, p. 647–718; M. Belli, “Il centro e la circonfer-
enza. Proclo, Boezio e Tommaso d’Aquino”, in P. Totato, L. Valente (eds), Sphaera. Foma 
e immagine e metafora tra medioevo ed età moderna (Firenze: Olschki, 2012), p. 51–80, at 
p. 51–62, and the literature quoted therein.
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As is clear from the previous paragraphs in Proclus’ treatise, providence and 
fate act at two different levels: the former is the cause of the goods for those for 
whom it provides (“causam esse bonorum hiis quibus providetur”), whereas fate 
is “the cause of some connection between and sequence of the things that occur” 
(“causam […] connexionis cuiusdam et consequentie hiis que generantur”).21 
(F) As a consequence, things that depend on fate also fall under providence: 
“they have their interconnection from fate, but their orientation to the good 
comes from providence. Thus, the connection will have the good as its end 
and providence will order fate”. (G) There are two realms (regna) of things 
intelligible and sensible. Providence rules over things intelligible and sensible, 
while fate only governs sensible things. Even though the two realms are hier-
archically ordered, each of them is nonetheless autonomous, retaining its own 
laws. This means that the realm of fate, which is the world of nature, can be 
explained by its own laws without reference to any superior ontological level 
of reality. In this light, Berthold’s keen interest in the issues related to celestial 
causality and, more generally, to the philosophy of nature, becomes clear. The 
realm of fate provides the theoretical framework for scientific research, at the 
same time granting a bottom-up perspective on the providence of God and 
the gods.
Finally, it should be noted that Berthold also adopts the typical Proclean 
distinction secundum causam and per participationem to clarify the difference 
between providence and fate. (E) Providence is said to be, as the divine cause, 
the first source of all goods. (H) More precisely, providence stands in the same 
relationship to fate as the primary God does to what is divine by participa-
tion. (I) Moreover, since providence rules over intelligible beings whereas fate 
only rules over sensible beings, and since intelligible beings are primary beings 
(prime entia), providence is what it is primarily (prime est, quod est).
3 The Theologico-Metaphysical Approach: Providence  
and the Divine
Berthold’s concept of providence is also indebted to another of Proclus’ 
opuscules, Ten Doubts Concerning Providence (De decem dubitationibus circa 
providentiam). Indeed, in the propositum of Proposition 141, Berthold clarifies 
how providence is found in the divine, namely in the primary God and the 
21  Proclus, De providentia, c. 3, §7, p. 113, l. 2–4.
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gods. The gods are the henads (unitates or bonitates), also defined as causae 
primordiales.22
According to Berthold, the absolutely Good is absolutely First and thus is not 
coordinated with the things that it causes. It exercises providence absolutely 
over all beings (providet omnibus simpliciter), and its providence transcends 
them. This is the condition of God in whom providence resides secundum 
causam. The gods, who are first in their own given genus, but not absolutely 
first, exercise providence over the subsequent members in their series. As in 
the case of God, their providence does not enter into relation with the things 
that they cause. Every god stands in relation to its own universe – its series – 
just as the absolutely Good does to the entire Universe.23 The gods have provi-
dence per essentiam.
A long quotation from Proclus’ Ten Doubts Concerning Providence con-
firms the difference between the providence secundum causam of the First 
22  On the role and significance of the henads in Berthold, see L. Sturlese, “Einleitung”, 
to Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 136–159, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), p. ix–xv, at p. xi–xiii; 
A. Sannino, “Il Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum nella metafisica di Bertoldo di 
Moosburg”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), Per perscrutationem philosophicam. 
Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewid-
met (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 252–272, at p. 252–267; E. Ludueña, “El politeísmo de 
Proclo en la Expositio de Bertoldo de Moosburg”, in S. Filippi, M. Coria (eds.), La Identidad 
propia del Pensamiento Patrístico y Medieval. ¿Unidad y Pluralidad? (Rosario: Paideia 
Publicaciones, 2014), p. 393–403. On the function of the henads in Proclus’ Elements 
of Theology, see E. Massa, “La deificazione nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg 
a Proclo, Elementatio theologica, 129. Edizione del testo e prime analisi”, in R. Lievens, 
E. Van Mingroot, W. Verbeke (eds), Pascua Mediaevalia. Studies voor Prof. Dr. J.M. De Smet 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1983), p. 545–604, at p. 580–582; S. Gersh, “Proclus 
as theologian”, in S. Gersh (ed.), Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 80–107, at p. 92–97, with literature 
quoted at p. 93, n. 88.
23  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 141E, p. 49, l. 153–p. 50, l. 181: Primo modo simpliciter 
bonum, et hoc solum est prime simpliciter et per consequens non concluditur cum suis cau-
satis nec intra ordinem partialem nec etiam totalem, sed est simpliciter exemptum ab omni-
bus simpliciter et per consequens non habet providentiam nisi exemptam, et sic providet 
omnibus simpliciter. Secundo modo prime, scilicet in genere, respectu videlicet determinati 
ordinis, sunt ipsi dii, quorum quilibet est monarcha respectu suae antarkiae, immo totius 
seyrae suae, id est omnium sub suae causalitatis ambitu contentorum, et per consequens est 
exemptus ab omnibus suis causatis, cum omne, quod prime causa, exaltatum sit ab effectu 
per 75. Et sic “omne divinum” et per essentiam et secundum causam “et providet secundis 
et ereptum est ab his, quibus providetur, neque providentia submittente suam immixtam et 
unialem excellentiam neque unione providentiam exterminante” per 122. […] Sicut autem se 
habet simpliciter bonum ad totum universum simpliciter, sic se habet quilibet deus, qui est 
quaedam bonitas, ad suum universum. Et hoc de secundo.
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Principle, i.e. the primary Good, and the providence secundum essentiam of 
the gods. Berthold introduces a few slight changes to this text which involve 
a significant reinterpretation of Proclus’ original intention. Whereas Proclus 
maintains that providence is the cause that makes everything that exists in the 
universe good (“propter providentie causam bonum habet”), Berthold affirms 
that it is the primary Good that makes things good (“propter prime bonum 
bonificantur”), implying that the primary Good is the first and originary source 
of providence. Moreover, Berthold specifies that those beings that receive by 
themselves (per se) their good from providence, without any other intermedi-
ary, are the gods and, especially, the primary God (“sicut dii et praecipue primo 
Deus”).24 In other words, God and the gods are the first agents, each in his own 
order, for the distribution of the good, which unfolds through the subordinate 
series and the lower members of each series. After this quotation, Berthold 
adds that providence is in the gods not only per essentiam, but also secundum 
participationem. Since they all exist within the order of God and receive his 
influence, the gods partake in his providence.25
In Proposition 141, Berthold refers twice to Proposition 120, another of the 
most cited propositions in the Tabula contentorum. Therefore, in order to bet-
ter understand Berthold’s views on the three modalities of providence – secun-
dum causam, per essentiam, and per participationem – it is appropriate to turn 
to his discussion of Proposition 120 (“Omnis deus in sua existentia totis habet 
providere et primitus providere in diis”). In the propositum Berthold conceptu-
alizes the three modes of providence:26
24  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 141E, p. 50, l. 165–178. See Proclus, De decem dubitationi-
bus circa providentiam, q. 3, §17, p. 30, l. 8–22.
25  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 141F, p. 50, l. 182–192: Sane, quia dii intra ordinem unialem 
et sint monarchae, ut dictum est, et antarkes et pro tanto, licet exempti sint a suis causa-
tis sicut prime ens ab omnibus entibus, tamen omnes insimul accepti praeter prime Deum, 
cum concludantur intra ordinem, ut dictum est, qui ordo etiam sicut et omnis universitas 
est quoddam totum formale finitum specie et partibus. Et sic superior deus influit alteri 
submisso et bonitatem, inquantum gradatim bonitas in eis contrahitur, et etiam propriam 
intentionem, in qua est prime, cuius vestigium aliquale in sequentibus derelinquit. Et talis 
bonificatio sive provisio boni vel providentia, cum omnes sint coordinati, dicitur coordinata. 
Sicut autem dictum est de diis per essentiam, quod primorum est providentia respectu sub-
sequentium coordinata, ita etiam se habet in omnibus diis secundum participationem […].
26  Before conceptualizing the three ontological levels of the good in the propositum, 
Berthold had already distinguished the twofold status of the henads – per essentiam and 
secundum participationem – in the suppositum: Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super 
Elementationem theologicam. Propositiones 108–135, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 
2011), 120B, p. 93, l. 92–95: Deorum vero naturalium quidam sunt per essentiam tales, ut 
sunt superessentiales bonitates unialem ordinem integrantes, alii vero per participationem 
sunt huiusmodi, sicut prima inferiorum ordinum, puta infinitatum, substantiarum, vitarum, 
intellectuum et huiusmodi, sicut inferius apparebit.
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li ‘bonum’ dicitur tripliciter, quia “aut secundum causam, puta primum: 
etenim bonum illud et existentiae omnis causa et bonorum omnium 
ut unitatum” et sic etiam est universaliter omnium conservativum per 
providentiam propriae virtutis, “aut secundum existentiam, puta unus-
quisque deus unum et bonum existens” per 119 in commento, et istis 
convenit providentia per existentiam, sicut et bonitas, “aut secundum 
participationem, puta, quod in substantiis bonum, propter quod et unita 
est omnis substantia”.27
By starting from the definition of providence as “the operation of the good 
bestowing what is appropriate upon each thing” (“operatio boni unicuique 
congrua largientis”),28 Berthold claims that the good is stated in three differ-
ent ways. The Good secundum causam is the first Good, which is the cause 
of every being (existentiae omnis) and of all goods-unities. As such, the Good 
is the principle of the preservation of all things thanks to the providence of 
its power. The good per existentiam is predicated of the gods, as each god is 
good and one. Providence per existentiam resides in the gods. Finally, the good 
secundum participationem is predicated of substances in the sense that every 
substance is unified by its participation in the good.
The abovementioned text is indeed a literal quotation from Proclus’ Ten 
Doubts Concerning Providence, punctuated by a few of Berthold’s remarks, 
which make explicit the reference to providence which is merely implicit in 
the Proclean passage. A few lines below, after demonstrating that “one”, being 
shared by all things, is the ratio providendi in general, Berthold again distin-
guishes three modes of “one” – secundum causam, per existentiam, and secun-
dum participationem – on the basis of the same Proclean source.29
27  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120D, p. 99, l. 269–276. See Proclus, De decem dubita-
tionibus, q. 10, §63, p. 102, l. 7–p. 104, l. 12. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120I, p. 103, 
l. 398–404: […] prime providens est Deus, quia et prime bonum, quod non solum est verum 
simpliciter de prime Deo, sed etiam de diis, qui sunt prime bonum suorum ordinum. Alia 
autem post hos, quando secundum unum illocantur et divinae operantur. Cum igitur unum 
et bonum supersubstantialiter sit in ipsis diis et sic ipsorum essentia, necessario etiam ipsum 
providere primitus erit in eis et per eos in omnibus, quibus participative convenit providere, 
sicut et bonum est in eis per participationem.
28  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120D, p. 98, l. 260.
29  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120H, p. 102, l. 374–381. See Flasch, “Einleitung”, p. xiii–
xvii, xxi–xxiii, concerning the priority of the Good over the One. For this reason, Imbach 
considers it not inappropriate to refer to Berthold’s theological philosophy (scien-
tia divina) as agatho-theology. See Imbach, “Au-delà de la métaphysique”, p. 388, n. 63. 
J.A. Aertsen, “Ontology and Henology in Medieval Philosophy (Thomas Aquinas, Master 
Eckhart and Berthold of Moosburg)”, in E.P. Bos, P.A. Meijer (eds), On Proclus and His 
Influence in Medieval Philosophy (Leiden / New York / Köln: Brill, 1992), p. 120–140, at 
p. 125, n. 24, disagrees with Flasch on this point.
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Once it has been made clear that there are three levels of providence, but 
that the providential order ultimately must be reduced to the primary God, 
in whom providence secundum causam resides, the question arises as to why 
God, who can govern the universe on his own without any help, delegates his 
providence to the secondary gods. In this case, Berthold has recourse to the 
same quotation from Ulrich of Strassburg’s De summo bono ii.5.18 which he 
also cites in Proposition 141.30 Adopting what we can call a principle of pleni-
tude, Berthold argues that God accomplishes through secondary causes – 
which are the primordial causes – all that he could have done by himself and 
could have governed through his providence, so that the universe, which has 
received from him all the possible degrees of divine goodness, may not be 
deprived of the dignity of causality and the opportunity to cooperate in his 
divine operation. The secondary causes are arranged according to the twofold 
mode of providence theorized by Augustine’s De Genesi ad litteram.
Circa tertium sciendum, quod, licet prime bonum super omnia super-
benedictus Deus per se principaliter omnia efficiat et per providentiam 
gubernet, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis, quae 
est divinissimum operum, non deesset universo, cui communicati sunt 
omnes gradus divinae bonitatis possibiles existere, operatur etiam per 
secundas causas a se, scilicet per primordiales. Et istae sunt ordinatae 
dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae, quae distinguit 
Augustinus viii Hexaemeron sui dicens, quod “gemina operatio providen-
tiae invenitur, partim naturalis, partim voluntaria”. Secundum primum 
actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, qui in hoc volumine 
exprimitur, quibus omnibus supereminent ipsae primordiales causae, 
quas auctor vocat deos.31
The meaning of natural providence changes between Proposition 141 and 
Proposition 120. We see in this passage from 120E that Berthold does not 
understand the notion in a physicalist sense. This is all the more surprising 
given that, as we already know, Ulrich’s De summo bono ii.5.18 is the seminal 
source for Berthold’s physical interpretation of natural providence. Yet, if we 
compare the abovementioned passage with its source in the De summo bono, 
we will notice a few interesting differences:
30  See above, footnote 14.
31  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120E, p. 100, l. 295–305.
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Ad horum ergo intellectum consideremus primo, quid hoc nomine signi-
ficetur. Deus omnia, quae causat, per providentiam causat eo, quod ipse 
operatur per intellectum et artem. Et quamvis per se principaliter omnia 
efficiat, tamen, ut dignitas causalitatis et divinae cooperationis non dees-
set universo, cui communicatae sunt omnes divinae bonitates naturaliter 
communicabiles, operatur etiam per secundas causas. Et illae sunt ordi-
natae dupliciter secundum duplicem modum providentiae. Dicit enim 
Augustinus viii libro Super Genesim: “Gemina operatio providentiae 
reperitur: partim naturalis, per quam dat lignis et herbis incrementum, 
partim voluntaria per operationem angelorum et hominum”. Secundum 
primum actum providentiae est ordo naturalis causarum, quem philo-
sophi determinant, scilicet quod primo sunt causae universales, scilicet 
caelestia et motus eorum, et sub illis sunt causae particulares.32
What are only secondary causes in the De summo bono, become the primor-
dial causes, i.e. the gods, in the commentary on the Elementatio theologica. 
Whereas according to Ulrich the chain of physical causes, from the celestial 
spheres down to the particular causes, constitutes the order of causes of natu-
ral providence determined by philosophers – the foremost among whom is 
Boethius – Berthold refers to the natural order of causes which is expressed in 
this volume (in hoc volumine exprimitur), namely in the Elements of Theology. 
Therefore, Berthold is clearly reinterpreting Ulrich’s notion of the connection 
of physical causes in terms of the order of theologico-metaphysical causes, 
the most perfect and highest of which are the primordial causes, namely the 
gods-henads. Significantly, while Ulrich also cites the first examples of natural 
providence mentioned by Augustine – examples based on the natural world 
(the growing of trees and herbs), here Berthold leaves them out.
Overall, then, the metaphysical reinterpretation of Ulrich’s text runs coun-
ter to Proposition 141, where Berthold regards natural providence as fate and 
theorizes the existence of the realm of fate. Far from excluding each other, 
Berthold’s two different conceptions of natural providence indicate the exis-
tence of two different approaches to providence in the Expositio. 
In Proposition 122 (“Omne divinum et providet secundis et ereptum est ab 
his, quibus providetur, neque providentia submittente suam immixtam et uni-
alem excellentiam neque unione providentiam exterminante”), which is also 
widely quoted in the Tabula, Berthold shifts his focus to the transcendence of 
both the general providence of the primary Good and the special providence 
of the gods. He argues that since it pre-contains the lower members in a nobler 
32  See Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 18, §9, p. 145, l. 256–p. 146, l. 268.
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way that they exist in themselves, all that is first in every essentially ordered 
universe is the universal cause exercising providence over all those that are 
posterior.33 Moreover, that which is essentially divine (divinum per essentiam) 
is said to be the essence of the things for which it provides, while these things 
participate in it according to their capacity. However, that which is essentially 
divine is exempt from them (exemptum a provisivis), for were it not transcen-
dent, its causality would no longer be universal.34
The transcendence of all that is divine – both secundum causam and secun-
dum essentiam – relative to its own effects is due to its absolute and excel-
lent unity.35 From Dionysius the ps.-Aeropagite Berthold derives the analogy 
between goodness and the sun, which nicely fits his attempt to describe the 
transcendence of providence. He maintains that just as the sunlight shines 
everywhere, yet the sun keeps unchanged the purity and perpetuity of its 
substance, remaining what it is, so the operation of providence reaches every-
thing, while at the same time transcending everything.
Talis autem extensionis actus providendi generalitate sua ad omnia et 
nihilominus ereptionis eius ab omnibus exemplum satis aptum inveni-
mus in nostro sole magno, qui est “totus splendens et superlucens” […] 
sed per ipsum esse “illuminat omnia, quaecumque participare ipso pos-
sunt, et superextentum habet lumen ad omnem extendens visibilem 
mundum splendores propriorum radiorum et sursum et deorsum”. “Et 
nihil est visibilium, ad quod non pertingat secundum magnitudinem 
excedentem splendorem proprii luminis”. Et licet ipse sol sic sit in infe-
rioribus istis generabilibus et corruptibilibus, quae “et movet ad vitam 
et nutrit et auget et perficit et mundat et renovat”, tamen nihilominus 
non recedit a puritate et perpetuitate suae substantiae manens hoc, 
quod est.36
33  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 122A, p. 116, l. 67–69: Omne autem primum omnis uni-
versitatis essentialiter ordinatae praehabet omnia submissa nobiliori modo, quam sint in se 
ipsis, et sic est causa universaliter providens omnibus, quae sunt post ipsum.
34  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 122B, p. 117, l. 88–91: […] sequitur ipsum esse essentiam 
omnium provisorum, quae tamen essentia est in unoquoque provisorum, secundum quod 
potest ea participare ex propria analogia. Item, quod sit exemptum a provisivis, quia, si esset 
inter provisa, non provideret omnibus universaliter […].
35  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 122L, p. 121, l. 266–p. 122, l. 268: sed ratione unitatis est 
ereptum ab omnibus, quibus providetur, et in se ipso mansivum in sua unionali excellentia.
36  See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 122I, p. 120, l. 220–p. 121, l. 232. See Dionysius ps.-
Areopagita, De divinis nominibus, ed. B.R. Suchla (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 1990), 4.4, 
p. 147, l. 11–p. 148, l. 5.
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4 Nature as a Way of Accessing Providence
The realm of fate is the domain of corporeal and sensible things, of physical 
phenomena, of knowledge based on sense-perception: simply put, it is the 
world of nature.
In order to understand what exactly Berthold means by the realm of fate 
and what he considers to be the relationship between fate and providence, 
I turn to Proposition 34 (“Omne, quod secundum naturam convertitur, ad id 
facit conversionem, a quo et processum propriae subsistentiae habet”), which 
does not explicitly deal with providence, but rather with nature. In the sup-
positum, while illustrating the several meanings of the word natura, Berthold 
quotes a long text from the Hermetic De VI rerum principiis. From this text he 
derives the idea of nature as a universal and special power (vigor) which first 
resides in the celestial sphere and operates in inferior realities by stimulating 
their qualities to develop.37 Nature originates from ratio, the law of the stars 
(lex astrorum), which is the uniform and perpetual disposition of the celes-
tial motions. With this disposition originates the machine of the world (mundi 
machinam), by which the world and its components are harmoniously ruled 
(benigna amicitiae pace).38
37  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam. Propositiones 14–34, 
eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 34A, p. 222, 
l. 67–89: natura est vigor quidam universalis et specialis ex causa et ratione nascens, pri-
mum caelo innascens, in universis et singulis quadrupartitus, qualificatus non qualificans et 
quantificatus non quantificans, differentes qualitates successive diffundens. […] Natura vero 
nata qualitates in singulis differentes non qualificando, sed operando diffundit, id est qua-
litates excitando exerit. Simile potest dici de quantitate, quod eam successive dicitur diffun-
dere, ut unaquaeque res ab alia in suo genere nascatur. See Hermes Latinus, Liber Hermetis 
Mercurii Triplicis de VI rerum principiis, ed. T. Silverstein, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale 
et littéraire du Moyen Âge 22(1955), p. 217–302, at p. 248–249. For an analysis of Berthold’s 
Hermetic conception of nature, see A. Sannino, “Il concetto ermetico di natura in Bertoldo 
di Moosburg”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), Hermetism from Late 
Antiquity to Humanism. La tradizione ermetica dal mondo tardo-antico all’Umanesimo = 
Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Napoli 20–24 novembre 2001 (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2003), p. 203–221. For inspiring remarks on the theory of nature by Dietrich of Freiberg 
and Berthold, see M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, “Filosofia della natura e filosofia dell’intelletto in 
Teodorico di Freiberg e Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu 
Meister Eckhart (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 115–127.
38  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 34A, p. 221, l. 50–54: Ratio est vis quaedam a causa proce-
dens, cuncta a principio ordinans. Haec lex astrorum dicitur, quae est aequa et perpetua 
motuum eorum dispositio, quae mundi machinam efficit et moderatur, per quam mundus et 
mundana nulla coactione, sed benigna amicitiae pace reguntur. See Hermes Latinus, Liber 
de VI rerum principiis, p. 248.
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In light of this Hermetic text and the other sources quoted by Berthold 
(Avicebron and Isaac Israeli), it can be argued that nature is bipartite, being 
subdivided into a superior operating nature (natura superior operativa), which 
consists in the quality of the celestial bodies, and an inferior nature (natura 
inferior), which consists in the elemental qualities acted upon by the motions 
of the celestial spheres.39
This perspective is in accord with the special attention Berthold devotes to 
issues related to celestial causality and their investigation, which may at first 
appear out of place in a commentary on the theologico-metaphysical summa 
of the Neoplatonic tradition. By way of example, I refer only to a long quo-
tation from a certain “diligens motuum astrorum investigator et calculator, 
frater Arnoldus dictus Luscus” (the one-eyed brother Arnoldus).40 According 
to Berthold, Arnoldus is the author of a work entitled De periodis motuum et 
mobilium caelestium, which was dedicated to calculating the periods of the 
celestial bodies. From this work, Berthold quotes the scientist as saying that 
the calculation of the Great Year (the famous and feared Magnus Annus) is 
incomprehensible to the human intellect, being known only to God and to 
39  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 34A, p. 222, l. 90–p. 223, l. 112. On Hermes’ presence in 
Berthold, see L. Sturlese, “Proclo ed Ermente in Germania da Alberto Magno a Bertoldo 
di Moosburg. Per una prospettiva di ricerca sulla cultura filosofica tedesca nel secolo 
delle sue origini (1250–1350)”, in K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart, 
p. 22–33, at p. 28–30; A. Sannino, “Berthold of Moosburg’s Hermetic Sources”, in Journal 
of the Warburg and Courtauld Institutes 63(2000), p. 243–258; A. Palazzo, “La ricezione 
di un passo ermetico (Asclepius 8) nel tardo medioevo. Ulrico di Strasburgo, Pietro di 
Tarantasia, Riccardo di Mediavilla, Bertoldo di Moosburg e Dionigi il Certosino”, in 
T. Iremadze, T. Tskhadadze, G. Kheoshvili (eds), Philosophy, Theology, Culture. Problems 
and Perspectives. Jubilee Volume Dedicated to the 75th Anniversary of Guram Tevzadze 
(Tbilisi: Publishing House “Nekeri” / Publishing House “Arche”, 2007), p. 104–125, at 
p. 113–121.
40  Th. Kaeppeli, Scriptores Ordinis Praedicatorum Medii Aevi, 4 vols (Roma: Istituto Storico 
Domenicano, 1970–1993), vol. 1, p. 133, only includes Arnoldus in his catalogue without 
being able to provide any biographical detail. I. Draelants, “La transmission du De ani-
malibus d’Aristote dans le De floribus rerum naturalium d’Arnoldus Saxo”, in C. Steel, 
G. Guldentops, P. Beullens (eds), Aristotle’s Animals in the Middle Ages and Renaissance 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1999), p. 126–158, at p. 132, n. 21, conjectures that 
Arnoldus is in fact the same person as Arnold of Saxony, a German Dominican active in 
the 13th century, and the author of the encyclopaedia entitled De floribus rerum natura-
lium. According to Draelants, the hypothesis could be supported provided that Arnold is 
demonstrated to be the author of the astronomical and astrological content of ms Basel, 
Universitätsbibliothek, O.vi.4, which bears evident resemblances to Arnold’s authentic 
works.
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whomever he will disclose it; moreover, Berthold copies the table calculating 
the positions of the celestial bodies over the Great Year.41
The importance of astronomy and astrology also lies in their practical use-
fulness. Berthold claims in the prologue that these sciences enable man to 
govern the sensible world, which is the realm of fate. This is due to the fact 
that among all philosophers, only astrologers were divinely given by celestial 
decrees the ability to investigate and grasp future events by observing the first 
natural, essential, and eternal causes.42
Since it is ruled by celestial causality, inferior nature is intrinsically ordered. 
Based on this assumption, Berthold cannot doubt the purposefulness of the 
work of nature or its finalism (“secundo de ipsius naturae, prout hic sumitur, 
in operando finis praeconceptione et totius operis sui in finem directione”). 
Indeed, he contends that the thesis that nature is a force (vis) moving without 
any rational design leads to a series of doctrinal mistakes, such as necessitari-
anism, the absence of a maker of nature, chance, the denial of natural final-
ism. Against these erroneous positions, Berthold argues that nature is ruled by 
a superior rational principle, adducing a number of authorities in support of 
this view.
From Book xii of Averroes’ Commentary on the Metaphysics Berthold quotes 
the renowned dictum stating that “even nature does not know, nonetheless it 
works in a perfect and orderly way, somehow recalled by nobler active virtues, 
which are called intelligences”.43 The rationality of the natural mechanism is 
41  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam. Propositiones 184–211, 
ed. L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 2014), 198E, p. 147, l. 151–p. 148, l. 196. On the theory 
of the Magnus Annus, see G. De Callataÿ, Annus Platonicus. A Study of World Cycles in 
Greek, Latin and Arabic Sources (Louvain-la-Neuve: Université Catholique de Louvain / 
Institut Orientaliste, 1996). One should note that Proclus also displays a keen interest in 
physical investigation and astronomy, as attested by his several works in both these fields. 
However, the Platonic astronomy pursued by Proclus searches for the hidden causes 
of phenomena and is different from “scientific” investigation based on observation of 
celestial phenomena and the formulation of artificial hypotheses. See A.-Ph. Segonds, 
“Philosophie et astronomie chez Proclus”, in G. Boss, G. Seel (eds), Proclus et son influence. 
Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel, juin 1985 (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987), p. 159–177.
42  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prologus 16, p. 24, l. 636–641: Quod autem per eas et spe-
cialiter astronomiam et astrologiam homo mundi sensibilis vocetur proprie gubernator, 
apparet. Tum quia astrologis solis inter omnes philosophantes divino munere communicac-
tum est decretorum caelestium ex consideratione causarum naturalium primarum per se et 
essentialium ac sempiternarum in futurorum eventibus scrutatores esse et conscios […].
43  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 34B, p. 224, l. 148–151: Nam secundum Averroem super 
XI Metaphysicae cap. 6 “natura”, “quamvis non intelligat” nec rationem habeat, “facit” 
tamen “perfecte et ordinate, quasi esset rememorata ex virtutibus agentibus nobilioribus ea, 
quae dicuntur intelligentiae”. See Averroes, Metaphysica, in Aristotelis Opera cum Averrois 
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evident in the balance (mensura) between the heat of stars and that of gener-
ated things, a balance that depends on the divine intellectual art.
Divine providence (divina sollicitudo) is the cause of the rational govern-
ment of nature:44 all beings and natural processes exhibit regularities because 
they originate from the divine mind, as is made clear in On the Consolation of 
Philosophy, Book iv, prose 6. Significantly, in this case Berthold only quotes 
the beginning of Boethius’ passage, the part that relates to physical processes, 
while omitting the rest of prose 6: “omnium generatio rerum cunctusque 
mutabilium naturarum progressus et, quidquid aliquo movetur modo, causas, 
ordinem, formas ex divinae mentis stabilitate sortitur”.45
Cicero’s De natura deorum confirms that the orderliness of natural processes 
indicates that nature is governed rationally by the divine art.
Istud nihilominus regimen rationis inesse naturae ab arte prima, vide-
licet divina, per artes, quae sub illa sunt, manifestum est per operatio-
nes ipsius naturae in naturalibus, secundum quod eleganter declarat 
Cicero ubi supra libro ii capitulis 10, 11, 12 tam in animalibus quam in 
terrae nascentibus, tam in caelestibus quam terrestribus, ut breviter 
recolligam, quae “natura mentis et rationis expers” efficere non potuit, 
utpote mundi stabilitio, apertissima eiusdem cohaesio, partium libratio, 
circularis colligatio, stellarum ordinatio, motuum proportio, alimenti a 
terrae nascentibus attractio, arborum erectio, mutua invicem complexio, 
animantium in suo genere distinctio, ciborum variorum electio, medici-
narum quaesitio, sollertiarum et artium ostensio, marium et feminarum 
ad perpetuam generis conservationem distinctio, partium corporis ad 
procreandum concipiendumque aptatio, ad generandum mutua desi-
deriorum excitatio, sine magistro duce mammarum appetitio, appetita-
rum inventio, ad custodiendum procreata dilectio. His et consimilibus 
manifestum est “mente consilioque divino omnia in hoc mundo ad salu-
tem hominum conservationemque administrari mirabiliter” secundum 
eundem. Ex quibus etiam concluditur nihil eorum esse fortuitum, immo 
Commentariis, 8 vols (Venezia: Junta, 1562–1574), vol. 8, lib. xii, comm. 52, f. 305rD–E. 
Interestingly, the same dictum is quoted several times by Eckhart indirectly through 
Thomas Aquinas’ works. See A. Palazzo, “Eckhart’s Islamic and Jewish Sources. Avicenna, 
Avicebron, and Averroes”, in J. Hackett (ed.), A Companion to Meister Eckhart (Leiden / 
Boston: Brill, 2013), p. 253–298, at p. 286–288.
44  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 34B, p. 224, l. 154.
45  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 34B, p. 224, l. 161–p. 225, l. 164. See Boethius, De consola-
tione philosophiae, lib. iv, prosa 6, §7, p. 122, l. 20–23.
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haec omnia esse opera providae sollertisque naturae, secundum quod 
dicit in eodem.46
Above all, one is persuaded that the world is ruled by intelligent reason by 
considering the uniformity of celestial motions, as these are the origin for the 
regularity of physical events, experienced in the inferior region.
[…] unde, sicut dicit idem ubi iam supra, ex certis caeli motibus, ex ratis 
astrorum ordinibus, ex sphaerarum revolutionibus, quae non nisi vera 
ratione fieri possunt, convincitur mundum regi non casu, sed ratione, 
sicut ipse idem manifestat in eodem per pulchram contemplationem 
visibilium usque ad 11 capitulum.47
Aristotle’s Physica argues that even creatures such as monsters, usually consid-
ered to be mistakes of nature, demonstrate the teleologism of nature: they do 
not occur because natural events lack direction, but as a result of a material 
contrariety, which prevents the natural agent from introducing the intended 
form into matter.48
In other words, Berthold is persuaded that contemplation of the order and 
beauty of nature, as well as the scientific study of physical and astronomical 
processes, offers access to providence, access based on the effects of provi-
dence on the inferior world.49 This a posteriori demonstration, which leads to 
46  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 34B, p. 225, l. 170–188. As for Cicero’s De natura deorum, 
see the passages registered ad lin. by Berthold’s editors.
47  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 34B, p. 226, l. 205–209.
48  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 34B, p. 227, l. 237–245: Ceterum id ipsum ostendit pecca-
tum et error, quod accidit tam in natura quam in arte, quia omne agens, circa cuius actum 
contingit peccatum et error, agit propter finem, sed non invenit suam intentionem propter 
impedimentum; in quibus enim peccatur, alterius gratia agitur; natura autem est ratio 
agendi, in qua accidit error et peccatum, sicut apparet in monstris propter indispositionem 
ex parte materiae, ob quam efficiens non inducit formam intentam in materiam, sicut in 
semine, quando corrumpitur, agens non inducit formam intentam, quia prius necesse est 
esse semen, quam sit animal, et multas in eo praecedere alterationes.
49  He uses the same lines of reasoning when it comes to the issue of the providence exer-
cised by each god, for he maintains that it is possible to intuit the existence of a superior 
rationality from the order (Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 120E, p. 96, l. 195: ad ordinem; 
p. 96, l. 197–198: per contrariorum in unitatem concordantiam; p. 97, l. 223–224: in ordine 
secundum gradum sibi debitum), the beauty (p. 97, l. 212–222: ex specie), and the effects it 
has created. In this context, a preeminent role must be credited to Cicero’s De natura deo-
rum, often cited indirectly through Thomas of York’s Sapientiale. On this, see F. Retucci, 
“Magister Thomas Anglicus Minor. Tommaso di York fonte dell’Expositio di Bertoldo di 
Moosburg”, in Quaderni di Noctua. La tradizione filosofica dall’antico al moderno 5(2019), 
p. 1–41, as well as Retucci’s contribution in this volume. One finds an intriguing hint 
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knowing the existence of the divine intelligence and his providential activity, 
does not conflict with but rather complements the metaphysical approach, 
which focuses on providence as the distribution of the good from the primary 
God secundum causam through the divine per essentiam and per participatio-
nem and down to the whole of reality.
It has been argued that, in Berthold’s view, philosophical enquiry consists 
in both knowledge of God and the study of nature.50 It must, however, be 
emphasized that these are not two separated fields of research, but two levels 
of one and the same “oblique” motion, the type of philosophical investigation 
adopted by Proclus in the Elements of Theology. By progressing per ratiocina-
tionem from known to unknown things, from sensible to intelligible beings, the 
philosopher eventually comes to know the highest Good. He ascends to “the 
theological” contemplation of the One by considering the works of creation, 
the government of creatures, and the harmony of contrasting things.
[…] per motum obliquum, qui proprius erat philosophorum et erat per 
laboriosam investigationem primi omnium existentium principii divi-
dendo, definiendo, communibus principiis utendo, a notis ad ignota 
per ratiocinationem progrediendo, a sensibilibus ad intelligibilia ascen-
dendo et inter intelligibilia ab uno in aliud tendendo, quousque ad sim-
pliciter ultimum perveniatur, ascenderit ipse Proclus in summi boni 
notitiam, apparet in praesenti libro, ubi in excelsum maximum ascendit 
per operum conditionem, conditorum gubernationem et contrariorum 
conciliationem.51
In sum, by perceiving the effects of divine providence on the order of physical 
events and the regularity of celestial phenomena, a human being can start a 
process of cognitive improvement that will culminate in a unifying grasp of 
everything (secundum unum omnium), as he attains the cognitio providentio-
nalis proper to the primary One.52
at Thomas of York’s conception of the beauty of the cosmos in U. Eco, Arte e bellezza 
nell’estetica medievale (Milano: La nave di Teseo, 2016), p. 44, n. 1.
50  U.R. Jeck, “Die hermetische Theorie des Mikrokosmos in der Metaphysik Alberts 
des Grossen und im Prokloskommentar des Berthold von Moosburg”, in Patristica et 
Mediaevalia 20(1999), p. 3–18, at p. 7.
51  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expositio tituli D, p. 40, l. 110–117.
52  On cognitio providentionalis, see Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 134D–E, p. 215, 
l. 61–p. 217, l. 104.
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5 Conclusion
Berthold’s belief in the rational governance of nature, emphasis on the order 
of the machina mundi, and admiration for the harmony of nature, and so on, 
were not merely traditional and stereotypical motifs derived from his sources 
that he wearily repeated. On the contrary, Berthold was truly fascinated by 
the world of nature. From the scanty information at our disposal, we know 
that he owned and annotated manuscripts containing works of scientific 
content (Ptolemy’s Almagest and Macrobius’ Commentary on the Dream of 
Scipio) and Albert the Great’s autographs (De animalibus, a part of Physica, 
De caelo, De generatione et corruptione, De natura loci and De causis proprieta-
tum elementorum);53 that he added comments to Dietrich of Freiberg’s De iride 
and Aristotle’s Meteora; and that he wrote a now lost treatise De polo iridis.54 
Moreover, his Exposition on the Elements of Theology discusses several issues 
in natural philosophy (light,55 time, movement, celestial periods, etc.56) and 
quotes large extracts from several scientific sources (e.g. Ptolemy, Thebit ben 
Chorat, Alhazen, Alfred the Englishman, etc.). All of this contributes to the 
picture of a scholar with prominent scientific interests, a thinker dominated 
by Wissenschaftspathos.57
By delineating a two-layered structure of reality, the regna duo theory 
provides the philosophical background for Berthold’s scientific interest and 
research. Fate is the principle behind the connection of cause and effect; it is 
what binds the dispersed multiplicity of sensible phenomena together, giving 
rise to an orderly and knowable world, to nature itself. Behind – and above – 
the regularity of natural processes and the uniform periodicities of celestial 
bodies moved by celestial souls, human reason recognizes a superior and 
53  On the Berthold’s “library”, see Sturlese, “Introduzione”, p. xix–lix.
54  L. Sturlese, “Note di Bertoldo di Moosburg O.P., scienziato e filosofo”, in Freiburger 
Zeitschrift für Philosophie und Theologie 32(1985), p. 249–259; According to early-modern 
sources, he also wrote several works on astronomy: Albert de Castello, Brevis et compen-
diosa Cronica ordinis Praedicatorum, in R. Creytens, “Les écrivains dominicains dans la 
chronique d’Albert de Castello”, in Archivum Fratrum Praedicatorum 30(1960), p. 227–
313, at p. 283 (the Chronica is found at p. 260–291); B. Faes de Mottoni, “Il commento di 
Bertoldo di Moosburg all’Elementatio theologica di Proclo. Edizione delle proposizioni 
riguardanti il tempo e l’eternità”, in Studi medievali 12(1971), p. 417–461, at p. 419–420.
55  See e.g. B. Faes de Mottoni, “Il problema della luce nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg 
all’Elementatio theologica di Proclo”, in Studi medievali 16(1975), p. 325–352.
56  Due to space limitations I could not examine Propositions 198–200, dedicated to move-
ment, animation and cosmology and largely based on natural-philosophical sources (e.g., 
Proclus’ Elementatio physica, Aristotle’s physical writings, the Timaeus, etc.).
57  Flasch, “Einleitung”, p. xix.
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divine intelligence. At the physical level, the causal operation of divine provi-
dence brings forth the arrangement of natural events according to regular laws 
of development.
Despite its importance, the role of fate – and the world of nature more 
generally – has largely been underestimated by scholarship, leaving the 
Augustinian doctrine of twofold providence as the main focus for scholarship 
on Berthold’s theory of providence. Yet it is precisely this relationship between 
the regna duo, between providence and fate, that deserves more attention if 
Berthold’s theory is to be fully understood in itself and in the context of the 
debate on providence that took place among German Dominicans between 
the mid-13th century and the third quarter of the 14th century.
This new interpretive approach, which emphasizes the astronomical-
physical processes within Berthold’s metaphysical project, also unveils a ten-
sion that seems inherent in the concept of natural providence and that has 
until now remained undetected. In the Exposition on the Elements of Theology, 
we find two different understandings of natural providence. Often, as in 
the Expositio tituli, Berthold interprets natural providence in a theologico-
metaphysical way as the procession of goodness which, originating with the 
primary God secundum causam, is per essentiam and per participationem in 
the divine realities. Sometimes, however, Berthold adopts a physical approach, 
consonant with Augustine’s passage in the De Genesi ad litteram, and considers 
natural providence to be the order of natural phenomena, seeing in this order 
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chapter 12
Founding a Metaphysics of Light in Proclus’ 




Like many of his philosophical standpoints, the theory of formal causality that 
Berthold of Moosburg developed in his Exposition on the Elements of Theology 
results from an original combination of the doctrines inherited from Albert 
the Great and the so-called German Dominican school. Since it is intimately 
connected to the notion of flux and the concept of essential cause, Berthold’s 
theory of formal causation is an essential aspect of his intellectual project 
that sets it apart from the dominating Aristotelian framework of his time. His 
account of formal causation brings together his positions on universals, his 
account of cognition and the structure of the soul and, most of all, the produc-
tion of the physical universe in its physical and cosmological dimensions. It is 
known that, on these topics, Berthold builds on his Dominican predecessors’ 
developments on the theory of emanation. But his conception of formal cau-
sality cannot be entirely superimposed upon these earlier doctrines, for two 
main reasons.
On the one hand, Berthold intends to harmonize many sources that, as 
we will see, are sometimes divergent regarding the nature of forms and were 
partly rejected by his main influences. On the other hand, his exposition on the 
Elements of Theology forces him to adjust his theory of forms to its precise con-
tent. The Elements describe Form as something posterior to Being.1 Defining 
the first cause as superintellectual and superessential (Proposition 115), Proclus 
does not seem to allow the description of God as the first form or the form of 
forms, a phrase often used in the Latin tradition to describe God, which Berthold 
takes up.2 But while the Elementatio seems on the face of it incompatible with 
1 Proclus, The Elements of Theology, ed. E.R. Dodds (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971), 
Prop. 74, p. 70–71.
2 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 108–
135, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2011), 112D, p. 27, l. 79–84.
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a pure metaphysics of form, Berthold’s hermeneutical tools for interpreting 
it – rooted in the Latin theological and philosophical tradition – are strongly 
dependent from the vocabulary of forms and hylomorphism. How, then, did 
the Exposition on the Elements of Theology lead Berthold to a specific account 
of formal causation? And to what extent did he have to take some distance 
from ideas defended on the subject by Albert the Great and his followers?
A first answer to these questions is that Berthold aims at the same time to 
adapt the Elements to a Christian perspective, to the specific theory of causa-
tion built by his Dominican predecessors and, first of all, to the philosophi-
cal terminology of the period. Indeed, Berthold cannot fully explain Proclus’s 
text without using – and modifying to a certain extent – the vocabulary of 
Aristotelian hylomorphism.3 This answer, while correct in outline, is still too 
general to be satisfying, and needs to be refined regarding the precise points 
where Berthold’s status as a commentator of Proclus led him to original views. 
Several studies have already highlighted the way Berthold grounds his doctrine 
of causality on a wide range of philosophical material leading him to a highly 
systematized theory of emanation.4 However, Berthold’s theory of forms is 
intended to encompass a general account of the various levels of reality – of 
which the formal flux is only one side – that has not yet been studied in detail.
This paper aims to fill this gap by analyzing Berthold’s most distinctive 
ideas on this topic. His most original views on forms can be divided into three 
categories: first, the way Berthold’s conception of forms supports his theory 
of light; second, the way he defines form as a universal principle capable of 
3 As is known, even if the use of hylomorphic discourse in Proclus is common and betrays the 
influence of Aristotle, Proclus refuses hylomorphism as a general ontological theory and a 
coherent theory of the soul. See H.S. Lang, “The Status of Body in Proclus,” in D.D. Butorac, 
D.A. Layne (eds), Proclus and his Legacy (Berlin / Boston: De Gruyter, 2017), p. 69–82; 
C. Russi, “Causality and Sensible Objects: A Comparison between Plotinus and Proclus,” in 
R. Chiaradonna, F. Trabattoni (eds), Physics and Philosophy of Nature in Greek Neoplatonism. 
Proceedings of the European Science Foundation Exploratory Workshop (Il Ciocco, Castelvecchio 
Pascoli, June 22–24, 2006) (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2009), p. 145–171; G. Van Riel, “Proclus on 
Matter and Physical Necessity,” in Chiaradonna, Trabattoni (eds), Physics and Philosophy of 
Nature, p. 231–255.
4 E. Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg: Un aporte sobre la Escuela de 
Colonia (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013); K. Flasch, “Procedere ut imago. Das Hervorgehen des 
Intellekts aus seinem göttlichen Grund bei Meister Dietrich, Meister Eckhart und Berthold 
von Moosburg,” in K. Ruh (ed.), Abendländische Mystik im Mittelalter (Stuttgart: Metzler, 
1986), p. 125–134; M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, “Filosofia della natura e filosofia dell’intelletto in 
Teodorico di Freiberg e Bertoldo di Moosburg,” in K. Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu 
Meister Eckhart (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), p. 115–127; E. Paschetto, “L’Elementatio theologica 
di Proclo e il Commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg. Alcuni aspetti della nozione de causa,” 
Filosofia 27(1976), p. 353–378.
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distinct modes of existence; and finally, the way Berthold justifies the grada-
tion of beings described in the Elements using hylomorphic terminology. It will 
become clear that, far from being disconnected, these themes represent three 
sides of a unified and original theory of forms through which, besides his first 
ambition to explain the eternal realities and the beyond-wisdom contained in 
the Elements, Berthold also takes positions on important debates of his time.
2	 The	Identification	of	Light	and	Form
2.1 Berthold’s Sources
One of the fundamental principles lying at the core of Berthold’s conception of 
form is its identification with light, which underlies the constant comparison 
between the process of emanation and the diffusion of light. The image of light 
is arguably central to every Neoplatonic doctrine, but it acquired a particu-
lar importance in the school of Cologne and especially in Berthold’s system.5 
More than a simple metaphor of creation, light diffusion came to represent 
a theoretical model for the mechanism of emanation. Translated into more 
technical concepts, the thesis of a diffusion of essences from the divine unity 
to created beings is captured by the expression forma fluens describing this 
essential dynamism, which Berthold analyzes in Proposition 18. The associa-
tion between the notions of form and flux echoes one of the most important 
debates in 14th-century natural philosophy about the definition of motion.6 
Quite unrelated to this debate in Berthold’s work, the expression rather takes 
us back to Albert the Great.
Albert mainly presented this concept in his De causis et processu universi-
tatis. In this work, Albert called forma fluens the process by which divine per-
fections flow from higher realities to the sensible world.7 This phrase enabled 
5 B. Faës de Mottoni, “Il problema della luce nel commento di Bertoldo di Moosburg 
all’Elementatio theologica di Proclo,” in Studi medievali 16(1975), p. 325–352.
6 A. Maier, “Die Wesensbestimmung der Bewegung,” in Die Vorläufer Galileis im 14. Jh. (Roma: 
Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1949), p. 9–25; A. Maier, “Forma fluens oder fluxus formae,” in 
Zwischen Philosophie und Mechanik (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 1958), p. 61–143; 
J.M.M.H. Thijssen, “The Debate over the Nature of Motion: John Buridan, Nicole Oresme and 
Albert of Saxony. With an Edition of John Buridan’s Quaestiones super libros Physicorum, 
secundum ultimam lecturam, Book III, Q. 7,” in Early Science and Medicine 14/1(2009), 
p. 186–210.
7 S. Milazzo, La théorie du fluxus chez Albert le Grand. Principes philosophiques et appli-
cations théologiques, PhD diss. (Université de Metz, 2007) <url:https://hal.univ 
-lorraine.fr/tel-01749027/document>; A. de Libera, Métaphysique et noétique. Albert le Grand 
(Paris: Vrin, 2005), p. 143–209; T.M. Bonin, Creation as Emanation. The Origin of Diversity in 
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Albert to reconcile the vertical dimension of formal causation with the idea of 
participation suggested by the image of flux, while insisting on the difference 
between the notion of flux and the usual four Aristotelian causes.8 In his works, 
Albert already suggested a link between his theory of universals and the nature 
of light. He explained how universals, in other words, forms or essences, could 
be related at the same time to distinct individuals and have distinct modes of 
existence (ante rem, in re, post rem). Albert’s conception of universals allowed 
forms to exist as intelligible models, in concrete beings, or in the intellect while 
remaining self-identical as essences.9 To this extent, the properties of light cor-
respond to Albert’s views on essences: the nature of light is such that it remains 
the same in its source and in the medium in which it is propagated. For this 
reason, the flux of forms can be conceived in terms of light. This identification 
of light and form therefore enables Albert to ground the thesis according to 
which forms remain essentially the same in their source and in their medium 
of diffusion, so to speak.10
On this point, however, Albert’s influence on Berthold is only one among 
others. One of his most important sources is the Liber de intelligentiis of 
Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, which draws on the notion of light as well as optical 
Albert the Great’s On the Causes and Procession of the Universe (Notre Dame: Notre Dame 
University Press, 2001).
8  Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, ed. W. Fauser (Münster 
i.W.: Aschendorff, 1993), lib. i, tr. 4, c. 1, p. 42-43, l. 38-3: Non enim fluit nisi id quod unius for-
mae in fluente et in eo in quo fluit fluxus. Sicut rivus eiusdem formae est cum fonte, a quo fit 
fluxus, et aqua in utroque est eiusdem speciei et formae. Quod non semper est in causato et 
causa. Est enim quaedam causa aequivoce causa. Similiter non idem est fluere quod univoce 
causare. Causa enim et causatum univoca in alio causant aliquando. A fonte autem a quo fit 
fluxus non fluit nisi forma simplex absque eo quod aliquid transmutet in subiecto per motum 
alterationis vel aliquem alium. […] Fluxus est simpliciter emanatio formae a primo fonte, qui 
omnium formarum est fons et origo.
9  Albert the Great, Physica, ed. P. Hossfeld (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1987), lib. i, tr. 1, c. 6, 
p. 10; Albert the Great, Super Porphyrium de V Universalibus, ed. M. Santos Noya (Münster 
i.W.: Aschendorff, 2004), 2, 3, p. 24; Albert the Great, Metaphysica, ed. B. Geyer (Münster 
i.W.: Aschendorff, 1960), lib. v, tr. 6, c. 5, p. 285. On Albert the Great’s theory of univer-
sals, see T. Noone, “Albert and the Triplex universale”, in I.M. Resnick (ed.), A Companion 
to Albert the Great. Theology, Philosophy and the Sciences (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2013), 
p. 619–626; de Libera, Métaphysique et noétique, p. 211–264; A. de Libera, La querelle des 
universaux. De Platon à la fin du Moyen Âge (Paris: Seuil, 1996), p. 177–206; A. Bertolacci, 
“Le citazioni implicite testuali della Philosophia prima di Avicenna nel Commento alla 
Metafisica di Alberto Magno: analisi tipologica”, in Documenti e Studi sulla Tradizione 
Filosofica Medievale 12(2001), p. 179–274; G. Wieland, Untersuchungen zum Seinsbegriff im 
Metaphysikkommentar Alberts des Grossen (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1972), p. 41–46.
10  Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. v, tr. 6, c. 5, p. 285, l. 73–77.
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concepts, such as diffusion and reflection, to explain the process of creation.11 
From the Liber de intelligentiis, Berthold borrows the idea of treating notions 
such as light refraction, multiplication or radiation not only in their physi-
cal meaning but also in a metaphysical sense. The diffusion of light and its 
reflection, in particular, can serve to model the processive and conversive 
movements of the emanative flux.12 But Berthold’s closest source for the iden-
tification of light diffusion and formal causality is Ulrich of Strassburg. More 
than in Albert’s works, the comparison of form and light in Ulrich’s thought 
not only represents a figure of speech, but expresses a relation of identity 
between the two terms, including when the meaning of light is broadened 
from its physical sense to the analysis of creation. In this respect, the divine 
activity of producing all existing forms is an intellectual light.13 Ulrich’s work 
ties together Albert’s theory of universals and the identification of light and 
form.14 Because Ulrich does not integrate these views to a radical henology – 
like Berthold will do – the notions of light and form remain associated with the 
concept of being. As a consequence, the equivalence of light, form and being is 
an essential aspect of the De summo bono.15
Berthold takes up these convergent influences. Like Ulrich, frequently cited 
when he tackles the topic, Berthold takes light from a metaphysical point of 
view as more than a mere metaphor. In the Exposition, light is also defined as 
11  Adam Pulchrae Mulieris, De intelligentiis, in C. Baeumker (ed.), Witelo, ein Philosoph und 
Naturforscher des XIII. Jahrhunderts (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1908), p. 1–71. The influ-
ence of this work on Berthold has been analyzed in detail by de Libera; see A. de Libera, 
La mystique rhénane, d’Albert le Grand à Maître Eckhart (Paris: Seuil, 1994), p. 410–423.
12  A. de Libera, La mystique rhénane, p. 419sq.
13  Ulrich de Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 1, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1989), lib. 
i, tr. 1, c. 2, p. 9, l. 71–72: […] lumen divini intellectus, quod est hypostasis omnium formarum.
14  Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 4–5, ed. S. Tuzzo, lib. iii, tr. 4, c. 
7, §2, p. 32, l. 22–32; De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 3, ed. A. Palazzo, lib. iv, tr. 3, c. 2, 
§30, p. 37, l. 503–505; on the reception of Albert’s doctrine in Ulrich, see A. de Libera, 
“Ulrich de Strasbourg, lecteur d’Albert le Grand,” in Freiburger Zeitschrift für Philosophie 
und Theologie 32(1985), p. 105–136.
15  See for instance Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 1–4, ed. A. de Libera, 
lib. ii, tr. 3, c. 4, §3, p. 55, l. 35–39; lib. ii, tr. 3, c. 5, §3, p. 65, l. 52–53; Ulrich of Strassburg, 
De summo bono. Liber 2, Tractatus 5–6, ed. A. Beccarisi, lib. ii, tr. 5, c. 10, §2, p. 60, l. 30–31; 
Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 3, Tractatus 4–5, ed. S. Tuzzo, lib. iii, tr. 5, c. 
6, §5, p. 80, l. 131–133; Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. Liber 4, Tractatus 1–2,7, ed. 
S. Pieperhoff, lib. iv, tr. 2, c. 5, §18, p. 104, l. 328–329; Ulrich of Strassburg, De summo bono. 
Liber 4, Tractatus 2,8–14, lib. iv, tr. 3, c. 1, §14, p. 11, l. 219–220. See F.J. Lescoe, God as First 
Principle in Ulrich of Strasbourg: Critical text of Summa de bono, IV, 1 (Alba House: New 
York, 1979), p. 113sq; C. Putnam, “Ulrich of Strasbourg and the Aristotelian Causes,” in 
J.K. Ryan (ed.), Studies in Philosophy and the History of Philosophy, vol. 1 (Washington, D.C.: 
The Catholic University of America Press, 1961), p. 139–159.
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the first form, and this identification results in a systematic analogy between 
the causal activity of forms and the mode of action proper to light:
De primo notandum, quod ‘forma probatur per hoc esse, quod prima 
causa est pura lux formalis, et quia causat per essentiam suam, sequitur 
necessario, quod eius effectus sit diffusio formalitatis: hoc enim est cau-
salitas essentialis, sicut lux essentiali causalitate et formali nihil causat 
nisi lumen, talis autem diffusio est formale esse omnium’.16
2.2 Berthold’s Metaphysics of Light
Insofar as Berthold grants to light an eminent role, he is willing to define it as 
a special type of form. Light enjoys a particular status, for its features are dif-
ferent from the process of information typical of other forms. Like an essential 
cause, the diffusion of light entails the presence in another subject of the same 
form having a different being (secundum aliud esse).17 According to Berthold, 
this property is not exemplified only by physical light. In Proposition 36, he 
distinguishes three types of light: natural, intellectual and supersubstantial. 
Whereas intellectual light pertains to the level of intelligence, supersubstantial 
light refers to the divine activity of emanation. On the basis on this distinction, 
Berthold can establish a series of analogies between these different types of 
light through a principle of proportionality, e.g. between physical and intellec-
tual light: “omnino eodem modo proportionaliter se habet in luce intellectuali, 
sicut dictum est de luce corporali”.18 By virtue of its immaterial character, intel-
lectual activity is analogous to the transparency of an illuminated medium. 
Because of its simplicity, intellectual light is analogous to the com-penetration 
of physical light on the sensible plane. The multiplication of light reflects on 
the sensible plane the diffusing process of intellectual perfection that Berthold 
16  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 112D, p. 27, l. 73–77, cited from Ulrich of Strassburg, De 
summo bono, lib. iv, tr. 2, c. 5, §2, p. 94, l. 18–23.
17  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propo- 
sitiones 35–65, ed. A. Sannino (Hamburg: Meiner, 2001), 36A, p. 15, l. 14–20: […] lux et color, 
ratione suae originis, quae est lumen in perspicuo, et hoc sive terminato quoad colorem 
sive conculcato quoad lucem, ex proprietate naturae suae non sic absolute informant sua 
subiecta sicut aliae formae physicae, puta calor et huiusmodi, sed informant ea in quodam 
ordine ad extra sua subiecta, quo scilicet se ipsas diffundant et multiplicent et faciant extra 
sua subiecta in alia, et hoc secundum aliud esse, quam habeant in suo proprio subiecto. See 
also 36D, p. 16, l. 44–50.
18  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 36E, p. 19, l. 165–166; see also 36B, p. 17, l. 105; 37B, p. 24, 
l. 81–82; p. 25, l. 111.
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defines as a forma radians19 in order to express its communicability.20 Just 
like a polished surface does not retain physical light but transmits it without 
modifying its nature, one being reflects intellectual light toward another one 
without altering its essence.21 Thus, the reflection of physical light provides a 
theoretical model for explaining the conversive movement of created intel-
lects toward their cause.
But this analogy can also be extended to analyze the activity of the divine 
(supersubstantial) light. More precisely, Berthold intends to conceptualize 
in terms of light diffusion the Neoplatonic thesis according to which created 
beings continuously depend on the causal flux of the first cause. To do so, 
Berthold needs to translate the purity and immediateness of this vertical cau-
sality into the vocabulary of hylomorphism. To this end, he relies on an inter-
esting aspect of Dietrich of Freiberg’s own theory of formal causation, namely 
his theory of forma perfectionalis. In several works, Dietrich had defined par-
ticular entities that he called perfectional forms.22 Perfectional forms have 
four properties: their inherence in substances depends on prior dispositions; 
they are not composed of genus and species; they do not appear through con-
tinuous motion, but through direct transmutation; they do not have proper 
contraries.23 This concept is an original construction of Dietrich’s that does not 
fully correspond to the usual meaning of the scholastic term perfectio: the soul 
of an animate being, for instance, cannot be counted as a perfectional form. 
According to Dietrich, perfectional forms belong to the class of secondary acts, 
even though a secondary act is not necessarily such a form (for instance, the 
act of speaking in comparison with the ability to speak is not such a form). 
Since they do not meet any resistance from contraries, perfectional forms are 
not progressively educed from the potency of matter but immediately appear 
when actualized. Furthermore, these forms are not composed of genus and 
species. Since being in potency requires the existence of a genus, perfectional 
19  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 36A, p. 15, l. 13–14; p. 16, l. 43; 36D, p. 19, l. 156; 37A, p. 22, 
l. 14, p. 23, l. 49–60.
20  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 36D, p. 19, l. 167–170.
21  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 37A, p. 23–24, l. 68–70: Quoniam igitur impossibile est 
superficiem politam in eo, quod polita, recipere aliquam formam naturalem absolute infor-
mantem et quiescentem in ea et denominantem ipsam, sed solum secundum transmissio-
nem et fluxum in aliud […].
22  Dietrich of Freiberg, De natura contrariorum, ed. R. Imbach (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980), 
p. 109–114; Dietrich of Freiberg, Utrum in Deo sit aliqua vis cognitiva inferior intellectu, ed. 
M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1983), p. 313–314; Dietrich of Freiberg, De luce et 
eius origine, ed. R. Rehn (Hamburg: Meiner, 1985), p. 20.
23  Dietrich of Freiberg, De natura contrariorum, ed. R. Imbach (Hamburg: Meiner, 1980), c. 
39–45, p. 109–114.
396 Roudaut
forms do not exist in potency within a subject, which explains that the exter-
nal agent communicates its own essence to it. From these properties, Dietrich 
deduced that perfectional forms imply a relation of constant and immediate 
ontological dependence to another agent. He considered them as particular 
kinds of forms different from substantial and accidental forms. Dietrich first 
used this notion in the Quaestio utrum in Deo to explain the status of human 
intellectual understanding and took as examples the acts of sensation and 
those of the possible intellect. But the most frequent example and the main 
application of this notion is light, which Dietrich describes as a perfectional 
form not only in the De luce et eius origine, but also in his treatise on the nature 
of contraries.
Berthold borrows this concept from Dietrich to explain several theorems 
of the Elements. Commenting on Proposition 79, he quotes large passages of 
Dietrich’s Tractatus de natura contrariorum to explain how in certain cases a 
perfection can be instantaneously actualized and not continuously educed 
from potency to act.24 But most of all, Berthold merges Ulrich’s identification of 
light and form together with Dietrich’s theory of perfections when comment-
ing on Proposition 143, which contains an explicit reference to light. Berthold 
takes advantage of Dietrich’s concept of perfectional form which allows him 
to explain the modalities of divine illumination described in the proposition: 
“Omne quidem, quod alienum a divino lumine fit, illustratur autem omne 
subito a diis”. Berthold needs to justify the immediate character of illumina-
tion cast upon creatures expressed by the adverb subito in the proposition. For 
doing so, Berthold relies on a comparison between light in its physical, intel-
lectual, and supersubstantial aspects, which is justified by the fact that every 
type of light comes from the divine form as its ultimate cause.25
However, Berthold mentions several arguments designed to show that cog-
nitive processes cannot be instantaneous. Quoting Alhazen’s De aspectibus, 
Berthold notes that complex understanding such as the intellection of a syl-
logism made of several propositions seem to require some time, just like vision 
in the sensible order.26 Nonetheless, Berthold shows that understanding must 
24  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propo- 
sitiones 66–107, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 79 E–F, p. 95, l. 147–157; p. 96, 
l. 191–202; p. 97, l. 212–217. See also 72C, p. 39, l. 41.
25  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 136–159, ed. F. Retucci (Hamburg: Meiner, 2007), 143L, p. 69, l. 321–324: Unde 
etiam quaelibet forma, quanto minus habet huius luminis per obumbrationem materiae, 
tanto deformior est et alienior a divino luminae, et quanto plus habet huius luminis per 
elevationem supra naturam, tanto pulchrior est.
26  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 143O, p. 72–73, l. 435–450.
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be instantaneous, since intellectual light – just like physical light – implies an 
immediate relation to an actualizing cause. To do so, he quotes paragraph 44 
of the Tractatus de natura contrariorum where Dietrich concluded that per-
fections only exist by an immediate actualization from an external agent.27 
Berthold then applies this description to the divine light by an a fortiori argu-
ment. Given that physical illumination is an instantaneous actualization, and 
not a continuous process, it will necessarily be true of divine light, which is 
more perfect than physical light.28 Thus, in order to justify the immediate rela-
tion of created beings to the divine, Berthold ties together his metaphysical 
interpretation of light and Dietrich’s theory of perfectional forms. Moreover, 
unlike Dietrich, Berthold extends the concept of perfectional forms to any 
operation in the natural and supernatural world,29 allowing him to emphasize 
the hierarchical dependence of the created universe from the higher levels of 
reality within the framework of an emanative cosmology.
This point is indicative of Berthold’s general attitude toward his sources 
for constructing his theory of forms, and more particularly toward Dietrich. 
Here, we can see him extending a notion that was not designed to serve this 
purpose in Dietrich’s thought. Dietrich considered as an important princi-
ple the Aristotelian axiom that everything tends towards its own perfection. 
According to him, this end is immediately achieved only in intellects per essen-
tiam semper in actu, whereas other beings need additional operations to real-
ize their nature. But even in his later writings (the De luce and the De natura 
contrariorum), Dietrich used the concept of “perfectional forms” to explain the 
physical properties of light and never directly exploited this notion to concep-
tualize the cosmological order, i.e. to describe the separate intelligences and 
their operations. Berthold’s metaphysical expansion of this concept is notable 
27  Dietrich of Freiberg, Tractatus de natura contrariorum, c. 43–44, p. 113: Quamvis autem hoc 
genus formarum, quas perfectiones voco, sint naturae extraneae a subiecto sicut et hae for-
mae, quae sunt entium principia, quia tamen in natura perfectionum non distinguitur inter 
actum et potentiam, per consequens non reperietur in eis distinctio inter formam generis 
et speciei. […] Unde per consequens huiusmodi formae, quod saepe dixi perfectiones, non 
habent fieri per motum, sed per simplicem transmutationem eo, quod motus non est nisi de 
forma in formam, quae sunt eiusdem generis secundum Philosophum in X Metaphysicae.
28  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 143O–P, p. 73, l. 455–470: Sed magister Theodoricus trac-
tatu De natura oppositorum 44 cap. oppositum sentit, ostendendo formas perfectionales 
‘fieri non per motum, sed simplicem transmutationem’ et per consequens ‘unaquaeque 
earum secundum se et absolute respicit suum perfectibile, et ideo adest et abest modo sim-
plici et indivisibiliter suo perfectibili secundum simplicem et instantaneam dependentiam a 
sua causa’. Et sic visio et illuminatio medii secundum eum fit in instanti. See also 78E, p. 89, 
l. 125.
29  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 44B, p. 74, l. 61–64.
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from the way he describes the actualization of such forms. Dietrich described 
it as a “simple transmutation” to emphasize its immediate character by con-
trast with continuous motion.30 Berthold takes a further step and refers to the 
actualization of these indivisible perfections as a “simple emanation” (“non 
per motum et transmutationem, sed per simplicem emanationem”).31 From 
this perspective, it appears clearly that Berthold aims to provide a rigorous 
account of emanation by enriching the terminology of hylomorphism. The 
concept of perfectional forms allows him to give the notion of intellectual light 
a literal meaning, and to provide a rigorous justification for referring to God as 
the first light.32
3 Forms and Universality
3.1 Berthold’s Sources
The temporal modalities of illumination are not the only properties that 
Berthold needs to prove in order to ground his metaphysics of light. Following 
his main sources on this theme – i.e. Albert, Ulrich, and Adam Pulchrae 
Mulieris – he also needs to explain how the essence of perfections remains the 
same despite the division and multiplication following their diffusion from the 
first cause. The emanative process of creation, understood as the descending 
movement of a formal flux, requires the elaboration of a theory of essence 
as a principle capable of different modes of being. In other words, Berthold’s 
doctrine of emanation requires a theory of universal essence. Interestingly, 
whereas his realism of universals is in line with his Dominican predecessors, 
Berthold has his own distinctive strategy for presenting the universal forms. 
His theory of universals gives a new direction to Albert the Great’s views on the 
reality of forms ante rem that are separate from concrete individuals. Berthold’s 
distinction between two types of universals – praedicationis (logical) and sepa-
rationis (theological) – not only serves to attribute the theory of transcendent 
universals to the “true” Platonici and to defend them against Aristotle; it also 
lays the foundation for a dynamic conception of forms. Berthold’s realism 
about universals is much more than a mere semantical standpoint: building on 
Dietrich’s identification of form and essence,33 Berthold’s theory of universal 
30  Dietrich of Freiberg, De natura contrariorum, c. 44, p. 113, l. 11–14.
31  Correction of the cptma edition, which gives enumerationem (143P, p. 73, l. 468) instead 
of emanationem (cf. MS Oxford, Balliol College Library, 224B, f. 212va; MS Vat. lat. 2192, 
f. 222rb).
32  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 143K–L, p. 68–70, l. 290–358.
33  Dietrich of Freiberg, Tractatus de quiditatibus entium, eds R. Imbach, J.-D. Cavigioli 
(Hamburg: Meiner, 1983). It must be noted that despite his proximity with Dietrich on the 
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essence allows him to conceive “forms” as dynamic principles contributing to 
the ontological production of the universe from the higher spheres of reality 
to the sensible plane.
In fact, the singularity of Berthold’s theory of forma universalis lies in the 
different authorities summoned to justify his realist position on the subject. 
The most distinctive feature of his theory of universal forms is his frequent 
and at times surprising use of Ibn Gabirol’s Fons Vitae, which Albert the Great 
had strongly criticized.34 Considering only his exposition on Proposition 177, 
Berthold quotes this work no less than twenty-six times.35 Several of these 
quotations are significant passages meant to justify Berthold’s own ideas. 
However, this use is surprising because among the Neoplatonic materials 
available to him, something could hardly be more distant from the system 
Berthold intends to build than Ibn Gabirol’s ontology. It cannot be excluded 
that Berthold’s reliance on authors – like Thomas of York36 – more open to 
Ibn Gabirol’s ideas than his Dominican sources explains to a certain extent 
the numerous citations from the Jewish philosopher. In any case, the ideas 
exposed in the Fons Vitae do not fit at first sight with his doctrine.37 Following 
the Dominican tradition – and not only the Albertist school – Berthold rejects 
analysis of substantial forms, Berthold describes the hylomorphic compound as being 
made up from two essences – something that Dietrich would strictly deny (Expositio 
super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 184–211, ed. L. Sturlese [Hamburg: 
Meiner, 2014], 193E, p. 104, l. 139–141: […] ut composita ex materia et forma: est enim ibi 
unum esse, sed duae essentiae sibi mutuo unitae essentialiter). The coexistence of the two 
essential parts in the hylomorphic compound represents the converse relation of an 
essential cause, since it implies identity in esse but difference secundum essentiam (193E, 
p. 104, l. 139); see also 1B, p. 75, l. 138–139.
34  B. McGinn, “Ibn Gabirol, The Sage among the Schoolmen,” in L.E. Goodman (ed.), 
Neoplatonism and Jewish Thought (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 
p. 77–110, esp. p. 96–98. On the influence of the Fons Vitae on Albert’s theory of the formal 
flux, see Bonin, Creation as Emanation, p. 15, p. 96–98, n. 1–3.
35  Berthold’s quotations from Avicebron are numerous, especially on the on the theme of 
form and matter: in Proposition 3 (11 citations); Prop. 4 (14); Prop. 24 (14); Prop. 34 (9); 
Prop. 36 (3); Prop. 80 (3); Prop. 83 (4); Prop. 98 (5); Prop. 135 (6); Prop. 145 (5); Prop. 159 
(6); Prop. 170 (20); Prop. 172 (7); Prop. 173 (4); Prop. 177 (26); Prop. 187 (9). On Avicebron’s 
influence on Berthold, see A. Beccarisi’s contribution in this volume.
36  On Thomas of York’s influence on Berthold and the transmission of Neoplatonic materi-
als through his Sapientiale, see F. Retucci’s contribution in this volume; see also E. King, 
“Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg’s Expositio super Elementationem theologicam 
Procli,” in D. Calma (ed.), Reading Proclus and the Book of Causes. Volume 1. Westerly 
Scholarly Debates and Networks (Leiden / Boston: Brill, 2019), p. 394–437.
37  For an introduction to Avicebron’s metaphysics, see S. Pessin, Ibn Gabirol’s Theology of 
Desire: Matter and Method in Jewish Medieval Neoplatonism (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013); J. Schlanger, La philosophie de Salomon Ibn Gabirol (Leiden: Brill, 
1968).
400 Roudaut
the binarium famossissimum, i.e. the two famous ideas constituting the doctri-
nal core of the Fons Vitae.
On the one hand, Berthold does not subscribe to the plurality of substantial 
forms in concrete substances.38 He clearly aligns himself with Dietrich’s way of 
defending the position that only one substantial form can be present in a com-
pound substance. The faculties of a being do not indicate different substantial 
forms, but only different parts of the soul that are virtually included in the 
unique form inhering in matter. As such, a soul is a single form that is ontologi-
cally simple, even though it can be analyzed in several formales intentiones or 
principia formalia.39 The phrases “formal intentions” and “formal principles” 
are taken up from Dietrich and, as we will see below, play a central role in 
Berthold’s theory of forms.40 Just like Dietrich, Berthold employs them to refer 
to intelligible features representing the parts of a thing’s definition, the partes 
ante totum constituting the nature of a form.41 Thus, there is only one substan-
tial form present in a given compound, even if this form can be decomposed, 
so to speak, into different formal intentions.
On the other hand, Berthold rejects universal hylomorphism, the view 
according to which every substance without exception is composed from 
matter and form. Nonetheless, his relation to Ibn Gabirol’s doctrine is more 
38  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 187E, p. 51, l. 310–313: Dico autem istas tres partes unam 
rationalis animae substantiam essentiare et non esse diversas in corpore, cum nulla forma 
substantialis uniatur corpori subiecto mediante alia forma substantiali, sed forma perfectior 
dat corpori subiecto, quidquid dabat inferior, et adhuc amplius. Unde anima rationalis dat 
corpori humano, quidquid dat anima vegetabilis plantis, quidquid sensibilis brutis, et ali-
quid ulterius, et propter hoc ipsa una anima secundum substantiam est in homine vegeta-
bilis, sensibilis et rationabilis. Cuius signum est, quod, cum operatio unius partis intenditur, 
alterius partis operatio impeditur, et quia redundantia fit unius in aliam. See also 47B, p. 90, 
l. 60–63; 205B, p. 211, l. 87–93.
39  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. 
Propositiones 160–183, eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 171A, p. 110, l. 45–61.
40  Dietrich’s use of the simple term intentiones is by far the most common in his works, 
but he also employs the phrase formales intentiones in several occasions, see for instance 
Tractatus de origine rerum praedicamentalium, 4.21, p. 174, l. 210; 4.33, p. 178, l. 332; De intel-
lectu et intelligibili, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), lib. ii, c. 16, §1, p. 157, l. 34; 
Tractatus de accidentibus, 8.4, p. 64, l. 113. For some occurrences of the phrase principia 
formalia, see Tractatus de origine rerum praedicamentalium, 4.33, p. 178, l. 341–342; 5.44, 
p. 194, l. 445; Quaestio utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita ex materia et forma, ii.25, 
p. 335, l. 267; Tractatus de accidentibus, 3.3, p. 56, l. 62. On Dietrich’s concept of intentions, 
see A. de Libera, “La problématique des intentiones primae et secundae chez Dietrich de 
Freiberg,” in Flasch (ed.), Von Meister Dietrich zu Meister Eckhart, p. 68–94.
41  For the characterization of partes ante totum as principia formalia, see 16A, p. 25, l. 34–35; 
19B, p. 60, l. 87; 32E, p. 211, l. 177–178; 74B, p. 51, l. 49–50; 170H, p. 102, l. 255; 171F, p. 117, 
l. 261–262.
401Founding a Metaphysics of Light in Proclus’ Universe
ambiguous on this point. Berthold acknowledges the authorities of Boethius 
and pseudo-Dionysius stating that spiritual substances are immaterial.42 But, 
in accordance with Proposition 196, he admits the existence of a spiritual body 
or vehicle perpetually associated with the soul. Although this incorruptible 
vehicle is different from the material body, Berthold seems to be commit-
ted to the view that separate forms are always linked to a potential princi-
ple, not unlike the universal matter posited by Ibn Gabirol. Commenting on 
Proposition 187, Berthold rejects the idea that forms contain matter as part 
of their essence. Aiming to justify that no soul can be destroyed, Berthold 
unsurprisingly denies that the human souls and intellects contain matter as an 
essential part. He gets to this conclusion by an argument from lesser to greater, 
showing that since vegetative and sensitive souls themselves do not possess an 
essential relation to matter, it will be impossible to attribute such a relation to 
higher forms.43 Even the form of a stone as a form is immaterial. Indeed, the 
hylomorphic composition of the form itself would lead to an infinite regress, 
insofar as the formal part of this composition will also have its own matter, like 
any element of the compound will have its co-principle, and so on.
3.2 Universal Hylomorphism and the Problem of the First Principles
Nonetheless, Berthold finds a useful resource in Ibn Gabirol’s idea of a universal 
form whose progressive multiplication generates the created world. Therefore, 
he sets up an original strategy to legitimize the meaning of universal matter, 
existing at every level of creation according to Ibn Gabirol.44 Having exten-
sively quoted the Fons Vitae in Proposition 159, Berthold eventually rejects 
universal hylomorphism as a literal interpretation of Proclus’s statement that 
42  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159C, p. 193–194, l. 139–149; 187C, p. 48–49, l. 214–219. 
According to Berthold, these theological authorities are in line with Aristotle’s opinion on 
the subject.
43  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 187A, p. 43, l. 39-53: Si igitur aliquam inveniamus formam 
minus nobilem anima rationali vel totali, quae non habet materiam, omnis anima, de qua 
agitur, erit omnino immaterialis. Medium istius rationis apparet, quia lapideitas, quae est 
forma lapidis, inquantum forma non habet materiam, alias enim procederetur in infinitum. 
Ergo nec forma vegetabilis nec sensibilis nec rationalis nec intellectualis nec divina habe-
bunt in sui essentia materiam. Et ipse Averroes videtur hoc probare specialiter de forma seu 
anima vegetabili, quia nulla forma, quae non est aliquid praeter hoc, quod est forma, habet 
materiam aliam quam subiectum, cuius est forma, alias enim secundum totale esse suum 
non esset in ratione formae. Quod vero anima vegetabilis in plantis et sensibilis in animali-
bus sint tales formae, manifestum est, quia, si essent aliquid praeter hoc, quod sunt formae et 
actus corporum, iam non essent virtutes in corpore, nec penderet earum esse ex corpore, cum 
essent aliquid in se praeter corpora. Si igitur formae ignobiliores sunt simplices et immate-
riales, multo fortius animae nobiles erunt formae omnino immateriales.
44  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159B, p. 191, l. 75–77.
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Limit and Infinity are the first principles of every composite being.45 Matter 
cannot be regarded as an universal principle, because it represents a part of 
physical substances and as such does not exist in angels and supernatural 
beings. However, Berthold offers more acceptable interpretations of this idea:
Proprie enim materia dicitur, ubi est admixta privationi, propter quam 
ipsa est principium transmutationis.
Minus autem proprie seu communiter dicitur de materia, ubi non est 
admixta privationi, sicut est in caelo, et tamen est ibi sub situ et dimen-
sione, unde et nominatur subiectum potius quam materia ab Averroe 
super viii Metaphysicae.
Communius dicitur materia, ubi nec subicitur privationi nec situi, sed 
tantum dicit potentiale, quod subicitur actui, et sic est in anima partiali 
et creatura spirituali, scilicet in angelis. Et hoc vult dicere Rabbi Moses in 
libro, quem vocat Matrem philosophiae cap. 75: ‘Omne, inquit, quod est in 
potentia ad aliquid, attinet materiae, quia possibilitas semper invenitur 
in materia’, actus vero attribuitur formae.
Communissime dicitur materia, ubi etiam excluso tali potentiali 
solum dicit potentiam determinativam actualis, ubi determinans, scili-
cet minus actuale, et determinatum, scilicet magis actuale, coincidunt in 
eandem essentiam et naturam re, licet differant intentione, et talis mate-
ria est in animabus nobilibus, intellectualibus hypostasibus et omnibus 
entibus citra deos.46
Thus, in a broader sense, matter can also refer to the principle devoid of priva-
tion existing in heavenly bodies, and even to the sort of potentiality that can 
be found in the partial souls or spiritual creatures like angels. But in the largest 
sense (communissime) matter refers to an actual potency of determination in 
which the more actual is not essentially distinct from the less actual, but only 
intentionally, and in this sense the most noble souls and the intelligences pos-
sess some matter.47
Having detailed the different meanings of the term “matter”, Berthold still 
has to make sense of the idea of a universal form. But the idea of a form pres-
ent in every being does not seem fully compatible with Proclus’s system. In 
Propositions 73 and 74 of the Elements, Proclus establishes a hierarchy between 
45  Proclus, The Elements of Theology, p. 138–139.
46  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159C, p. 194, l. 152-166.
47  On the distinction between three types of matter (with a reference to Thomas of York), 
see also 187C, p. 47–48.
403Founding a Metaphysics of Light in Proclus’ Universe
wholes, forms, and being. In Proposition 73, Proclus demonstrates that Being 
is superior to Wholeness, since every whole participates Being, while the con-
verse is false.48 Similarly, according to Proposition 74 of the Elements, eidos, 
which is rendered in the Latin version by species, is posterior to Being, since 
every form is a being, while the converse is false (for instance, privation is still 
a sort of being, but not a form). Wholes are prior to Forms, because the lat-
ter are already cut (ἤδη τεμνόμενον) – i.e. divided – into distinct individuals.49 
Thus, Forms are posterior to Wholes, which are less universal than Being but 
more universal than Forms.50 In this perspective, forms, strictly speaking, 
only belong to the intellectual level, and not to the divine realm, so that the 
phrase forma universalis should be restricted to the Intellect. The Intellect, full 
of forms, can be properly said to be a universal form in the sense that it con-
tains all intelligible models of species, as stated by Proposition 177 and as Ibn 
Gabirol showed in his Fons Vitae.51
At this point, Berthold seems to be caught between the conflicting sources 
he is willing to harmonize. On the one hand, the definition of God as the high-
est or first form represents a classic theme of the Latin theological tradition, 
to which Albert and his followers were not opposed. Berthold himself often 
describes the first cause as formalius, and sometimes refers to it as the prima 
forma.52 But on the other hand, owing to a distinction taken up from the De 
causis,53 Berthold sharply differentiates the causal activity of the One, operat-
ing per modum creationis, and the secondary causes that operate per modum 
formae. This latter mode of operation can be called information, determi-
nation, or composition.54 Furthermore, according to Ibn Gabirol, the forma 
formarum refers to a created principle. In the Fons Vitae, the concept of 
48  Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Prop. 73, p. 68–69: Πᾶν μὲν ὅλον ἅμα ὄν τί ἐστι, καὶ μετέχει 
τοῦ ὄντος· οὐ πᾶν δὲ ὂν ὅλον τυγχάνει ὄν. [Every whole is at the same time an existent thing, 
and participates Being but not every existent is a whole – trans. Dodds].
49  Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Prop. 74, p. 70–71: Πᾶν μὲν εἶδος ὅλον τί ἐστιν (ἐκ γὰρ 
πλειόνων ὑφέστηκεν, ὧν ἕκαστον συμπληροῖ τὸ εἶδος)· οὐ πᾶν δὲ ὅλον εἶδος. [Every specific 
Form is a whole, as being composed of a number of individuals each of which goes to 
make up the Form; but not every whole is a specific Form – trans. Dodds].
50  On Proclus’s theory of wholes and universals, see L. Siorvanes, Proclus. Neo-Platonic 
Philosophy and Science (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1996), p. 67–71.
51  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 177A, p. 173, l. 16–20. See also 173A, p. 127–129.
52  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 112D, p. 27, l. 82, l. 85.
53  Liber de causis, Prop. XVII(XVIII), p. 86. On the per creationem/per modum formae distinc-
tion in Berthold, see Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg, p. 30–31, 
p. 178, p. 403; E. Ludueña, “Creatio y determinatio en la Escuela Renana: de Alberto Magno 
a Bertoldo de Moosburg”, in Princípios: Revista de Filosofia 22/37(2015), p. 77–97.
54  In this context, the phrases “information” and “determination” are taken up from Albert 
the Great and Dietrich of Freiberg (3A, p. 93, l. 37, n. 6), whereas the term “composition” 
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universal form refers to the highest created principle of the universe that gen-
erates every subsequent being by its conjunction with universal matter. In this 
system, form and matter represent universal principles in a double sense: first, 
because they are present in every being;55 second, and most of all, because they 
are the first created principles, whose union generates a series of derived crea-
tures. The First Intelligence,56 distinct souls (rational, sensitive, vegetative),57 
Nature, and finally the physical substance bearing the nine accidents58 repre-
sent the stages of this descending process. The ultimate cause of everything is 
independent from the realm of universal form and matter to which God relates 
only through his will.
Berthold manages to solve this difficulty by reinterpreting in his own way 
the two first principles that Ibn Gabirol called “universal matter” and “uni-
versal form”. Berthold replaces those universal principles with the first One 
(prime unum) and the first infinity (prime infinitas), that is to say the first of 
the six unitates immediately following the first cause.59 Everything comes 
from these two principles, like Proclus demonstrated using the terms Limit 
and Infinity just like, in his own way, Ibn Gabirol with the terms form and 
matter.60 But Berthold’s solution retains something of Ibn Gabirol’s doctrine of 
a co-production of the whole universe from two principles. Indeed, the prime 
infinitas that replaces universal matter accounts for the presence of the inco-
hatio formarum in matter and, in this respect, represents the proper cause of 
multiplicity in the created universe including in the material world.
We can see how, despite many prima facie incompatibilities, Berthold man-
ages to make sense of philosophical material that was not held in high esteem 
by his Dominican predecessors. Berthold does not follow Ibn Gabirol’s scheme 
of universal emanation, in the sense that the series of emanated beings in 
the Fons Vitae is quite different from the more complex Proclean universe. 
Nonetheless, Berthold agrees with Ibn Gabirol on the equivalence of form and 
universality in a precise sense: what is more universal contains more forms, 
and the first universal cause virtually contains all perfections as well as specific 
models informing the created universe, as Proclus had emphasized. However, 
Berthold cannot have it both ways. His attempt to reconcile Ibn Gabirol with 
(denoting the relation between form and matter) stems from Gundissalinus’s De proces-
sione mundi (4A, p. 104, l. 100).
55  Avicebron, Fons vitae, ed. C. Baeumker (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1995), lib. i, c. 5, p. 7–8.
56  Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. v, c. 10, p. 274; lib. v, c. 11, p. 277.
57  Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. iii, c. 46–49, p. 183–188.
58  Avicebron, Fons vitae, lib. iii, c. 1, p. 73–74.
59  On this point, see Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg, p. 165–219.
60  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 159G, p. 197, l. 265–269.
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Proclus’s henology not only modifies the meaning of the adjective “universal” 
central to Ibn Gabirol’s cosmology, his interpretation also leads him to deviate 
from Proclus’s original text, which did not identify the One with the principle 
of Limit and located it, so to speak, beyond Limit and Infinity.61
3.3 Conceptual Distinctions
The reality of universal essences has a direct implication on the internal 
structure of the universe as Berthold conceives it. Berthold defines an intrin-
sic relation between the universal character of essences and the ontological 
properties Proclus attributed to self-constituted realities (antipostata). This 
relation is characterized owing to Dietrich of Freiberg’s guiding reflections on 
the nature of spiritual substances.62 Drawing on Dietrich’s analysis, Berthold 
considers that pure forms – i.e. purely spiritual entities – are species before 
being individuals, since they are not individuated by quantity nor possess 
partes post totum. In other words, some beings (like hypostatic intellects) that 
Berthold calls entia secundum speciem are such that they are, in a sense, “more 
species than individuals”, insofar as they are alien to the individualizing con-
ditions of material existence. Since these beings are higher principles than 
material entities, their spiritual influence is not limited by matter as in the 
case of concrete individuals. The fact that they are constituted by pure intelli-
gible perfections, themselves undivided but participated by lower individuals, 
explains why Berthold refers to these entities as “species before individuals”. 
This priority must not be understood in a chronological sense, but as a type of 
ontological priority. Concrete individuals, in contrast, are individuals before 
being a species, since the full actualization of their essential properties implies 
the development of material dispositions.63 Matter and the dimensional quan-
tity attached to it give essences a concrete mode of being, which necessarily 
entails a certain partibility characterizing the realm of individuals. The partes 
post totum of a substance (i.e. the integral parts that come along with con-
crete existence) explain that the operations of corporeal souls do not imme-
diately coincide with their essence and are subject to the division entailed by 
quantified matter. However, even in the case of partial souls, whose powers are 
61  Proclus, The Elements of Theology, p. 138–141.
62  Dietrich of Freiberg, Quaestio utrum substantia spiritualis sit composita ex materia et 
forma, ii, p. 335, l. 252–255: Substantiae enim ingenerabiles et incorruptibiles quantum ad 
id, quod sunt, prius natura sunt entia ut simpliciter et secundum speciem quam entia indi-
vidualia; secundario autem et secundo ordine sunt entia individualia.
63  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 187D, p. 50, l. 260–263, l. 272–274; for similar analyses, 
see 20A, p. 67, l. 81–84; 121D, p. 106, l. 52–60. On this point, see K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in 
Dietrich of Freiberg, Schriften zur Naturphilosophie und Metaphysik, p. xxxiii–xxxiv.
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divided into distinct parts, the different faculties are different aspects of one 
single form.
One will note, at this point, that Berthold employs a single concept of form 
to describe quite different realities. As a matter of fact, regarding the different 
status of forms and their equivocal meanings, Berthold makes two important 
distinctions that must be noted. The first is to be found in Proposition 28. Here, 
Berthold makes a distinction between “substantial form”, which refers to a part 
of the compound substance, and what should more properly be called “essen-
tial form”. Whereas the former syntagm should be restricted to designate the 
part of the hylomorphic compound, the latter refers to a form that does not 
inhere in a subject, but whose perfection is nevertheless participated by it. The 
essential form designates an intention that more truly informs a subject with-
out becoming one with it:
Voco autem formam substantialem communi nomine pro forma, quae 
est altera pars compositi, et pro forma essentiali, quae est intentio rea-
lis, quae etiam realius et essentialius omni forma substantiali qualita-
tive informat, cum ipsa non faciat compositionem realem cum subiecto 
suo, forma autem substantialis et subiectum suum ponant in numerum, 
quamvis unum per essentiam suam penetret aliud.64
This distinction echoes the difference Berthold establishes in Proposition 25 
between the term essentia, which should be restricted to the entia secundum 
speciem, and the term substantia that refers to the level of concrete beings 
beginning with celestial bodies.65
A second important distinction can be found in Berthold’s exposition on 
Proposition 194. There, Berthold underlines the difference between the closely 
related terms species and forma or idea, which are very often confused accord-
ing to him. Berthold does not quote the famous remarks made by Augustine on 
this problem,66 but he recalls that the term species refers to the specific reasons 
64  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 28E, p. 177, l. 210–215.
65  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 25C, p. 142, l. 166–172: Dico autem substantiam, secun-
dum quod condividitur contra essentiam, quae est ens ut simpliciter, ut iam dictum est, et 
secundum speciem. Substantia vero est ens hoc cum proprietate individuali. Et sic ratio sub.-
stantiae proprie loquendo in separatis incipit in anima totali, quae unita corpori caelesti 
constituit cum eo unum, cuius potentia sive ratio agendi est substantia caeli, prout est com-
posita ex anima totali et corpori caelesti. See also 178D–E, p. 196, l. 236–253, where Berthold 
tries to establish the compatibility of Plato’s theory of Ideas with Aristotle’s identification 
of formal, final, and efficient causes.
66  Augustine, De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, ed. A. Mutzenbecher (Turnhout: 
Brepols, 1975), p. 70–71.
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making up the essence of things. These specific reasons express intelligible 
features possessing a universal mode of being devoid of individual character. 
By contrast, forma or idea refer rather to the model from which an individual 
entity comes to being. Once again, Berthold follows a distinction that Dietrich 
previously articulated in the De visione beatifica. In this work, Dietrich under-
lined the difference between the rationes rerum present in the divine mind and 
the ideas. Whereas the former only constitute the pure intelligible features of a 
given species that do not determine its individual aspects (therefore constitut-
ing res secundum speciem), the latter phrase refers to the exemplar form from 
which individual things derive.67 In Proposition 194, Berthold employs his col-
lage technique to make his point: making Dietrich’s distinction more precise, 
Berthold adds that ideas exist in mobile causes, whereas species belong to the 
level of hypostatic intellects. The distinction between universal and individual 
form is therefore emphasized and complements the theory of “beings accord-
ing to species”:
Tales autem species differunt ab ideis sive formis; respiciunt enim solum 
res, immo respiciendo constituunt secundum esse specificum simpli-
citer vel prout determinatur ad individuum modo, quo iam dictum est; 
solius autem esse specifici est ratio sive definitio. Ideae autem sunt for-
mae exemplares, secundum quas ad quarum imitationem procedunt res 
secundum esse individuale.
Est et alia differentia specierum et idearum. Species enim, prout sunt 
idem, quod rationes essentiales causales, inexistunt causes simpliciter 
immobili et intransmutabili, qualis est intellectualis hypostasis – sic 
namque species derivatae, utpote intransmutabilis substantiae, proce-
dunt ab immobili causa, per 76 –; ideae autem inexistunt causae vel per 
se mobili vel ex se mobili ratione eius, quod est per se mobile.
Et haec sufficiant de specierum et idearum differentia, si accipiantur 
secundum proprias rationes, licet frequenter unum pro alio accipiatur.68
From this perspective, we can see that the reality of universal essences accord-
ing to Berthold participates to the very structure of the universe. The causal 
dynamism of beings secundum speciem marks the border between these self-
subsistent realities and the sensible world derived from them.
67  Dietrich of Freiberg, De visione beatifica, ed. B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977) 1.2.1.1.3, 
p. 38–39, l. 65–72.
68  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 194D, p. 110–111, l. 100–113.
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4 Describing the Cosmological Order in Terms of Forms
4.1 Forms, Intentions, and Formal Principles: An Extended Hylomorphic 
Vocabulary
By themselves, however, those distinctions appear insufficient to fully charac-
terize the complexity of Proclus’s universe and its numerous ontological lay-
ers. Above the level of the hypostatic Intellect, the six divine beings (prime 
infinitas, prime entitas, prime vitas, prime intellectualitas, prime animealitas, 
prime naturalitas) represent the most formal level of the universe immediately 
following the first One. These entities cannot be adequately described by the 
Aristotelian idea of form understood as an essence composed of genus and 
specific difference. Rather, Berthold describes these entities with the concepts 
of “formal intention” or “formal principle”. The first One is one single intention 
(intentio unius). Since a “formal intention” represents a perfection that can be 
participated by the effects flowing from the first cause, Berthold alternatively 
uses the expression “formal principle” to designate it: “Unum est primum et 
universalissimum principium inter omnia principia formalia”.69 Each god or 
divine unity following the first One (Proclus’s henads) is also constituted by a 
unique intention. However, whereas the first One is unum secundum causam 
principaliformiter,70 the divine unities (to which Berthold also refers to as 
bonitates) are one per essentiam. This difference entails that the gods represent 
different “contractions” of this first One’s unique intention.71 The first divine 
unity (the prime infinitas) is constituted by the intentio infinitatis (or intentio 
virtutis), the second one (the prime entitas) is constituted by the intentio entita-
tis, which is a further contraction of the intentio unius, and so on.
69  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 3E, p. 97, l. 214–215. Berthold favours the phrase inten-
tio for describing the nature of the unitates and the prime unum, and tends to reserve 
principa formalia – that connotes a causal character – for the lower beings composed 
from several of these intelligible features. Nonetheless, he also uses the latter phrase in 
the singular form to designate the first One and the unities; see for instance 190D, p. 83, 
l. 248.
70  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 5D, p. 120, l. 248–250.
71  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 43E, p. 71, l. 177–181: […] rerum sic separatarum quaedam 
stant in una intentione tantum. Et hoc dupliciter, sive simpliciter, ut prime unum, sive con-
tracte, ut bonitates. Et istae cum prime uno proprie et principaliter dicuntur antipostaton 
sicut stantes se ipsis totis et totaliter sub absoluta formali independentia ad omnem aliam 
intentionem. On Berthold’s definition of unities or gods, see E. Ludueña, “Dioses, inteli-
gencias y ángeles de Alberto Magno a Bertoldo de Moosburg”, in Cuadernos de filosofía 
66(2016), p. 47–59.
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Berthold justifies whenever he can his terminology by showing how it fits 
with Proclus’s text, even when his reading does not fully correspond to the 
intended meaning of the Elementatio. For instance, his reading of the term uni-
formis given by William of Moerbeke’s translation of Proposition 160 (“Omnis 
divinus intellectus uniformis est” […]) reverses the original meaning of the 
term ἑνοειδής, which only indicates in Proclus’s text that every divine intellect, 
insofar as it is divine, has the character of unity.72 Berthold reads this passage 
as intended to mean that divine intellects share the same formal intention and, 
to this extent, are essentially identical.73 The divine unities sharing the same 
intention can be called uniform in this sense, which allows Berthold to describe 
in his own terms the relation between God and the unities. This terminology 
also supports Berthold’s claims on the equivalence of light and form. The gods 
are constituted by a single formal intention, just like light in the physical realm 
is the purest form:
Sicut enim lux est maxime formalis et nobilis inter omnes formas sen-
sibiles et habet in se unite et simpliciter et excellenter perfectiones 
omnium qualitatum visibilium adeo, quod etiam sit hypostasis, id est for-
malis subsistentia, omnium colorum, ita bonitas deorum consistit in hoc, 
quod ipsa sola ratione suae supersubstantialitatis est pura et immixta 
et sic omnino formalis nihil habens vel de materia vel materiae condi-
cionibus sibi permixtum, immo nec de aliis intentionibus formalibus 
essentialiter.74
The single intention defining the unities explains their self-subsistent char-
acter. The unities are self-subsistent because they can totally revert upon 
themselves insofar as they are devoid of any internal complexity and repre-
sent different contractions of a unique intention. Berthold’s description of 
the divine beings as formal principles or formal intentions makes the most of 
72  Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Prop. 160, p. 140–141: Πᾶς ὁ θεῖος νοῦς ἑνοειδής ἐστι καὶ 
τέλειος καὶ πρώτως νοῦς, ἀφ᾽ ἑαυτοῦ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους νόας παράγων. [All divine intelligence 
is perfect and has the character of unity; it is the primal Intelligence, and produces the 
others from its own being – trans. Dodds]. William translates the proposition as follows: 
Omnis divinus intellectus uniformis est et perfectus et prime intellectus a se ipso alios intel-
lectus producens. See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 160D, esp. p. 5–6, l. 65–99.
73  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 160D, p. 5, l. 75–77: Prime autem et principaliformiter 
unum, quod est forma superdea, non dicitur proprie ‘uniforme’, sed ‘bonificum’ et unificum 
per commentum 112. Si autem ascribitur sibi nomen ‘uniformis’, hoc est, inquantum dicitur 
‘idem’ […].
74  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 143L, p. 68, l. 301–308.
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the vocabulary he borrows from Dietrich. Dietrich already used the notions 
of “intention” and “contractions” in his own account of the emanative process 
of creation. More precisely, Dietrich employed these notions to conceptualize 
the emanation of the distinct Intellects from God, each of which instantiates 
a more or less universal intention (ens, vivum, rationale).75 Dietrich described 
the series of Intelligences flowing from God as a series of contractions of the 
most formal intention that Dietrich identified with the concept of esse. The 
term “contraction” meant in this context that the subsequent determina-
tions of this first formal intention are less universal than it. Berthold takes up 
this terminology, but he adjusts it to the henology of Proclus with its various 
gods, identifying the more universal and formal intention with the notion of 
oneness.76 As a result, Berthold manages to equate the notions of universality 
and unity together with the concept of form: whatever is universalius is also 
actualius and formalius.
4.2 Composition and Structures of the Formal Intentions
Berthold’s theory of formal principles or formal intentions enables him to 
offer a mereological account of the way the various ontological layers follow-
ing the first One are derived from it. According to Berthold’s reading of the 
Elementatio, the realm of specific forms is made up from a combination of the 
formal intentions constituting the level in between the One and the Intellect.77 
Below the level of the unitates is the series of the infinitates that are composed 
of two intentions, namely the intentio infinitatis and the intentio unius (which 
Berthold also designates as the intentio finitatis due to his identification of 
the first One and Limit). The subsequent series of the enter entia results from 
the combination of three formal principles, i.e. the intentio unius, the intentio 
infinitatis, and the intentio entitatis, and so on.
75  See Dietrich of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, lib. ii, c. 16, §1, p. 157, l. 28–35: Sicut 
autem accepimus rationem generis in supremis intellectibus secundum primam et simpli-
cissimam omnium intentionum entis, scilicet secundum esse, sic sumendum est rationem 
speciei secundum quandam intentionem magis contractam et minus simplicem in his, quae 
sequuntur inferius, scilicet in intellectibus moventibus caelos, et haec intentio est vivum 
inquantum vivum. In ipsis enim primo invenitur ratio vitae quantum ad moventia et mota, et 
ideo haec intentio formalis secundo loco ponitur et immediate post primam omnium inten-
tionum, scilicet ipsum ens, cui mox coordinatur vivum.
76  On the conceptual shifts entailed by Berthold’s henology, see E. King, “Berthold of 
Moosburg on Intellect and the One of the Soul”, in Dionysius 36(2018), p. 184–199.
77  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 43E, p. 71, l. 182–183: Quaedam vero stant in pluribus 
intentionibus. Et hoc dupliciter, quia vel habent respectu ad corpus vel non.
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It must be noted that Berthold attempts a mathematico-metaphysical 
deduction of the numbers of divine beings and highest spiritual entities in gen-
eral. In doing so, Berthold demonstrates a certain familiarity with Boethius’s 
De institutione arithmetica, which conveyed the Platonist and Pythagorean the-
ories of Nicomachus of Gerasa whose reincarnation, as the story goes, Proclus 
was believed to be. Berthold establishes that the first multiplicity must be such 
that it can be divided into three parts, since every essentially ordered series 
includes a beginning, a medium, and an end. The first multiplicity – the divine 
unities – must be composed of six elements, since it is the least number than 
can be decomposed in three equal parts (given that the number 3 can only 
be divided in three elements than are not quantities but three unities).78 The 
number six – the first perfect number79 – allows the first multiplicity to be 
divided into equal parts following an arithmetical proportion. This arithmetic 
proportion, unlike other types of proportion (geometric, harmonic), preserves 
the same difference between the terms of the series and, therefore, expresses 
in spite of this difference their essential identity (identitas unius intentionis).80 
On the basis on such principles, Berthold deduces the number of the subse-
quent series of principles (infinitates, enter entia, vitae, and so on) that result 
from the first series of unities and the different combinations of formal prin-
ciples received from them.81
We can see now how specific forms constituting the intelligible models 
of concrete individuals result from a composition of principia formalia that 
ultimately stem from the first contractions of the intentio unius. Although it 
is unique, the substantial form inhering in a compound substance is made up 
of different formal principles that can be analyzed through its essential defini-
tion. Berthold’s characterization of the formalia principia as partes ante totum 
(parts of the specific definition) complexifies the Proclean notion of a “whole 
prior to the parts” (ὅλον ἐκεῖνο πρὸ τῶν μερῶν) that designates in the Elements 
the first cause of a series of beings depending on it. But this theory of formal 
intentions allows Berthold to conceptualize the internal complexity of spe-
cific forms and to relate it to their ultimate intelligible causes. To this extent, 
the formal intentions or formal principles are the fundamental elements of 
the various degrees of composition present in the cosmological order. This 
expansion of the hylomorphic terminology enables Berthold to analyze the 
78  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 62B, p. 182, l. 61–64.
79  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 62B, p. 182, l. 40.
80  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 62B, p. 183, l. 82.
81  See the table in the cptma edition, Expositio, 62B, p. 184.
412 Roudaut
whole hierarchy of beings in terms of formal composition – something alien 
to Proclus’s Elementatio in which forms are described as mutually intricated at 
the intellectual level.82 As recent studies have shown, Berthold makes the most 
of this mereological account of formal principles through which he bridges 
theological sources quite distant from a terminological point of view (most 
notably Eriugena’s doctrine of the primordial causes).83
One of the most interesting aspects of Berthold’s theory of formal principles 
lies in the fact that he intends not only to use it to explain the constitution of 
specific essences but also the emergence of material reality. Indeed, Berthold 
deduces from the different ways the formal principles can be connected the 
three main classes of beings composing the whole universe. The first class 
comprises formal principles that can be associated with one another at a for-
mal level to constitute specific essences. For the second class, due to a certain 
degree of complexity, the composition of formal principles does not gener-
ate unified essences but results in different natures, producing the sphere of 
bodies (corpora). The process by which the composition of formal principles 
comes to produce material beings is described as a “distraction” (in contrast 
with contraction) from their own nature of principles. Whereas the formal 
principles can combine in a unified and stable manner to produce purely intel-
ligible beings (the entia secundum speciem), the increasing complexity of their 
composition generates natures that become separate from their intelligible 
models and are affected by the multiplicity characterizing the sensible world. 
In accordance with the principle of continuity, a third class must exist where 
the formal intentions produce realities affected by division but still participat-
ing to the intellectual level, that is to say souls.84 In some cases, Berthold fur-
ther details this scale of being. He explains how the celestial souls are located 
in between the celestial bodies and the incorporeal beings which, inasmuch 
as they are defined by a plurality of formal principles, still remain under the 
divine unities consisting in one unique intention:
‘Hoc autem medium necessario triplex, unum quidem per aequidistan-
tiam et duo per approximationem extremorum’. Illud autem medium, 
quod est superiori extremo proximum, est omnis res per se perfecta, 
in qua principia formalia remanent in ratione et natura principiorum 
82  Proclus, The Elements of Theology, Prop. 176, p. 154–155.
83  Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de Moosburg. On Eriugena’s influence on 
Berthold, see also King, “Eriugenism in Berthold of Moosburg”.
84  See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 34D, p. 229–230, l. 325–329; 76I, p. 69–70, l. 178–
192; 80C, p. 100–101, l. 64–73; 91B, p. 159, l. 41–46; 108E, p. 4–5, l. 59–71; 171A, p. 109, l. 14–121; 
187E, p. 51, l. 264–267; 197B, p. 134, l. 50–54.
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simpliciter, et per consequens sunt res ut simpliciter et secundum spe-
ciem. Medium vero, quod est inferiori extremo proximum, est substan-
tia corporis caelestis, in quo, licet sit incorruptibile, tamen principia 
formalia sunt in ea simpliciter distracta in ulteriores naturas, scilicet in 
naturam corporeitatis, et sic est res ut haec et particularis, hoc, inquam, 
medium est immediatum generabilibus et corruptibilibus. Est et medium 
per aequidistantiam, in quo principia formalia nec remanent simpliciter 
in ratione et natura principiorum nec etiam simpliciter distrahuntur in 
alias naturas, puta anima totalis, quae est separata, et sic communicat 
superioribus, et coniuncta corpori, et sic communicat cum inferioribus 
propter respectum ad corpus, a quo superiora sunt penitus absoluta. ‘Et 
sic omnia sunt conexa in virtute, quam conexionem Pythagoras vocavit 
catenam auream’.85
Thus, Berthold maintains the key standpoints of Dietrich’s ontology, and man-
ages to take into account with the same conceptual architecture the level of 
divine beings that Dietrich did not take into account. To this extent, Berthold 
intimately links the core intuition of his emanative model with precise stances 
on contemporary issues, like the status of quantified matter in the process of 
individuation and the thesis of the unicity of form in human beings. These 
positions are articulated through a dynamic conception of essences, which 
flow from the ideal sphere to the physical realm in multiple modes of being.
4.3 The Status of Forms in Matter
The resemblance or dissemblance between the terms of the chain of being can 
now be explained within this extended hylomorphic framework. Although a 
formal cause usually accounts for the resemblance between the cause and its 
effect, since it consists in the transmission of the same essence from one sub-
ject to another, this transmission can happen more or less perfectly. According 
to Berthold, perfect resemblance exists when two things share the same form 
according to the same reason and mode, like the Father and the Son. A less 
perfect resemblance exists when two things share the same form according 
to the same reason but not the same mode, and a still less perfect when they 
share the same form but neither according to the same reason nor the same 
mode.86 To explain these different modalities in the transmission of a same 
form, Berthold uses again the notion of formal intentions along with the couple 
contraction/distraction. Every agent brings about something similar to itself. 
85  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 108E, p. 4–5, l. 59–73.
86  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 28D, p. 177, l. 171–177.
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However, insofar as it does so by transmitting a certain formal intention, this 
intention sometimes remains the same, whereas it is sometimes contracted 
or even “distracted” into other natures, accounting for the various degrees of 
multiplicity that reaches its highest point in the material world.87
However, since they derive from a combination of principia formalia, forms 
possess an intrinsic relation to their intelligible models even at the lowest level 
of matter. On this point, Berthold’s theory of material forms is indebted to 
Albert the Great’s views on the subject, which he follows closely. In Albert’s 
system, the theory of natural generation was based on a certain conception of 
matter, according to which forms somehow already exist in it, even if under 
a potential mode of being called incohatio formae. Interestingly, Albert ana-
lyzed the structure of matter with the same concepts serving to define emana-
tive causality in general, namely the idea of identity secundum essentiam and 
difference secundum esse.88 According to Albert, forms as such are essentially 
identical with their privation in matter. They remain essentially unchanged 
when actualized in it, and only change according to their being. In his 
Metaphysica, this theory was intended to solve the problem of the emergence 
of natural beings. It explains how new forms can arise in nature without hav-
ing to admit their preexistence in matter and without postulating their induc-
tion ab extra by God.89 The idea of an active potency of matter is in line with 
the principle according to which nothing comes from nothing. It also entails 
that matter already contains the disposition for future actualizations. Albert 
called this potency aptitudo formalis and equated it with the concept of ratio-
nes seminales.90
Dietrich of Freiberg also subscribed to the thesis that potential forms in 
matter are identical secundum essentiam with actual forms, although distinct 
from them secundum esse. In his treatise De miscibilibus in mixto, Dietrich took 
87  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 28E, p. 177, l. 231–235.
88  Albert’s theory of matter, along with its associated concepts of active potency and the 
incohatio formae, is disseminated among different works (for instance Physica, lib. i, tr. 3, 
c. 10; De anima, lib. i, tr. 2, c. 7; De caelo, lib. i, tr. 3, c. 4) has been studied in detail, begin-
ning with Nardi’s works (see esp. B. Nardi, “La dottrina d’Alberto Magno sull’ inchoatio for-
mae”, in Studi di filosofia medievale (1960), p. 69–101). For a recent synthesis on the topic, 
see A. Rodolfi, Il concetto di materia nell’opera di Alberto Magno (Firenze: Galluzzo, 2004).
89  Albert the Great, Metaphysica, lib. xi, tr. 1, c. 8, p. 468–471.
90  See P.M. Wengel, Die Lehre von den rationes seminales bei Albert dem Grossen: Eine ter-
minologische und problemgeschichtliche Untersuchung (Würzburg: Mayr, 1937); Nardi, “La 
dottrina d’Alberto Magno sull’ inchoatio formae”.
415Founding a Metaphysics of Light in Proclus’ Universe
care to specify that this idea does not entail the plurality of forms in matter, an 
apparent consequence of this thesis.91
Differentiating the equivocal meanings of the phrase “active potency”,92 
Berthold equally conceives the essentia formae as something permanent 
receiving different modes of being, and takes up the notion of incohatio 
formae.93 Like Dietrich, Berthold refuses the separability of matter from form 
as much as the plurality of forms and, like Albert, he does not make use of 
the literal interpretation of the Dator formarum attributed by Albert to the 
Platonici.94 The most notable aspect of his position lies in his insistence on the 
intimate connection between the potential being of forms in matter and their 
intelligible model. The form understood as the ideal model eternally existing at 
the intellectual level is the constitutive principle of a thing’s essence (princip-
ium constitutivum esse specifici), even for something like a house that is brought 
to being artificially.95 In this respect, specific essences enjoy an eternal mode of 
being in the divine intellect that is independent of their contingent actualiza-
tion in the material world.96 Commenting on Proposition 48, Berthold states 
more precisely in which sense forms are eternal. He demonstrates that the 
91  Dietrich of Freiberg, Tractatus de miscibilibus in mixto, ed. W. Wallace (Hamburg: Meiner, 
1985), 21, p. 46–47.
92  On the notion of potentia activa, see 25C, p. 141–142, where Berthold distinguishes three 
types of active potency, which enables him to deduce three maneries perfectorum. See 
also Berthold, Expositio, 78A–E, p. 86, l. 21–25; p. 89, l. 109–122; 27E, p. 165, l. 144–154. Let us 
note that in Proposition 1B, Berthold defines the potential plurality of forms in matter as 
a “passive potential multitude” (Berthold, Expositio, 1B, p. 74–75, l. 129–135).
93  See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 77G, p. 78, l. 158–164: Forma etiam dicitur esse in 
potentia in materia, inquantum essentia sua stans sub esse imperfecto seu potentiali, quod 
quidam vocant esse confusi habitus, perficitur in actum existentem eiusdem essentiae cum 
forma in potentia. Potentia enim et actus non diversificant essentiam formae, hoc est forma 
in potentia et in actu non diversificant eandem numero essentiam, cum processus de poten-
tia ad actum non largiatur procedenti multitudinem essentiarum, sed perfectionem in esse 
et in toto. See also Berthold, Expositio, 24A, p. 126, l. 45–47; 59C, p. 167, l. 153–154, l. 162–163; 
205A-C, p. 209, l. 23–30. On the implications of this position in Berthold’s emanationist 
metaphysics, see M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, “À propos du néoplatonisme d’Albert le Grand. 
Aventures et mésaventures de quelques textes d’Albert dans le Commentaire sur Proclus 
de Berthold de Moosburg”, in Archives de philosophie 43(1980), p. 635–654, esp. p. 635–638.
94  Albert the Great, De causis et processu universitatis a prima causa, lib. I, tr. 4, c. 1, p. 43–44.
95  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 178F, p. 197, l. 285–292.
96  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 118B, p. 77, l. 63–66: Sed res ab aeterno fuerunt in Dei 
omnipotentia et voluntate tantum secundum esse potentiale potentiae activae, in scientia 
fuerunt ab aeterno non solum ut in potentia causae secundum illam speciem scientiae Dei, 
quae vocatur dispositio, sed etiam quia, ut dictum est supra, rerum rationes ab aeterno sunt 
in ipsa.
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corruption of an individual form – even a corporeal one – does not annihilate 
its entire being. The true form as such – the ideal model from which an individ-
ual is brought to actual existence – never ceases to subsist as an essence, even 
if it can lose existence (“nulla forma substantialis cadit ab essentia in purum 
non ens, licet quaedam cadant ab esse”).97 To this extent, Berthold’s theory of 
generation of natural forms at the lowest level of matter is intrinsically depen-
dent on his doctrine of universals since it implies the thesis of a variation of 
the same essence only secundum esse.
4.4	 Berthold’s	Classifications	of	Forms
From all of these concepts, Berthold is able to describe the structure of the 
Proclean universe in his own terms – that is to say, without abandoning the 
vocabulary of forms inherited from the Latin theological tradition. Thus, the 
structure of the multiple modes of being is not simply repeated from the 
descriptions given by the Elements, but it is thoroughly analyzed and justi-
fied through Berthold’s conceptual framework. Berthold offers several classi-
fications of forms that all underline the principle of continuity98 according 
to which between any two opposite orders of beings, something must always 
exist.99 While the divine unities only contain a unique formal intention, the 
realm of specific forms begins at the intellectual level and, from there, covers 
the entirety of the created universe. Commenting on Proposition 41, Berthold 
defines a purely spiritual being as a forming form ( forma formans), whereas 
a form having a relation to matter is a forma informans. Forming forms are 
per subsistens, whereas informing forms subsist per aliud, due to their rela-
tion to matter. The class of informing forms is subdivided in corporeal and 
non-corporeal. It covers the entire range of forms that are not entirely intellec-
tual, from souls – be they total or partial – to purely corporeal forms. Forming 
forms, on their side, can be divided due to the fact that some of them func-
tion like subjects for others, even if not in a material sense, since they are 
composed from different formal intentions. Indeed, some forming forms are 
97  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 48B, p. 97, l. 121–133.
98  On this point, see also Berthold, Expositio, 205A, p. 209, l. 20–22 where Berthold distin-
guishes three modes of information following a similar reasoning.
99  These classifications are often redundant but nonetheless present the interest of being 
based on different approaches that encompass Berthold’s theory of formal principles 
and maneries entium. The main examples can be found in Proposition 25 (following 
the modalities of constitution, p. 142–143); Proposition 41 (types of informing relations, 
p. 49–51); Proposition 48 (relation to privation, p. 94–96); Proposition 82 (criterion of 
divisibility, p. 118–119); Proposition 112 (separability, p. 28–29); Proposition 173 (participa-
tion, p. 129–130); Proposition 190 (operations, p. 83–84); Proposition 205 (relation to mat-
ter, p. 209–210).
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more universal than another because they are composed of fewer intentions 
(as stated in Proposition 72). This distinction, therefore, supposes Berthold’s 
theory of the composition from formal intentions that defines the dependence 
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100 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 41C, p. 49–51, l. 73–148: Ex praemissis evidenter apparet, 
quod subsistere per se et non fulciri aliquo alio, et esse in alio sive fulciri et sustentari ali-
quo alio sunt modi substantiae ita, quod omnis forma formans habet subsistentiam per se, 
informans autem habet esse in alio, quae etiam, ut sit in genere dicere, est duplicis maneriei: 
quaedam enim est corporalis, quaedam non, seu incorporalis. Dico autem ‘corporales’, quae 
educuntur de potentia materiae per agens physicum. Et haec adhuc sunt in duplici differen-
tia, quia vel sunt formae animatorum vel inanimatorum, et haec sunt generum diversorum, 
quia vel elementorum vel mixtorum […]. Formae autem animatorum corporales etiam sunt 
in duplici differentia, quia vel vegetabilium vel sensibilium. […] Super quam sunt formae 
simpliciter incorporales, et hae iterum sunt in duplici manerie, quia vel partiales vel totales. 
Partialis autem est anima rationalis, quae inquantum huiusmodi non est actus alicuius cor-
poris neque forma corporalis nec operans in corpore, sed solum inquantum est vegetativa 
[…]. Totalis autem, quae etiam nobilis anima dicitur, secundum se totam est elevata super 
corpus subiectum, licet etiam secundum se totam sit in corpore, quamvis autem secundum 
aliam et aliam rationem. Et ista tenet ultimum seu supremum gradum formarum informan-
tium. Ex praemissis apparet, qualiter formae informantes habeant esse in. Verum, quia in 
formis formantibus quibusdam, non inquantum sunt formantes, sed formatae, compositis 
videlicet ex diversis intentionibus pluribus vel paucioribus, quales sunt omnes res supra ani-
mas totales et citra bonitates existentes, quaedam habent rationem subiectorum, quaedam 
autem formarum, ideo etiam tales quasi formae insunt suis subiectis, cum quibus tamen non 
ponunt in numerum essentiarum sicut informantes praedictae, sed compositum ex eis est ut 
res una, quae est ens ut simpliciter et secundum speciem.
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Some differences in these classifications must be noted, however. For 
instance, the principle of continuity is sometimes intended to define the sta-
tus of human souls, which are partly informing matter, and partly detached 
from it by their intellectual character. This is the case in Proposition 82, where 
Berthold analyzes the multiplication of forms in matter and classifies them 
according to division or partibility. Forms can be grouped into two general 
classes: those that can be divided according to their subject, and those that 
are fully separate from matter. In the former group, there exists a distinction 
between entia secundum speciem like hypostatic intelligences and particu-
lar beings like angels.101 Among the forms that can be divided according to 
their subject, some are fully immersed in matter, whereas others are totally 
undivided by their subject and remain separate from it, like celestial forms 
(total souls).102 According to the principle of continuity, human souls are then 
defined in between incorporeal forms not divided by their subject and forms 
entirely divided by it.103
At other places, like in Proposition 112, the principle of continuity is rather 
meant to clarify the status of total or celestial souls. Here, Berthold presents 
the gradation of forms following the criterion of separability.104 Total souls are 
presented as formae mediae, i.e. located between the realm of incarnate forms 
and purely separate entities. Berthold explains that total souls are only causes 
and not principles since they are not educed from potency to act, unlike mate-
rial forms that are both principles and causes. Natural forms present differ-
ent degrees of separability from matter, from the most humble souls entirely 
immersed in it to the rational souls whose intellectual activity does not depend 
on matter. Fully separate forms can be divided due to the fact that some self-
subsistent entities are still inferior to the level of gods which, unlike the first 
One, include a first type of multiplicity. Berthold complements this classifica-
tion with the Boethian distinction between the true forms, entirely separated 
from matter, and the imagines formarum.105
101 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 82A, p. 118, l. 17–18.
102 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 82A, p. 119–120, l. 69–71: Non enim existunt ex eo neque in 
parte et universaliter neque in divisibili neque in indivisibili, et istae sunt formae, quae sunt 
quasi extremae ad formas corporales.
103 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 82A, p. 120, l. 77–78.
104 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 112D, p. 28, l. 114–119: Inter veras vero formas et non veras, 
quia sunt extremae, necessario dantur formae mediae, scilicet animae caelorum, quae 
conectunt causaliter infimas cum supremis. Ex praemissis apparet formae diversa significa-
tio, quia dicitur et de forma thearchica et principaliformi per se et secundum se subsistente, 
quae sunt verae formae, et de non veris secundum suos gradus et mediis inter extremas.
105 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 112D, p. 28, l. 105, l. 122.
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In Proposition 48, Berthold offers another description of the hierarchy of forms 
based on the way they relate to privation and potency.106 Here, this approach 
enables him to provide a classification that takes into account the way differ-
ent kinds of forms exist or come to being. Purely corporeal forms such as the 
elements or material bodies are subject to privation secundum subiectum et 
formam, because these forms are entirely educed from the potency of matter 
and, like the composite substance in which their inhere, did not exist before 
this actualization.107 The operations of such entities are entirely dependent 
on their bodies. Other forms, like partial souls, are partly separable from their 
subject since some of their activities (intellectual operations) are independent 
of matter. These forms, therefore, cannot be not educed from the potency of 
matter and, because of that, do not cease to exist when separated from their 
subject.108 A third kind of forms, the total souls, is neither separable nor sub-
ject to annihilation.109
106 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 48A, p. 94–96, l. 17–98.
107 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 48A, p. 94, l. 21–24: Omnes enim tales formae habent pri-
vationem oppositam secundum subiectum et formam, quia totum, quod fit actu, fuit prius in 
potentia; compositum autem fit actu; ergo et quantum ad materiam et formam prius fuit in 
potentia.
108 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 48A, p. 94, l. 25–28: Alia est forma habens privationem 
secundum subiectum et non secundum se ipsum, qualis est anima partialis: non enim educi-
tur de potentia materiae, sed corpore organizato secundum Aristotelem infunditur, propter 
quod etiam non tota immergitur, sed partim est separata.
109 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 48A, p. 96, l. 93–98.
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It appears that these classifications use different criteria to demarcate the 
dynamic, modal, and relational aspects of a same graduated structure. Despite 
slight differences owing to the criteria taken into account, the classifica-
tions are convergent. They show how Berthold manages to conceptualize the 
complex organization of the Proclean universe in his own terms, obtaining a 
sort of combinatory deduction of the main ontological levels exposed in the 
Elementatio.
5 Conclusion
In view of these elements, Berthold’s main innovations on the theme of forms 
appear as complementary aspects of a same project, i.e. to found his doctrine 
of emanation within the philosophical vocabulary of his time despite the 
dominance of Aristotelian hylomorphism. His efforts to provide a rigorous 
definition of light in its spiritual dimension, to justify its status as a univer-
sal principle and to explain its different modalities of manifestation all work 
toward the same goal, that we could sum up in the expression “metaphysics 
of light”. The concept of light and its generative dynamism enables Berthold 
to sharpen Albert’s distinction between the Aristotelian conception of formal 
causation and the specific action of the formal flux. The diffusing action of the 
first cause in different modes of manifestation is conceptualized as the multi-
plication and diffraction of a primordial formal principle, which virtually con-
tains the different intentions composing the created universe, just as natural 
light – invisible in itself – contains all possible colors.
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To explain the mix of identity and otherness entailed by this diffusion, 
Berthold draws on the key idea that something can produce an effect essen-
tially identical to the cause but different secundum esse. Even though Berthold 
does not depart on this point from the main positions of his Dominican prede-
cessors, his own contribution extends these ideas to a more complex universe 
that, in addition, was not theorized in the same concepts in the Elements. This 
conceptual adaptation relies on a twofold strategy. On the one hand, Berthold 
selects and extends several technical notions inherited from the German 
Dominican School to make sense of different aspects of Proclus’s text. This 
is true of Dietrich’s theory of perfectional forms that helps to describe the 
dynamic aspect of the flux, whose action is simple and instantaneous like the 
operations of agents acting per essentiam. This same goes for the concepts of 
intentio formalis or principium formale, that Berthold employs to study a level 
of reality (i.e. gods or divine unities) that his predecessors did not recognize. 
On the other hand, Berthold applies the conceptual framework of hylomor-
phism already available to him (idea, species, forma) to organize the layers of 
reality owing to a small set of additional terms ( forma formans, formans infor-
mans, forma subsistens, forma per se/per aliud subsistens, and so on). In his 
innovations, Berthold remains faithful to the fundamental ideas defended by 
his Dominican masters about the unity of the hylomorphic compound, the 
status of matter and the nature of causality.
Alain de Libera has considered one of the central ideas of the School of 
Cologne to be the model of causation based on the idea of a formal flux that, 
through different modes of being, remains essentially the same.110 To a cer-
tain extent, some may wonder if this model would apply to Berthold’s theory 
of forms itself when compared to the foundations laid by his predecessors. 
The originality of his construction lies in the unique way he combines mul-
tiple sources, even when his main authorities were openly hostile to them, like 
Albert the Great was hostile to Ibn Gabirol. On the theme of forms and formal 
causation, Berthold departs on several points from his main influences, nota-
bly Albert and his Dominican followers. But it would be a mistake to see his 
innovations as a betrayal of them, when Berthold is first driven by the unpara-
lleled will to explain the full complexity of Proclus’s work in the philosophical 
vocabulary of his time.
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chapter 13
Peter of Ireland and Berthold of Moosburg on First 




In his “Introduction” to the first volume of the edition of Berthold of Moosburg’s 
Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli, Kurt Flasch refers to the 
fact that, already at the beginning of the 20th century, writers such as Martin 
Grabmann and Engelbert Krebs had noted that Berthold’s work was within the 
tradition of the German Dominican School, ultimately leading back to Albert 
the Great, which gave rise to a strong Neoplatonic tradition with Ulrich of 
Strassburg, Dietrich of Freiberg, Meister Eckhart and then the high point of the 
reception of Proclus with Berthold.1 Grabmann, Flasch points out, had noted 
the contrast between this Neoplatonic tendency and the more thoroughgoing 
Aristotelian approach stemming from Albert’s other pupil, Thomas Aquinas. 
In an article by Grabmann, one was led to the conclusion that this divergence 
between Thomas and Ulrich of Strassburg was perhaps also due to the influ-
ence of Aquinas’ other teacher, Master Peter of Ireland.2
1 See K. Flasch, “Einleitung”, in Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theo-
logicam Procli, Prologus, Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1984), p. xi: “Gleich zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts lenkten Martin Grabmann und 
Engelbert Krebs die Aufmerksamkeit auf Berthold; sie stellten ihn vor als einen charakter-
istischen Autor der deutschen Dominikanerschule, insbesondere als einen Erben Dietrichs 
von Freiberg. Grabmann sah, daß man in der deutschen Albertschule eine mehr aristotelisie-
rende, eher an Thomas anknüpfende Richtung von einer stärker neuplatonischen Strömung 
unterscheiden müsse, für die er Ulrich von Straßburg, Dietrich von Freiberg, Meister Eckhart 
und eben Berthold als charakteristisch ansah.”
2 See M. Grabmann, “Thomas von Aquin und Petrus von Hibernia”, in Philosophisches Jahrbuch 
33(1920), p. 347–362. Grabmann, while referring to the research Clemens Baeumker had 
already carried out on Peter of Ireland, states (p. 360): “Für diese Prägung des Thomistischen 
Aristotelismus war es, wie Baeumker weiterhin ausführt, vielleicht doch von Bedeutung, 
daß Thomas, ehe er zu dem Deutschen Albert kam, schon bei Petrus von Hibernia die ents-
cheidende Richtung auf Aristoteles bereits vorgefunden und auf sich hatte wirken lassen. 
Jedenfalls hat Ulrich Engelberti, der ureigenste Schüler Alberts des Großen, von seinem 
großen Lehrer eine ganz andere Art der Scholastik ererbt als Thomas von Aquin. Zwischen 
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Keeping these two distinct but related traditions in mind, what I wish to do 
here is to make a comparison by concentrating on Proposition 102 of the Elements 
of Proclus and the version known to Peter from Proposition xvii(xviii) of the 
Liber de causis in order to compare the approaches of Peter of Ireland and 
Berthold of Moosburg, while at the same time using Aquinas’s Lectio xviii of 
his Commentary on the Book of Causes as a bridge between the two traditions.
On the surface, our topic here centres on the classic triad of Being-Life- 
Intellect which for Plotinus were conceptual distinctions that defined the 
one hypostasis of Nous; Proclus then sees each as hypostases and in precisely 
that order. This is clarified and the order established already by Proclus in 
Proposition 101:
All things which participate intelligence are preceded by the unpartici-
pated Intelligence, those which participate life by Life, and those which 
participate being by Being; and of these three unparticipated principles 
Being is prior to Life and Life to Intelligence.
For in the first place, because in each order of existence unparticipated 
terms precede the participated (Prop. 100), there must be Intelligence 
prior to things being intelligent, Life prior to living things, and Being prior 
to things which are. And secondly, since the cause of more numerous 
effects precedes the cause of fewer (Prop. 60), among these principles 
Being will stand foremost; for it is present to all things which have life and 
intelligence (since whatever lives and has intellection necessarily exists), 
but the converse is not true (since not all that exists lives and exercises 
intelligence). Life has the second place; for what shares in intelligence 
shares in life, but not conversely, since many things are alive but remain 
devoid of knowledge. The third principle is Intelligence; for whatever 
is in any measure capable of knowledge both lives and exists. If, then, 
Being gives rise to a number of effects, Life to fewer, and Intelligence to 
yet fewer, Being stands foremost, next to it Life, and then Intelligence.3
der neuplatonisch gerichteten Summa Ulrichs und der Summa theologiae des Aquinaten 
bestehen so durchgreifende Unterschiede, daß man für beide nicht den gleichen Lehrer 
und die gleiche Schule vermuten möchte.” See also C. Baeumker, “Petrus de Hibernia. 
Der Jugendlehrer des Thomas von Aquino und seine Disputation vor König Manfred”, 
Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.-philolog. und hist. 
Klasse. Heft 8(1920), p. 41–49. For a different point of view, see A.A. Robiglio, “‘Neapolitan 
Gold’. A Note on William of Tocco and Peter of Ireland”, in Bulletin de philosophie médiévale 
44(2002), p. 107–111.
3 See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propo- 
sitiones 66–107, ed. I. Zavattero (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 101, p. 211–216, Latin text at p. 215; 
English translation by E.R. Dodds in Proclus, The Elements of Theology (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 19632), p. 91.
431Peter of Ireland and Berthold of Moosburg
In fact the triad Being-Life-Intelligence are developed in Propositions 101, 
102, and 103 but for the reasons which will become clear below, here we will 
focus on Proposition 102.
2 Peter of Ireland
Peter of Ireland (Petrus de Hibernia, de Ybernia) was active as a teacher and 
writer at the University of Naples from perhaps as early as the 1240s until at 
least the mid-1260s. Born in Ireland sometime towards the beginning of the 
13th century, the fact of his career taking place in the South of Italy, with its 
Norman links with Ireland and England, would make his being of Gaelic origin 
less probable than his being of an Anglo-Irish family. The lack of a University 
in Ireland meant that, like Richard FitzRalph a century later, he probably left 
Ireland at around fifteen years of age to pursue his studies abroad. We do not 
know at which university he studied but the most likely candidate is Oxford. 
The historical records we do have place him at the world’s first state university 
at Naples as Professor of Logic and Natural Philosophy in the middle part of 
the 13th century.
The initial interest of scholars in Peter of Ireland was mainly due to the 
fact that he was held to be a teacher of the young Thomas Aquinas at Naples 
University from 1239–44, introducing Thomas to the study of Aristotle and 
perhaps also to the commentaries of Avicenna and Averroes. However, based 
upon internal evidence, the surviving works of Peter would seem to date from 
at least a decade later, and to relate to lectures given in the 1250s and 1260s.4
Peter was one of those authors towards the mid-thirteenth century who 
explored and taught the new learning which had arrived with the transla-
tions of Aristotle’s works and his Arabic commentators (at a time when these 
works were forbidden to be taught at the University of Paris). Again, we know 
from Rabbi Moses ben Solomon of Salerno that he met with Peter of Ireland, 
whom he called “that wise Christian,” and some others in the 1250s to discuss 
the leading doctrines of Maimonides.5 An Aristotelian influence is clear in the 
way in which Peter did philosophy, where, like his student Thomas Aquinas, 
4 Peter of Ireland, Expositio et Quaestiones in Aristotelis librum De longitudine et brevitate 
vitae, ed. M. Dunne (Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Peeters / Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de 
Philosophie, 1993); Peter of Ireland, Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis, ed. 
M. Dunne (Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Peeters / Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 
1996).
5 See G. Sermoneta, Un glossario filosofico ebraico italiano del XIII secolo (Firenze: Olschki, 
1969), p. 45.
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a clear distinction between philosophy and theology is maintained. In terms 
of his philosophical approach he seems to consciously eschew the Christian 
Neoplatonic tradition.6 However, the influence of Arabic Neoplatonism is 
present in his work especially through his use of Avicenna. The only reference 
to Plato I have found is in his Determinatio magistralis:
Et propter hoc dicit Phylosophus: sumus et nos finis omnium, non finis 
propter quem omnia sunt, sed ut illud cuius dicunt esse omnia propter 
aliquam utilitatem; sed omnia sunt propter unum motorem omnium, 
primum scilicet. Et dicitur bonum distinctum, propter quod sunt omnia. 
Et propter hoc, si sustinentur indiuidua unius speciei per indiuidua alte-
rius speciei uel generis, hoc non est contra naturam ordinantem, sed 
totum est de bonitate ordinis et de sollicitudine ordinantis datum. Et 
non est inconueniens quod magis appareat beniuolencia nature in una 
specie quam in alia, quamuis ex se natura habet equaliter ad influen-
dum, tamen non est equaliter res sunt preparate ad recipiendum influen-
ciam; unde relegata est inuidia ex toto a primo, sicut ait Plato.7 Bonum 
ergo quod dicitur bonum ordinis non inuenitur nisi secundum magis et 
minus, secundum prius et posterius, et secundum nobilius et uilius; et 
semper posterius est propter prius, et uilius propter nobilius, et imper-
fectius propter perfectius, et materia propter formam et motus propter 
motorem.8
The Commentary on the De longitudine et brevitate vitae contains extensive 
quotations from writings by Aristotle, Physics, De caelo, De generatione et 
corruptione, the fourth book of the Meteorologia, De anima, Parva Naturalia, 
De animalibus and also from the available medical authors, Constantine the 
6 The exception being the opening of the De longitudine commentary, beginning as it does 
with the Liber de causis, or the Liber de pura bonitate as Peter terms it, the original title as 
translated from the Arabic Kalām fī maḥḍ al-khair. The text is based on the Elementatio theo-
logica of Proclus with commentaries by an unknown Arabic author. Peter like many of his 
contemporaries presumably thought that it was a work of Aristotle although some held it to 
be by al-Fārābī.
7 Plato, Timaeus, ed. J.H. Waszink, Timaeus a Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus 
(London / Leiden: The Warburg Institute / Brill, 1962), 29e, p. 22, l. 18: Optimus erat, ab optimo 
porro invidia longe relegata est.
8 The text of the Determinatio magistralis was republished from the 1920 edition of Baeumker 
in Peter of Ireland, Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis, p. 245–250, here 
p. 248.
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African, Galen, Haly Abbas, Isaac Israeli, Nicolaus Damacenus, and al-Rāzī. 
Peter is aiming at making a conscious attempt to reconstruct Aristotle’s phi-
losophy of life by looking at and exploring all of the pertinent sources and not 
just the text of the De longitudine. There are the conventional references to 
Physics v, Meteorologica iv, the De generatione; but Peter is unusual is giving 
many references to the De plantis, and especially in his extended references to 
the De animalibus. In fact, in style and content Peter is quite close to the more 
extended treatment of Peter of Spain in his Questiones super libro De animali-
bus.9 However, one thing that Peter did not find in his sources listed above was 
a philosophical discussion of the origin of life and for this he turned in his 
Prologue to the Liber de causis.
The Prologue to the commentary on the De longitudine does not deal 
with Aristotle’s text but is, instead, an extended version of a divisio scientiae 
which as a literary form serves to give an idea of the nature and subject of 
the science which studies the problem in question – life and death – and the 
reasons why life is short or long. The prologue opens with a long quotation 
from Proposition xvii(xviii) of De causis (inspired by Proposition 102 of the 
Elementatio theologica). In fact, in this short prologue Peter gives two titles for 
the work, the Liber de pura bonitate and the Liber de causis. As the subject mat-
ter of the commentary will refer to life, its length or shortness, and its contrary 
death, it is only natural to examine the ultimate origin of life first.
According to Aquinas the purpose of Proposition xvii(xviii) of the De cau-
sis is to show the universal dependence of all things upon the First Being which 
is God:
Postquam ostensum est quod res omnes dependent a primo secundum 
suam virtutem, hic ostendit quod dependent omnia a primo secundum 
suam naturam. Et circa hoc duo facit: primo ostendit universalem depen-
dentiam rerum a primo secundum omnia quae pertinent ad naturam vel 
substantiam earum, secundo ostendit diversum gradum appropinquatio-
nis ad primum a quo dependent, sicut et de dependentia virtutis dixerat, 
et hoc 19a propositione, ibi: Ex intelligentiis est etc.10
9  Peter of Spain, Questiones super libro De animalibus, ed. F. Navarro Sanchez (Farnham: 
Ashgate, 2015).
10  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, ed. H.D. Saffrey (Paris: Vrin, 2002), 
Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 1–8.
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Now let us compare Peter’s quotation with that of St Thomas:
Peter of Ireland
Sicut habetur in libro De pura bonitate: res omnes habent essenciam 
propter ens primum et res uiue sunt mote per essenciam suam propter 
uitam primam.11
Thomas Aquinas
Primo ergo ponit talem propositionem: res omnes habent essentiam 
per ens primum, et res vivae omnes sunt motae per essentiam suam prop-
ter vitam primam, et res intelligibiles omnes habent scientiam propter 
intelligentiam primam.12
From the above, it is immediately clear that Peter is selective in his use of the 
quotation; he is interested in the dependence of beings upon the First Being 
and of life upon the First Life and excludes those passages in the commentary 
which refer to knowledge and understanding (scientia/intelligentia).
Of course, Peter did not know of the text of Proclus and was not able to make 
the comparison which Aquinas makes between the two texts.13 Aquinas is clear, 
as distinct from Peter, that in order to understand Proposition xvii(xviii) we 
must grasp that all grades of things can be led back to three: being, living and 
understanding:
Ad huius autem propositionis intellectum primo quidem considerandum 
est quod omnes rerum gradus ad tria videtur reducere quae sunt esse, 
vivere et intelligere. Et hoc ideo quia unaquaeque res tripliciter potest 
considerari: primo quidem secundum se, et sic convenit ei esse, secundo 
prout tendit in aliquid aliud, et sic convenit ei moveri, tertio secundum 
quod alia in se habet, et sic convenit ei cognoscere quia secundum hoc 
cognitio perficitur quod cognitum est in cognoscente non quidem mate-
rialiter sed formaliter.14
The question is, why does Peter not refer to the First Intelligence? We cannot 
be sure but there are a number of reasons, of course, which one might consider. 
The text of Aristotle which he is commenting on concerns length and shortness 
11  Peter of Ireland, In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae, Prologue, p. 67.
12  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 8–12.
13  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 12–101, l. 3.
14  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 101, l. 8–16.
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of life and, as he will show, it is the task of natural philosophy (physica) to con-
sider this. It is not, however the task of natural philosophy to consider how the 
known is in the knower, not materially, but formally, as Aquinas puts it: “cog-
nitum est in cognoscente non quidem materialiter sed formaliter”.15 Perhaps 
another reason might have been to avoid certain contemporary debates on the 
relationship between intelligentia and intellectus. He condemns the Averroistic 
doctrine of a single intellect in his commentary on the Peryermenias.16
The De causis introduces a distinction with regard to being, life and intel-
ligence, namely, that being is by way of causation, life, and intellect by way of 
information. St Thomas, following Aristotle and the Ps. Dionysius understands 
all three to be one and the same as God.17 Peter, however, in beginning his 
15  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 101, l. 15–16. See also, 
Aquinas, De sensu et sensato, p. 5, l. 68–79, where he says that Aristotle never wrote a 
treatise on intellect per se, and that if he had it would have belonged to metaphysics and 
not the science of nature (referred to in S. Donati, “Albert the Great’s Treatise De intellectu 
et intelligibili. A Study of the Manuscript and Printed Tradition”, in Documenti e studi sulla 
tradizione filosofica medievale 30[2019], p. 162, n. 15). I am grateful to Evan King for draw-
ing my attention to this.
16  Peter of Ireland, Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis, i, lect. 1, q. 5, p. 24: Per 
distinctionem huius “anime” [16a 6–7] communiter loquentes soluunt hic istud, quod intel-
lectus sunt idem apud omnes, id est quod intellectus conceptus de re apud unum consentiens 
sit intellectui concepto de re apud alterum et non interimit conceptio unius conceptionem 
alterius. Set illud est uulgare, primum est sophisticum.
17  Aquinas quotes this proposition in De potentia, q. 3, a. 1 c: Et propter hoc ex nihilo aliquid 
facere potest; et haec eius actio vocatur creatio. Et inde est quod in Libro de causis, dici-
tur, quod esse eius est per creationem, vivere vero, et caetera huiusmodi, per informationem. 
Causalitates enim entis absolute reducuntur in primam causam universalem; causalitas vero 
aliorum quae ad esse superadduntur; vel quibus esse specificatur, pertinet ad causas secun-
das, quae agunt per informationem, quasi supposito effectu causae universalis: et inde etiam 
est quod nulla res dat esse, nisi in quantum est in ea participatio divinae virtutis. Propter 
quod etiam dicitur in Libro de causis, quod anima nobilis habet operationem divinam in 
quantum dat esse. Aquinas also presupposes it in Quodlibet iii, q. 3, a. 1 c: Respondeo. 
Dicendum, quod impossibile est, id quod per creationem producitur, ab alio causari quam 
a prima omnium causa; cuius ratio est, secundum Platonicos, quia quanto aliqua causa est 
superior, tanto eius causalitas ad plura se extendit. Unde oportet ut in effectibus id quod 
ad plura se habet, ad superiorem causam referatur. Manifestum est autem quod in ordine 
principiorum essentialium quanto aliqua forma est posterior, tanto est magis contracta, et 
ad pauciora se extendit. Quanto autem forma est prior, et propinquior subiecto primo, tanto 
oportet quod ad plura se extendat. Sequitur ergo quod formae posteriores sunt ab inferiori-
bus agentibus; priores vero et communiores a superioribus. Et sic relinquitur quod id quod 
est primum subsistens in unoquoque, sit a prima omnium causa. Quaelibet ergo alia causa 
praeter primam, oportet quod agat praesupposito subiecto, quod est effectus causae primae. 
Nulla ergo causa alia potest creare nisi prima causa quae est Deus; nam creare est produ-
cere aliquid non praesupposito subiecto. Quaecumque ergo non possunt produci in esse nisi 
per creationem, a solo Deo creantur. Haec autem sunt illa quae, cum sint subsistentia, vel 
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Prologue on life as such has to turn to the Liber de causis to explain how the 
plurality of things requires a first. Although Peter does not justify this in the 
text, Aquinas does so in his commentary:
Secundo considerandum est quod in unoquoque genere est causa illud 
quod est primum in genere illo, a quo omnia quae sunt illius generis in 
illo genere constituuntur, sicut inter elementaria corpora ignis est pri-
mum calidum a quo omnia caliditatem sortiuntur; non est autem in ali-
quo rerum ordine in infinitum procedere. Oportet igitur in ordine entium 
esse aliquod primum quod dat omnibus esse, et hoc est quod dicit quod 
res omnes habent essentiam per ens primum.18
Similarly, not only being, but life derives from a first:
Similiter oportet in genere viventium esse aliquod primum, et ab hoc 
omnia viventia habent quod vivant; et quia viventis proprium est quod 
sit suiipsius motivum, ideo dicit quod res vivae omnes sunt motae per 
essentiam suam, id est sunt moventes seipsas, propter vitam primam; 
unde et in libro Procli dicitur: omnia viventia suiipsorum motiva sunt 
propter vitam primam. Et quod movere seipsum procedit a prima vita, 
probat subdens: quoniam vita est processio procedens ex ente primo quieto 
sempiterno.19
non sunt composita ex materia et forma, sed sunt formae in suo esse subsistentes, sicut sunt 
angeli; vel sunt ea quae si sint composita ex materia et forma, tamen materia eorum non est 
in potentia nisi ad unam formam, sicut est in corporibus caelestibus; utraque enim haec pro-
ducuntur absque productione primi subsistentis in eis. Possunt autem produci in actum abs-
que productione primi subiecti tam composita ex materia et forma, quorum materia est in 
potentia ad diversas formas, et sic in eadem materia possunt sibi diversae formae succedere; 
tam etiam formae quae non sunt subsistentes in suo esse, quae quidem non dicuntur esse 
quia ipsae habeant esse, sed quia subiecta habent aliqualiter esse secundum eas; unde nec 
ipsae secundum se dicuntur fieri vel corrumpi, sed in quantum subiecta fiunt entia in actu 
vel non entia secundum ipsas. Anima autem rationalis est subsistens in suo esse, alioquin 
non posset habere operationem absque communione suae materiae. Unde relinquitur quod 
anima rationalis non possit produci in esse nisi per creationem. Et ita patet quod angelus 
nullo modo sit causa eius, sed solum Deus.
18  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 102, l. 4–11.
19  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 102, l. 11–19.
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This first according to Aquinas is as follows:
Sicut autem supra dictum est,20 secundum Platonicos primum ens, quod 
est idea entis, est aliquid supra primam vitam, id est supra ideam vitae, et 
prima vita est aliquid supra primum intellectum idealem; sed secundum 
Dionysium primum ens et prima vita et primus intellectus sunt unum 
et idem quod est Deus; unde et Aristoteles in XIIo Metaphysicae primo 
principio attribuit quod sit intellectus et quod suum intelligere sit vita, et 
secundum hoc ab eo omnia habent esse et vivere et intelligere.21
Peter, of course, is not aware of the Elements, nor does he ever make reference 
to the Ps. Dionysius. The only slightly parallel notion which I can find in his 
writings comes from the Peryermenias commentary (i, lect. 16, q. 1) when he 
is making a quite unusual (for him) theological point22 against the Stoics and 
Epicureans:
Set contra istos [Stoics and Epicureans] sunt ratiocinationes manifeste, 
quia non est possibile causam primam intelligere aliquid eorum que sunt 
hic secundum quod hic; nec est dubium quin intelligat et uiuat, cum sit 
intellectus purus, sicut probatur in naturalibus; intellectus autem purus, 
qui nullo modo est in potencia semper intelligit; intelligere autem uiuere 
est […] si intelligeret res que sunt hic sicut homo intelligit sua scientia, 
esset per receptionem et esset in potencia intelligens quandoque; set 
nulla potencia cadit in eo, sicut probatur in naturalibus. Et quia intelligi-
bile est perfectio intelligentis, quia ducit ipsum in actum, patet quoniam 
nichil intelligit extra se: quod enim esset ducens ipsum in actum, esset 
20  Aquinas refers here to his remarks on Prop. 12 of the De causis which is actually Prop. 103 
of the Elements, where Proclus speaks of the first triad of hypotheses, being, life, and 
intelligence and the three basic relations to which they give rise: causal, essential, and 
participative.
21  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 103, l. 16–23.
22  According to James McEvoy the entire Christian Neoplatonic tradition is absent from his 
writings; Boethius is mentioned but only insofar as he is a commentator on Aristotle’s 
logic and remarkably Augustine is entirely absent. Peter maintains a thorough going 
Aristotelianism and apart from a few comments, there is nothing which would identify 
him as a Christian. See J.J. McEvoy, “Maître Pierre d’Irlande, professeur in naturalibus 
à l’université de Naples”, in J. Follon, J.J. McEvoy (eds), Actualité de la pensée médiévale 
(Louvain-la-Neuve / Paris: Peeters / Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1994), 
p. 146–158.
438 Dunne
enim tunc aliquid nobilius Deo, et esset ille Deus magis quam primus, et 
quis esset ille Deus? Patet ergo demonstratiue quoniam nichil intelligit 
extra se; intelligit ergo se solum per se et primo; sua autem essencia sem-
per sibi est presens; ergo semper intelligit, et sunt in eo quod intelligit et 
quo intelligit et intelligens idem. Et hec est Trinitas personarum, ad cuius 
cognitionem omnes aspirabant; sua ergo essencia est sua actio, et actio 
sua est sua uoluntas […].23
3 Berthold of Moosburg
When we turn to Berthold, we see immediately that his concerns at the begin-
ning of the commentary on Prop. 102 are quite different from those of Peter of 
Ireland. His focus is on the unparticipated (the amethecta), the participants, 
and what is participated. He writes: “having shown the priority of the ame-
thecta in respect both of all participants and also in respect of each other, now 
Proclus indicates the property of some participants, as having its origin in its 
causes […].”24 If we compare Proposition xvii(xviii) of the De causis with 
Proposition 102 of the Elements (the text which Berthold had prae oculis) we 
can note some differences, of course:
Res omnes habent essentiam per ens primum, et res vivae sunt motae 
per essentiam suam propter vitam primam, et res intelligibiles omnes 
habent scientiam propter intelligentiam primam. [Liber de causis, 
Prop. XVII(XVIII)]25
Omnia quidem qualitercumque entia ex fine sunt et infinito propter 
prime ens; omnia autem viventia sui ipsorum motiva sunt propter vitam 
primam; omnia autem cognitiva cognitione participant propter intel-
lectum primum. [Elementatio theologica, Prop. 102].26
Two notions stand out in the text of the Elementatio which are not in the De 
causis, namely, “limit and infinite” and “participates” and which will be much 
of the focus of Berthold’s Expositio. In the first part of his commentary (of three 
parts) he begins with an argument based on intensive and extensive infinity:
23  Peter of Ireland, Expositio et Quaestiones in Peryermenias Aristotelis, i, lect. 16, q. 16, p. 123.
24  See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102, p. 217, l. 7–9: Postquam ostensa est prioritas 
amethectorum et ad omnia participantia et inter se, nunc auctor ostendit participantium 
quorundam proprietatem ex origine suarum causarum dicens: Omnia.
25  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 9–12.
26  Proclus, The Elements of Theology, p. 93; Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102, p. 217, l. 1–5.
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De primo sciendum, quod, sicut apparet prima facie, quod non omnia 
qualitercumque entia sunt ex fine et infinito. Sive finis accipiatur inten-
sive et infinitas extensive, licet enim omne productum sive principiatum 
inquantum huiusmodi […] sit limitatum et finitum in essentia sua sal-
tem respectu superioris, scilicet producentis sive principiantis per 93, 
non tamen omne tale est infinitum sive participans infinitate extensiva, 
quia aliquando ens non est nullatenus ens, et sic est qualitercumque ente 
participans, sed non est infinitae potentiae durationis […].27
In the second part of the first part, Berthold offers his solution:
Et ideo secundum hoc videtur ipsum elementum quoad primam partem 
sic debere distingui, quod omnia qualitercumque entia sive existentia 
ex fine et infinito, cuiusmodi sunt enter entia per 89, sunt talem pro-
prietatem participantia propter prime ens. Quod sic videtur intelligen-
dum, quia, cum omnis causa et ante causatum operetur et cum ipso et 
post ipsum plurium est institutiva per 57, ideo, licet prime ens inquan-
tum amethectum non sit ab alia causa, sed ingenitum per 99, tamen, 
inquantum est unitas quaedam intra ordinem unialem conclusa, proce-
dit a duabus causis, scilicet principali et concausa. Principali, quod est 
prime unum, quod etiam directe est causa et totalis ipsius prime entis. 
Concausa, scilicet prima unitate intra ordinem, scilicet prime infinitate, 
quae est intermedia prime unius et prime entis per 92 in commento. 
Et per consequens, cum prime unum sit finitas et primo unum infini-
tas, quae quidem infinitas, licet directe sub ratione infinitatis non agat 
in ipsum prime ens, inquantum est unitas, cum producat effectus suos 
secundum gradum determinatae distantiae ad prime unum per declara-
tionem 57 et 59, tamen relinquit in eo vestigium infinitatis.
Et sic prime ens, licet sit unitas, tamen quasi compositum est ex fini-
tate ratione prime unius et infinitate ratione secundo unius, scilicet 
prime infinitatis, quae in ipso prime ente et cum ipso agunt, derivat 
enter entibus non solum entitatem ratione propriae intentionis, in qua 
est prime, sed etiam finitatem et infinitatem, inquantum agit in ratione 
superiorum. Et sic omnia qualitercumque existentia ex fine et infinito 
sunt propter prime ens.28
27  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102A, p. 217, l. 14–21.
28  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102B, p. 217, l. 28–p. 218, l. 48.
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Aquinas on this point is more succinct:
Et hoc idem dicitur in libro Procli cii propositione, sub his verbis: omnia 
quidem qualitercumque entia ex fine sunt et infinito, propter prime ens. 
Omnia autem viventia suiipsorum motiva sunt propter vitam primam. 
Omnia autem cognitiva cognitione participant propter intellectum primum. 
Dicit autem quod omnia sunt ex fine et infinito propter prime ens quia, ut 
supra habitum est in 4 propositione, ens creatum compositum est ex finito 
et infinito.29
In fact, Aquinas had clarified this before in his exposition of Proposition 4:
Quam quidem compositionem etiam Proclus ponit LXXXIXa proposi-
tione, dicens: Omne enter ens ex fine est et infinito. Quod quidem secun-
dum ipsum sic exponitur: Omne enim immobiliter ens infinitum est 
secundum potentiam essendi; si enim quod potest magis durare in esse 
est maioris potentiae, quod potest in infinitum durare in esse est, quan-
tum ad hoc, infinitae potentiae. Unde ipse praemisit in LXXXVIa propo-
sitione: omne enter ens infinitum est, non secundum multitudinem, neque 
secundum magnitudinem, sed secundum potentiam solam, scilicet exi-
stendi, ut ipse exponit. Si autem aliquid sic haberet infinitam virtutem 
essendi quod non participaret esse ab alio, tunc esset solum infinitum; et 
tale est Deus, ut dicitur infra in 16a propositione. Sed, si sit aliquid quod 
habeat infinitam virtutem ad essendum secundum esse participatum ab 
alio, secundum hoc quod esse participat est finitum, quia quod participa-
tur non recipitur in participante secundum totam suam infinitatem sed 
particulariter. In tantum igitur intelligentia est composita in suo esse ex 
finito et infinito, in quantum natura intelligentiae infinita dicitur secun-
dum potentiam essendi; et ipsum esse quod recipit, est finitum. Et ex hoc 
sequitur quod esse intelligentiae multiplicari possit in quantum est esse 
participatum: hoc enim significat compositio ex finito et infinito.30
In the second part, Berthold concludes:
Cum ergo prime ens sit quodammodo et finitum et infinitum, necessa-
rium est omnia qualitercumque entia participare eadem proprietate per 
97, fine scilicet et infinitate. Cum ergo diversus sit modus participandi, 
et omnia entia participent finitate, et quaedam participent infinitate 
29  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 100, l. 12–101, l. 7.
30  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 4, p. 30, l. 8–30.
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et intensiva et extensiva semper et connaturaliter, necessarium videtur 
omnia entia esse ex fine et participare saltem aliqualem illustrationem 
infinitatis, cum infinitas in plus se habeat entitate. Et sic omne ens est 
aliqualiter infinitum, sed non e converso.31
4 First Being and First Life
Now let us return to Peter of Ireland and to the opening text of his Prologue 
where Peter gives a suitably magisterial overview of the ultimate origin of all 
being and life from the First Being and First Life:
Sicut habetur in libro De Pura Bonitate: res omnes habent essenciam prop-
ter ens primum et res uiue sunt mote per essenciam suam propter uitam 
primam, et hoc est sicut dicit ibi commentator, quia omnis causa dat ali-
quid suo causato, unde ens primum dat causatis suis esse et uita prima dat 
causatis suis motum. Vnde dicit quod uita est processio procedens ab ente 
primo, quieto et sempiterno. Et quamuis ens primum det causatis suis esse 
et uita prima dat hiis que sub ipsa sunt uitam, non tamen eodem modo, 
quia ens primum dat esse per modum creacionis, set uita prima non dat 
uitam per modum creacionis, set per modum forme.32
Now life consists in some kind of capacity to initiate movement or change, 
but not everything has such a capacity; not all things which are have the per-
fection of living, yet it is being which is common to all existing things, living 
or otherwise. What is meant, then, by the statement that being is given per 
modum creationis and life per modum formae? Aquinas distinguishes between 
two modes of causality: the first is when something comes to be praesupposito 
altero and this is called fieri aliquid per informationem (Peter uses the term 
infusio) because that which comes afterwards se habet ad id quod presupponi-
tur per modum formae; the second type of causality in when something comes 
to be nullo praesupposito, and this is what is called creation.
Aquinas explains it this way:
Tertio considerandum quod ista tria diversimode causantur in rebus, 
sive a diversis principiis secundum Platonicos, sive ab eodem principio 
secundum fidei doctrinam et Aristotelis. Est enim duplex modus cau-
sandi: unus quidem quo aliquid fit praesupposito altero, et hoc modo 
31  See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102C, p. 218, l. 55–61.
32  Peter of Ireland, In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae, Prologus, p. 67.
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dicitur fieri aliquid per informationem, quia illud quod posterius advenit 
se habet ad illud quod praesupponebatur per modum formae; alio modo 
causatur aliquid nullo praesupposito, et hoc modo dicitur aliquid fieri 
per creationem. Quia ergo intelligere praesupponit vivere et vivere prae-
supponit esse, esse autem non praesupponit aliquid aliud prius; inde est 
quod primum ens dat esse omnibus per modum creationis. Prima autem 
vita, quaecumque sit illa, non dat vivere per modum creationis, sed per 
modum formae, id est informationis; et similiter dicendum est de intel-
ligentia. Ex quo patet quod, cum supra dixit intelligentiam esse causam 
animae, non intellexit quod esset causa eius per modum creationis, sed 
solum per modum informationis, ut supra expositum est.33
One term which Aquinas does not address here is the concept of processio / 
procedere, found of course in the text of the De causis and Elementatio. Peter 
uses the term only once apart from quoting the De causis and in quite a differ-
ent context:
Vnde, credendo quod uita celi non sit processio sui motus a primo 
motore separato, ⟨s⟩et a motore coniuncto, necesse est ponere duplicem 
motorem primi mobilis, coniunctum et separatum.
Avicenna and Algazel assigned two movers to each heaven, a conjoined 
mover or soul, and a separated mover or Intelligence. The Intelligences impart 
motion to the heavens whereas the soul is the substantial form of the heavens. 
Thinkers such as Aquinas identify the Intelligences with Angels but there is 
no sign of such an identification here. Peter seems to reject the emanationist 
theory that life is a procession from the First Separate Mover (God) but instead 
assigns two movers to the primum mobile.34
One can interpret processio to mean that the One, like any other reality which 
produces something else, does so because of its perfection and abundance of 
power. The activity of procession does not diminish the One or lessen its per-
fection. Nor is procession a transition such that what is produced is something 
completely different from that which produces it. Procession, rather, is a pro-
cess by which the One produces a multiplication of itself through its power – 
what proceeds is, therefore, similar to what produces it, with the producer 
remaining more perfect than the produced. The produced has the same nature 
as the producer but not in the same way. Thus, the vita prima contains the 
33  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 104, l. 1–17.
34  Peter of Ireland, In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae, Prologus, p. 69.
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forms in itself in an infinitely perfect way whereas the forms in the produced 
are such in a similar but, in relation to the One, imperfect way.
The terminology which Peter uses in the Prologue is, as I have mentioned, 
quite unique compared with the rest of his texts, which is to be expected. 
Processio I have already mentioned, but the same is true of creo/-are and 
creatus, -a -um – all the occurrences with one exception are to be found in 
the Prologue. The occurrences of the word forma are also heavily concentrated 
here, with 19 out of a total of 33 occurrences found in the few opening pages.
Peter’s conclusion from the De causis is that life is to be found in living 
things in the way of a form and not in the way of a created thing and, secondly, 
that life does not become actual, does not go out into being (exire in esse), by 
means of creation but only in the way that form does, that is, by infusion. A liv-
ing thing exists as a result of both activities / modes of procession.35
The next two paragraphs of Peter’s text consist of a series of syllogisms 
which reduce being (contingent), life, and substance to their formal cause and 
brings both Boethius and Aristotle into line with the Liber de causis. As can be 
seen, Peter’s central focus is upon the notion of form as the source of life. In the 
first paragraph, Peter makes use of two phrases, the first from Boethius and the 
second from Aristotle, almost as if they were sayings (confirmed by their use 
also by Albert the Great).36 The first is drawn from the De Trinitate of Boethius37 
and states that every being derives from form. All being then is dependent on 
35  Peter of Ireland, In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae, Prologus, p. 67: Quod potest 
intelligi dupliciter: quod uita sit in uiuentibus per modum forme et non per modum rei cre-
ate; non enim forma est creata, sicut iam ostendetur. Vnde potest sic intelligi quod uita non 
exit in esse per uiam creacionis, set per uiam per quam exit forma, scilicet per infusionem et 
utroque modo uiuum.
36  See also Albert the Great, De Morte et vita, ed. A. Borgnet, Opera omnia, vol. 9 (Paris: Vivès, 
1890), p. 346–347: His ergo sic praelibatis, accipiamus ex probatis a nobis in physicis libris, 
quod vita est actus primus et essentialis et continuus animae in corpus, non per modum 
somni, sed per modum vigiliae existens ab anima in ipsum. Dico autem actum perfectionem 
quam endelechiam Graeci vocant. Sicut enim cujuslibet essentiae formalis quae dat esse et 
rationem ei in quo est, proprius et primus actus est esse quod dat ei cujus est forma : ita 
formae determinatae et specificatae quae ultima est et convertibilis, est dare determinatum 
et specificatum esse quod est ab ea essentialiter, sicut actus lucere essentialiter convenit luci. 
Cum ergo anima sit quaedam formarum specificantium, sibi essentialiter convenit dare ani-
mato corpori specificatum et determinatum esse. Et hoc esse vocatur vita in viventibus : et 
ideo egregie dictum est, quod vivere viventibus est esse.
37  Boethius, De Trinitate, ed. C. Moreschini, De consolatione philosophiae. Opuscula theo-
logica (München / Leipzig: Saur, 20052), c. 2, p. 169, l. 79–83: […] in divinis intellectualiter 
versari oportebit neque ducere ad imaginationes, sed potius ipsam inspicere formam quae 
vere forma neque imago est et quae ipsum esse est ex qua esse est. Omne namque esse ex 
forma est […].
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that form which is being itself and from which being derives. Now, Peter con-
tinues, the being of living things is being, therefore the being of living things is 
from form.38 The second argument comes from Aristotle (De anima, ii iv): life 
in living things is “to be” (esse); therefore to live is from form; but to live is life; 
therefore, life is from form.
In the next paragraph, the same argument of Aristotle is taken up again:
Item, argumentum Aristotilis est: uiuere uiuentibus est esse; set nichil est 
causa esse nisi substancia; ergo substancia est causa uiuere; set uita est 
causa uiuere; ergo uita est substancia; set non materia, non compositum; 
ergo forma.39
Life in living things is existence, but the cause of existence in all things is sub-
stance; therefore, substance is the cause of living. However, life comes from the 
life which is the cause of living; therefore, life is from substance; but not matter 
or the composite, therefore from form. However, what kind of form? Peter now 
suggests that forms and not created and provides the reasons why:
Quod autem forma non sit creata, patet: quia omne quod est creatum est 
hoc aliquid; forma non est hoc aliquid; ergo non est creata. Quod autem 
forma non sit hoc aliquid, patet, quia omne quod est hoc aliquid est id 
quod est; forma non est id quod est; ergo non est hoc aliquid.
Probatio assumpcionis: id quo est unumquodque quod est, non est id 
quod est; forma autem est quo est unumquodque quod est; ergo forma 
non est id quod est. Immo uidetur quod ita debeat formari: id quo est 
unumquodque quod est, non est id quod est; forma est quo est unumquo-
dque quod est, ergo non est id quod est.
Item, quod forma non sit hoc aliquid patet per Aristotilem in principio 
secundi De Anima: ibi enim dicit quod forma est secundum quam unum-
quodque est hoc aliquid, nam forma non est creata set infusa, uita uero 
infusa et non creata.40
38  Peter of Ireland, In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae, Prologus, p. 67: Quod patet 
hoc modo: omne enim esse est a forma; esse uiuencium est esse; ergo esse uiuencium est a 
forma. Set uiuere uiuentibus est esse; ergo uiuere est a forma; set uiuere est uita; ergo uita 
est a forma.
39  Peter of Ireland, In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae, Prologus, p. 67.
40  Peter of Ireland, In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae, Prologus, p. 67–68.
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Since everything which is created is a certain determined thing (hoc aliquid), 
form cannot be said to belong to this category because it is not a certain thing. 
Thus, together with the reasons which we have already seen, it can be affirmed 
that form is not something which has been created. In order to explain this, 
Peter introduces the real distinction, found in Boethius (but ultimately drawn 
from Aristotle), between id quod est and id quo est. The form is the id quo est of 
the id quod est since it causes the id quod est to be; it is the reason for its being. 
The argument is reinforced by the quotation drawn from Aristotle where he 
says that form is that according to which something is a certain individual 
thing. Thus, Peter brings the introductory part of the Prologue to an end, con-
cluding that the forms or perfections of things are not created but are infused, 
and since life is a form, it is not created but infused, it seems, by procession. 
Peter affirms this by quoting the text of the “commentary” of the De causis: “the 
first life gives life to those who are under it, not by way of creation, but by way 
of form”. Aquinas, as we have seen, concludes in a similar way.41
The rest of Peter’s text deals with some dubia such as whether the life of the 
heavens is the same as life in the sublunary world; whether the soul is a mover; 
and whether natural philosophy is the right part of philosophy to deal with 
length and shortness of life. It is interesting to note that Peter dwells on the dif-
ferent kinds of motion but also the differing kinds of life as Berthold will also 
do as we shall see below.
Whereas Berthold’s classification will be quite original, Peter’s overview of 
the world of living things is strictly Aristotelian:
Viuere ergo quod est ab anima dicitur multipliciter: quod testatur 
Aristotiles in libro De Anima dicens: uiuere dicto multipliciter, et⟨si⟩ 
secundum unumquodque alicui inest ipsum uiuere dicimus, ut intel-
lectum, ⟨sensum⟩, motum secundum locum uoluntarie, secundum 
alimentum, crementum, detrimentum. Ex quo patet quod non solum 
animalia uiuunt, set eciam plante: habent enim potenciam et princi-
pium motus in se, secundum quem per alimentum sussipiunt cremen-
tum et detrimentum. Sic ergo concludit Aristotiles quod plante uiuunt. 
Vnumquodque enim uiuit in fine quousque accipiat alimentum, et 
cum non possit sucipere alimentum, non amplius natum est uiuere. 
Et ita potencia uegetatiua in mortalibus est causa uite. Vnde alibi 
dicit Aristotiles quod uegetatiua est communissima potencia anime, 
41  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 104, l. 12–17. See note 33, 
above.
446 Dunne
secundum quam inest uiuere omnibus uiuentibus. Ista enim potencia 
potest separari ab omnibus aliis in mortalibus, alie uero nullo modo ab 
ista: quedam enim animalia uiuunt uegetacione et sensu et non habent 
motum uoluntarium secundum locum, sicut sunt animalia que uiuunt 
per adherenciam, et hec non sunt perfecta animalia, immo sunt medium 
inter animalia perfecta et plantas. Viuunt enim per adherenciam sicut 
plante, set addunt aliquid super uitam plante: uita enim plante non est 
nisi uita occulta, set sensus est illustracio uite, sicut habetur ab Aristotile 
in principio primi De Vegetabilibus. Primus autem sensus, scilicet tactus, 
separabilis est ab omnibus aliis, set alii omnes nequaquam separantur ab 
ipso. Maxime autem dicitur uiuere quod habet in se omnem causam uite, 
scilicet intellectum, sensum, motum secundum locum et cetera. Vnde 
dicitur in 6 Principiis quod racionale animancius est bruto.42
5 First Life and First Mind
In the second part of his commentary, Berthold looks firstly at the different 
kinds of movement and secondly, at the different motions of those living 
things which move themselves.
He begins with a long quotation from Dionysius, De divinis nominibus 9.9:
Moveri ipsum religiose aestimandum est non secundum portationem 
aut mutationem aut alterationem aut modalem aut localem motum, 
non directum, non circularem, non est ambobus, non intelligibilem, non 
animalem, non naturalem, sed eo, quod ad substantiam agat Deus, et 
contineat omnia et totaliter omnia provideat et eo, quod assit omnibus, 
omnium circuitu et ad existentia omnia provisivis processibus et ope-
rationibus. Set et motus Dei immobilis, si decet Deum laudari sermone, 
permittitur, et rectum quidem intelligere convenit neque declinabilem et 
inflexibilem processum operationum et ex ipsa totorum generationem, 
obliquum autem stabilem processum et generativum statum, secun-
dum circulum autem identitatem et media et extrema circumdantia et 
circumdata continere et conversionem ad ipsum eorum, quae ab ipso 
processerunt.43
42  Peter of Ireland, In librum De longitudine et brevitate vitae, Prologus, p. 69–70.
43  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102D, p. 219, l. 68–79.
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This allows Berthold to distinguish between different kinds of motion:44
Motus portationis qui est motus per accidens, sicut anima movetur motu 
corporis, et, cum sint quattuor species motus violenti – pulsio, tractio, 
vectio, vertigo – positus unus fuit pro omnibus.
Motus scilicet mutatio substantialis per quam res substantialiter mutatur.
Motus alterationis: secundum quamcumque formam accidentalem.
Motus modalis quo res se habet aliter quam prius.
Motus modalis qui est ad ubi, licet causaliter sit ad formam.
Motus intelligibilis: de potentia habituali ad habitum et imperfectum et 
perfectum et de habitu ad actum.
Motus animalis, qui est secundum passiones animalium, quae dicuntur 
animales motus et sunt coniuncti.
Motus naturalis: perficit per principia naturalia et modo naturali sui 
quoad motum naturae, qui est ad unum. Item est motus rectus, circu-
laris et obliquus.
Motus vitalis qui tamen est in intelligibili, animali et naturali 
comprehenditur.
In 102E,45 Berthold begins by stating that a living thing is said to share in life, 
and so it differs from a non-living thing by having within itself the principle 
of its own motion, and consequently that everything which has in itself the 
principle of its own motion is said to be alive, whether such a principle is dis-
tinguished either in reality and intention because there is a part of living – as 
in animals, or by reason only as in partial and complete souls, of which some is 
life and living, and in intellects which although they live, yet are not properly 
life. And thus living is said to differ from life, which is “the way and movement 
from the steadfast substance of being” (Prop. 102 comm.) or from the unmov-
ing being.
Berthold now lists different levels of life:46
Vita essentialis: quaedam incessabilis ebullitio sive scaturrigo manens in 
propria identitate inegressibiliter.47
44  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102D, p. 219, l. 80–94.
45  See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102E, p. 219, l. 96–p. 220, l. 116.
46  See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102E, p. 220, l. 104–116.
47  See also Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 100D, p. 206, l. 108: fontana scaturrigo; 
Prop. 131E, p. 196, l. 176–186: In intellectibus etiam invenitur transfusio, quo aliud fluat in 
aliud […]. Similiter se habet in aliis substantiis separatis, quae sunt entia ut simpliciter et 
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Vita intellectualis: esse intellectuale seu entitas intellectualis, converitur in 
se ipsam, et sic se tota se totam penetrat.
Vita animae totalis: etiam est esse ipsius, est motus intellectus practici, qui 
est esse mobilis, inquantum est mobile [see Prop. 102 D]
Vita immortalitas: est fortis et indeclinabilis et sempiterni motus [cf. De 
div. nom. 6.1]
Vita intellectus: coniuncta potentiis organicis est motiva per inclinationem 
suam, quae vocatur voluntas.
Vita materialis et organica: movet per appetitum sensibilem, animalis 
secundum locum et secundum affectiones.
Vita imperfectam cognitionem sensitivam habens: movet secundum con-
strictionem et dilationem in eodem loco.
Ultima vita: secundum ultimam resonantiam habet vivere, est motus con-
sequens naturam nutribilis generis.
Berthold concludes this second part by stating that every living thing moves 
itself by means of a vital movement. And since every property existing in living 
things, inasmuch as they participate in life, are necessarily led back to some-
thing first as such, the conclusion is that all living things are self-moving on 
account of the first life.
The third part allows Berthold to distinguish between the different kinds of 
knowers in general:48
Sensitivum: sensitivum exterior quod etiam est quintuplex in perfectis ani-
malis non orbatis; sensitivum communis quod sequitur imaginativum et 
hoc cogitativum.
Ratiocinativum: opinativum, creditivum and scientificum.
Intellectivum: infimum, medium, and supremum.
Superintellectivum: super quae omnia secundum suos gradus.
secundum speciem. Et in hoc consistit quaedam ebullitio sive fontana scaturrigo talis sub-
stantiae in causando aliquid extra et ita est redundans in aliquid aliud extra se; cf. Dietrich 
of Freiberg, De intellectu et intelligibili, ed. B. Mojsisch, Opera omnia, vol. 1. Schriften zur 
Intellekttheorie (Hamburg: Meiner, 1977), i.8.1–2, p. 141, l. 46–p. 142, l. 71. See also Berthold 
of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propositiones 160–183, 
eds U.R. Jeck, I.J. Tautz (Hamburg: Meiner, 2003), 167B, p. 59, l. 40–41: Verum primus intel-
lectus, scilicet secundum causam, principalformiter est fontana scaturrigo omnis intellec-
tualitatis […].
48  See Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102G, p. 220, l. 129–135.
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Next, a long quotation from the De providentia allows Berthold to distin-
guish between the various ways in which the various knowers participate in 
knowing:49
Cognitivum per essentiam, scilicet intellectuales hypostases, in quibus 
idem est cognitivum, cognitio, cognitum et ratio essendi.
Cognitivum quod semper et connaturaliter cognitione participat sicut 
sunt animae totales et huiusmodi.
Quod quandoque cognitione participat, sicut sunt animae, et hoc sive 
intellectuali sive rationali sive sensitiva.
This allows Berthold to reach his conclusion in 102I, that all things which share 
in knowing are such because of the first intellect, which is the summit of all 
cognition.50
This is something Aquinas himself had confirmed:
[…] unde et in libro Procli dicitur quod omnia cognitiva cognitionem par-
ticipant propter intellectum primum. Et ratio huius assignatur quia omnis 
scientia radicaliter non est nisi intelligentia; intelligentia enim est sum-
mitas quaedam, ut Proclus dicit, omnis cognitionis; unde intelligentia est 
primum cognoscens et influens cognitionem supra omnia cognoscentia.51
6 Conclusion
This brief examination of how three medieval authors in chronological order 
dealt with a text, originally written by Proclus, reworked and made known as 
a ps.-Aristotelian work before being ‘returned’ to its original author, is reveal-
ing of and revealed by how our three authors were challenged and rose to 
that interpretative challenge in different and innovative ways. The focus shifts 
between the ‘Aristotelian’ interpretation of Peter of Ireland, the mediation of 
Thomas Aquinas who Janus-like looks back and then forward to the thorough-
going Platonic approach of Berthold of Moosburg.
49  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102H, p. 221, l. 155–162.
50  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 102I, p. 221, l. 164–166: Ex praemissis satis habetur ter-
tium, scilicet quod omnia, quae cognitione participant, sunt huiusmodi propter prime intel-
lectum, qui est summitas omnis cognitionis.
51  Thomas Aquinas, Super Librum de causis expositio, Prop. 18, p. 103, l. 10–15.
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Peter of Ireland does, however, make one final reference to Proposition 102/18 
at the end of his Prologue as he concludes his divisio scientiae as a justification 
of why he, as a teacher of natural philosophy, is dealing with the topic of life. 
Here is what he has to say:
Vnde quamuis uita non sit corpus neque a corpore proprie loquendo, 
saluatur tamen per ea que sunt in corpore, ut per calidum et humidum 
et cetera; et quia physice per se est considerare causam saluacionis uite 
in uiuente, propter hoc sciencia de uita et de eius opposito ad ipsam 
pertinet. Alio tamen modo considerando uitam secundum eius causam 
efficientem primam, non pertinet ad physicam considerare secundum 
quod sic diffinitur in libro De Causis: uita est processio procedens ab ente 
primo, quieto et sempiterno. Sic ergo patet de quo sit ista sciencia, quia 
de passione concomitante ipsam animam uegetabilem in corpore, de 
qua demonstrat aliam passionem, scilicet longitudinem et breuitatem. 
Vnde proprie intendit in hac sciencia inquirere causam longitudinis et 
breuitatis uite. Omnia autem mensurantur periodo, non tamen eodem, 
sicut habetur in physicis, quia quedam mensurantur reuolucione que fit 
una die, quedam autem reuolucione que attenditur secundum reuolucio-
nem lune, quedam autem secundum reuolucionem solis; et ita quedam 
uiuunt per unam diem, quedam per plures, quedam per mensem, et sic 
deinceps. Etsi causa huius diuersitatis longitudinis et breuitatis uite sit 
diuersitas reuolucionum corporum supercelestium, tamen hanc diuer-
sitatem non attendit hic primo et per se, set diuersitatem que attenditur 
secundum principia materialia uiuentis, secundum tamen quod regula-
tur a superioribus.52
By way of conclusion, Peter as a natural philosopher, will walk a different path 
than that of Proclus’ triad of Being-Life-Intellect but maybe while accepting 
that the way of Proclus is perhaps a higher path.
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chapter 14
Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and 
Marsilio Ficino as Historians of Philosophy
Stephen Gersh
University of Notre Dame
1 Introduction
Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino are undoubt-
edly the three pre-eminent Platonists of the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries ranked in chronological order. However, it is a rather surprising that none 
of the three acknowledges the influence of his predecessor within the group 
and indeed they scarcely mention one another. Nicholas of Cusa discusses 
the erroneous assumptions concerning God’s presence in all things when this 
notion is not approached with “learned ignorance” and the consequent justi-
fication with which certain saints argue that the intellectual light should be 
withdrawn from those with weak mental eyes. This intellectual light is then 
illustrated with a list of authors and books including the commentaria Iohannis 
de Mossbach in propositiones Procli.1 Marsilio Ficino responds in a letter dated 
12 June 1489 to an inquiry by his friend Martin Prenninger regarding the avail-
ability of books in Latin setting out the essentials of Platonic philosophy. He 
supplies a list of books including both scholastic and more modern authors 
that ends with quaedam speculationes Nicolai Cusii Cardinalis.2 These ref-
erences of Nicholas to Berthold and of Ficino to Nicholas together with the 
absence of any reference in Ficino to Berthold do not take us beyond the level 
of basic bibliography. Indeed, the bibliography is rather defective given that 
1 Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, h ii, p. 30, l. 1–3 in Nicholas of Cusa, Opera 
omnia, iussu et auctoritate Academiae Heidelbergensis ad codicum fidem edita (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1932–2006) [= h]. This Latin edition together with English and German translations 
can be accessed at www.cusanus-portal.de.
2 Marsilio Ficino, Epistulae, in Marsilii Ficini […] opera et quae hactenus extitere et quae in 
lucem nunc primum prodiere omnia […] (Basel: Heinrich Petri, 1576 [photographic reprint 
Torino: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1959]), lib. ix, 12, p. 899. Henceforth cited as Opera omnia.
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the names of Berthold and Nicholas are both misspelled by the authors who 
cite them, or at least by their copyists and editors.3
The present essay will leave to those who consider the general psychology 
of authorship the question why writers who clearly have some knowledge of 
each other’s works and share a philosophical agenda do not explicitly make 
common cause. Instead, we will attempt to make a comparative study of the 
three authors that elucidates both their similarity of philosophical method 
and doctrine and also their numerous subtle deviations in approach. The main 
points of similarity are first, that for them writing the history of philosophy is 
part of doing philosophy itself, this being obvious in the case of Berthold and 
Ficino and also arguable in that of Nicholas; second, that for them Platonism is 
the closest philosophy to Christianity according to the authority of Augustine 
and according to the example of Dionysius the Areopagite. The subtle devia-
tions are numerous and include: first, Berthold and Ficino are both explicit 
commentators – lemmatic in the former case and discursive in the latter –, 
whereas Nicholas is not primarily an exegete. Second, Nicholas and Ficino 
emphasise the concordance of Plato and Aristotle whereas Berthold stresses 
their disagreement. Third, Nicholas and Ficino are anti-Scholastic in underly-
ing intent, Nicholas being openly subversive – especially via his doctrines of 
the coincidence of opposites and his methodology based on conjecture – and 
Ficino being more subtly evasive, whereas Berthold remains more embedded 
in the scholastic context. Fourth, Nicholas and Ficino avoid the axiomatic 
method of philosophical expression, whereas Berthold assigns it prominence. 
Finally, both Berthold and Nicholas depend on the medieval “Platonic” corpus – 
especially Augustine, Dionysius the Areopagite and Proclus –, whereas Ficino 
also introduces works newly translated from the Greek.
Against the background of these writers’ common assumptions regard-
ing the importance of the history of philosophy and of their particular com-
mitment to a belief in the inherent sympathy of Platonism and Christianity, 
this essay will examine how Berthold, Nicholas, and Ficino collectively – 
albeit with the variety of subtle deviations mentioned above – approach the 
Hermetica, Plato, and Proclus, making briefer reference to their readings of the 
Pythagoreans, the Latin Platonists, and the Greek Neoplatonists for reasons of 
space. With an appropriate caveat about simplification, we will conclude that 
with respect to their exploitation of these intertextual foundations of Platonic 
philosophy, Nicholas and Ficino are closer to one another than is Berthold to 
either Nicholas or Ficino.
3 It is “John of Mossbach” rather than Berthold of Moosburg, while “Cusa” appears in a strange 
variety of spellings in the early Ficino printings.
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2 Hermetica
The writings originating in late antiquity and the Middle Ages and attributed 
to the mythical figure of Hermes Trismegistus play a major role in establish-
ing the notion of “Platonism” for our three philosophers. The importance of 
these writings stems from the venerable authority attributed to their assumed 
ancient author, although there was always a certain measure of controversy 
surrounding their value.4 A favourable presentation of Hermes and his works 
can be found primarily in Lactantius who in his Divinae institutiones reports 
that Trismegistus often described the excellence and majesty of the one God, 
called him by the names that Christians use: namely, “God” and “Father,” and 
also declared that the one God actually has no name.5 In addition, the same 
church father quotes a work by Trismegistus called the Logos Teleios in which 
the first God is said to have made a second God who was his Son6 and to have 
foretold the restoration of the world: a point on which he was in agreement 
with the Sibyl.7 A more ambivalent presentation of Hermes and his writings 
occurs in Augustine. On the negative side, the bishop of Hippo quotes the opin-
ion of the Egyptian Hermes called “Trismegistus” concerning demons from a 
Latin translation of his work entitled Asclepius.8 Hermes here maintains that 
there are two classes of gods: created by the supreme God and created by men 
respectively, the latter being idols dedicated to gods and animated by them.9 
Augustine clearly finds this author to be rather problematic for, although the 
latter rightly prophesies the time when the pagan religion will be conquered by 
a new belief, he does not explicitly name the latter as Christianity and seems 
to deplore the forthcoming events. This would indicate that the prophecy was 
4 For biographical information about Hermes see Lactantius, Divinae institutiones, lib. i, c. 6, 
reporting Cicero’s reference to five Mercuries, the fifth being the one who slew Argus and 
therefore fled to Egypt and gave laws and letters to the Egyptians. He was called Thoth by 
Egyptians, was of great antiquity, and was imbued with so much learning that he acquired the 
name “Trismegistus”; De ira Dei, c. 11, Trismegistus more ancient than Plato and Pythagoras; 
Augustine, De civitate Dei, lib. xviii, c. 39, reporting that Trismegistus lived long before the 
sages and philosophers of Greece but after Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Joseph, and even Moses. 
At the time when Moses was born there lived Atlas, Prometheus’ brother, a great astronomer. 
He was grandfather by the mother’s side to the elder Mercury who begat the father of this 
Trismegistus.
5 Lactantius, Divinae institutiones, lib. i, c. 6.
6 Lactantius, Divinae institutiones, lib. iv, c. 6.
7 Lactantius, Divinae institutiones, lib. vii, c. 18.
8 Augustine’s reference here is to Hermes Latinus, Asclepius, eds A.D. Nock, A.-J. Festugière, 
Corpus Hermeticum, vol. 2 (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1973), c. 23–24, p. 325, l. 4–p. 326, l. 20.
9 Augustine, De civitate Dei, lib. viii, c. 23.
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revealed to him not by the Holy Spirit but by demons.10 On the positive side, 
the church father cites Hermes Trismegistus’ statements to the effect that there 
is one true God who is the artificer of the universe as being close approxima-
tions to the truth. In the light of such statements, Augustine finds it very sur-
prising that the same author allows men to be subjected to man-made gods 
and bewails the destruction of this idolatrous religion.
During the period under review in the present study, we can distinguish 
two phases in the interpretation of Hermes Trismegistus based on the range 
of texts available:11 a medieval phase and a Renaissance phase.12 In the medi-
eval phase, the main texts are the Asclepius already mentioned – a genuinely 
ancient text whose Latin translator was often thought to be Apuleius13 – and 
two pseudo-antique medieval works: the Liber XXIV philosophorum and the 
De VI rerum principiis, the former being often cited without specific mention 
of Hermes as author.14 These texts are all used by Berthold of Moosburg who 
cites them often through intermediate sources such as Alan of Lille, Albert the 
Great, and Thomas of York.15 They are also used by Nicholas of Cusa who gen-
erally cites them directly, as his extant ms glosses on the Asclepius would seem 
to indicate.16 In the Renaissance phase, the main texts are the Asclepius and 
the medieval treatises once again, although these are now supplemented by 
the Pimander, i.e. Ficino’s translation of the Greek Corpus Hermeticum.
10  The discussion continues down to De civitate Dei, lib. viii, c. 26 quoting Asclepius, 
cc. 24–25, p. 326, l. 15–329, l. 23.
11  On the ms tradition see P. Lucentini, V. Perrone Compagni, “I manoscritti dei testi 
ermetici latini”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), Hermetism from Late 
Antiquity to Humanism. La tradizione ermetica dal mondo tardo-antico all’Umanesimo = 
Atti del Convegno internazionale di studi, Napoli 20–24 novembre 2001 (Turnhout: Brepols, 
2003), p. 715–745.
12  The phases are mainly distinguished by the range of texts available.
13  For a survey see C. Gilly, “Die Überlieferung des Asclepius im Mittelalter”, in R. van den 
Broek, C. van Heertum (eds), From Poimandres to Jacob Böhme. Gnosis, Hermetism and the 
Christian Tradition (Leiden: Brill, 2000), p. 336–367.
14  For a survey see Hermes Latinus, Il Libro dei ventiquattro filosofi, ed. P. Lucentini (Milano: 
Adelphi, 1999), containing the study: “La fortuna del ‘Libro dei ventiquattro filosofi’ nel 
Medioevo”, p. 103–150.
15  For citation of these three Hermetic texts by Thomas of York see D. Porreca, “Hermes 
Trismegistus in Thomas of York. A 13th-Century Witness to the Prominence of an Ancient 
Sage”, in Archives d’histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge 72(2005), p. 147–275. See 
also L. Sturlese, “Saints et magiciens. Albert le Grand en face d’Hermès Trismégiste”, in 
Archives de philosophie 43(1980), p. 615–634.
16  See note 34.
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2.1 Berthold of Moosburg
Berthold of Moosburg cites the Asclepius with bibliographical precision as 
Trismegistus ad Asclepium De Hedera, id est, De Deo deorum.17 The importance 
of this work for him is indicated by his use of two passages as the basis of an 
informal lemmatic commentary setting out his doctrine of the macrocosm 
and microcosm in the Prologue to his Expositio. The passage dealing with 
the macrocosm reads: “Mundus est opus Dei immutabile, gloriosa construc-
tio, bonum multiformi imaginum varietate compositum, machina voluntatis 
Dei suo operi absque invidia suffragantis” (“the world is an immutable work 
of God, a glorious construction, a good composed of a multiform variety of 
images, a mechanism of the will of God who ungrudgingly supports his work”).18 
The first lemma extracted from this, opus, is initially glossed by noting that 
the Hermetic author refers to a “work” rather than to a “creature” because of 
the peculiar status of the primordial causes: a notion derived by the commen-
tator from the Clavis physicae of “Theodorus”.19 The gloss is next expanded 
intertextually by Berthold who observes that this same work is perfectissimum 
according to Plato’s Timaeus, pulcherrimum according to Boethius’ De con-
solatione philosophiae, and ordinatissimum according to Augustine and the 
Asclepius itself.20 There follows a series of lemmatic comments of a similar 
kind based on the terms immutabile, gloriosa constructio, bonum multiformi 
imaginum varietate compositum, and machina voluntatis dei21 after which the 
commentator returns to his base text using a different methodology. The com-
plementary passage dealing with the microcosm reads: “Homo est nexus Dei et 
mundi super mundum per duplicem indagationem existens […] et hoc modo 
mundi gubernator proprie vocatur. Subnexus autem Deo, pulchritudines eius 
non immersas mundo […] accipiens per similitudinem divinam” (“man is 
the bond between God and the world, existing above the world in terms of a 
17  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Prologus, 
Propositiones 1–13, eds M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, L. Sturlese (Hamburg: Meiner, 1984), 
Expositio tituli K, p. 47, l. 368–369, using the reading De Hedera of codex v. On the titles 
see Porreca, “Hermes Trismegistus and Thomas of York”, p. 150–151.
18  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prologus 8, p. 14, l. 296–299. The passage summarized 
by Berthold is Asclepius, c. 25, p. 328. l. 20–23.
19  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 9, p. 14, l. 300–302. Several other texts influenced by 
Eriugena are also cited.
20  The passages cited are Calcidius, Commentarius in Timaeum, ed. J.H. Waszink, Timaeus a 
Calcidio translatus commentarioque instructus (London / Leiden: Warburg Institute / Brill, 
1962), p. 23, l. 16–20 (= Plato, Timaeus, 30d–31a); Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, 
ed. C. Moreschini (München / Leipzig: Saur, 2005), lib. iii, m. 9, p. 80, l. 7; and Augustine, 
De ordine, passim.
21  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 10–13, p. 16, l. 363–p. 23, l. 569.
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twofold investigation […] and in this way he is properly called the governor 
of the world. Bound in subordination to God, he receives the latter’s beauties 
that are not immersed in the world through his similarity to the divine”). This 
passage is actually not a direct quotation from the Asclepius but a summary of 
the latter in Albert the Great’s Metaphysica.22 The first lemma extracted from 
it, nexus dei et mundi,23 is initially glossed by noting that the Hermetic writer is 
alluding to the four principal parts of the totality: namely, body, soul, intellect, 
and unity – a division derived from Proclus rather than the Asclepius itself. 
After suggesting that the first three terms require little comment, Berthold 
expands the gloss intertextually by citing for an explanation of unity Proclus’ 
De providentia et fato and noting that Dionysius’ De divinis nominibus agrees 
with this teaching,24 the discussion continuing with the statement that there 
is an assimilation of the microcosm to God through unity and intellect and to 
the world through soul and body. There follows a series of lemmatic comments 
of a similar kind based on the terms duplicem indagationem, gubernator, sub-
nexus Deo, and pulchritudines non immerses mundo.25
In addition to the Asclepius, Berthold makes a number of references to the 
medieval Hermetic texts.26 From the Liber XXIV philosophorum he quotes the 
VII regula Trismegisti stating that God is “a beginning without beginning, a 
process without variation, an end without end” (“principium sine principio, 
processus sine variatione, finis sine fine”), and per VI ibidem the statement that 
he is that “in comparison with which substance is accident and accident is 
nothing” (“cuius comparatione substantia est accidens, accidens vero nihil”).27 
22  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 14, p. 23, l. 570–577. The passage summarised by 
Berthold is Albert the Great, Metaphysica, ed. B. Geyer (Münster i.W.: Aschendorff, 1960), 
lib. i, tr. 1, c. 1, p. 2, l. 5–15, which itself follows Asclep., c. 6–10, p. 301, l. 18–309, l. 4.
23  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 15, p. 23, l. 578–579.
24  The passages cited are Proclus, De X dubitationibus circa providentiam, ed. D. Isaac (Paris: 
Les Belles Lettres, 1977), c. 10, §64, p. 134, l. 12–14; and Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 
c. 7, §1, 865C.
25  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 16–18, p. 23, l. 604–p. 27, l. 734.
26  On Berthold’s use of the medieval Hermetica see the series of studies by A. Sannino, 
“Berthold of Moosburg’s Hermetic Sources”, in Journal of the Warburg and Courtauld 
Institutes 63(2000), p. 243–258; A. Sannino, “Il concetto ermetico di natura in Bertoldo 
di Moosburg”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), Hermetism from Late 
Antiquity to Humanism, p. 203–221; A. Sannino, “Il Liber viginti quattuor philosophorum 
nella metafisica di Bertoldo di Moosburg”, in A. Beccarisi, R. Imbach, P. Porro (eds), Per 
perscrutationem philosophicam. Neue Perspektiven der mittelalterlichen Forschung. Loris 
Sturlese zum 60. Geburtstag gewidmet (Hamburg: Meiner, 2008), p. 252–272.
27  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit., i, p. 46, l. 332–335. The passages cited are 
Liber XXIV philosophorum, in Hermes Latinus, Le Livre des XXIV philosophes, ed. F. Hudry 
(Grenoble: Millon, 1989), maxim 6, p. 108 and maxim 7, p. 111.
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Without attribution he also quotes the statement in the same work that God 
is “an infinite sphere whose centre is everywhere but whose circumference is 
nowhere” (“sphaera infinita, cuius centrum est ubique, circumferentia vero 
nusquam”).28 From the De VI rerum principiis he quotes a variety of teachings 
including the notions that intellect is transformed from on high into divine 
knowledge, that intellect so transformed investigates what the Good’s causal-
ity and effectivity is,29 that the Good is the creator of all things and the pleni-
tude of knowledge, and that the Good is the mind that discharges its function 
without any fatigue.30
2.2 Nicholas of Cusa
Nicholas of Cusa’s interest in the tradition of philosophical Hermetica can be 
documented throughout his career, starting from some of the earliest sermons 
to the De ludo globi of 1462–3.31 A passage in his Apologia doctae ignorantiae 
shows decisively albeit indirectly the importance that he attaches to this lit-
erature by comparing the dialogic and didactic relation between Hermes and 
“Aesculapius” to that between Dionysius the Areopagite and Timothy and even 
to that between Christ and St. Paul.32 The earlier work of which the Apologia 
is a defence – De docta ignorantia – had already contained some striking ref-
erences to the Asclepius. In support of his argument for the lack of distinc-
tion in the Absolute Maximum, Nicholas notes that “for this reason, Hermes 
Trismegistus rightly says that ‘since God is all things, he has no proper name, 
for it would be necessary either to give God every name or call all things by his 
name’” (“quoniam Deus est universitas rerum, tunc nullum nomen proprium 
est eius, quoniam aut necesse esset omni nomine Deum aut omnia eius nomine 
28  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 11, p. 18, l. 419–420. The passage cited is Lib. XXIV 
Philos., maxim 2, p. 208.
29  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11F, p. 192, l. 261–265: sicut dicit Trismegistus De sex 
principiis cap. 1. The passage cited is Hermes Latinus, Liber de VI rerum principiis, eds 
P. Lucentini, M.D. Delp (Turnhout: Brepols, 2006), part i, c. 2, l. 48–50.
30  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 11F, p. 193, l. 296–305. The passages cited are Lib. De VI 
rerum princ., part i, c. 2, l. 4–10; part i, c. 2, l. 44–48; part i, c. 3, l. 1–8; part i, c. 3, l. 21–24.
31  For Nicholas’ reading of the testimonies of Lactantius and Augustine concerning Hermes 
Trismegistus see Sermo i, §2 [December 1430], eds R. Haubst, M. Bodewig (Hamburg: 
Meiner, 1977). However, he adopts a more circumspect view of some doctrines in the 
Hermetic books in Sermo ii, §2 [January 1431]. The influence of Hermetic texts on Nicholas 
has been studied by A. Minazzoli, “L’héritage du Corpus Hermeticum dans la philosophie 
de Nicolas de Cues”, in La Ciudad de Dios 205(1992), p. 101–122; P. Arfé, “Ermete Trismegisto 
e Nicola Cusano”, in P. Lucentini, I. Parri, V. Perrone Compagni (eds), Hermetism from Late 
Antiquity to Humanism, p. 223–243; and G. Federici Vescovini, Nicolas de Cues (Paris: Vrin, 
2016), p. 53–64.
32  Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, h ii, p. 5, l. 21–23.
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nuncupari”).33 Whereas this quotation is obviously drawn directly from the 
Asclepius – a work on which Nicholas’ manuscript glosses survive –,34 another 
passage is probably taken indirectly through Thierry of Chartres. In developing 
his account of the fourfold structure of the Contracted Maximum, Nicholas 
quotes the view of unnamed authorities that the movement characteristic of 
the created world “is a certain spirit that is as though intermediate between 
matter and form […] a spirit of connection which proceeds from both: namely, 
possibility and the world-soul” (“spiritus quidam esse, quasi inter formam et 
materiam medius […] spiritus connexionis procedere ab utroque: scilicet, pos-
sibilitate et anima mundi”).35
Nicholas is not deterred from citing some of the most controversial and the 
most enigmatic parts of the Asclepius. In De beryllo he includes among a set 
of premises to be employed in the explanation of the hermeneutical device 
called the “intellectual beryl” the statement of Hermes Trismegistus that “man 
is a second god” (hominem esse secundum deum) and then glosses this by argu-
ing that, just as God is the creator of “real beings” (entia realia) and natural 
forms, so is man the creator of “conceptual beings” (rationalia entia) and arti-
ficial forms: an analogy that underlies his methodology of conjecture.36 In De 
ludo globi he destabilizes the notion of the world’s physically precise sphericity 
by endorsing Mercury’s view that it is not the world’s roundness “of itself” (ex 
se) but only the forms of things contained in it that are actually visible.37
It is consistent with his all-pervasive epistemology exploiting the “coin-
cidence of opposites” that Nicholas should especially gravitate towards the 
paradoxical utterances forming the quasi-definitions of God in the Liber XXIV 
philosophorum. In the second book of De docta ignorantia he attributes to an 
anonymous sage the fourteenth proposition of that work stating that “God is 
the opposite of nothing with being as the intermediary” (Deus est oppositio 
33  Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. i, c. 24, p. 48, l. 13–15. The reference is to 
Asclepius, c. 20, p. 321, l. 5–9. See also Nicholas of Cusa, De beryllo, h xi/1, §13, l. 10–12.
34  See P. Arfé (ed.), Cusanus-Texte III. Marginalien. 5. Apuleius. Hermes Trismegistus. Aus 
Codex Bruxellensis 10054–56 (Heidelberg: Winter, 2004).
35  Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. ii, c. 10, p. 96, l. 14–p. 97, l. 17. The reference 
is to Asclep., c. 14, p. 313, l. 3–7 and l. 20–22; c. 16, p. 315, l. 13–16; c. 17, p. 315, l. 22–24 and 
p. 316, l. 3–4. Cf. Thierry of Chartres, Commentum super librum Boethii De Trinitate, ed. 
N.M. Häring, Commentaries on Boethius by Thierry of Chartres and His School (Toronto: 
Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1971), c. 4, p. 91–96.
36  Nicholas of Cusa, De beryllo, h xi/1, §7, l. 1–2. The reference is to Asclepius, c. 6, p. 301, 
l. 18–p. 302, l. 2.
37  Nicholas of Cusa, De ludo globi, h ix, lib. i, §13, l. 15–17. The reference is to Asclepius, c. 17, 
p. 316, l. 5–10.
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nihil mediatione entis).38 In the same book he applies without attribution – 
exactly as Berthold had done earlier in his Expositio – the second proposition: 
“God is an infinite sphere whose centre is everywhere but whose circumference 
is nowhere” by analogy to both the Absolute and the Contracted Maximum.39
2.3 Marsilio Ficino
The status of the Hermetica as a literary source was changed radically by 
Marsilio Ficino.40 In the proem to his translation and commentary on Plotinus’ 
Enneads published in 1492, he describes the circumstances surrounding his 
commission almost thirty years earlier to translate the Greek Hermetic corpus, 
a manuscript of which had come into the possession of Cosimo de’ Medici.41 
The resulting Latin translation of the Greek text42 – to which he assigned the 
title of Pimander – is prefaced with a short argumentum summarising all the 
biographical and genealogical information about the mythical author that 
could be derived from Cicero, Lactantius, and Augustine.43 This short preface 
is the Florentine writer’s only extended critical reflection on the Hermetica, 
since the annotations on the separate treatises that accompanied his transla-
tion in some of the early printings are in fact by Jacques Lefèvre d’Étaples.
It is the fact that Ficino here introduces some of his own most important 
ideas that makes this preface a document of real interest. He explains that 
the ancient author was called “thrice-greatest” (ter maximus) because he was 
considered to be the greatest philosopher, the greatest priest, and the greatest 
king – a detail important with respect to Ficino’s view of the fusion of phi-
losophy and religion.44 Regarding the character of Hermes, the commentator 
informs us that he was the first philosopher to transfer himself from physics 
38  Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. ii, c. 2, p. 66, l. 11. The reference is to 
Liber XXIV philosophorum, maxim 14, p. 133.
39  Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. ii, c. 12, p. 103, l. 20–p. 104, l. 3. The reference 
is to Liber XXIV philosophorum, maxim 2, p. 95.
40  On the influence of Hermetica on Ficino see M.J.B. Allen, “Marsilio Ficino, Hermes 
Trismegistus and the Corpus Hermeticum”, in J. Henry, S. Hutton (eds), New Perspectives 
on Renaissance Thought. Essays in the History of Science, Education and Philosophy in 
Memory of Charles B. Schmitt (London: Duckworth, 1990), p. 38–47; S. Gentile, C. Gilly 
(eds), Marsilio Ficino e il ritorno di Ermete Trismegisto. Marsilio Ficino and the Return of 
Hermes Trismegistus (Firenze: Centro Di, 1999).
41  Marsilio Ficino, In Enneadem I, ed. S. Gersh (forthcoming), proem §1.
42  Apparently because of a lacuna in his Greek manuscript, Ficino in his Pimander omits 
one treatise included in the modern edition.
43  Marsilio Ficino, Opera omnia, p. 1836.
44  However, the notion of Mercury’s triple profession itself may have been derived from a 
similar suggestion at De VI rerum principiis, prol., l. 6–7.
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and mathematics to divine matters and the first to dispute widely regarding 
the majesty of God, the order of daemons, and the vicissitudes of souls. He 
adds that Hermes also speaks as a prophet in predicting the end of the old 
religion and rise of a new faith, the advent of Christ, the future judgment, and 
the resurrection. From these comments, it becomes apparent that Ficino is 
following the favourable view of Lactantius – i.e. that Hermes has definite pro-
Christian tendencies – rather than the sceptical view of Augustine. Regarding 
the organization of the Hermetic corpus, the argumentum informs us that of 
their author’s many books two are most important: one concerning the divine 
will and entitled Asclepius and another concerning the power and wisdom of 
God and entitled Pimander. It further notes that the former was translated into 
Latin by Apuleius, whereas the latter remained in Greek until it was brought to 
Italy by Leonardo of Pistoia and translated by Ficino on the orders of Cosimo 
de’ Medici. Finally, we learn that Hermes is the founder of a tradition of “ancient 
theology” (antiqua theologia) which continued with Orpheus, Aglaophemus, 
Pythagoras, Philolaus, and Plato in a sixfold order – an idea crucial for Ficino’s 
interpretation of the history of philosophy.
Despite completing a translation of the Greek Hermetic corpus, Ficino 
uses this material only to a limited extent in his own commentaries and 
treatises.45 It is not absolutely clear why this is the case, although possible rea-
sons might include a desire to distance himself from medieval philosophical 
material that had by this time become a cliché – as he perhaps does also with 
Proclus’ Elements of Theology –, and a feeling that he now also has better Greek 
writings – e.g. those of Plato and Plotinus – covering the relevant metaphysical 
topics. In fact, the one Hermetic passage that he exploits in a significant way 
is the controversial one in the Asclepius dealing with statue-making.46 In book 
three of his De Vita, Ficino presents this text from a novel intertextual per-
spective in arguing that Plotinus, in the Fourth Ennead,47 “imitates Mercury” 
45  The main importance of Hermes for Ficino seems to be as the founder of the tradition 
of “ancient theology” that is integral within the Florentine’s view of the history of phi-
losophy. However, from the time of the first version of Ficino’s Philebus commentary and 
the Platonic Theology onwards, Hermes’ position in that tradition is usurped – under the 
influence of Proclus and Plethon – by the equally mythical figure of “Zoroaster”, the puta-
tive author of the Chaldaean Oracles.
46  See above.
47  The third book of Ficino’s treatise was originally conceived as a commentary on Plotinus, 
Ennead iv.3.26 and appears as such in the dedication ms of his Plotinus translation and 
commentary but not in the editio princeps.
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(Mercurium imitatus)48 in illustrating the soul’s acquisition of celestial gifts 
with the magi’s capturing of something divine and wonderful in their statues.49 
To some extent, this perfectly justifiable interpretation in relation to the origi-
nal Plotinian discussion can be viewed as sanitising the Hermetic text by treat-
ing the animation of statues as a metaphor for a natural process rather than as 
literal account of an occult contrivance.50
3 Pythagoreans
The importance of Pythagoras and his followers for the development of phi-
losophy before Plato was well established for later generations by the doxogra-
phies in writers such as Augustine and Macrobius and by the role of “Timaeus” 
in the Platonic dialogue. We must distinguish two phases of reception in the 
period under review. During the medieval phase, the main texts transmitting 
Pythagorean51 doctrine in technical detail are Boethius’ De institutione arith-
metica and De institutione musica, both of which are partially translations of 
the Greek theorist Nicomachus of Gerasa.
3.1 Medieval Phase
3.1.1 Berthold of Moosburg
Berthold of Moosburg knows his Pythagoreanism, in the first instance, through 
Boethius. In one passage he quotes from this source “Archytas the Pythagorean” 
(Archytas Pythagoricus) on the organization of the categories into a decadic 
48  A little later, he says: “that same Mercury, whom Plotinus follows […]” (Mercurius ipse 
quem Plotinus sequitur […]), “Mercury […] following him Plotinus […]” (Mercurius […] 
secutus hunc Plotinus […]), etc.
49  Marsilio Ficino, Three Books on Life, eds C.V. Kaske, J.R. Clark (Tempe, Arizona: Arizona 
Center for Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 2002), lib. iii, c. 26, p. 388, l. 77–p. 392, l. 139.
50  For more detail on this question, see S. Gersh, “Marsilio Ficino as Commentator on 
Plotinus. Some Case-Studies”, in S. Gersh (ed.), Plotinus’ Legacy. The Transformation of 
Platonism from the Renaissance to the Modern Era (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2019), p. 19–43, at p. 36–41.
51  Many modern scholars distinguish between “Pythagorean” (=pre-Platonic) and “Neo- 
Pythagorean” (post-Platonic) doctrine – a distinction that we can ignore here as being 
meaningless for the authors presently under consideration. There are useful recent sur-
veys in A. Hicks, “Pythagoras and Pythagoreanism in Late Antiquity and the Middle Ages”, 
in C.A. Huffman (ed.), A History of Pythagoreanism (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2014), p. 416–434; and M.J.B. Allen, “Pythagoras in the Early Renaissance”, in 
Huffman (ed.), A History of Pythagoreanism, p. 435–453.
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structure,52 and in another the doctrine that all things derived from the pri-
maeval nature are formed according to the principle of number.53 Secondly, 
Berthold’s Pythagoreanism comes via Calcidius’ Commentary on the Timaeus: 
for example, in a passage where he explicitly quotes this text as justification 
of the analogy between the division of multitude by the number 3 in arithme-
tic and the division of substance into indivisible, divided, and mixture in the 
Platonic account of the soul’s generation.54
3.1.2 Nicholas of Cusa
The importance of Pythagoreanism for Nicholas of Cusa cannot better be doc-
umented than by citing the passage in the first book of De docta ignorantia 
which introduces a threefold arithmetical analogy comprising Unity, Equality, 
and Connection in order to express the trinitarian nature of the Absolute 
Maximum discussed earlier in the text.55 Although Nicholas refers to ancient 
Pythagoreanism, he is here clearly using one of his favourite medieval sources 
as an intermediary or at least as an inspiration, namely, the Boethian commen-
taries of Thierry of Chartres:
No nation has ever existed which did not worship God and believe that 
he was absolutely the Maximum. We find Marcus Varro in his books 
of Antiquities to have remarked that the Sisennii revered Unity as the 
Maximum, while Pythagoras – a man celebrated in his era for an irrefut-
able authority – further asserted that this Unity was a Trinity. In investi-
gating its Truth and elevating our mind higher, let us argue according to 
the following premises: Nobody doubts that that which precedes all oth-
erness is eternal, for otherness is the same as mutability. But everything 
that naturally precedes mutability is immutable and therefore eternal. 
Indeed, otherness consists of one thing and another, and so otherness 
52  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio super Elementationem theologicam Procli. Propo- 
sitiones 14–34, eds L. Sturlese, M.R. Pagnoni-Sturlese, B. Mojsisch (Hamburg: Meiner, 1986), 
24A, p. 126, l. 52–54, via Boethius, De institutione arithmetica, ed. G. Friedlein (Leipzig: 
Teubner, 1867 [photographic reprint Frankfurt a. M.: Minerva, 1966]), lib. ii, c. 41, p. 139, 
l. 13–19.
53  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 19A, p. 59, l. 40–45, via Boethius, De institutione arith-
metica, lib. i, c. 2, p. 12, l. 14–15. The passage in Berthold includes an intertextual cross-
reference to Proclus, De malorum subsistentia, ed. D. Isaac (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1982), 
c. 1, §4, p. 33, l. 37–38.
54  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 6E, p. 131, l. 162–170. The reference is to Calcidius, In 
Timaeum, p. 27, l. 6–14.
55  Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. i, c. 7–9, p. 14, l. 22–p. 19, l. 14. Chapter 7 
bears the heading: “On the trine and unitary Eternity” (De trina et una aeternitate).
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like number is posterior to Unity. Consequently, Unity is prior in nature 
to otherness and, since it precedes it naturally, is Eternal Unity.56
This passage is by no means alone in testifying to the importance of 
Pythagoreanism in Nicholas’ thought. The precise metaphysical status of num-
ber is determined in his Idiota de mente57 where the character of the “Layman” 
praises the Pythagoreans for treating number not just mathematically as pro-
ceeding from our mind but “symbolically and rationally” (symbolice ac ratio-
nabiliter) as proceeding from the divine mind, the former number being the 
image of the latter.58 He adds that Pythagorean doctrine was followed by the 
Platonists who in their turn were followed by Boethius.
During the Renaissance phase, the aforementioned Latin texts transmitting 
Pythagorean doctrine in a technical sense were supplemented by numerous 
works becoming available for the first time in Greek. These included Plato’s 
Timaeus and Parmenides together with their Greek commentaries by Proclus, 
Porphyry’s De vita pythagorica, Iamblichus’ De vita pythagorica and De com-
muni mathematica scientia, Timaeus of Locri’s De natura mundi et animae, and 
Hierocles’ Commentaria in Aureum carmen.
3.2 Renaissance Phase
3.2.1 Marsilio Ficino
Marsilio Ficino has an ambivalent view of Pythagoreanism. On the one 
hand, he emphasises the importance of Pythagoreanism within the tradi-
tion of “ancient theology” which always includes Pythagoras and sometimes 
also Philolaus as representatives of the Graeco-Italian school in the list of 
authorities.59 On the other hand, Ficino is highly critical of the doctrine 
56  Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. i, c. 7, p. 14, l. 24–p. 15, l. 10: Nulla umquam 
natio fuit quae Deum non coleret et quem maximum absolute non crederet. Reperimus M. 
Varronem in libris Antiquitatum annotasse Sissennios unitatem pro maximo adorasse. 
Pythagoras autem, vir suo aevo auctoritate irrefragabili clarissimus, unitatem illam trinam 
astruebat. Huius veritatem investigantes, altius ingenium elevantes dicamus iuxta praem-
issa: Id quod omnem alteritatem praecedit aeternum esse nemo dubitat. Alteritas namque 
idem est quod mutabilitas. Sed omne quod mutabilitatem naturaliter praecedit immutabile 
est, quare aeternum. Alteritas vero constat ex uno et altero; quare alteritas sicut numerus 
posterior est unitate. Unitas ergo prior natura est alteritate et, quoniam eam naturaliter 
praecedit, est unitas aeterna.
57  Nicholas of Cusa, Idiota de mente, h v, c. 6, §88, l. 11–22 and §95, l. 1–21.
58  See S. Toussaint, “Mystische Geometrie und Hermetismus in der Renaissance. Ficinus 
und Cusanus”, in Perspektiven der Philosophie 26(2000), p. 339–356.
59  See the argumentum of the Pimander, cited above. Among later illustrations of this his-
torical thesis see Ficino, In Ennead. i, proem 2.
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of transmigration of the soul into animals which he believes Plato to have 
endorsed only in a metaphorical sense, although some of the late ancient 
Platonici including Plotinus mistook it for a literal truth.60
4 Plato
During the period here under review, we must distinguish three phases in the 
interpretation of Plato based on the range of texts available: a medieval phase, 
a transitional phase, and a Renaissance phase. In the medieval phase, the main 
texts are Calcidius’ translation and commentary on the Timaeus (as well as 
Cicero’s translation), William of Moerbeke’s translation of the Parmenides as 
lemmata within his translation of Proclus’ commentary;61 Aristippus’ transla-
tions of the Meno and Phaedo;62 and the doxographies in Augustine’s Contra 
Academicos, De civitate Dei viii, and De diversis quaestionibus, q. 46. The tran-
sitional phase utilizes the same texts together with certain newer humanist 
translations from the Greek. Among the latter are the Parmenides as a separate 
text translated by George of Trebizond in the fifteenth century,63 the Apology, 
Crito, and Phaedrus in the translation of Leonardo Bruni,64 and the Republic 
60  See Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plotinus. Volume 4. Ennead III, Part 1, ed. S. Gersh 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2017), In Ennead. iii.4, §9–14. Cf. In 
Enneadem iii.2, §30. In the Theologia platonica, Ficino proposes a classification of six 
Academies according to their tendency to read Plato’s accounts of the vicissitudes of souls 
literally or metaphorically. See Marsilio Ficino, Platonic Theology. Volume 6. Books XVII–
XVIII, eds M.J.B. Allen, J. Hankins (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006), 
lib. xvii, c. 1, §1–2, p. 6–8. See also Ficino, Theologia Platonica, lib. xvii, c. 3, §5, p. 32–34; 
Theologia Platonica, lib. xvii, c. 3, §10, p. 40–42; Theol. Plat., lib. xvii, c. 4, §1, p. 44–46.
61  See Proclus, Commentaire sur le Parménide de Platon, Traduction de Guillaume de 
Moerbeke, ed. C. Steel, 2 vols (Leuven / Leiden: Leuven University Press / Brill, 1982–
1985), which includes Moerbeke’s translation of extracts from Proclus’ Commentary on 
the Timaeus (vol. 2, p. 559–587). Moerbeke’s translation of the Parmenides is based on 
Proclus’ lemmata and extends only as far as the “first hypothesis”.
62  See Plato, Meno interprete Henrico Aristippo, eds V. Kordeuter, C. Labowsky (London: 
Warburg Institute, 1940) and Phaedo interprete Henrico Aristippo, ed. L. Minio-Paluello 
(London: Warburg Institute, 1950).
63  See J. Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance, 2 vols (Leiden / New York: Brill, 1990), 
p. 180–186, 429–435; I. Ruocco (ed.), Il Platone latino. Il Parmenide. Giorgio di Trebisonda 
e il cardinale Cusano (Firenze: Olschki, 2003). George of Trebizond’s translation – being 
independent of Proclus’ commentary – covers the entire text of the Parmenides.
64  For notes on the provenance of the Apology, Crito, and Phaedrus translations and the preface 
to the Phaedrus see H. Baron (ed.), Leonardo Bruni Aretino. Humanistisch-philosophische 
Schriften, mit einer Chronologie seiner Werke und Briefe (Leipzig / Berlin: Teubner, 1928), 
p. 3–4, 172, and Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance, p. 388–400. For the Crito text 
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in the translation of Pier Candido Decembrio.65 In the Renaissance phase, the 
main texts are the complete Latin translation of Plato by Ficino together with 
argumenta for all dialogues and longer commentaries on the Symposium (also 
called De amore), Phaedrus, Parmenides, Timaeus, and Philebus, and of course 
the Greek texts of Plato themselves. Among the many doctrinal aspects of this 
Plato reception, we will concentrate here on two that are particularly impor-
tant for understanding the Platonists’ own historical viewpoint: the notion of 
concealment and the relation between Plato and Aristotle.
4.1 The Notion of Concealment
The notion that the ancient Academy had pursued a deliberate strategy of con-
cealing their metaphysical doctrine behind a display of sceptical methodol-
ogy was very influential among later Platonists. The main authority for this 
teaching was Augustine, who in Contra Academicos lists the important teach-
ings of Plato – the immortality of the human soul, the distinction between the 
intelligible and sensible worlds, and so forth – and reports that such doctrines 
were as much as possible “preserved and guarded as mysteries” (servata et pro 
mysteriis custodita) by his successors. According to Augustine, many students 
of philosophy were erroneously starting to believe that everything is corpo-
real, in response to which Arcesilaus “thoroughly concealed the doctrine of the 
Academy and buried it as a golden hoard to be discovered some day by poster-
ity” (“occultasse penitus Academiae sententiam et quasi aurum inveniendum 
quandoque posteris obruisse”), preferring to disabuse those whom he consid-
ered badly taught rather than teach those whom he considered unteachable.66 
The notion that Arcesilaus’ adoption of sceptical methodology was a strata-
gem aimed at concealing dogmatic metaphysics seems to have been derived 
by Augustine from a rather oblique reading of a passage in Cicero’s Academica 
in which the New Academic practice of arguing against all things and for all 
things “for the purpose of finding the truth” (veri inveniendi causa) is discussed. 
Here, Lucullus asks what these thinkers have discovered. The Academic replies 
that “their custom is not to show this” (non solemus […] ostendere). Lucullus 
then asks what these “mysteries” (mysteria) are and why the school “conceals” 
see Plato, Il Critone latino di Leonardo Bruni e di Rinuccio Aretino, eds E. Berti, A. Carosini 
(Firenze: Olschki, 1983).
65  See Hankins, Plato in the Italian Renaissance, vol. 1, p. 117–154.
66  Augustine, Contra Academicos, lib. iii, c. 17, §37–c. 20, §45 [at c. 17, §38]. It seems likely 
that Augustine understood the philosophical strategy of Arcesilaus as being broadly 
equivalent to Socrates’, and therefore perhaps something that Socrates’ follower Plato 
would himself have sanctioned. See Augustine, De civitate Dei, lib. viii, c. 4.
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(celare) these things as something base. The Academic replies that it is in order 
to guide our hearers by reason rather than by authority.67
In the opinion of certain medieval Platonists, this report by Augustine 
needed to be read in conjunction with a statement by Dionysius the Areopagite. 
In his ninth Letter, the latter explains that the theological tradition has a dou-
ble aspect: on the one hand “the ineffable and the mysterious” (aporrhētos kai 
mustikē) which is symbolic and employs initiation, and on the other hand “the 
manifest and more known” (emphanēs kai gnōrimōtera) which is philosophical 
and employs demonstration. Dionysius continues by explaining that symbol-
ism has been utilized by the sacred writers both to protect the understanding 
of the highest truths from the multitude of the irreligious and to accommodate 
those understandings to the varying capacities of the hierarchy.68 It is worth 
noting immediately that Augustine and Dionysius have somewhat different 
ideas about what concealed and what was concealed within the philosophi-
cal thinking of their predecessors. With Augustine it was an autonomous dia-
lectical methodology that concealed and Platonic metaphysics in general that 
was concealed, whereas with Dionysius it was symbolism and ritual that con-
cealed and mystical unification that was concealed. The tension between the 
two approaches resulting from the intertextual use of these historical accounts 
will be the source of much that is both puzzling and productive in the later 
tradition.
4.1.1 Berthold of Moosburg
Berthold of Moosburg provides a good illustration of the reception and exploita-
tion of the Augustinian thesis regarding Platonic concealment. In the Expositio 
tituli of his commentary, he attempts to contextualize Proclus’ philosophical 
project by emphasising the crucial role of this philosopher in unwrapping the 
“coverings” (integumenta) with which the first Platonists,69 and especially the 
Academics, enwrapped their wisdom. He further explains that according to 
Cicero’s account as relayed through Augustine, the custom of these thinkers 
was to “conceal” (occultare) their doctrine and not to “reveal” (aperire) it to 
anyone who had not spent an entire lifetime within their sect.70 According to 
Berthold, the Platonic wisdom that was kept concealed was a complete axiom-
atic system setting out the relation between the first cause and its many effects.
67  Cicero, Academica, lib. ii, c. 18, §60.
68  Dionysius, Epistula IX, §1, 1105D–1108B. Cf. Dionysius, De caelesti hierarchia, c. 2, §2, 
140A–B and c. 2, §5, 145A–B; Dionysius, De ecclesiastica hierarchia, c. 1, §5, 377A.
69  Augustine had suggested, albeit rather tentatively, that it was Plotinus who accomplished 
this. See our discussion below.
70  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. A, p. 37, l. 18–21.
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4.1.2 Nicholas of Cusa
Nicholas of Cusa supplies a striking example of the reception and exploitation 
of the corresponding Dionysian teaching together with a further refinement 
making it explicit that the Dionysian teaching is also a Platonic one. In one 
paragraph of De beryllo, he notes that both Plato “in his letters” (in epistulis) 
and great Dionysius forbade “these mysteries to be divulged” (haec mysteria 
[…] propalari) to those who do not know “the intellectual elevations” (elevatio-
nes intellectuales),71 and in another that Plato in his letters says that all things 
exist with the king of all things and for his sake and that he wrote wisely that 
this teaching should be held as a “secret” (secretum).72 The mystery to which 
Nicholas refers in both these passages is his own praxis of conjecture by which 
one is guided towards an experience of the first principle.
4.1.3 Marsilio Ficino
The notion of Platonic concealment has its most far-reaching implications in 
connection with Marsilio Ficino’s doctrine of the “ancient theology” (prisca 
theologia). The fullest explanation of this can be found in the proem to his 
Commentary on Plotinus’ Enneads where he makes the following main points. 
First, it was the custom of the ancient theological tradition from Hermes 
Trismegistus to Plato “to veil the divine mysteries both with mathematical 
numbers and figures and with poetic fictions” (“divina mysteria cum mathe-
maticis numeris et figuris tum poeticis figmentis obtegere”). This was in order 
to prevent them from being rashly communicated to all and sundry. Second, 
Plotinus was the first and only thinker who stripped away these mathematical 
and poetic coverings from theology and “divinely penetrated into the secrets 
of the ancients” (arcana veterum divinitus penetravit). This statement is cor-
roborated with the testimony of Porphyry and Proclus.73
In addition to making an extensive application to the historiography of phi-
losophy, Ficino’s rethinking of the notion of Platonic concealment – on which 
both the Augustinian and Dionysian formulations as well as scattered remarks 
in Proclus’ writings were probably influential – is associated with several 
71  Nicholas of Cusa, De beryllo, h xi/1, §2, l. 1–4. The references are to Plato, Epistula II, 
312d–e (probably cited through Proclus, Théologie platonicienne. Livre II, eds H.-D. Saffrey, 
L.G. Westerink [Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1974], lib. ii. c. 8, p. 54, l. 24–25) and to Dionysius, 
Epistula IX, §1, 1105D – as cited above – and perhaps Dionysius, De mystica theologia, 
c. 1, §2, 1000A–B.
72  Nicholas of Cusa, De beryllo, h xi/1, §15, l. 1–§16, l. 19. The reference is to Plato, 
Epistola II, 312e–313a (probably cited through Proclus, Theologia platonica, lib. ii, c. 8–9, 
p. 51, l. 21–p. 61, l. 9).
73  Marsilio Ficino, In Enneadem i, pr. §2, ed. S. Gersh.
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striking new developments resulting from the availability of the complete 
Platonic corpus. These include a hermeneutical distinction that seems to have 
been conceived specifically in order to maintain that the ancient Athenian 
did not himself believe literally in transmigration, although the distinction 
itself also has more general philosophical implications. In Platonic Theology 
xvii, Ficino argues that Plato affirms as literally true regarding divine matters 
only what is stated in those of his writings where he speaks in his own person, 
whereas the statements regarding similar topics contained in his other dia-
logues where he is reporting the views of the ancients should be understood 
in a non-literal manner.74 In the course of this same discussion, the Florentine 
also shows how this thesis is useful in explaining the seemingly enigmatic 
statements of Plato in his Second and Seventh Letters that no written work of 
his has existed or ever will exist on divine matters and therefore that nobody 
has existed or will exist who will understand his views on such questions.75 
According to Ficino, the teachings of Plato regarding the existence of divine 
providence and the immortality of the soul are disclosed in such texts as the 
Letters and the Laws where the author speaks in his own person, whereas his 
views on other matters are mysteries veiled in the manner of the ancient theo-
logians and presented as the utterances of such literary characters as Timaeus, 
Parmenides, and Melissus.
Ficino’s rethinking of the notion of Platonic concealment also includes 
a further hermeneutical distinction that is useful for maintaining that the 
ancient Athenian did not advocate the doctrine of transmigration in a literal 
sense. Also in Platonic Theology xvii, the Florentine argues that the conceal-
ment of doctrine by the earliest Academy led to a variety of interpretations 
of the ancient theology on the part of later thinkers that can be associated 
with six “academies” following one another in a sequence of which the first 
three were Greek and the second three foreign.76 These schools were: the “old” 
academy headed by Xenocrates, the “middle” academy under the headship 
of Arcesilaus, and the “new” academy headed by Carneades, followed by the 
74  Marsilio Ficino, Theologia Platonica, lib. xvii, c. 4, §6, p. 52 and lib. xvii, c. 4, §14, p. 60–62.
75  Marsilio Ficino, Theologia Platonica, lib. xvii, c. 4, §5–6, p. 50–52 – the references are 
to Plato, Epistola II, 314c and Epistola VII, 341c. Cf. Ficino’s Argumentum in Epistulam II, 
Opera omnia, p. 1530–1532 and Argumentum in Epistulam VII, Opera omnia, p. 1534–1535.
76  Marsilio Ficino, Theologia Platonica, lib. xvii, c. 1, §2, p. 6–8. The symmetry with the set of 
six ancient theologians is obvious and deliberate on Ficino’s part. For him, the entire his-
tory of philosophy is governed by divine providence which proceeds in an orderly – and 
hence, numerical – manner. On Ficino’s history of the six academies see Hankins, Plato in 
the Italian Renaissance, vol. 1, p. 283, notes 41–42, and M.J.B. Allen, Synoptic Art. Marsilio 
Ficino on the History of Platonic Interpretation (Firenze: Olschki, 1998), p. 56–79.
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“Egyptian” academy headed by Ammonius,77 the “Roman” academy under the 
headship of Plotinus, and the “Lycian” academy headed by Proclus. Ficino is 
highly critical of the last two Academies with respect to their interpretation 
of the circulation of souls in a literal sense,78 whereas he endorses the view of 
the first four Academies and especially the first and fourth which take a more 
metaphorical approach to the same doctrine.79 It is not clear to what extent 
the Florentine would maintain precisely this classification when consider-
ing the history of Platonic tenets other than that of transmigration, especially 
given the rather artificial distinction between the school of Ammonius and 
that of Plotinus and the placing of the normally “divine” Plotinus in the less 
favoured camp.
4.2 The Relation between Plato and Aristotle
In Contra Academicos, Augustine speaks of a certain doctrine of the truest 
philosophy as having been consolidated through many centuries by indus-
trious and discerning men who continued to teach that “Aristotle and Plato 
are so concordant with one another that it is to the unskilled and inattentive 
that they seem to disagree” (“Aristotelem et Platonem ita sibi concinere ut 
imperitis minusque attentis dissentire videantur”).80 This statement is clearly 
based on Cicero who reports in his Academica – in his turn, explicitly quoting 
Varro – that originating with Plato there was established a philosophy that was 
“single and harmonious” (una et consentiens), despite having the two names 
of “Academic” and “Peripatetic”. Both schools in dependence on Plato pro-
duced “a certain science of philosophy, an ordering of subject-matter, and a 
system of teaching” (“ars quaedam philosophiae et rerum ordo et descriptio 
disciplinae”): something inconsistent with the Socratic manner of discussing 
everything in a doubting manner. Although there was originally “no difference 
between the Peripatetics and that Old Academy” (“nihil […] inter Peripateticos 
et illam veterem Academiam differe”) and both drew from the same source,81 
Aristotle excelled in a certain abundance of ingenuity.82 Now, Augustine’s 
statement somewhat transforms the original account on which it depends for, 
whereas Cicero views the concordance between Plato and Aristotle as vested 
in the systematization of thinking and accords a certain primacy to Aristotle, 
77  I.e. Ammonius Saccas.
78  Marsilio Ficino, Theologia Platonica, lib. xvii, c. 3, p. 28–44.
79  Marsilio Ficino, Theologia Platonica, lib. xvii, c. 4, p. 44–62.
80  Augustine, Contra Academicos, lib. iii, c. 19, §42.
81  I.e. Plato.
82  Cicero, Academica, lib. i, c. 4, §17. Cf. Cicero, Academica, lib. ii, c. 5, §15 for a briefer 
statement.
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the continuation of Augustine’s text associates the concordance with the doc-
trine of the intelligible and sensible worlds and implicitly prioritises Plato.
These reports concerning the original concordance between Platonic 
and Aristotelian thought were well known to the medieval and Renaissance 
Platonists who understood them in connection with the synthesising approach 
to the two traditional doctrines that they observed in the Latin Platonic writ-
ings of late antiquity in general. For them, there were clearly many possible 
answers to the question of precisely how a doctrinal concordance that is obvi-
ously not intended to be a purely nominal distinction must be understood, 
and the type of solutions envisaged clearly varied in accordance with informa-
tion regarding the content of Plato’s and Aristotle’s writings gradually emerg-
ing between the twelfth and the fifteenth centuries. However, the concordance 
between Platonic and Aristotelian thought as understood by the authors stud-
ied in this essay undoubtedly took the form of a complex network of identities 
and differences between various philosophical tenets in which the balance 
was in effect always tilted towards the Platonic side of the equation.
4.2.1 Berthold of Moosburg
The radically Platonic character of the Elementatio theologica of Proclus, the 
sole work on which Berthold of Moosburg is commenting, would seem to mili-
tate against any commitment on his part to the traditional doctrine of concor-
dance. Nevertheless, much of the Elementatio’s philosophical procedure had 
already integrated Aristotelian notions and – to take the most immediately 
obvious example – Berthold furthers this approach by expressing the propo-
sitional method itself in the technical terminology of the four causes.83 Thus, 
the Platonic author corresponds to the efficient cause of the Elementatio,84 the 
prior definitions represent its material cause,85 the network of implications 
and exclusions of propositions, the application of common notions, and the 
necessity inherent in the whole system correspond to its formal cause,86 and 
the arrangement of propositions in a sequence representing scalar ascent to 
the first principle represent its final cause.87 Although the introduction of the 
four causes in this manner illustrates a common procedure with the accessus 
(“introductions”) to philosophical works adopted by scholastic writers, and 
although the establishment of analogies between literary and metaphysical 
83  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit., p. 37, l. 5–9.
84  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit., p. 37, l. 7 and l. 10–14.
85  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. I, p. 45, l. 296–p. 46, l. 313.
86  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. K, p. 47, l. 343–p. 49, l. 407.
87  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. L, p. 49, l. 408–414 and 420ff.
473Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino
structures is not foreign to ancient Neoplatonism, there is absolutely nothing 
in the original Greek text of Proclus or its Latin translation that suggests pre-
cisely this organisation.
But when turning from methodology to content, we do find Berthold more 
inclined to argue that Plato and Aristotle “are divergent and not in harmony” 
(diversantur […] non concordant).88 Maintenance of the distinction between 
the two thinkers is especially marked in the section called Praeambulum in the 
course of which the commentator explains the nature of Proclus’ philosophy 
by setting up a series of metaphysical contrasts between the two more ancient 
authorities. Here, he notes with respect to the object of highest intellectual 
activity, that this is “being qua being” (ens in eo quod ens) for Aristotle but the 
One or Good for Plato;89 with respect to the psychic faculty to be employed in 
this activity, that this is the “intellect” (intellectus) for Aristotle but “a knowing 
above intellect” (cognitio supra intellectum) for Plato;90 and with respect to the 
name of the process, that this is “metaphysics or first philosophy” (metaphysica / 
prima philosophia) for Aristotle but “divine super-wisdom” (divinalis supersa-
pientia) for Plato.91 It is perhaps obvious from this summary that the “Plato” 
to which Berthold here refers has much more in common with Dionysius the 
Areopagite than with the founder of the Academy.
4.2.2 Nicholas of Cusa
Nicholas of Cusa follows the Augustinian tradition in according Platonism a 
privileged status on the grounds of its unique affinity with Christianity, at the 
same time reflecting a pattern widespread among earlier medieval thinkers of 
seeing “Platonism” as broadly identifiable with the theology of Dionysius the 
Areopagite.92 On occasion, we do find him explicitly contrasting Plato favour-
ably with Aristotle: for instance, when considering the question of the world’s 
eternity or createdness in De venatione sapientiae, he notes that Aristotle denies 
88  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeambulum C, p. 65, l. 430–432.
89  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. B, p. 56, l. 116–119, and Praeamb. C, p. 65, l. 422–
429. Cf. Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, 1A, p. 74, l. 113–123.
90  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 65, l. 433–p. 66, l. 458, and p. 67, 
l. 504–p. 68, l. 528.
91  Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Praeamb. C, p. 65, l. 422–p. 66, l. 458, and p. 68, l. 539–540.
92  For evidence regarding Nicholas’ understanding of Plato and the Platonic Tradition see 
M.L. Führer, “Cusanus Platonicus. References to the Term Platonici in Nicholas of Cusa”, in 
S. Gersh, M.J.F.M. Hoenen (eds), The Platonic Tradition in the Middle Ages. A Doxographic 
Approach (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2002), p. 345–370; and S. Gersh, “The Virtue of 
Absence. Nicholas of Cusa and the Historical Plato”, in A. Balansard, I. Koch (eds), Lire 
les dialogues, mais lesquels et dans quel ordre? Définitions du corpus et interprétations de 
Platon (Sankt Augustin: Academia, 2013), p. 117–131.
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that the “possibility of coming-to-be” (posse fieri) has a beginning, whereas Plato 
“with superior vision” (melius videns) said that time is the image of the eternal.93 
However, these passages are surprisingly rare for such a committed Platonist 
as Nicholas, and he more frequently endeavours to read Aristotle in the most 
charitable way, often by reporting his doctrine in an already platonised form 
via Albert the Great or various Arabic commentators. His ultimate position 
is that stated in the formal debate between a Peripatetic “philosopher” and a 
Platonic-Dionysian “layman” entitled Idiota de mente: namely, that the relation 
between the viewpoints characterised here as Aristotelian and Platonic must 
itself be understood in terms of the coincidence of opposites.94
Notable examples of his obliquely affirmative characterisations of Aristotle 
and the Peripatetics can be found in works from Nicholas’ middle to late peri-
ods. In De non-aliud, he remarks that although the Stagirite “fell short” (defe-
cerit) in first or mental philosophy, he nevertheless wrote many completely 
praiseworthy things in the rational and moral spheres.95 In De apice theoriae, 
Nicholas states rather cryptically that the “mental power” (posse mentis) of 
Aristotle is displayed only partially in his books, and that this fact is something 
that the ignorant “do not see” (non vident).96 What Nicholas is saying here is 
that the real posse of Aristotelian thought – this technical term signifying both 
its “power” and its “possibilities” – is only disclosed by skilful interpretation – 
the “seeing” also mentioned and equated with the interpreter’s intellectual 
elevation. Presumably, an instance of reading Aristotle in the right man-
ner would be Nicholas’ own explanation in De beryllo97 and De venatione 
sapientiae98 of the Stagirite’s notion of intellect as being both a triunity and a 
multiplicity of forms. A further example would be his refashioning in De non-
aliud of Aristotle’s question whether or not one and being are other than the 
93  Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, h xii, c. 9, §25, l. 1–§26, l. 4. There is one other 
major issue concerning which Nicholas prefers Platonism to Aristotelianism: namely, the 
status of the law of contradiction. This point will be discussed below in connection with 
axiomatics.
94  Nicholas of Cusa, Idiota de mente, h v, c. 2, §66, l. 19–§67, l. 3; c. 3, §71, l. 1–2; and c. 4, §77, 
l. 15–26. On Nicholas’ Aristotelianism see S. Gersh, “Medieval Platonic Theology. Nicholas 
of Cusa as Summation and Singularity”, in J. Hankins, F. Meroi (eds), The Rebirth of Platonic 
Theology. Proceedings of a Conference held at The Harvard University Centre for Italian 
Renaissance Studies (Villa I Tatti) and the Istituto Nazionale di Studi sul Rinascimento 
(Firenze, 26–27 April, 2007) (Firenze: Olschki, 2013), p. 15–45, at p. 30–35.
95  Nicholas of Cusa, De non-aliud, h xiii, c. 19, p. 47, l. 10–12.
96  Nicholas of Cusa, De apice theoriae, h xii, §21, l. 1–§22, l. 6.
97  Nicholas of Cusa, De beryllo, h xi/1, §36, l. 8–15; §39, l. 5–8.
98  Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, h xii, c. 8, §22, l. 1–§24, l. 22. Cf. De non-aliud, 
h xiii, c. 10, p. 22, l. 23–p. 23, l. 9.
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substance of beings as an answer to the effect that they are the “not-other” 
(non aliud).99
In actual fact, it is because of his rather ingenious reading of Aristotle 
that Nicholas is able ultimately to subscribe to the traditional ancient and 
medieval notion of the concordance of Platonism and Aristotelianism. It is 
likewise because of a particular reading of “Plato” that avoids the caricature 
of “Platonism” as amounting to the identification of logical genera and spe-
cies with separate substances: a view that is explicitly rejected in De beryllo.100 
The Platonism that Nicholas espouses is always rather the version implicit 
in Dionysius the Areopagite’s writings on which various teachings of non-
Christian Platonists such as Proclus can sometimes be treated as commentary. 
This can be seen in Idiota de mente where the Layman explains that according 
to the Aristotelian doctrine, the contents of sensation form the basis of the 
contents of reason and the contents of reason form the basis of the contents 
of intellect. But according to the Platonic doctrine, the contents of sensation 
form the basis of the contents of reason whereas the contents of reason do not 
form the basis of the contents of intellect. The Layman finally concludes that 
according to the combined Platonic and Aristotelian doctrine, the contents of 
sensation form the basis of the contents of reason, while reason by turning first 
towards sensation and then towards intellect cognitively multiplies the first 
principle’s single infinite Form.101
4.2.3 Marsilio Ficino
A commitment to the traditional doctrine of concordance was relatively 
easy for Marsilio Ficino to make.102 When Ficino’s attention had shifted from 
Proclus to Plotinus,103 he could rely on the testimony of the latter’s biographer 
Porphyry that concealed Stoic and Peripatetic doctrines were blended into 
his teacher’s writings, that Aristotle’s metaphysical doctrines were concen-
trated in them, and that Peripatetic commentaries were read in Plotinus’ 
99  Nicholas of Cusa, De non-aliud, h xiii, c. 18–19, p. 44, l. 1–p. 47, l. 14. Cf. De venatione sapi-
entiae, h xii, c. 21, §60, l. 1–12.
100 Nicholas of Cusa, De beryllo, h xi/1, §49, l. 9–17.
101 Nicholas of Cusa, Idiota de mente, h v, c. 2, §65, l. 1–§66, l. 20; and c. 4, §77, l. 1–§79, l. 10. 
For the first point see especially Idiota de mente, h v, c. 2, §63, l. 1–§66, l. 20. For the second 
point see Idiota de mente, h v, c. 2, §67, l. 1–§68, l. 16; c. 3, §71, l. 1–9; c. 4, §74, l. 1–§79, l. 10; 
and c. 7, §99, l. 1–§107, l. 14. For the first point see also De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. ii, c. 6, 
p. 80, l. 1–p. 81, l. 15.
102 On the possibility of an evolution in Ficino’s thinking on this point see J. Monfasani, 
“Marsilio Ficino and the Plato-Aristotle Controversy”, in M.J.B. Allen, V. Rees (eds), 
Marsilio Ficino. His Theology, his Philosophy, his Legacy (Leiden: Brill, 2002), p. 179–202.
103 See below.
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seminars including those of Aspasius, Alexander of Aphrodisias, and Adrastus.104 
Indeed, Porphyry was himself one of the earliest proponents of the doctrine of 
concordance and perhaps one of the influences behind Augustine’s endorse-
ment of the thesis. When the Florentine comes to write a formal commentary 
on Plotinus, he declares that his own aims as an exegete are to explain here 
not only how Plotinus reveals the hidden meaning of Plato’s utterances but 
also how Plotinus provides us with a correct interpretation of Aristotle.105 This 
same commentary is indeed very informative concerning certain major points 
at which Ficino finds the two ancient thinkers in agreement,106 other points at 
which he considers them to be divergent,107 and still other points at which he 
finds their relation to be ambivalent.108
For Ficino, the real dispute was not between Plato and Aristotle but between 
the better commentators of Aristotle – those including Plotinus who empha-
sise Aristotle’s “Platonism” – and worse commentators – those who concen-
trate on the differences between the two ancient thinkers. In one important 
passage, the Florentine goes as far as to argue that Plotinus himself can be seen 
as resolving the conflict between those Peripatetics who follow Alexander in 
thinking that the human intellect is individual but mortal and those who fol-
low Averroes in maintaining that it is immortal but not individual. According 
to Ficino, if the reader accepts, on the one hand, the multiplicity of individual 
human intellects with Alexander and, on the other, the immortal gift of total 
intelligence with Averroes, he will come into possession of “the complete doc-
trine of our Plotinus” (integra Plotini nostri sententia).109 Ficino has touched 
104 Porphyry, Vita Plotini, §14. Cf. Ficino’s translation, Opera omnia, p. 1542.
105 Marsilio Ficino, In Enneadem i, pr., §2–3.
106 See Marsilio Ficino, In Enneadem i.1, §19. With respect to a discussion of the relation 
between discursive reason and intellect, Ficino concludes that Plotinus “in employing 
here the terminology of Aristotle, indicates that Aristotle in this context differs hardly at 
all from Plato” (dum vero hic verbis Aristotelis utitur, significat Aristotelem in his a Platone 
minime dissidere).
107 See Marsilio Ficino, In Enneadem i.3, §15. Concerning the subject of metaphysics, Ficino 
notes that Plato deals with being endowed with a self-sufficient condition of relatedness 
to that which is superior and that which is inferior to being – i.e. in the Parmenides –, 
whereas Aristotle is concerned with being qua being subsumed under the notion of being 
which is common to all things – i.e. in the Metaphysics.
108 See Marsilio Ficino, In Enneadem i.4, §35. With respect to the doctrine of mind, Ficino 
concludes that Aristotle in De anima iii maintains that intellect truly exists as immortal 
but in other places denies that there is remembrance – and therefore a rational power – 
after death.
109 Marsilio Ficino, In Enneadem i.1, §15–16.
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upon this question earlier in the commentary while reformulating it as a con-
flict between those who think with Alexander that intellect can be the proper 
life of the body and those who think with Averroes that intellect cannot prop-
erly give life to the body.110
5 Latin Platonists
Any attempt to situate the three subjects of the present study in terms of 
their consciousness of themselves within a historical tradition must also take 
account of an influential group of late ancient Latin writers of philosophical 
or semi-philosophical character. These writers continued to be studied by all 
the medieval Platonists primarily because they preserved important remnants 
of the precious ancient Greek philosophy lost to readers in the Latin-speaking 
west since the fifth century. We must distinguish two phases of their recep-
tion in the period under review. During the medieval phase, Calcidius’ 
Commentarius in Timaeum, Macrobius’ Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis, 
Martianus Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, and Boethius’ De conso-
latione philosophiae were the most important texts.111
5.1 Medieval Phase
5.1.1 Berthold of Moosburg
Berthold of Moosburg provides an elegant example of intertextual reading 
when he explains that the theta and pi and the steps placed between these 
letters embroidered on Philosophia’s robe according to Boethius’ De consola-
tione philosophiae represent stages in the ascent to the first principle through 
the propositional method set out in Proclus’ Elementatio theologica.112 Not less 
striking is Berthold’s application of Proverbs 9:1 on Wisdom as having built 
her house by cutting out seven columns to the seven primordial causes of 
Eriugena and the Clavis physicae and their various participations through the 
110 Marsilio Ficino, In Enneadem i.1, §8.
111 For discussion of these authors and works in general see S. Gersh, Middle Platonism and 
Neoplatonism. The Latin Tradition, 2 vols (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame 
Press, 1986); and for specific examples of their medieval transmission, S. Gersh, “The First 
Principles of Latin Neoplatonism. Augustine, Macrobius, Boethius”, in Vivarium 50(2012), 
p. 113–138.
112 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. L, p. 49, l. 415–p. 51, l. 491. The reference is to 
Boethius, De cons. philos., lib. i, pr. 1, §3–4.
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interpretation of the number 7 and its factors (1 + 6, 2 + 5, 3 + 4) in Macrobius’ 
Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis.113
5.1.2 Nicholas of Cusa
That these Latin Platonists of antiquity continue to have an impact on Nicholas 
of Cusa is shown by a passage in his De docta ignorantia,114 which forms a link 
between the earlier discussion of the Absolute Maximum as Unity, Equality, 
and Connection,115 and the later one of the process through which we receive 
“guidance” (manuductio) towards that Absolute through a series of geometri-
cal examples.116 Here, Nicholas is referring directly to a passage in Martianus 
Capella’s De nuptiis Philologiae Mercurii describing the ritual of purgation in 
which the allegorical figure of Philology prepares for deification.117
Let us now inquire what Martianus means when he says that Philosophia, 
desiring to ascend to the knowledge of this Trinity, vomited circles and 
spheres. It has previously been shown that there is only a single and most 
simple Maximum, and that neither the most perfect solid figure – the 
sphere – nor the most perfect plane figure – the circle – nor the most 
perfect rectilinear figure – the triangle – nor the figure of the simplest 
rectilinearity – the straight line – is such a Maximum. This Maximum is 
above all these things to such an extent that we must necessarily expel 
everything that is attained through sense, imagination, or reason together 
with their material associations in order to reach that most simple and 
most abstract understanding where all things are one, and where the line 
is a triangle, a circle, and a sphere.118
113 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 11, p. 19, l. 451–471. The reference is to Macrobius, 
Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1970), lib. i, c. 6, p. 19, 
l. 16ff. On Berthold’s study of Macrobius see I. Caiazzo, “Mains célèbres dans les mar-
ges des Commentarii in Somnium Scipionis de Macrobe”, in D. Jacquart, C. Burnett (eds), 
Scientia in margine. Études sur les marginalia dans les manuscrits scientifiques du Moyen 
Âge à la Renaissance (Genève: Librairie Droz, 2005), p. 171–189.
114 Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. i. c. 10, p. 19, l. 18–20.
115 Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. i. c. 5–9, p. 11, l. 23–p. 19, l. 14.
116 Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. i, c. 10, p. 19, l. 15ff.
117 Martianus Capella, De nuptiis Philologiae et Mercurii, ed. J. Willis (Leipzig: Teubner, 1983), 
lib. ii, §135–138, p. 42, l. 5–p. 43, l. 6.
118 Nicholas of Cusa, De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. i, c. 10, p. 19, l. 18–p. 20, l. 9: Nunc inquiramus 
quid sibi velit Martianus quando ait Philosophiam ad huius trinitatis notitiam ascendere 
volentem circulos et sphaeras evomuisse. Ostensum est in prioribus unicum simplicissimum 
maximum, et quod ipsum tale non sit nec perfectissima figura corporalis, ut est sphaera, 
aut superficialis, ut est circulus, aut rectilinealis, ut est triangulus, aut simplicis rectitu-
dinis, ut est linea. Sed ipsum super omnia illa est, ita quod illa quae aut per sensum aut 
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According to the well-known earlier medieval exegesis of this text by 
Remigius of Auxerre, the cognitive ascent of the human soul signified by 
Philologia’s purgation involves the setting aside of the contents of the medi-
eval quadrivium in order to reach a transcendent unknown.119 Nicholas has 
considerably enriched the metaphysical significance of the original. For him, 
this ascent especially includes the transition from an understanding of finite 
geometrical figures in their discreteness to the comprehension of infinite ones 
coinciding in the Absolute Maximum.
During the Renaissance phase, the aforementioned Latin texts were gradu-
ally superseded as sources of ancient philosophical doctrine by the original 
Greek writings, even if they continued to be admired for their imaginative 
qualities. However, Calcidius’ Commentarius in Timaeum and Boethius’ math-
ematical writings at least were of sufficiently technical character to retain their 
position in the curriculum alongside the newly acquired treatises.
5.2 Renaissance Phase
5.2.1 Marsilio Ficino
Ficino’s earliest studies on Platonism were based on the Latin sources men-
tioned and as late as 1489 he continues to recommend as sources of Platonic 
study: Boethii Consolatio […], Calcidii commentarium in Timaeum, Macrobii 
expositio in Somnium Scipionis and other Latin writings.120 His own prac-
tice is to refer quite often to Boethius’ De consolatione philosophiae: notably, 
in emphasizing the predominance of the subjective aspect in epistemology121 
and in establishing doctrinal equivalence between Boethius and Proclus,122 
and also less often to quote Calcidius’ In Timaeum: for instance, in connection 
imaginationem aut rationem cum materialibus appendiciis attinguntur necessario evomere 
oporteat ut ad simplicissimam et abstractissimam intelligentiam perveniamus ubi omnia 
sunt unum, ubi linea sit triangulus circulus et sphaera.
119 Cf. Remigius of Auxerre, Commentum in Martianum Capellam, ed. C.E. Lutz, 2 vols 
(Leiden: Brill, 1962–1965), vol. 1, lib. ii, lemma 59, l. 6, p. 173–174. This commentary was 
widely used throughout the Middle Ages.
120 Marsilio Ficino, Epistulae, lib. ix, 12, Opera omnia, p. 899.
121 Marsilio Ficino, Commentary on Plotinus. Volume 5. Ennead III, Part 2, and Ennead IV, 
ed. S. Gersh (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2018), iv.6, §1 – reference to 
Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, lib. v, m. 4, §1–9.
122 Marsilio Ficino, Commentaries on Plato. Volume 2. Parmenides, Part 1, ed. M. Vanhaelen 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2012), c. 32, p. 128 – reference to Boethius, De 
consolatione philosophiae, lib. v, pr. 4, l. 70–116 –; Marsilio Ficino, Commentaries on Plato. 
Volume 2. Parmenides, Part 2, ed. M. Vanhaelen (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University 
Press, 2012), c. 97, p. 266 – reference to De consolatione philosophiae, lib. iii, m. 9, l. 15–17.
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with the structure of means123 and the mechanism of sight.124 Ficino’s contin-
ued use of Boethius was no doubt influenced by Boethius’ status as a Christian 
Platonic authority and Calcidius’ as a writer of mathematical sophistication.125
6 Proclus
During the period here under review, we can distinguish three phases in the 
interpretation of Proclus based on the range of texts available: a Medieval 
phase, a transitional phase, and a Renaissance phase.126 In the medieval 
phase, the main texts are the Elementatio theologica, Elementatio physica, 
Tria opuscula, and Commentarius in Parmenidem, in translations by William 
of Moerbeke.127 These texts are all used by Berthold who as a pioneer – and 
obviously in contrast to his usage of the Hermetica where scholastic doxog-
raphies sometimes intervene – always cites them directly through their Latin 
translations.
6.1 Berthold of Moosburg
We will confine ourselves to making just a few illustrations of Berthold’s exten-
sive intertextual handling of the Athenian scholarch. In the course of his expo-
sition, the first explicit citation of Proclus’ Elementatio physica occurs when 
Berthold explains the key term elementatio itself with reference to a work on 
physics “which this same author is also said to have published” (“quam etiam 
iste auctor dicitur edidisse”).128 Turning to the Tria opuscula, we find very exten-
sive use in connection with numerous central theological doctrines, especially 
123 Marsilio Ficino, Compendium in Timaeum, Opera omnia, c. 19, p. 1446 – reference to 
Calcidius, In Timaeum, §8–22, p. 61, l. 10–p. 73, l. 4.
124 Marsilio Ficino, Compendium in Timaeum, Opera omnia, c. 41 (= c. 42 [correcting defective 
pagination]), p. 1446 – reference to Calcidius, In Timaeum, §236–48, p. 248, l. 15–p. 259, 
l. 17.
125 Ficino also continues to use Macrobius’ Commentarius in Somnium Scipionis – mostly 
without explicit citation – as a source of the “Platonists’” doctrines regarding cosmic har-
mony and the souls’ celestial journeys. Cf. Marsilio Ficino, Theol. plat, lib. xviii, passim. 
On Ficino and Macrobius see Caiazzo, “Mains célèbres”.
126 For a survey of Proclus’ influence during the Middle Ages see S. Gersh, “One Thousand 
Years of Proclus. An Introduction to his Reception”, in S. Gersh (ed.), Interpreting Proclus. 
From Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 1–29.
127 See Proclus, Elementatio theologica, translata a Guillelmo de Moerbeke, ed. H. Boese 
(Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1987) and Proclus, Commentaire sur le Parménide de 
Platon, Traduction de Guillaume de Moerbeke.
128 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. i, p. 45, l. 280–284.
481Berthold of Moosburg, Nicholas of Cusa, and Marsilio Ficino
in such a manner as to facilitate the establishment of doctrinal connections 
between Proclus and Dionysius the Areopagite. In fact, the editors of vol. 1 
(Propositions 1–13) of the Expositio list four passages of De X dubitationibus 
circa providentiam, nine passages from De malorum subsistentia, and eight pas-
sages from De providentia et fato that are cited often repeatedly within that part 
of the Expositio alone. Finally, there is a rare citation of Proclus’ Commentarius 
in Parmenidem in the course of Berthold’s exposition when he quotes “accord-
ing to Proclus On the Parmenides” (secundum Proclum Super Parmenidem) a 
statement to the effect that the world is the plenitude of all kinds of forms.129
In the transitional phase, the main texts are the four translations by William 
of Moerbeke mentioned above together with an important new translation 
that appears in the intellectual milieu surrounding Nicholas of Cusa.130
6.2 Nicholas of Cusa
It is from the time of his De beryllo (1458) onwards that Nicholas of Cusa, hav-
ing earlier relied on Platonic material derived through the Latin tradition as 
supplemented by Moerbeke’s work, began to turn to Greek works in newer 
humanistic translations.131 Most important among the latter was the Theologia 
Platonis of Proclus as translated by Pietro Balbi of which important manu-
scripts survive containing Nicholas’ own marginalia.132 Nicholas’ enthusiastic 
129 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 11, p. 17, l. 401–402.
130 Nicholas of Cusa’s encounter with Proclus and especially his glossing of the Moerbeke 
translations is discussed by S. Gersh, “Nicholas of Cusa”, in S. Gersh (ed.), Interpreting 
Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance, p. 318–349. On more specific philosophical 
questions see W. Beierwaltes, “Cusanus und Proklos. Zum neuplatonischen Ursprung des 
non-aliud”, in Nicolò Cusano agli inizi del mondo moderno. Atti del Congresso internazionale 
in occasione del V centenario della morte di Nicolò Cusano, Bressanone 6–10 settembre 1964 
(Firenze: Sansoni, 1970), p. 137–140; W. Beierwaltes, “Das seiende Eine. Zur neuplatonischen 
Interpretation der zweiten Hypothesis des platonischen Parmenides. Das Beispiel 
Cusanus”, in G. Boss, G. Seel (eds), Proclus et son influence. Actes du Colloque de Neuchâtel, 
juin 1985 (Zürich: Éditions du Grand Midi, 1987), p. 287–297; W. Beierwaltes, “Centrum 
tocius vite. Zur Bedeutung von Proklos’ Theologia Platonis im Denken des Cusanus”, in 
A.-Ph. Segonds, C. Steel (eds), Proclus et la Théologie platonicienne. Actes du Colloque inter-
national de Louvain, 13–16 mai 1998, en l’honneur de H.-D. Saffrey et L.G. Westerink (Leuven / 
Paris: Leuven University Press / Brill, 2000), p. 629–651; and Gersh, “Medieval Platonic 
Theology”, p. 15–45.
131 There are also some traces of influence from this material in earlier works – especially De 
coniecturis – although the main development is after De docta ignorantia and mostly late. 
See R. Haubst, “Die Thomas- und Proklos-Exzerpte des ‘Nicolaus Treverensis’ in Codicillus 
Strassburg 84”, in Mitteilungen und Forschungsbeiträge der Cusanus-Gesellschaft 1(1961), 
p. 17–51.
132 Marginalia on Proclus’ Elementatio theologica also survive although, for reasons that we 
cannot pursue here, these are much less detailed. For the texts of the marginalia see 
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use of his new sources is indicated in dramatic form at the beginning of De 
non-aliud where the character of the Abbot is said to have been busy in the 
study of Proclus’ In Parmenidem and that of Peter to be currently in the pro-
cess of translating Proclus’ Theologia Platonis.133 Further evidence is provided 
by De venatione sapientiae where Nicholas refers to Proclus’ Theologia Platonis 
by its Latin title and states that it contains six books,134 and where there are 
numerous verifiable citations both of the In Parmenidem and of the Theologia 
Platonis.135
In the Renaissance phase, the main texts are the four translations by William 
of Moerbeke once again, Balbi’s translation of the Theologia Platonis, together 
with the Greek texts of Proclus’ writings that were brought into prominence by 
Ficino’s translations and commentaries.136
6.3 Marsilio Ficino
It can be assumed that Ficino consulted the medieval Latin versions wherever 
these were available,137 although his superior expertise in Greek philology and 
wider knowledge of Greek philosophy meant that he worked primarily on the 
original sources. Regarding the Elementatio theologica, there is some evidence 
that he may himself have made a new translation of this work: namely, glosses 
in the manuscript on which he based his translation of Plotinus – MS Paris, 
BnF, gr. 1816 – that are possibly fragments of his version of the Elementatio.138 
However, Ficino seems to have soon lost interest in any such a project as 
may have existed, for the glosses referring to Proclus’ treatise in the Plotinus 
H.-G. Senger (ed.), Cusanus-Texte III. Marginalien. 2. Proclus Latinus. Die Exzerpte und 
Randnoten des Nikolaus von Kues zu den lateinischen Übersetzungen der Proclus-Schriften. 
2.1. Theologia Platonis – Elementatio theologica (Heidelberg: Winter, 1986); and K. Bormann 
(ed.), Cusanus-Texte III. Marginalien. 2. Proclus Latinus. Die Exzerpte und Randnoten des 
Nikolaus von Kues zu den lateinischen Übersetzungen des Proclus-Schriften. 2.2. Expositio in 
Parmenidem Platonis (Heidelberg: Winter, 1986).
133 Nicholas of Cusa, De non-aliud, h xiii, c. 1, p. 3, l. 2–7.
134 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, h xii, c. 8, §21, l. 7–9.
135 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, h xii, c. 17, §49, l. 3–8; and c. 22, §64, l. 7–12.
136 For a survey of Ficino’s reading of Proclus see M.J.B. Allen, “Marsilio Ficino”, in S. Gersh 
(ed.), Interpreting Proclus. From Antiquity to the Renaissance (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2014), p. 353–379.
137 See C. Steel, “Ficino and Proclus. Arguments for the Platonic Doctrine of the Ideas”, in 
J. Hankins, F. Meroi (eds), The Rebirth of Platonic Theology, p. 63–118, especially at p. 93–94.
138 There is also an apparent reference to a translation in a letter dated 1474. On the tes-
timony and “fragments” see D. Robichaud, “Fragments of Marsilio Ficino’s Translations 
and Use of Proclus’ Elements of Theology and Elements of Physics. Evidence and Study”, in 
Vivarium 54(2016), p. 46–107, at p. 49–50.
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manuscript are not repeated in the corresponding passages within the Plotinus 
commentary that was composed later on.139 Regarding the Theologia Platonis, 
there is evidence in his letter to Martin Prenninger of 17 June 1489 referring 
to a Latin translation of the work that Ficino knew Balbi’s translation or at 
least knew of it.140 However, his notes on the Greek text in the ms Firenze, 
Bibl. Riccard. 70 show clearly that he studied also the larger theological trea-
tise primarily in the original language.141 In addition, Ficino undoubtedly used 
the original texts of Proclus’ commentaries on the Timaeus and Parmenides 
in connection with his own commentaries on those dialogues, also producing 
his own translations of extracts from Proclus’ commentaries on the Republic142 
and First Alcibiades.143
6.4 Proclus as Preeminent Platonist
The high valuation placed on Proclus by medieval Platonists was based on the 
philosophical richness of his writings buttressed by his presumed dependence 
on the authority of Dionysius the Areopagite. This doctrinal dependence – the 
order of which is now known to be reversed – was assumed by our three cen-
tral figures. Doubts about the genuine apostolic authenticity of the Dionysian 
corpus had existed since it first appeared on the scene and in both the east-
ern and western sectors of medieval Christendom. However, it was not until 
the rise of humanism in the fifteenth century and especially after the work 
of Lorenzo Valla and Desiderius Erasmus that decisive proof of the Dionysian 
pseudepigraphy was obtained.
Nicholas of Cusa’s contribution to the fifteenth-century debate is strangely 
detached or ambivalent. An annotation in one of this writer’s mss of Dionysius 
states his amazement that neither Augustine nor Jerome cites Dionysius who 
is mentioned as an authority only many years later by John Damascene and 
139 However, Ficino refers to the work in a letter of 1492: namely, Epistulae, lib. xi, 28, Opera 
omnia, p. 937.
140 Ficino, Epistulae, lib. ix, 12, Opera omnia, p. 899. The same letter also refers to the Latin 
version of the Tria opuscula.
141 See H.-D. Saffrey, “Notes platoniciennes de Marsile Ficin dans un manuscrit de Proclus 
(Cod. Riccardianus 70)”, in Bibliothèque d’Humanisme et de Renaissance 21(1959), 
p. 161–184.
142 At Epistulae, lib. xi, 28, Opera omnia, p. 937, he speaks of having in 1492 obtained six books 
and the beginning of the seventh of this work and of having translated some extracts. 
However, Ficino never obtained access to a complete ms.
143 Ficino also translated a short work of Proclus about theurgy to which he gave the Latin 
title De sacrificio et magia.
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Gregory the Great.144 There is also a letter from Nicholas to Valla dated 1450 
in which he requests permission from the latter to have copied his In Novum 
Testamentum Annotationes which Nicholas has already read in a borrowed 
copy.145 The Cardinal must therefore have been familiar with Valla’s critique 
of the apostolic status of Dionysius. However, there is no evidence in Nicholas’ 
published writings – even after 1450 – that he questioned the authority of a 
source which remained equally canonical for Berthold and Ficino.
6.4.1 Berthold of Moosburg
There is plenty of circumstantial evidence suggesting that Berthold of 
Moosburg adopts the standard medieval viewpoint regarding the priority of 
Dionysius to Proclus. In a position of strategic significance near the beginning 
of his Expositio tituli, he argues that the Lycian thinker’s theological excel-
lence resides in his ascending to knowledge of the supreme Good “through 
the triplicity of motions that Dionysius in chapter 4 of On Divine Names [sec-
tion K] ascribes both to angels and souls: that is, the circular, the rectilinear, 
and the oblique” (“per triplicem motum quos ascribit Dionysius 4 cap. De 
Divinis Nominibus K et angelis et animabus: scilicet circularem, rectum et 
obliquum»).146 This statement seems to confirm that Berthold believes Proclus 
to have lived subsequently to Dionysius and to have been influenced by him. 
After this passage, when the German commentator goes on to connect the 
three Dionysian motions with different psychic faculties and their uses by 
drawing upon a discussion not in Proclus’ Elementatio but in his De providen-
tia et fato, we can assume that he sees this Proclus text and others like it as 
extended glosses on the Areopagite.147
6.4.2 Nicholas of Cusa
Nicholas of Cusa provides a fairly detailed analysis of what he takes to be the 
historical relation between Proclus and Dionysius in a chapter of De venatione 
144 ms Bernkastel-Kues, Cod. Cus. 44, fol. 1v published by L. Baur (ed.), Cusanus-Texte III. 1. 
Marginalien. 1 Nicolaus Cusanus und Ps.-Dionysius im Lichte der Zitate und Randbemer-
kungen des Cusanus (Heidelberg: Winter, 1941), p. 19. On the Cusanus-Valla connection see 
E.N. Tigerstedt, The Decline and Fall of the Neoplatonic Interpretation of Plato. An Outline 
and Some Observations (Helsinki: Societas Scientiarum Fennica, 1974), p. 22–24.
145 The letter is only extant as included in Valla’s Antidotum in Poggium iii. It is discussed 
in detail by L. Barozzi, R. Sabbadini, Studi sul Panormita e sul Valla (Firenze: Le Monnier, 
1891), p. 127ff.
146 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. A, p. 37, l. 30–p. 38, l. 34.
147 Proclus, De providentia et fato, ed. D. Isaac (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1979), c. 4, §17–19, p. 41, 
l. 1–p. 44 l. 32.
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sapientiae.148 In the course of discussing how philosophers have surveyed 
the conjectural “field of Unity” (campus unitatis), Nicholas notes the practice 
of denying all attributes of the One as a means of establishing its transcen-
dence. He then explains that the book Parmenides shows how Plato made the 
pursuit of the One by means of logic, that Proclus “sums up” (epilogat) this 
teaching in the second book of his Platonic Theology, and that Dionysius “imi-
tates” (imitatur) Plato in a similar pursuit of the One.149 Although Nicholas’ 
argument establishes that both Proclus and Dionysius follow Plato, he has not 
been explicit concerning the relative priorities of the two later writers. This 
omission is rectified in a passage in De non-aliud where the Cardinal notes that 
Proclus “came after Dionysius” (post Dionysium venit) because he cites Origen150 
who himself came after Dionysius,151 and that Proclus “follows Dionysius” 
(Dionysium sequendo) in denying both unity and goodness of the First whereas 
Plato called the First both one and good.152
6.4.3 Marsilio Ficino
There are explicit statements by Marsilio Ficino indicating that he also 
endorses the prevailing view concerning the priority of Dionysius to Proclus. 
One example can be found in a passage where Ficino is commenting on the 
Plotinian notion that evil consists of a falling short of the law contained in 
the divine mind and in nature, and then connects this with the doctrine that 
evil is not existent but only quasi-existent in Proclus who “in my opinion, fol-
lows in the wake of Dionysius the Areopagite” (“Dionysium, ut arbitror, secu-
tus Areopagitam”).153 That Ficino was conscious of the problem concerning 
the absence of references in the early Church Fathers to the Dionysian Corpus 
is indicated in a letter noting his “frequent suspicion” (saepe […] suspicari) 
that the Platonists who preceded Plotinus such as Ammonius, Numenius and 
maybe some of their predecessors had read the works of Dionysius “before they 
were hidden away” (antequam […] delitescerent) as a result of some unknown 
calamity to the Church.154
148 The argument of the following paragraph expands some earlier comments at Nicholas of 
Cusa, De beryllo, h xi/1, §12, l. 11–12.
149 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, c. 22, §64, p. 62, l. 3–20.
150 The reference is to Proclus, Theologia platonica, lib. ii, c. 4, p. 31, l. 1–9.
151 We have supplied what seems to be Nicholas’ missing premiss.
152 At De non-aliud, h xiii, c. 20, p. 47, l. 23–26, Nicholas says that it is unclear whether 
Proclus had actually read Dionysius.
153 Marsilio Ficino, In Enneadem iii. 2, §23. The references are to Proclus, De malorum 
subsistentia, c. 2, §11–39 and c. 3, §49, and Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, c. 4, §18–35, 
713D–736B.
154 Marsilio Ficino, Epistulae, lib. xi, 3, Opera omnia, p. 925.
486 Gersh
6.5 Changing Attitudes to Proclus’ Doctrine
In turning from the consideration of the later Platonists’ view of Proclus’ 
historical position in relation to philosophy and Christianity to their view of 
his actual doctrine, we will attempt to pursue the analysis in two directions. 
On the one hand, a conceptual trajectory in the case of our selected authors 
will be traced consisting of their increasing awareness of – or willingness to 
acknowledge – the inherent paganism of Proclus’ doctrine indicated by its 
emphatic polytheism. On the other hand, we will discern a double or inverted 
trajectory in the same authors’ thinking comprising a decline of their appar-
ent interest in Proclus’ axiomatic theory and – in a complementary relation to 
that – a noticeably heightened interest in his doxographical content.
6.5.1 Increasing Recognition of Proclus’ Inconsistency with Christianity
6.5.1.1 Berthold of Moosburg
Berthold’s Expositio obviously has to take account of a prominent feature of 
Proclus’ original text – reinforced by the Tria Opuscula and the Commentarius 
in Parmenidem [only its first part] –: namely, its contention that reality 
includes a hierarchical chain of causality subsequent to the First Cause – the 
One or Good – that begins from a series of “gods” (dei) or “unities” (henades / 
monades). Given that Dionysius explicitly rejects the notion that there are 
“many causes and divinities causing one another in a hierarchy of higher and 
lower” (“polla ta aitia kai allōn allas paraktikas theotētas huperechousas kai 
hupheimenas”)155 – which is precisely the doctrine advocated by Proclus in the 
Elementatio –, it was obviously necessary for Berthold to start from the earlier 
scholastic practice when dealing with Proclus of assimilating the latter’s gods 
or unities somehow to transcendent Forms, and then to insert these principles 
into the framework provided by the Dionysian doctrine of the single God’s 
names. Presenting in summary form156 the information contained in three 
passages in the early part of his Expositio,157 we can say that Berthold estab-
lishes the following hierarchical plan of the divine world consisting of four 
distinct levels: Level 1 – The First One and Good <A>;158 Level 2 – the gods of 
155 Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, 5.2, 816C.
156 In order to simplify things, we here omit much of the intertextual component which 
includes references to Boethius, De consolatione philosophiae, lib. iii. pr. 10, §85–6; 
Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis, lib. i, c. 6, §5–6, and an abundance of biblical citations.
157 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Prol. 4, p. 12, l. 227–p. 13, l. 250 [= passage A]; Prol. 5, p. 13, 
l. 254–263 [= passage B]; Prol. 11, p. 19, l. 451–471 [= passage C]; Prol. 12, p. 21, l. 524–535 
[= passage D].
158 For the reader’s greater convenience, the different passages in Berthold’s text are indi-
cated with letters A–D. See the previous note.
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Proclus’ Elementatio – equivalent to unities or goodnesses in themselves, “self-
sufficient” (autoteleis = per se perfecta) terms <A>, that are seven in number 
<C>, equivalent to the “primordial causes” (primordiales causae) of Augustine, 
Eriugena, and the Clavis physicae <B>, “unparticipated” (amethecta) terms 
<D>, and comprising goodness, infinity,159 being, life <BC>, intellectuality, 
animality, and naturality <C>; Level 3 – Numerous unities in participants <A>, 
terms having substances in themselves, being [a primary group of]160 effects of 
the primordial causes <B>, participated terms <A>, and comprising infinities,161 
beings, lives <B>, intellectualities, animalities, and naturalities <BD>; Level 4 – 
Divine and intellectual souls <BD>, terms having substances in other things, 
being [a secondary group of] effects of primordial causes <B>, and participat-
ing terms <B>. As a result of the idealistic turn of his thought prompted by his 
studies of Augustine, Eriugena and the Clavis physicae,162 Berthold manages 
to effect a rather successful reconciliation between Proclus and Dionysius by 
aligning the former’s elaborate stratification of real principles with (partially 
mind-dependent) modalities of the single participatory relation associated 
with each of the Dionysian divine names.
In his Theologia platonica, Proclus had arranged his gods less as the highest 
of a number of superimposed series of metaphysical principles than as the 
unitary initial moments of triadic structures discerned between and within 
the primary hypostases of being, life, and intellect. The second book of Proclus’ 
work also includes an explanation of how this theological doctrine had been 
elaborated in the second part of his commentary on the Parmenides: a useful 
feature for medieval readers in that the relevant material was missing from the 
manuscript used by Moerbeke for his Latin version and has still not been recov-
ered. In addition, the gods of Proclus’ Theologia platonica were less the abstract 
causes of hierarchies of metaphysical principles than the concrete allegorical 
personifications of such causes in the imagery of Orphic and “Chaldaean” reli-
gious cult. In turning from Berthold to Nicholas and Ficino, we find the two 
later thinkers grappling in ways that are both similar and divergent with the 
159 “Infinity” and the other terms are here naturally singular.
160 We here distinguish a primary and secondary group by name, since both the structur-
ing of his system and Proclus’ original doctrine clearly requires it. In fact, Berthold’s own 
explanation was not written with the utmost clarity at this point, for he on occasion con-
flates levels 3+4 <AB>, whereas at other times he separates them <CD>.
161 “Infinities” and the other terms are here naturally plural.
162 On the important aspect of Berthold’s use of Eriugena and the Clavis physicae for the for-
mation of his general viewpoint see E. Ludueña, La recepción de Eriúgena en Bertoldo de 
Moosburg. Un aporte sobre la Escuela de Colonia (Saarbrücken: Publicia, 2013) and E. King, 
Supersapientia. A Study of the Expositio super Elementationem Theologicam Procli of 
Berthold von Moosburg, PhD diss. (University of Cambridge, 2016).
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more intractable polytheism of Proclus’ most substantial and definitive treat-
ment of Greek theology.
6.5.1.2 Nicholas of Cusa
We will never know exactly what Nicholas of Cusa thought of Berthold of 
Moosburg’s ingenious explanation of Proclus’ gods – other than the fact 
that he included the commentary of “John of Mossbach” in his list of forbid-
den books.163 However, the Cardinal reports in considerable detail his criti-
cal encounter with this more overtly cultic version of polytheism in Proclus’ 
Theologia platonica in numerous passages of his De beryllo,164 De principio,165 
De non-aliud,166 and De venatione sapientiae167 in most of which he sets out 
from a discussion of the metaphysical doctrine of the One and the One-Being 
in Plato’s Parmenides as explained by Proclus. The sermon-treatise De 
principio168 displays with particular clarity Nicholas’ twofold strategy of main-
taining the theological reading of the dialogue while driving a wedge between 
the acceptable negative and affirmative theology of Proclus and his unaccept-
able polytheism.169
Nicholas begins here by stating the positive aspects of Proclus’ doctrine. 
This is correct in distinguishing as two modes of being: the One that is the 
absolute and un-participated cause of the multiplicity of things and the 
One-Being that is the contracted and participated cause of the multiplicity 
and the being of things.170 The phraseology here aligns the Platonist’s distinc-
tion with his own standard dichotomy of absolute and contracted Maximum.171 
However, Nicholas immediately follows this statement with a negative remark. 
Proclus is incorrect in arguing that the One-Being is participated in a primary 
way by “other gods” (alii dei),172 and is a “multiplicity co-eternal” (plura […] 
163 There is a deep affinity between Berthold and Nicholas in that both thinkers similarly 
developed an idealistic standpoint on the basis of reading Eriugena and the Clavis 
physicae. See above.
164 Nicholas of Cusa, De beryllo, h xi/1, §12, l. 11–§13, l. 12.
165 Nicholas of Cusa, De principio, h x/2b, p. 8, l. 11–18 and p. 39, l. 1–33.
166 Nicholas of Cusa, De non-aliud, h xiii, c. 20–22, p. 47, l. 29–p. 53, l. 30
167 Nicholas of Cusa, De venatione sapientiae, h xii, c. 21–22, §59, l. 1–§64, l. 20.
168 Here, Nicholas treats Plato and Proclus in tandem, his assumption being that the latter’s 
commentary approximates to the original teaching of the former.
169 We know from other statements in Nicholas’ writings that he approves the theological 
reading of the Parmenides as long as that is maintained on Dionysius’ terms.
170 Nicholas of Cusa, De principio, h x/2b, p. 39, l. 1–34.
171 As stated in De docta ignorantia and elsewhere.
172 Nicholas of Cusa, De principio, h x/2b, p. 40, l. 1–12.
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coaeterna) with the One.173 The critique is now amplified in two stages. In the 
first stage, he states the theological doctrine elaborated by Proclus after the first 
two hypotheses of the Parmenides and summarised in his Theologia Platonis as 
follows: a. there is a distinction between the One and the One-Being; b. there 
is a division of the One-Being – or the participated being or the contracted 
being – into three modes of being called being, life, and intellect; a further 
division of life – the second mode of being – into a simple unity, the unitary 
life, and the multitude of lives; and a further division of intellect – the third 
mode of being – into a simple unity, the unitary intellect, and the multitude of 
intellects;174 c. the One is identified with the First God who exercises a univer-
sal providence; d. the multiple divisions of the One-Being are identified with 
secondary gods who exercise partial providence, these secondary gods – who 
participate in the First God in a primal manner – including a division into 
intellectual gods, celestial gods, and cosmic gods; e. the First God is identified 
with Jupiter and one of the secondary gods who preside over mechanical arts 
with Vulcan.175 In the second stage, Nicholas attacks the obvious polytheism 
of this doctrine by turning the arguments of Parmenides and Zeno in the first 
part of the Parmenides against the doctrine of a multiplicity of self-subsistent 
principles such as Forms co-eternal with the One extracted by Proclus from the 
second part of the dialogue.176
6.5.1.3 Marsilio Ficino
Ficino’s main contribution to this debate can be found in two texts: a short 
argumentum (“analytical study”) forming the preface to his translation of 
the Parmenides in his Platonis Opera omnia volume of 1484177 and a lengthy 
173 Nicholas of Cusa, De principio, h x/2b, p. 25, l. 1–18. At De venatione sapientiae, h xii, 
c. 21, §62, l. 1–12, he notes that Proclus is incorrect in treating the One-Being as a divine 
species participating in the One.
174 Nicholas of Cusa, De principio, h x/2b, p. 39, l. 1–34.
175 Nicholas of Cusa, De principio, h x/2b, p. 40, l. 1–14. There is perhaps a briefer reference to 
the doctrine of Proclus’ Theologia Platonis concerning God and the opposition of motion 
and rest at De possest, h xi/2, p. 21, l. 1–13.
176 Nicholas of Cusa, De principio, h x/2b, p. 25, l. 1–p. 30, l. 22.
177 Marsilio Ficino, Argumentum in Parmenidem, Opera omnia, p. 1136–1137. The short argu-
mentum explains that the aim of the dialogue is to study how the One is above all things 
and how all things are derived from it. In order to accomplish this, it ascends through 
levels of unity starting from the sensible sphere, passing through that of intelligibles and 
Ideas, and culminating in the reason-principle of the Ideas. Ficino lists the quaestiones 
concerning the Ideas in the first part of the dialogue and notes the arrangement of the 
hypotheses in the second part. By adopting all these typically Proclean positions, it is 
clear that Ficino was familiar with the later Neoplatonic exegesis of the dialogue by 1484 
at the latest.
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commentary published in the collected edition of his Plato commentaries in 
1496. It is in the latter that his critical encounter with the more overtly cultic 
version of polytheism in Proclus’ Theologia platonica is worked out in detail. 
As in the case of Nicholas of Cusa, there is a twofold strategy of maintaining 
the theological reading of the dialogue while driving a wedge between the 
acceptable negative and affirmative theology of Proclus and his unaccept-
able polytheism. In so doing, he at the same time adopts a relatively polite 
yet firm critical stance against an interpretation of the same dialogue recently 
publicised by his former student and “fellow Platonist” Giovanni Pico della 
Mirandola.
We need to consider three extracts from the Parmenides Commentary. In 
the first passage, Ficino summarises the view of Syrianus and Proclus regard-
ing the threefold ordering of the super-mundane gods into the intelligible, the 
intelligible-and-intellectual, and the intellectual gods; and of the mundane 
gods into the souls of the greater spheres, the souls of the stars, and the invis-
ible divinities within the spheres. This is described as part of the Platonists’ 
attempt to demonstrate that Parmenides “introduces precisely as many orders 
of gods as he posits propositions in the first and second hypotheses” (“toti-
dem ad unguem deorum ordines introducere quot propositiones in prima 
secundaque suppositione ponit”).178 A second passage adopts a critical stance 
with respect to this obvious polytheism by warning against the method of “cal-
culating the number of individual gods in accordance with that of individual 
phrases” (“cum clausulis singulis deos singulos computare”).179 In the third 
passage, Ficino concludes that Parmenides conducts the entire disputation in 
the second half of the dialogue not as the dogmatic unfolding of a complete 
metaphysical system but as a logical exercise designed to test the hearers’ intel-
ligence. He argues that “underneath this dialectical form Parmenides also fre-
quently blends in mystical teachings” (“sub hac vero dialectica forma mystica 
quoque dogmata frequenter admiscet”) not everywhere and continuously in 
his discourse but scattered at whatever points the logical exercise might per-
mit.180 Thus, Ficino pursues the same strategy as did Nicholas in undermining 
the polytheism of Proclus’ text, although he does so in this case not by setting 
the first part of the Parmenides against the second but by distinguishing the 
latter’s surface and deeper meanings.
178 Marsilio Ficino, Commentum in Parmenidem, part ii, c. 94, §2–3, p. 238–240.
179 Marsilio Ficino, Commentum in Parmenidem, part ii, c. 94, §3–4, p. 240–242.
180 Marsilio Ficino, Commentum in Parmenidem, part ii, c. 90, §2, p. 220–222.
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6.5.2 Declining Interest in Proclus’ Axiomatics and Increasing Interest 
in his Doxography
6.5.2.1 Berthold of Moosburg
Berthold of Moosburg had understood, and rightly so, that the most impor-
tant feature of the Elementatio was its axiomatics.181 At the beginning of 
his Expositio tituli, he explains that Proclus was one of the most eminent of 
Plato’s disciples – something reflected in the etymology of his name: “famed 
far and wide” (procul cluens)182 – and then makes two fundamental exegeti-
cal moves.183 Berthold’s first exegetical move is to combine two doxographi-
cal passages in Augustine’s Contra Academicos:184 a passage referring to the 
Platonists’ deliberate concealment of their doctrine examined earlier;185 and 
a passage identifying Plotinus as the thinker who dispersed the clouds of error 
surrounding Plato’s work.186 With respect to the latter passage, Berthold alters 
the gist of the Augustinian original on the one hand, by associating Proclus 
very closely with Plotinus in relation to the definitive disclosure of Platonic 
truth, since he notes that “the countenance of Plato blazed forth especially 
in him” – i.e. Proclus – “just as it had done also in Plotinus” (“emicare max-
ime in eo sicut et in Plotino os illud Platonis”). On the other hand, he shifts 
the sense of Augustine’s statement by interpreting the definitive disclosure 
as the discovery of literal truth concealed behind allegory, for he glosses the 
“clouds of error” [nubes = non-technical term] as “the coverings with which 
the first Platonists and especially the Academics had enwrapped their wisdom” 
(“integumenta […] quibus Platonici primi et maxime Academici suam sapien-
tiam obvolvebant”) [integumenta = technical term for allegory]. Berthold’s sec-
ond exegetical move is to interpret the doctrine of Plato, now identified with 
that of Proclus, as an axiomatic system.187 He writes that Proclus “arranged 
the theorems of Plato himself in the present book and most subtly elucidated 
them once arranged” (“ipsius Platonis theoremata ordinavit in praesenti libro 
et ordinata subtilissime declaravit”). The evidence for this is provided by an 
181 On Berthold’s axiomatics see S. Gersh, “Berthold von Moosburg on the Content and 
Method of Platonic Philosophy”, in J. Aertsen, K. Emery, A. Speer (eds), Nach der 
Verurteilung von 1277. Philosophie und Theologie an der Universität von Paris im letz-
ten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts. Studien und Texte (Berlin / New York: De Gruyter, 2001), 
p. 493–503.
182 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. A, p. 37, l. 10–13. The etymology is derived from 
Papias.
183 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. A, p. 37, l. 14–29.
184 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. A, p. 37, l. 14–24.
185 Augustine, Contra Academicos, lib. iii, c. 20, §43.
186 Augustine, Contra Academicos, lib. iii, c. 18, §41.
187 Berthold of Moosburg, Expositio, Expos. tit. A, p. 37, l. 25–29.
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intertextual citation of Eustratius’ Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics. 
Berthold notes that “Plato handed down theorems regarding the primal Good 
that should be thought not as insignificant but as important and leading souls 
towards the greatest heights” (“Plato de primo bono tradidit non contempti-
bilia theoremata, sed magna et in excelsum maximum animas referentia”).188
The axiomatic aspect of Proclus’ theology has in reality a certain ambivalent 
status, on the one hand having discursive thinking as its defining character-
istic, but on the other being a vector towards its own transcendence in the 
non-discursive or mystical sphere. That Berthold understood this well enough 
is shown by his intertextual explanation of the propositional method in the 
Elementatio in terms of the ladder linking the theta and pi on Philosophia’s 
robe in Boethius’ Consolatio.189 However, the ambiguity of Proclus’ method-
ology was perhaps too much for the next generations of medieval Platonists 
who, if they were familiar with Berthold’s Expositio at all, decided to assimilate 
the Greek philosopher in a different way. In fact, the subsequent course of the 
latter’s influence can be charted by studying the double or inverse conceptual 
trajectory mentioned earlier: namely, a reduction of interest in Proclus’ axiom-
atic system – taken at its face-value – complemented by an increase of interest 
in his doxographical content.
6.5.2.2 Nicholas of Cusa
Many of the extant philosophical and theological books in Nicholas of Cusa’s 
library have abundant glosses in the master’s hand. This is particularly true 
with respect to his copies of the Moerbeke translations of Proclus although, 
while the annotations on the Theologia platonica are fairly extensive, those on 
the Elementatio theologica are brief and perfunctory.190 Of course, it may be 
that the Cardinal’s earlier study of the latter was illustrated in manuscripts of 
his that are no longer extant. However, it is more likely that these insignificant 
notes reveal how much his thought had moved away from a form of Platonism 
that compromised so readily with the axiomatic taste of the schoolmen.191 In 
188 Eustratius, In Ethicam nicomacheam Commentarius, ed. G. Heylbut (Berlin: Reimer, 1892), 
lib. i, c. 4, p. 39, l. 32–34. Of course, Berthold read this work in the Latin translation: In 
Ethicam nicomacheam Commentarius, translatio Roberti Grosseteste, ed. H.P.F. Mercken, 
The Greek Commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle in the Latin Translation 
of Robert Grosseteste, Bishop of Lincoln. Volume 1. Eustratius on Book I and the Anonymous 
Scholia on Books II, III, and IV (Leiden: Brill, 1973).
189 See above.
190 See Senger, Cusanus-Texte III.
191 This propensity is indicated by the enormous influence among the Schoolmen of another 
very axiomatic work: the Arabic-Latin De causis. It is perhaps no accident that Nicholas of 
Cusa also makes very little use of this text.
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Nicholas’ case, the axiomatic approach can be seen as replaced by his doc-
trine of “conjectures”. He explains this notion in the first book of De coniecturis192 
where he contrasts on the one hand, “unity of truth” (veritatis unitas) and on 
the other hand, “conjectural otherness” (alteritas coniecturalis). He notes that, 
since precision of truth is unattainable by human beings because of the lack 
of proportion between truth and the intellect, any “positive assertion” (pos-
itiva assertio) about truth must be conjectural.193 In Nicholas’ case also, the 
axiomatic approach can be seen as replaced by his doctrine of “coincidence 
of opposites”. Having devoted a major work to this notion in the specific form 
of “learned ignorance” (docta ignorantia), he found himself having to defend 
it against the attacks of the neo-scholastic Johannes Wenck. He replies by 
arguing that the law of contradiction is something established by prolonged 
acceptance among the currently dominant Aristotelian faction rather than a 
universal law.194 But then, a student of Proclus’ axiomatics would realise that 
acceptance of the law of contradiction was indispensable for such a project.
6.5.2.3 Marsilio Ficino
For Berthold, the axiomatics is equivalent to the mystery concealed in the 
Platonic tradition and revealed by Proclus in the Elementatio theologica, 
whereas for Ficino, the axiomatics would be equivalent to what conceals the 
mystery.195 But the Florentine’s position on this question is somewhat hypo-
thetical, since he never addresses this question directly, being interested less 
in Proclus the logician than in Proclus the doxographer.196 This change of 
focus with respect to the earlier tradition runs parallel with a shift in inter-
est from Proclus’ Elementatio theologica to his Plato commentaries and espe-
cially to those on the Timaeus and Republic now available in Greek.197 Two 
192 J. Koch, Die Ars coniecturalis des Nikolaus von Kues (Köln: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1956), 
discusses the nature of this doctrine and suggests various possible historical sources.
193 Nicholas of Cusa, De coniecturis, h iii, prol., p. 2, l. 1–12. Cf. De docta ignorantia, h i, lib. i, 
c. 1, p. 5, l. 1–p. 6, l. 24.
194 Nicholas of Cusa, Apologia doctae ignorantiae, h ii, p. 6, l. 3–12. We cannot go into detail 
here concerning the many ways in which Nicholas “recommends” – obviously he cannot 
“prove” – the coincidence of opposites.
195 As does similarly the demonstration by the chief protagonist in Plato’s Parmenides. See 
above.
196 On the possible traces of a commentary on the Elementatio theologica by Ficino, see 
above.
197 On this material see P. Megna, “Marsilio Ficino e il Commento al Timeo di Proclo”, in Studi 
medievali e umanistici 1(2003), p. 93–135; and P. Megna, “Per Ficino e Proclo”, in F. Bausi, 
V. Fera (eds), Laurentia Laurus. Per Mario Martelli (Messina: Centro interdipartimentale 
di studi umanistici, 2004), p. 313–362.
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examples of Ficino’s doxographical use of Proclus may perhaps suffice here. 
In the Compendium in Timaeum, Ficino considers the possible doubts of a 
reader as to whether Plato really thought the world to be everlasting, and then 
replies explicitly on the authority of Proclus198 that some commentators such 
as Severus, Atticus, and Plutarch did not consider the world to be everlasting, 
whereas others such as Crantor, Plotinus, Porphyry, Iamblichus, and Proclus 
understood it to be perpetually flowing forth from God.199 In the Argumentum 
in Critiam, Ficino discusses the causes of human intelligence and reports once 
again according to Proclus200 that, whereas Panaetius believes this to be the 
moderate warmth of the air, Longinus rather the blended quality of the region, 
and Origen rather the celestial aspects and emanations, Porphyry and Proclus 
himself seek the causality higher up in the world-soul and in the demiurgic 
intellect.201 Passages such as these in which Ficino explicitly cites the source 
of his doxography can be supplemented by many others clearly identifiable as 
borrowed from Proclus through the presence of absolutely identical clusters of 
the more ancient authorities in both writers’ texts.
7 Plotinus and the Greek Neoplatonists
Marsilio Ficino’s translations of the complete works of Plato and Plotinus, to 
which he added a range of shorter and longer commentaries, obviously marks 
a decisive turning-point in the history of philosophy. During the western medi-
eval period when Plato’s works were largely unavailable, Proclus had gradu-
ally risen to prominence as the definitive source of ancient Platonism. But 
from 1484 onwards when the Latin translation of Plato’s writings appeared, it 
is Plotinus who largely replaces Proclus, thereby recapturing the preeminent 
position within the Platonic tradition assigned to him by Augustine.202
Various of his letters and prefaces indicate that Ficino began the work of 
translating Plotinus in 1463 on the basis of the ms supplied by Cosimo de’ 
Medici (Firenze, Bibl. Med. Laur., Plut. 87. 3) and another one (Paris, BnF, 
198 “as Proclus recounts” (ut Proclus narrat).
199 Marsilio Ficino, Compendium in Timaeum, Opera omnia, c. 13, p. 1443. The reference is to 
Proclus, In Timaeum Commentaria, ed. E. Diehl, 3 vols (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903–1906), vol. 1, 
lib. i, p. 277, l. 8–16.
200 “Proclus says that …” (Proclus ait …).
201 Marsilio Ficino, Argumentum in Critiam, Opera omnia, p. 1486–1487. The reference is to 
Proclus, In Timaeum, lib. i, p. 162, l. 11–30.
202 For an introduction to the Plotinus commentary see S. Gersh, “Analytical Study”, in 
S. Gersh (ed.), Marsilio Ficino: Commentary on Plotinus, Ennead I.
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gr. 1816) copied from it, both these extant mss containing annotations in his 
hand.203 The commentaries prefixed to the translation reached their final form 
by 1490. It was in the spring of that year that the entire work was presented in 
a luxurious manuscript to its dedicatee, Lorenzo de’ Medici, this manuscript 
being now catalogued as MS Bibl. Med. Laur., Plut. 82. 10. and 82. 11. The printed 
edition appeared from the press of Antonio Miscomini in May 1492. This chro-
nology shows that Ficino spent roughly thirty years working on Plotinus, while 
the content of his other writings shows that he had thoroughly mastered 
Plotinian thought by the early 1470s.204 Among the latter are the commentary 
on the Symposium (= De amore), the first redaction of the commentary on 
the Philebus, and especially the Platonic Theology (eighteen books). Given the 
assumption that Plotinus was the philosopher who had resolved the enigmas 
in Plato’s dialogues,205 it is fair to conclude that for Ficino the philosophies 
of Plato and Plotinus were only distinct from one another on the rhetorical 
surface.
It is possible to reconstruct the process of composing the Commentary on 
the Enneads in some detail.206 We know that Ficino worked in the order of 
the Porphyrian edition and had completed the commentary up to the first 
two treatises of the Third Ennead by 1487 after which a two-year gap inter-
vened in which he worked instead on translations of various works by other 
Neoplatonists such as Porphyry, Iamblichus, Proclus, and Synesius. He then 
returned to Plotinus but soon after decided to write only shorter commentar-
ies in order to prevent the whole project from becoming out of hand.207
Ficino’s work on these other Neoplatonists made a significant contribution 
to the development of his own personal philosophy and to the dissemination 
of late ancient philosophy in general. In addition to his introduction of cer-
tain writings by Proclus that had not been known in western Europe during 
the Middle Ages,208 his translations of Porphyry’s De abstinentia and De occa-
sionibus (= the Aphormai pros ta noēta), of Iamblichus’ De mysteriis, and of 
Synesius’ De insomniis helped to propagate a radically new interpretation of 
203 On these mss see C. Förstel, “Marsilio Ficino e il Parigino Greco di Plotino”, in S. Gentile, 
S. Toussaint (eds), Marsilio Ficino, fonti, testi, fortuna. Atti del convegno internazionale, 
Firenze 1–3 ottobre 1999 (Roma: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2006), p. 65–88.
204 This judgment is based on the dates of composition – which are mostly known – rather 
than those of publication.
205 See above.
206 The narrative was constructed on the basis of references in Ficino’s letters by P.O. Kristeller, 
Supplementum Ficinianum, 2 vols (Firenze: Olschki, 1937), vol. 1, p. cxxvi–cxxviii.
207 See Marsilio Ficino, In Enneadem iv.3, §33.
208 See above.
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Platonism in western Europe. Combining as he did the talents of philosopher, 
philologist, physician, and priest, Ficino not only further extended the gen-
eral understanding of Neoplatonic theology and metaphysics but also brought 
into focus Plotinus’ doctrines of contemplative nature and cosmic sympathy. 
In particular, he drew upon the theurgic tradition so prominently displayed 
in the post-Plotinian writings that he translated in order to develop a theory 
of natural magic which, especially in combination with the cabalistic magic 
of Giovanni Pico, established a tradition of “occult philosophy” extending 
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